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Abstract
This ethnography is writing about the popular resistance of villagers in post­
reform China. It focuses on the political discourse of villagers who imagine, create 
and transmit it in everyday life. When they cany out resistance to the state, they 
speak about how they view their government, what the ideal govemment-villager 
relationship is, what the principle of justice and equity is, as well as what their 
relations with their family, kin and village are, and how they view the good life.
In their everyday practice, the evidence shows that there is an elaborate and 
pervasive principle of social contract or reciprocity, which underlies everyday social 
relationships. This principle is not only applied to person to person (e.g. villager and 
villager, villagers and cadres), it is also extended to the relationship between state and 
villagers. But the findings also tell that this principle is not an external norm/rule or 
institution/system which is static and unchangeable. It is transformed and reproduced 
by the villagers in eveiyday practices. The villagers strategically defined the meaning 
of zeren in terms of social contract for their own interest. When the state or the cadres 
violate their principle of zeren, villagers cany out resistance.
In Ku Village, villagers’ resistance is always in eveiyday form in order to 
avoid open confrontation and direct challenge to the state, because such open and 
organized activities are still dangerous and will probably be met with aimed force and 
bloodshed in socialist China. In their resistance, they are capable of formulating the 
rationale for their action discursively via defining and redefining the zeren of the 
government and their relationship with the state. They draw upon the memory and a 
rich variety of information from different sources for constructing their models of 
“good government” and “good cadre”, with which they judge the government and 
local cadres, and then justify their resistance to the state policies.
In post-reform China, collecting taxes, imposing fees and enforcing birth 
control have become the main arenas of conflict between state and villagers. The 
village cadres are always situated in a dilemma, which formulates an important 
characteristic of Chinese local politics. On the one hand, they have to implement the 
state policy; 011 the other hand, they do not want to hurt the personal relationship with 
the villagers because they are also bound by the principle of social reciprocity. So
normally, they collude with the villagers and keep “one eye opened and one eye 
closed”. At the specific historical moment, however, some village cadres collude with 
the state and do things against the interest of the villagers.
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1Chapter 1: Culture Domination and Popular Resistance — 
Rethinking Peasant Politics in Contemporary China
The train was running on the way to Mei County. I  could not fa ll asleep
because I  had to get off at Meizhou station at 5 a.m. in the early morning. I  was 
afraid that I  woidd miss the station. I  impatiently looked at my watch several times. I  
knew the train would arrive at Meixian soon. At 4:50 a.m., the train loudspeakers 
warned the passengers to prepare for getting off at Meizhou station. The train was 
slowing down soon after. It arrived at the station. I  followed the flow o f crowd and 
went out to the station. The waiting room was full o f people and was shrouded in 
strong smoke. Coming out from the waiting room, I  found even more people outside 
the station. Many women there carried the luggage for the passengers; many taxi 
drivers were waiting for business; many children peddled loudly. The railway from  
Meizhou to Shenzhen and Shantou was just completed in June o f 1996J It was seen 
as a great result o f gaige kaifang (reform and opening door) under Deng's era. 
Railway construction was always treated by the people as one o f the important 
indicators o f modernization, and one o f the important factors to industrialization. As 
the local newspaper I  read stated, the new railway will promote the economic 
development o f Mei county and its future will be glorious and magnificent.
Brother Ming discovered me among the crowd. He, who is about 43 years old, 
is my uncle's oldest son. Brother Ming is one of my important informants. He grew 
up in Ku Village - the village where I  stayed, and joined Renmin Jiefangjun (People's 
Liberation Army) when he was 18. After release from the military service, he was 
assigned by the government to work at the Commission for Inspecting Discipline (jilu 
jiancha weiyuanhui). Xiahai (doing business) has become the popular phenomena in 
China. Most departments o f the local government in China now set up their 
companies and enterprises, and their staffs do the business for the companies. Like 
Brother Ming, they have double identities — state cadres and businessmen. Brother 
Ming sent me to Ku Village by using his danwei’s (work unit) foreign imported car. 
At the time o f setting out to my fieldwork, I  still was quite uncertain what would
1 . Shantou and Shenzhen have been two Special Economic Zone of China since die late 1970s.
2happen in the field. I  had many questions in my mind, but I  did not know whether my 
questions would make sense to the villagers in their life. To me, everything seemed to 
be important, eveiything seemed to be irrelevant.
In the afternoon, our car passed through Songkou Bridge (see Picture 1.1). I  
Jmew I  had arrived at the Songnan town which was the township o f Ku Village. My 
father told me many stories about this bridge when I  was very young. Brother Ming 
told me that we would soon get to Ku Village.
Running into the main street o f Songnan town, our car was forced to slow 
down as too many people were walking in street without watching out for cars. The 
car horn was useless here. Slowing down the car gave me an opportunity to look 
around the street through the window o f the car. Songnan town was totally different 
from the one in my memories o f childhood: Many new buildings, many motorbikes, 
many new shops opened. Fashion dress shops, Karaoke bars, electrical equipment 
shops, furniture shops, restaurants, and popular music shops signified that Songkou 
has become "modernized” in some sense, at least in the Chinese government's sense.
It was a xuri (periodic market day). Villagers from different villages came to 
the free market for buying their daily necessities or selling goods they produced 
according to the practices o f hundreds years ago. Free market activities were 
prohibited in Mao's period because they symbolized capitalism. But the rural reform 
in the late 1970s have brought Chinese peasants back to the market, no matter 
whether under the banner o f socialism or capitalism. The abandonment o f the 
communes, and the recurrence offamily farming and free markets, has freed Chinese 
peasants from the constraints o f collective agriculture. They diversify their 
production away from the singular emphasis on grain production and exchange their 
products and surplus in the re-opened markets.
We passed the market where there was plenty o f "heat and noise" (renao). It 
was packed with people, filled with different voices, and dashingly colorful (see 
Picture 1.2). I  got out o f the car and walked in the market, took out my camera and 
took photo as other anthropologists have done. Vegetables, fruit, pork, chicken, 
seafood, and many other goods were sold in the market. Some stalls were 
permanent, and some were temporar)> (see Picture 1.3 and 1.4). People bargained 
the price with their best effort. I  looked up and found there were several yellow
3boards hung under the roof o f the market, on which were written the propaganda 
slogans o f the government, e.g. "It is honour to pay tax and fees, shameful to evade 
tax and fees” ( jiaona shuifei guangrong, toulou shuifei kechi).
Suddenly, I  heard some big noises from the other side. It attracted the 
attention o f the people in the fair. I  thought it was a quarrel, which happens often in 
the street and market in China. More and more people went to investigate what was 
happening. A pregnant woman with arms aldmbo was swearing at a man in the 
market area. "I won't pay the fee!" she angrily screeched, "you plainly bully me!" 
"Who bullies you! It is the regulation," the man said. The woman screeched 
continuously, "Okay, show me the document o f policy. Which regulation allows you to 
collect this fee?" The man replied, "Who are you? You have no right to read the 
document. " The woman was very angry and challenged the man again, "I sell my 
vegetable every xuri. Why you didn't collect the fee before?" The man calmly 
answered, "It is the new policy o f our government. Do you dare to resist the policy?" 
The woman insisted to refuse the payment, "Okay, ask your supervisor to come here. 
I'U ask him i f  I  have to pay so much fee!" The man said, "Don't be so fierce, if  you 
don't pay the fee, you can't sell your vegetable here no matter who collects the fee. I  
just handle the matter impartially (binggong banli)."
More and more people gathered here, many pairs o f eyes followed their 
movement. No one spoke. The pregnant woman continued to shout: i Don't cheat me. 
I  don't believe you! Ask your supervisor to talk with me. Eveiyone knows what you 
are. Shameless!" Then she turned to the surrounding people. She began to explain 
what happened and asked them to have it out. The surrounding people began to 
judge the right and wrong between two sides. The man quickly left the crowd.
According to the people around, the woman came from one o f the villages 
near Songkou town. Her husband was a disabled retired army-man. Now the local 
government faced financial problems and no more took care o f the disabled and 
retired army-man. For her family's livelihood, she had to set up a temporary fruit 
stall in Songkou town and sold the fruit she produced at xuri. She had set up the stall 
for a long time. But today a man o f the Industry and Commerce Bureau (ICB, Gong 
Shang Ju) suddenly collected the tax from her. He asked her to pay two yuan per day. 
She felt it was unreasonable (bujieli) to pay that amount because she could not even 
earn two yuan in a day.
4After a while, the man came with a older man who was the supervisor o f ICB. 
He told that she had to pay the fee in accordance with regulations. But because her 
husband was a disabled retired army-man, she was allowed to pay two jiao per day in 
the name o f giving appropriate preferential treatment (zhaogu). In the end she paid 
the stall fees as she said two jiao was reasonable (heli) and fair enough.
The crowd, which had gathered to watch the fun, dispersed. I  also got in my 
car and went to Ku Village. Brother Ming, told me yesterday was a rainy day; he 
worried about the road from Songnan town to Ku Village because the road became 
muddy and rugged after rain. We went from the wide township cement road to the 
narrow mud village path. Our car bumped seriously. The path was indeed muddy 
and rugged. Several times our car almost got stuck in the mud. Brother Ming was 
filled with anger at the muddy road and cursed the local government and the village 
cadres. He questioned about the responsibility and obligation (zeren) o f the local 
government. He said: "Every year they collect the money from the households for  
paving the way. But year after year the way remains the same." I  did not pay too 
much attention to his grumbling. I  thought it was quite normal when people faced 
that situation. Our car was very dirty when we got to Ku Village.
I  settled down at my uncle's house. I  called my uncle "Uncle Si" because he is 
the fourth child o f the family. He was about 70. As he said, he had experienced 
dynasty (chaodai) o f the Guomindang (National Party) and the Gongchandang 
(Communist Party). During dinner, when chatting with my uncle about what 
happened in the afternoon in the town market, he smiled and said: "Hok-Bin, today's 
Gongchandang is different from before. They tiy their best to make money without 
concerning about the sheng si (life and death) o f people . They create this policy 
today, tomorrow they create another policy. Gongchandang is good at naming. 
There are so many tu zhengce (local policies) in China." He also told me that "two 
yuan" was set by the low-level staff without the permission o f the government. The 
local staff often arbitrarily decided the amount o f the fee and then put the money in 
their pocket. During dinner, I  also mentioned about the poor village road. Uncle Si 
cursed the local government as did Brother Ming. He said: "It is the government's 
zeren (responsibility and obligation) to construct the road for the people. But they 
always complain about the shortage o f finances. Okay, now we provide the financial
5expenditure. But in the end, although we give the money eveiy year, the way is worse 
than before. I  don't Imow how they (local cadres) use the money..."
*  *  *  *
Language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a 
concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the 
“taste” of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a 
particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each 
word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially 
charged life ( M. M. Bakhtin, 1981:292).
Eveiyday language has been an important area of sociological or 
anthropological inquiry because it is recognized as the important vehicles or media, 
which operate as symbols, to carry meanings and represent meanings the people wish 
to represent. To use another metaphor, as Stuart Hall says, language functions as 
signs which represent our concepts, ideas and feelings (Hall, 1997: 5). It is a 
signifying practice we participate within daily life, consciously and unconsciously. 
The propaganda slogans written on the yellow boards hung under the roof of Songkou 
market is a sort of language with which the government ideologically shaped the 
reality of citizenship the people inhabit. The grumbling of my relatives is a kind of 
discourse the villagers use to refer and construct their knowledge of government or 
connotation of government. The dispute at the market is another way of negotiating 
power through everyday language, in which different parties read/ re-read, decode/ re­
decode, and interpret/ re-interpret the “policy”, “regulation” and “responsibility”. 
How to make sense of everyday language is always the most difficult work for an 
ethnographer as there are many voices, sometimes consistent, sometimes 
contradictory, and sometimes not understandable. Contextualizing eveiyday language 
seems to be a relatively reliable way of interpretation. To understand the slogans, 
disputes, grumblings, sensations and feelings, or other events and stories in my 
fieldwork, I think I have to locate these language and practice in the historical 
transformation of China in the reform era.
Dining the first decade of reform in China, one of the most important 
questions was whether the socialist government could earn credit and support from the 
Chinese via economic reform. In the first years, it seemed possible, especially in the
6countryside, because one of the most important and much publicized repercussions of 
the reform was the initial dramatic and then more gradual rise in economic 
opportunities, cash incomes and standards of living among peasant households. In the 
1980s, the number of newly rich and in particular “wan yuan hu” (ten thousand yuan 
peasant households) became the chief rationale and criterion for measuring the 
efficacy of reforms. Officially, the association of riches with reform permeated 
government reports, policy documents and speeches all constituted the overriding 
criterion of policy success. “Get rich quick”, “getting rich is glorious”, “riches for all” 
were slogans and popular rhetoric which encouraged widespread perception of 
economic prosperity and hopeM emulation of “ten thousand yuan” households.
By the decade of 1990s, there was a shift in both popular and official 
preoccupation with riches and prosperity to economic and social security or the 
maintenance of incomes. Although it was the socialist government’s imagination that 
the gaige kaifang would “let small parts of people get rich first” and then “riches for 
all”, it was also clear that not all regions and households had been in a position to take 
advantage, or were able to continue to take advantage of the new opportunities, or had 
benefited similarly from the reforms. The improved livelihood or new prosperity of 
Chinese, especially in countryside, was eroded by rising costs, inflation, additional 
imposed fee and taxes, and the government’s inability to purchase contracted grain or 
provide for necessary services. Under the new financial arrangement, the local 
government funds became independent. In the absence of central allocation, some 
local government funds were depleted and there was an increase in the numbers and 
amount of local taxes, fees levied and user-charges for service exacted on the villagers 
which not only affected the cultivation of land and agricultural production but also 
affected the ability of individual peasant households to support elderly and 
incapacitated family members and to meet the ever-rising costs of educating their 
children and of family health care. For the poor, the elderly and the ill, there were few 
guarantees of little more than a minimal safety net with allowances in cash or kind 
insufficient to support livelihood or even match those formerly provided by the 
collective. Encountering such insecurity and intensive extraction from the local 
government, Chinese peasants voiced unhappiness and took action to resist the
7unreasonable state policies.2 They questioned the responsibility and obligation (zeren) 
of the government in everyday discourse and challenged the legitimacy and authority 
of those irresponsible local government and local cadres in action.
The transformation or economic development of rural China during the first 
decade of reform have been well documented, but what has received less attention 
nationally and internationally has been the new sense of risk and new mood of 
insecurity increasingly experienced by many Chinese peasants in the post-reform era, 
especially those outside of the richer suburban and fertile regions. The aim of this 
study is to explore this hidden issue. It will focus on the peasants' new sense of risk 
and insecurity in the post-reform era, and how the peasants actively respond to the 
new risks and ongoing struggle to build a decent livelihood through manipulating 
their invented strategies and tactics. To conceptualize the whole project, this chapter 
aims to re-examine the conventional account of peasant and peasant society, and other 
related theoretical discussions of domination and resistance.
1.1. Peasants and Peasant Society in Question
Peasants do not write their own history nor is it written for them. It is 
written about and, often, without them. Their voice is barely ever 
heard at those places where decision are made about policies and 
profits. It is the interests and images of non-peasants which define 
the ways the 'Peasant Question' is being put and resolved in economic 
and political planning by state and agribusiness, impinging deeply on 
the peasants' existence in the modem world (Shanin, 1987: 381)
They were the voiceless ones, though they and their kind made four- 
fifth of all China's people. They were the ones ... abused by overlords 
and taxed by governments. They were the ones who were at the 
mercy of famine and flood (Buck in Huang, 1994:2).
Peasants are traditionally constructed and construed as powerless and 
voiceless (e.g. Marx, 1987; Gorky, 1987; Fanon, 1987). Whether the peasants are in 
China or elsewhere, the impression of peasants as passively receiving external 
ideologies, or at best as reacting to external initiatives, is widely distributed in
2 . It is often reported that there are an increasing number of violent clashes and rural unrest in the post 
reform era (e.g. Li & O'Brien, 1996; Zhong, 1997; Ming Bao Daily News, 1997; South China Morning 
Post, 1997; Apple Daily, 1997).
academic writings. As Shanin and Buck indicate, peasants are treated as ones without 
history. They are regarded as a passive and powerless social class incapable of 
enforcing their class interests in their own name, and unable to represent and speak for 
themselves. Moreover, they are powerless to organize themselves. So they are 
always at others' mercy (Shanin, 1987; Buck, 1949 in Huang 1994).
Classical Marxism would like to attribute peasants' powerlessness to economic 
factors. To Marx, the household-based mode of production constrains the small 
holding peasants to enter manifold relations with one another. In Marx's famous 
comment on the French peasantry, he states:
In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple 
addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a 
sack of potatoes... In so far as there is merely a local interconnection 
among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests 
begets no community, no national bond and no political organization 
among them, they do not form a class. They [peasants] are 
consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own 
name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They 
cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their 
representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an 
authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects 
them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from 
above. The political influence of the small holding peasants, therefore, 
finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society 
to itself (Marx, 1987:320).
Marx's "potatoes analogy" tells us two things. First, peasants cannot represent 
their own interests, indeed they have to be represented by others. To traditional 
Marxists, the working class or proletarians often suffer from false consciousness 
because ideology is shaped by those who control the means of intellectual production. 
More frequently, the working class or proletarians are seen as having accepted the 
ideas of the dominant class, ideas that represent the dominant position and thus distort 
actual working-class living experience. The political power of the dominant class 
depends on the material conditions that keep the subordinate class split up in isolated 
fragments, unable to formulate their own class interests. Second, the peasants, 
emblematic of the oppressed class under the feudal autocracy, constitute a majority of 
the population but are unable to mobilize as a unified group because of the limitation 
of their mode of production — small holding peasants economy, which isolates them 
from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. Thus they have no
more conscious unity than "potatoes in a sack." Marx expects industrial workers to 
form a victorious class because the growth of large factories is breaking down their 
isolation and brings them together. In this way the progress of capitalism is producing 
its 'own grave-diggers' (Marx & Engel in Collins edited, 1994).
A main problem in Marxist theoiy is that there is a split between "objective" 
conditions of oppression and "subjective" consciousness of this oppression, between 
ideology and behaviors, between economic and political spheres. Politics, ideology, 
and culture could only be understood as a reflection of the material "base" or relation 
of production or class relation. Resistance is viewed mainly as an organized struggle 
by subordinate groups informed by a coherent opposite ideology which can only be 
developed as a result of a certain level of class consciousness in terms of exploitation 
and oppression. So resistance in classical Marxist accounts is dominated by open 
confrontation in the form of organized large-scale rebellion and revolution. This is 
often criticized as economic determinism (Scott, 1989; Foucault, 1991; Giddens, 
1987; Collin, 1994).
The description of the powerlessness of the peasants for revolution and the 
prediction of victory for the working class is also due to the framework of Marxist 
historical materialism which basically is influenced by the modernist worldview.3 
With the modernization theoiy, they share similar problems to visualize development 
in term of a progressive and evolutionary change that society will automatically move 
from a simple, stagnant, unproductive and backward 'traditional society' towards a 
technologically and institutionally complex 'modem society'. In the developmentalist 
sense, there will be an increasing involvement in commodity market and a series of 
interventions involving the transfer of technology, knowledge, resources and 
organizational form from the more 'developed' societies to the 'less developed', 'under 
developed, 'third world' societies. In the economic sense, traditional economy, i.e. 
peasant economy, will be gradually transformed from small-scale and communal
3- The modernist view has strongly influenced all the academic disciplines for about two centuries, 
which was structurally consistent with empiricist epistemology, in which people assumed that human 
nature is a thinking substance and the human person is an autonomous rational subject. Moreover, 
people also pictured die physical world as a machine, the laws and regularity of which could be 
discerned by the human mind. Knowledge in modem mind was also assumed as certain, objective, and 
good. Under these basic assumptions, people optimistically believed that they were able to view the 
world as unconditioned observers. The good knowledge discovered by the rational and objective
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subsistence fanner economy to large scale and market-oriented economy. Rural 
people in historical development are often construed as the passive victims of 
capitalist market economy (Shanin and Alvi, 1982; Long, 1993; Schuunnan, 1993; 
Escobar, 1995; Kearney, 1996).
However, through much of the 1960s and 1970s, a somewhat romanticized 
vision of peasantry came out, which was very much a product of a post World War II 
era that had seen rural revolutionary movements, both successful and failed, 
throughout much of the Third World. As Michael Adas criticizes, this romanticized 
vision “overcorrected for an earlier consensus that peasants were passive, hopelessly 
divided by ‘amoral familialism,’ and resigned to oppression due to their acceptance of 
a ‘limited good’ view of the world” (Adas, 1992:127). It walked to another extreme 
to see the peasantry as a class prone to confrontational protest and highly susceptible 
to mobilization in the revolutionary movements (Adas, 1992). I think the passive and 
revolutionary extremes of conceptualizing peasant societies and response basically are 
two sides of one coin, which follow the same view of domination and revolution of 
conventional Marxism.
1.2. H egemony, Power and Cultural Dom ination
Gramsci is the one who rose challenge of the traditional Marxist view of 
power relationship. His concept of "hegemony" or "ideological hegemony" breaks 
through the traditional Marxist analysis of power which stresses the role of objective 
condition/ economic determinants and assumes that politics, ideology and culture can 
be understood as a reflection of the material base (Gramsci, 1991). To Gramsci, a 
material sense of domination is not enough to portray the power relation in modem 
industrial society. He was eager to provide the answer to one of the central questions 
of twentieth-century Marxism -  Why did the Western European working class not 
become revolutionary? Why did it not attack the roots of capitalist control? He 
believed that capitalist order remains stable because the great masses of the population 
accept it as necessary and spontaneously consent, which is imposed on social life by 
the dominant fundamental group (1971:12). In Gramsci's view, political dominance
scientific method could unlock the secrets of the universe and master nature, and create a better, 
modem, civil and enlightened world for "all" human society.
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not only rests on coercion, but the operation of power, and their success depends on 
consent from below. He uses the concept "hegemony" to understand how political 
society and civil society contribute to the production of meaning and value which in 
turn produce, direct and maintain the consent of the various strata of society to that 
status quo. These political society and civil society include the whole range of 
structure and activities like trade unions, education, churches, family and micro­
structure of the practices of everyday life (Bogg, 1976; Holub,1992).
For Gramsci, if the ruling elite/class seeks to perpetuate their power, wealth, 
and status, they have to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, attitudes, 
value, beliefs and render them unchallengeable. In the end, the dominant group's 
interests are accepted as universal. Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an 
"organizing principle" or worldview, that is diffused by agencies of ideological 
control and socialization into every sphere of daily life. As a result, the prevailing 
consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, and becomes paid of "common 
sense" or part of the natural order of things. Chantal Mouffe further interprets 
Gramsci’s thought that the achievement of hegemony was not only a simple process 
by which the dominant group imposed its own ideology 011 other groups; at the same 
time, the hegemonic ideology can make use of ideological elements from diverse 
sources, even from the ideology of those who are dominated (Mouffe, 1979:193).
In broad sense, similar to Gramsci, Foucault also argues that power is not 
imposed from above, but the operations of power and their success depend on consent 
from below. For both of them, power is produced and reproduced in the interstices of 
eveiyday life and permeate the individual’s understanding of the world. As Foucault 
asserted:
When I think of the mechanics of power, I think of its capillary form of 
existence, of the extent to which power seeps into the very grain of 
individuals, reaches right into their bodies, permeates their gestures, 
their postures, what they say, how they learn to live and work with 
other people (Foucault, 1980).
To Foucault, the main question to ask is "how power is exercised" and "by what 
means" rather than "what is power and where does it come from". In a conversation 
between Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, he clearly stated;
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Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly 
speaking, has an official right to power; and yet it is always exerted in 
a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the 
other. It is often difficult to say who holds power in a precise sense, 
but it is easy to see who lacks power (Foucault, 1977:213).
So, power is conceived by him no more as a property or a possession of a dominant 
class, state, or sovereign which can be accumulated, but as a strategy. That means 
when someone has power, it does not mean that others are without it. As de Certeau 
(1984) says, Foucault's power has no possessor, no privileged place, no superiors or 
inferiors, no repressive activity or dogmatism. So in Foucault's view, a zero-sum 
model of power is misplaced.
In Foucault's version, it is also not enough to use the concept "state" to analyze 
the power and domination in our society, because to him power is not conceived to be 
imposed from "the apex of social hierarchy", nor derived from a fundamental binary 
opposition between a ruling and ruled class or state and society, but it rather operates 
in a "capillary fashion" from below. He says:
To pose the problem in terms of the State means to continue posing it 
in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say in terms of law. If 
one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the State 
apparatus, this means grouping them as essentially repressive: the 
Army as power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, etc. I 
don't want to say that the State isn't important; what I want to say is 
that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of 
them necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State... because the 
State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able 
to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because 
the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power 
relations. The State is superstructure in relation to a whole series of 
power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, 
knowledge, technology and so forth (Foucault, 1980:122).
We do not say that the State is not important and that coercive domination does not 
exist (especially in the case of China), we just refuse to reduce power to only negative 
control of the will of others through prohibition, repression, and coercion. This also 
does not mean that repression and domination do not exist in our society, but that such 
a notion of power is inadequate for reaching an understanding of modem relations of 
power. As Foucault states:
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything 
but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it?
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What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the 
fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse (Foucault, 1980: 118-119).
So the major contribution of Foucault to our understanding of power is his assertion 
of the productive dimension of power or the relationship between knowledge and 
power. Power is productive in the sense that it constructs human subjects who act and 
think in a certain way willingly. In Foucault's whole project, his interest lies in the 
study of how human beings govern themselves and others through establishing the 
regime of truth. Foucault considers that power cannot be exercised except through the 
production of truth. Through the establishment of "regime of truth" and "regime of 
rationality", sovereign subjects can govern themselves and others. Power constitutes 
rules and procedures as well as "true discourses" which guide and legitimate their 
activities, shape their bodies, their acts, attitudes, and modes of eveiyday behavior.4
These practices lead to the development of modes of objectification that 
transform human beings into subjects, and to the production of a disciplinary society. 
According to Rabinow, the modes of objectification include "dividing practices", 
"scientific classification" and "subjectification" (Foucault, 1980; Rabinow, 1984). In 
the dividing practices, "the subject is objectified by a process of division either within 
himself or from others". The purpose of division and classification is for rejection.5 
The "scientific classification" arises from the modes of inquiry which tiy to give 
themselves the status of sciences. It further legitimates the dividing practices in the 
name of scientific truth and knowledge. This is why Foucault says that power 
produces knowledge, that power and knowledge directly imply one another, and that 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge,
4- In Foucault's analysis, these social procedures of exclusion and prohibition, comprising the forbidden 
speech of politics and sexuality, the division between reason and its other, madness, and the distinction 
between "truth" and "falsehood", form the way in which knowledge is put to work in our society 
(Foucault, 1981).
5. According to Rabinow, the most famous examples from Foucault’s work "are the isolation of lepers 
during die Middle Ages; the confinement of the poor, the insane, and vagabonds in the great catch-all 
Hospital General in Paris in 1656; die new classifications of disease and the associated practices of 
clinical medicine in early-nineteenth-century France; the rise of modern psychiatry and its entry into 
die hospitals, prisons, and clinics throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and finally the 
medicalization, stigmatization, and normalization of sexual deviance in modern Europe" (Rabinow, 
1984:8).
14
nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. Furthermore, Foucault is concerned with subjectification -  "the way a 
human being turns himself or herself into a subject". In the process of self-formation/ 
subjectification, the person is active. It allows individuals to effect, by their own 
means, various operations on their own bodies, souls, thought and conduct, and in 
such a manner as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and attain a state of 
perfection and happiness. The art of government is to make the regulation of the self 
come to be combined with the centralized power of the state. Through the 
"technologies of the self', individuals seek to effect a transformation of themselves to 
meet the rules of conduct and fulfill the domination of power.
1,3, Resistance and Discourse in Everyday Life
Influenced by the trend of post-structuralism, in recent years, conventional 
studies of peasant politics, which are dominated by accounts of open confrontations in 
the form of large scale rebellions and revolutions, have been critically challenged. 
Theoretically, conventional studies of peasant politics is greatly influenced by the 
Marxist paradigm and the view of structuralism,6 in which peasants as a subordinate 
group are usually treated as passive recipients of intervention and seen as disembodied 
social categories within structure of domination. But to post-structuralists, actors 
(individual or social group) are regarded as having the capacity to process social 
experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme 
condition of coercion. As Bourdieu states,
If one ignores the dialectical relationship between the objective 
structures and the cognitive and motivating structures which they 
produce and which tend to reproduce them, if one forgets that these 
objective structures are transformed by historical practices and are 
constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices whose 
productive principle is itself the product of the structures which it 
consequently tends to reproduce, then one is condemned to reduce the
6- The structuralism is greatly influenced by the classical linguistics. Saussure's distinction between 
'language' and 'speech', which is at the heart of structuralist, Levi-Strauss' thought. For Saussure, 
language is a social institution in which the relationship between word and object, signifier and 
signified, is arbitrary. Language as a system exists independently of individually created speech acts, 
each of which is contingent. Each speaker, following the rules and definitions of language, creates 
unique acts of speech, unique utterances. Language as an arbitrary is completely separate from speech, 
created voluntarily within the rules of the system (Feiemaan, 1990).
15
relationship between the different social agencies...to the logical 
formula enabling any one of them to be derived from any other 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 83).
Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and 
reproducer of objective meaning (Bourdieu, 1977:79).
Giddens also holds the similar view,
In following the routines of my day-to-day life I help reproduce social 
institutions that I played no part in bringing into being...my actions 
constitute the institutional conditions of actions of others, just as their 
actions do mine...My activities are thus embedded within and are 
constitutive elements of, structured properties of institutions stretching 
well beyond myself in time and space (Giddens, 1987:11).
So when people practice their everyday lives, they are reproducing or creating culture. 
They are active participants who process information and tactics in dealing with 
various actors and outside institutions. In process of social change, they are never 
passive subjects of the economic, social or institutional structure, but rather are agents 
whose strategies and interaction shape the outcome of development. Different 
patterns of social development result from the interactions, negotiations, and social 
struggle that take place between the several kinds of actors.
In the trend of post-structuralism, Michel de Certeau suggests a broader 
perspective on eveiyday life politics. He rejects the model of social production and 
action which largely focuses on the macro aspect of social process. He shifts the 
focus on the terrain of everyday life. For de Certeau, the "marginal majority" are 
nevertheless not merely passive receivers of outside domination. Albeit domination 
proceeds through strategies (economic, political, technological, institutions) that 
organize the world in ways that lead to the colonization of physical, social, and 
cultural environments, people "effect multiple and infinitesimal transformations of the 
domination forms under which they inevitably have to live and operate in order to 
adapt them to their own interests and, to the extent possible, to subject them to their 
own rules" (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992:74).7 He defines strategies as a way of seeking 
to discipline and manage people and institutions, whereas tactics are a way of 
constituting a sort of "anti-discipline" and "art of making" that proceed by
7- de Certeau gives an example that when Spanish colonized Indians, it imposed their own culture on 
the indigenous Indians. But the Indians often made of the rituals, representations and laws imposed on 
them something quite different from what their conquerors had in mind.
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manipulating imposed knowledge and symbols at favourable moments (de Certeau, 
1984:xix).
Adopting a post-structuralist view, the concept of “eveiyday resistance” and 
“avoidance protest” has developed to reassess the approach of peasant politics. 
Similar to de Certeau’s concept "Tactics", in James Scott's Weapons o f the Weak, 
Scott argues that much of the politics of peasant/ subordinate groups fall into the 
category of "eveiyday forms of resistance" which includes such acts as foot-dragging, 
dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, 
poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, anonymous 
threats, and so forth. The striking feature of eveiyday resistance is that
they require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of
implicit understandings and informal networks; they often represent a
form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic
confrontation with authority (Scott, 1985:xvi).
Scott defines these action as offstage action. The purpose of such resistance 
techniques is to avoid notice and detection, which reflects the tactical wisdom of 
peasants — working the system to their minimum disadvantage (Hobsbawm, 1973; 
Scott, 1985). As Scott and other scholars notice, most of the subordinate classes are 
not intended to destroy, or even radically alter, the political system or the social 
structures in which peasants or other subordinate group operate (Scott, 1985; Adas, 
1992). Peasants are aware that the state directly controls the means of production and 
coercion, and typically forecloses open protest. Open, organized and radical
confrontation will bring about a tragic outcome.8 So to the subordinate groups, 
eveiyday form of resistance is the most significant way and relatively safe technique 
peasants employed for avoiding aimed force and bloodshed, and minimizing their 
losses. Moreover, it will increase the management cost of government since the 
government has to prosecute thousands of cases, raise the penalties for 
noncompliance, and appoint more enforcement personnel. So we can say the absence
8- In socialist China, as Bum points out, "state policy in most of the period tied peasants to the land. 
Authorities effectively prevented rural to urban migration through die household registration and 
rationing systems. China's leaders isolated the peasantry from itself and reduced opportunities for 
peasant interaction unsupervised by die party." Moreover, although authority established a nationwide 
network of peasants' associations, with branches organized in the village, "these organizations were 
effectively controlled by die party. Peasants' associations functioned chiefly as a method of 
transmitting party policy to the countryside" (Burn, 1988:170-171). These restrained the organized 
and collective action of peasants.
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of formal organization and open and large-scale collective action does not imply 
nothing that peasants are powerless.
Everyday resistance generated in peasant society is also owing to the specific 
social structure of peasantry which is not suitable for them to employ the large-scale 
collective action, e.g. geographical dispersion, a class scattered, lacking in formal 
organization, lacking in organizational skills and experience and so forth. Public 
stage is controlled by the powerful, peasants lack a variety of political resources that 
allow them to influence the elite and officials, such as political campaigns, lobbying, 
and legal assistance by which they can influence power. So for the peasants and the 
subordinate group, they choose to resist offstage.
Everyday resistance is silent as a strategy, but not necessarily a silent activity. 
Subordinate groups sometimes achieve their resistance through discursive penetration. 
Sometimes they only resist only in action, and resist silently; sometimes they not only 
act practically, but also account for their action in words. They are capable of 
formulating the rationale for their action discursively. Their discourse is often 
inaudible. Most of the time they cany out their discourse offstage. But it does not 
mean that their eveiy political discourse is always offstage. Subordinate people as 
strategic actors are able to create public discourse according to the environment and 
situation. They are also able to make radical claims in public by adopting the central 
terms of what might have been seen as hegemonic discourse.
In Feiennan's study of Tanzania, for instance, he found that the colonial 
officers felt it difficult to suppress peasants' discussions of democracy, development, 
or the abolition of slavery because those topics were politically correct and publicly 
acceptable. So it made a space for a radical criticism (1990:44). The scholars of 
subaltern studies (Ranajit Guha and others) also share the similar argument that the 
subaltern groups are capable of formulating the counter-discourse.9 As Arnold states,
Subaltern might receive the substance of their culture from the 
hegemonic classes but make it their own by impregnating it with non- 
hegemonic values 01* by selecting some aspects and rejecting 
others...(1984:161-162).
9- The subaltern studies group has gone beyond Gramsci's position to argue that subaltern politics was 
an autonomous domain in the history of India and the peasants as subaltern groups can speak for 
themselves (Guha, 1988; Arnold, 1984). To Gramsci, there is an ambiguity with peasantry who are 
always subject to the authority of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up.
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When E. P. Thompson studied the English working class in the eighteenth century, he 
also remarked that: "Whatever this hegemony may have been, it did not envelop the 
lives of the poor and it did not prevent them from defending their own modes of work 
and leisure, and forming their own rituals, their own satisfaction and view of life." So 
to Thompson, hegemony does not constitute a rigid, automatic and all-determining 
structure of domination (Thompson, 1978: 163). Raymond Williams also has 
similarly warned against interpreting hegemony as a 'totalizing abstraction' to be 
virtually equated with the absolute ideological and political domination of society. "A 
lived hegemony is always a process", it is not a rigid, all-encompassing, unchallenged 
structure, but "has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified" 
(Williams, 1977: 112-13). There are always non-hegemonic or counter-hegemonic 
values at work to resist, restrict and qualify the operations of the hegemonic order 
(Williams, 1977; Arnold, 1984).
Everyday language and rhetoric is recognized as a crucial important aspect to 
study the peasant ideology or the counter-hegemonic value, as it embodies a specific 
conception of the world and constitutes the means by which sentiments can be 
communicated and shared among the peasants. As Parkin says, rhetoric or language 
is "a type of ritual: it says something about the speaker, the spoken-to, and the 
situation, which goes beyond what is contained in the surface message" (Parkin, 1975: 
114). To study the language in everyday life, Volosinov suggests that "in order to 
observe the phenomenon of language, both the producer and the receiver of sound and 
the sound itself must be placed into the social atmosphere" (1973:46). It is because 
"all forms of speech interchange operate in extremely close connection with the 
conditions of the social situation in which they occur and exhibit an extraordinary 
sensitivity to all fluctuations in the social atmosphere"(1973: 20).10
Studying everyday discourses of the subordinate group helps us to understand 
the dynamics of cultural conflict and accommodation in the process of interaction of 
different knowledge and worldviews. The dominant groups formulate the legitimate 
or normal form of knowledge and diffuse this knowledge to subordinate groups. 
Peasant resistance, in the sense of cultural studies, not merely involves the fighting
10- For example, in Ku Village, it was easy to find contradictions in the villagers' speech. They often 
sing one tune in front of the cadres, but another tune among themselves. So putting their speech in 
speaking context, we understand why they contradict themselves.
19
against the material extraction, but is the struggle of attempting to reject being 
enrolled in other's "projects" and get others to accept their particular frames of 
meaning and points of view. Peasant's everyday discourse reflect the subordinate 
ideology and consciousness, as well as the needs and aspirations of the peasant's own 
way of life. They struggle over how the past and present shall be understood and 
labeled, and struggle over how to define the principle of justice and equity. So 
through studying peasant's eveiyday discourse, we can make sense of what the 
peasants speak and understand why they undertake resistance. The studies of peasant 
moral economy in past twenty years have uncovered a host of principal reasons 
underlying peasants' resistance, such as equity, justice, and fairness, which are 
supposedly rooted in peasant tradition and culture. They propose that peasants resist 
because their norm of justice and subsistence ethics has been violated by those who 
intend to extract interest from them (Scott, 1976; Vlastos, 1986). This vision has been 
criticized as romanticizing the moral aspect of peasant society by Popkin with the 
approach of "rational peasant" (Popkin, 1979). But I think a purely economic-interest 
account or a moral account of peasant or subordinate group resistance is inadequate 
because peasant resistance often appears to have both a moral and a material basis 
(e.g. Arnold, 1984; Thompson, 1978; Feierman, 1990; Scott, 1989).
In sum, emphasis on non-confrontation and quotidian modes of peasant 
response has provided an important middle ground between the passive and 
revolutionary extremes of conceptualizing peasant societies and response. It redirects 
our attention to the larger context in which peasant communities operate and to their 
ongoing struggle to scale back the demands of the state and elite groups and thereby, 
retain enough of what they produce to build decent lives for themselves. It also 
results in an understanding of the peasant/ subordinate group's specific way of 
rationalizing the world and real life, and the general framework for real political 
activity among them.
1.4. Peasant Studies in China
In China, peasant study has been developed since the 1930s. The early China 
studies of peasant societies were greatly influenced by the conventional Marxism and 
modernist view. Due to the limitation of pages, I can only mention several classical
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studies for illustrating the problems of the early village studies which were influenced 
by the modernist view and served for making the powerlessness of Chinese peasants.
Fei Xiao-tong was the pioneer of peasant studies in China. In his books, he 
stated clearly that his aims were largely those of social reconstruction and his studies 
were for practical purpose. He was not satisfied with the traditional scholarship that 
provided very little guidance for practical action in changing Chinese society. He saw 
the problem of China as being rooted in the poverty, unemployment and exploitation 
of the peasantry. He was concerned about the disintegration of the traditional social 
order which had given the peasants some measure of security and well-being. He and 
other scholars (like Zhang Zhi-yi) felt that the urgent task of social reconstruction 
called for the application of scientific methods to the understanding of social and 
economic processes. To Fei, only after fully understanding the rural society via 
scientific method, would reconstruction and modernization of rural China became 
possible. Since China was conventionally represented as a rural society, it should not 
be surprising to understand Chinese society via villages (Fei, 1939; Fei and Zhang, 
1990; Beteille, 1987).
The first full-length study of a Chinese village, Peasant Life in China, was 
published in 1939 by Fei Xiao-tong.11 By then, there emerged a style of monograph 
writing about Chinese villagers by native anthropologists in the manner approved by 
functionalists. Kaixiangong, the village studied by Fei, was described in terms of the 
cycle of work or economic activities, domestic life and the kinship system, and 
ceremonial life or the cycle of rituals. The unit of economic activity on the peasant 
farm was the peasant household, and most of the important ceremonies were 
connected with either the cycle of economic activities or the domestic cycle of birth, 
marriage and death (Fei, 1939).12
' 1. This work was completed under the supervision of Malinowski at the London School of Economics 
under the University of London. At the time, Malinowski had successfully established the framework 
of analysis which included two features: first was to show the social and cultural activities of the 
peasants in their manifold inter-relatedness; die second was to concentrate on the day-to-day life of 
people rather than the colorful and the spectacular (Liu, 1995).
12- To Fei, anthropologists turn to villages not just because village life is important to understand 
China, but also because of the very assumption that a village is small enough for an adequate 
observation of its social relationships. It is a closed community in which functions of each part of the 
community can be observed in relation to the whole. Also, it is manageable to observe for a 
fieldworker who plans to stay only for a limited length o f period (Fei 1939:7).
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After Fei, the other native scholars basically adopted a similar approach to 
study Chinese villages. A second full-length study of Taitou in Shangdong province 
of China was published shortly afterwards by Martin Yang (M. Yang, 1948). There 
were other projects taken by other scholars such as Janies Yen, Liang Shu-ming, Lin 
Yue-hua, C.K Yang and so on. These kind of studies had to be discontinued before 
the Communists came to power. There were few studies on Chinese peasant 
communities after 1949. C.K, Yang's study of Nanching, a village on the fringe of 
Guangzhou, gave some idea of a peasant community during the transition from the old 
to the new social order. This study once again emphasized the distribution of land and 
the organization of production, and discusses the transformation during the stage of 
land reforms (C. K. Yang, 1959).
The early Chinese anthropologists basically followed the suit of their foreign 
counterparts. They stressed the importance of objective investigation and power of 
observation, namely the functionalist or the structural-functionalist approach. In the 
end, their researches were intrinsically synchronic and static. Their theoretical 
approach greatly influenced their view of Chinese peasant society. If we put these 
early Chinese village studies in their historical context, we can find that these studies 
are done for the sake of rural reconstruction (xicingtu chongjian) and modernization 
projects of China. Fei, Yen and Liang were all active organizers of xiangtu 
chongjian. Although they had somewhat more positive view of the cultural 
circumstances of China's rural inhabitants and the customs and beliefs they 
investigated have considerable importance for the rural China, they still thought the 
rural China they described was backward, and the problem of China was rooted in the 
poverty, unemployment and exploitation of the peasantry. To solve the problem of 
Chinese society, the change and modernization of rural China became necessary. But 
soon after "liberation", the discipline of anthropology and sociology were totally 
eliminated from the universities. Both the local or foreign scholars were baimed from 
doing research in China.
In recent years, soon before and after opening the door to outside world, an 
increasing number of scholars joined the study of peasant society and reconstructed 
the rural history in Mao's rural China. Pioneered by Parish and Whyte, they used 
Hong Kong as a base to interview refugees from China to study rural China under 
communist rule and wrote a thick volume called Village and Family in Contemporary
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China. The village life of China was constructed via interview records of 65 
emigrants in Hong Kong from 63 different villages located in 30 counties in 
Guangdong and one southern county of neighboring Fujian (Parish & Whyte, 1978). 
This problematic methodology has been copied by the other sinologists.13 Anita Chan 
etc. also adopted the same methodology to reconstruct the history of a South China 
village entitled Chen Village, from Mao's era to the reform era. The political 
stragglings between the village cadres in different campaigns was well described 
(Chan, Madsen Sc Unger, 1992). The works of Jean Oi, Vivienne Shue and David 
Zweig also contributed to our knowledge of the power relationship between rural 
cadres and peasants, and the local politics of how the local cadres deflected the central 
policy for protecting local interest (Oi, 1989; Shue, 1988; Zweig, 1984, 1989). 
Employing somewhat different methodology, anthropologists like Helen Siu, Potter 
and Potter have done the fieldwork in South China in reform era. Their works 
combine a historical depth with a solid grounding in ethnography, and deal with many 
different aspects of village life, which help us understand recent rural change in China 
(Siu, 1989; Potter and Potter, 1990).
However, the above studies seem to pay little or no attention to cultural 
domination in the socialist state. Myron L. Cohen is one of the few to look closely at 
how the "powerless peasantry" was invented and constructed by the Chinese 
Communist in a different way for legitimating the Communist Revolution and the 
new regime. As Myron L. Cohen said: "In order to create such a new society, and to 
supply the justification for its creation, it also required that the 'old' society be defined 
in such a way as to provide the basis for its thorough rejection" (Cohen, 1993:151). 
Whether in Mao's era or Deng's era, the Chinese Communist government faced the 
burden of cultural construction, for which there must be both a totally objectionable 
'old regime' and a new liberated society. The cultural construction of "old" and "new" 
regime is basically the question of hegemony in Gramsci's sense, of power/knowledge 
in Foucault's skeptic mind, and of cultural politics in anthropological circles.
Following the academic fashion of emphasizing the power of subordinate 
groups, in his book Peasant Power in China (1991), Kelliher begins to bring the
13, The whole critique of South China studies see Y. L. Chiu and H. B. Ku 1998, "Affirming 
Anthropological Research and Teaching in Asia and South China -- some historico-ethnographic 
recaps and, perhaps, a reminder" in The Future o f Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, CUHK.
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peasant back in to the political studies and re-emphasizes peasant power. His broader 
theoretical purpose is to contribute to the debate on the question of the "power of the 
weak". Unlike earlier works on Chinese peasantry by other scholars such as Bums, 
Oi, and Zweig, which showed how Chinese peasants and cadres deflected central 
policy, Kelliher asserts that even under a veiy powerful socialist state, peasants still 
have power to make state policy. According to Kelliher, the real force behind 
"decollectivization", or what he calls "privatization", was the Chinese peasantry. In 
the collective, peasants not only undermined the communes, but also forced state 
leaders to accede to the decollectivization of farm land in China. Like James Scott, 
Kelliher does not believe that peasant power is exerted through an organized 
conspiracy or some unified conscious strategy. He argues that atomized peasants 
living under the common economic and political conditions can respond to incentives 
and opportunities in the same manner. Although peasant power is narrow as it lacks 
any coercive force; still within these limits, peasant power is nonetheless real and 
effective. To him, peasant power can also include the power to make the state 
consider and finally elect policy choices that are of the peasants' own creation 
(Kelliher, 1992).
Kate-xiao Zhou, in her book How the Farmers Changed China: Power o f the 
People, shares the view that peasants in China are not passive and powerless to 
change their livelihood and intervene into the very history; on the contrary, they are 
powerful to change China. Like Kelliher, she argues that the reform of China was 
created and led by the Chinese peasants. As she says, "without farmers' initiative in 
baochan daohu and without the baochan daohn demonstration effect, WanLi and 
Beijing intellectuals would not have discovered baochan daohu" (Zhou, 1996:8). She 
takes Scott's position that the peasants' spontaneous, unorganized, leaderless, non- 
ideological, apolitical movements are significant and have far-reaching social, 
political and economic effects (1996: 12).
Although these two scholars of China studies try to construct a different view 
of rural China from the perspective of the subordinate classes, their macro approach 
cannot help us to understand the power/knowledge process in everyday practices. To 
them, power is still something that someone can possess. They also have an 
inclination to generalize Chinese peasants as a whole, and seem to overstate and over­
generalize the role of the peasants in the development process and to ignore the new
24
mechanisms, invented in reform era, which the state adopts to control rural society. 
Their portrayal of the peasant is also too uni-dimensional and ignores the disjuncture 
and fragmentation among the peasantry. By following the cultural version of power 
and resistance, we know that power has, as Foucault and de Certeaus stated, no 
possessor, 110 privileged place, no superiors or inferiors. Chinese peasants in their 
eveiyday life practices are reproducing and creating their own meaning of life-world. 
Although the Chinese government can impose national policy/ development 
programs on the rural society, the local people also can make these policies and 
programs imposed on them something quite different from what the policy maker had 
in mind in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own ways of life. So we 
have to recognize that individuals and social groups are "knowledgeable", and 
"capable" in that they devise ways of solving problematic situations and actively 
engage in constructing their own social world.
After the political and economic reforms of rural China, there are many 
variations between different villages. The development strategies of the Chinese 
government in the post-Mao period caused the great differentiation of rural population 
between the coastal and internal area, north and south China. It is difficult to 
understand rural China and peasants in totality and uniformity. Even within the same 
region or province, there is great diversity within the rural population. The 
abandonment of the commune, the recurrence of family farming, rural 
industrialization, the commercialization of rural economy and other development 
programs make the subject-position of peasants ambiguous. They can be rural 
producer, worker, merchant, businessman and so on. So now it has become 
increasingly difficult to identify peasants in post-Mao China with a coherent system 
of subject positions. So in my study, I do not intend to generalize the Chinese village 
and peasants as my study. Rather, I will investigate how a multiplicity of social actors 
established their sphere of autonomy in a fragmented social and political space under 
rural transformation. Through studying the everyday discourse, I will emphasize 
analyzing the ongoing processes of negotiation, adaptation, struggling and transferring 
of meaning that take place among the specific actors concerned in rural development 
in post-reform China.
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L5. Guanxi & Zeren — Exploring Indigenous Concepts
Based on the ethnographic studies, in recent years, some China 
anthropologists or sinologists have devoted themselves to constructing indigenous 
concepts, I think the work of exploring the indigenous concept is significant because 
through this we can understand the different philosophy and practice of the indigenous 
people. To make sense of the peasant resistance in the post reform era, exploring the 
indigenous concept via their everyday discourse becomes necessary. I hope this effort 
can make some contribution to the Chinese anthropology.
The Chinese concept"guanxi" has been recognized by many scholars as a key 
social-cultural concept to understand social relationships in Chinese society (e.g. 
Jacobs, 1979; King, 1991; Fei, 1992; Yang, 1994; Yan, 1996; Kipnis, 1997). Guanxi 
can be literally translated into English as "relation", "relationship", "personal 
connections", "social networks", or "particularistic ties". But none of these 
translations can fully grasp the rich meaning of guanxi. As Butterfield states, in 
Chinese society, people get used to dividing people into those with whom they 
already have guanxi (a fixed relationship and a connection), and those they do not. 
These connections operate like a series of invisible threads which tie Chinese to each 
other with great tensile strength (Butterfield, 1983:74-75). Shu-ming Liang also 
suggests that Chinese society is neither individual-based nor group-based, but guanxi 
(relation)-based, in which individuals engage in social exchange with each other 
(Liang 1963:94). Fei similarly concludes that Chinese society structurally is 
composed of numerous personal networks defined by dyadic social ties and without 
explicit boundaries. However, the content of these exchange behaviors in such a 
network-based society is contextually determined, and people's motivations for 
engaging in guanxi are differentiated. So the concept of guanxi is difficult to define 
clearly, even to a native Chinese. I agree with Kipnis that there is no unchanging, 
single form of guanxi. The person in the village can have urban guanxi, business 
guanxi, kinship guanxi, female/male guanxi, husband/wife guanxi, class guanxi, 
marriage guanxi, comrade guanxi, classmate guanxi, owner/tenant guanxi, 
parent/children guanxi and more. Some of these guanxi are pre-ordained and some 
are cultivated. Each of these relationships carries its own connotations and its own 
social and historical specificity (Kipnis, 1997:184). For analytical puipose, broadly 
based on their motivation, I classify guanxi into two types — instrumental guanxi and
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moral guanxi. Of course, no classification is adequate enough. Sometimes guanxi for 
instrumental purposes and guanxi in moral sense are difficult to separate clearly.
Instrumental Guanxi
Several studies reveal that the particularism and instrumentalism dominate 
people's guanxi in Chinese society. Jacobs defines guanxi as "particularistic ties" 
through which the Taiwanese make political allies and secure votes (Jacobs, 1979). 
Walder views guanxi as an informal aspect of the institutional culture in socialist 
factories. The granting and receiving of favors of various kinds is the motivating 
force behind personal ties, which help workers obtain desirable resources that 
otherwise would be inaccessible (Walder, 1986). Oi takes a similar position to 
Walder in pointing out that in rural China the peasants exchange their political loyalty 
for obtaining income opportunities, special distribution, and so forth. She 
conceptualizes this social behavior in rural China as socialist clientelism by adopting 
the patron-client model of anthropology (Oi, 1989).
Gift-giving (songli) as well as favors and banquets-giving (qingke) are the 
popular practices in the formation, maintenance, modification and reproduction of 
guanxi. In instrumental guanxi, the motivation of gift giving and other practices are 
for pursuing personal interest beyond the formal structure or official channels. 
(Walder, 1986; Yan, 1996; Yang, 1995). When people instrumentally send a gift to 
someone, they require, expect or hint for the recipients to return something in 
jiaohuan (exchange). "Something" here may imply many different kinds of things, 
e.g. obtaining and changing job assignments, buying certain foods and consumer 
items, getting into good hospitals, buying train tickets, obtaining housing, doing 
business and so on, which are part of the expectation of the gift givers. Putting gift- 
giving in the socialist Chinese context, we can better understand why there is an 
instrumental inclination of guanxi building in today's Chinese society and what the 
instrumental guanxi looks like.
In socialist China, after collectivization, participation in collective labor 
became the only means of obtaining grain outside the black market where prices were 
high and supply was uncertain. At the same time, in collective agriculture, all 
peasants in China also enjoyed a certain security level or subsistence guarantee. Each
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peasant was to receive a monthly minimum amount of grain as a basic ration (Jiben 
kouliang), independent of work points. Because individuals lacked availability of 
alternative sources for the satisfaction of their needs, they became the clients of the 
organization to which they belonged (Oi, 1985 & 1989). In urban China, after the 
integrating of private and public enterprises (gongsi keying), the work units (danwei) 
became the focal points for delivery of public goods, services, and other materials and 
social advantages that were not readily available from other sources. So the 
individuals depended on their work unit for satisfaction of their needs.14 It ensured the 
political loyalty of individuals to the working unit and leaders. In exchange for 
loyalty, the workers were rewarded systematically with income opportunities, special 
distribution, and so forth that the officials of government were able to dispense 
(Walder, 1986; Lu, 1989).
In Mao's period, consumer goods and materials were scarce, so the people had 
to resort to guanxi to acquire things not readily available in state stores and markets. 
Apart from political loyalty, gift giving was an important way for the workers or the 
peasants to obtain their personal interest because the cadres or officials derived 
authority from their ability to influence the everyday work distribution, opportunities 
for employment, and the allocation of welfare and relief. The political and economic 
structure of socialist China forced people to cultivate the instrumental personal 
guanxi connection with their leaders to fulfill their needs, and to maintain good 
relationships (gaohao guanxi) with their leaders for pursuing their interests via gifts.
In the reform era, guanxi building and gift-giving are still popular practices in 
China. Although the introduction of the market mechanism gradually eroded the 
redistributive power of state and its gatekeeper as most of resources could be obtained 
in the market, as Oi and Nee's observed, in this transitional period, market forces are 
still constrained and dominated by continued bureaucratic micro-intervention. On the 
one hand, the local cadres keep their position in state bureaucracy; on the other hand, 
they participate in private business. Thus the partial reform in China gives rise to a 
hybrid elite of cadre-entrepreneurs who are structurally located in networks, which 
allow them to maximize benefits from both the public and private sectors of the
14. In this sense, the authority of socialist state was derived from its monopolistic control o f allocating 
opportunities, goods and resources.
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socialist mixed economy. They are able to distort the allocative mechanism of the 
market by involving the personal connection network {guanxi wang) within the state 
organizations. They are likely to experience lower transaction costs on trade across 
the boundaries of the redistributive and private economies, which may provide them 
with more ready access to scarce resources and marketing outlets. Hence, peasants 
and entrepreneurs often have to seek to establish guanxi with the local cadres.15 
Because of this, the instrumental patron-client bond is still maintained after the rural 
reform (Oi, 1990 & 1992; Nee, 1991 & 1992). The desire of making money 
(zhuanqian) and becoming wealthy (zhifu) further encourages the people to cultivate 
guanxi with the cadres and official with whom they have no pre-established relations, 
or where a pre-established relation is remote. In Chinese terms, "walking through the 
back door" (zouhoumen) is widely known to be the most effective and necessary way 
to get things done through personal network. Manipulation of instrumental guanxi 
also causes serious corruption in both mainland China and Taiwan (Jacobs, 1979; 
Yang, 1994).
Moral Guanxi
People's motivations for cultivating guanxi are not necessarily for material 
interest or instrumental gains. They engage in guanxi or sending gifts to others for the 
sake of performing li, which means rituals, properties, and ceremonial expressions of 
ethical ideals, according to the Weberian interpretation (Weber, 1968:156-157). Gifts 
{liwu) and other material things like banquets are the means for people to perform 
their li in order to maintain the friendship, kinship, sentiment (renqing) and so on, 
rather than as the means of pursuing political and economic interests. When people 
practice moral guanxi, they will emphasize the cultural meaning codes rather than 
material aspects of the gifts. Importantly, the people engaging in moral guanxi more 
or less have fixed and pre-ordained relationships. The gift exchanges between the 
people in moral guanxi often reflect a long-term relationship between a giver and a 
recipient.
15- For instance, in some rural areas, local government still plays the role of owner of a corporation 
after decollectivization o f agriculture because it owns public property such as enterprise, various pieces 
of equipment as well as forest land, orchards, fish ponds and so on. So it has the right to offer certain 
individuals permission to operate the corporation's property or business (Oi, 1992).
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The word guanxi is a relatively modem expression of human relationship in 
Chinese society. According to Fei, there is a cultural root underlying the practice of 
moral guanxi. In Confucian philosophy, lun is a word used to describe the designated 
proper human relationship; it means the differentiated order among individuals (Fei, 
1992; King, 1991). According to Confucians, there are many kinds of relations 
between individuals, of which the well-known five cardinal relations are 
fundamental. Qing (affection) is about the relationship between parent and child; yi 
(righteousness) is between ruler and subject; bie (distinction) is between husband and 
wife; xu (order) is between older brothers and younger brothers; and xin (sincerity) is 
between friends. Among relationships, some of them are preordained givens, while 
others are voluntarily constructed. In a preordained relationship, for example, the 
father-son guanxi is more or less prescribed by fixed status as well as fixed 
responsibilities. In fact, for either the preordained or constructed guanxi, an 
individual still has considerable freedom in deciding whether to enter into the 
relationship with others. But people violating the relationship or not maintaining the 
lun or guanxi properly will be condemned as bu xiao (not filial) in parent-child 
relationship; and as bu zhong and bu yi (not loyal and righteous) in ruler-subject and 
friends relationships. Those failing to present gifts properly in the expected ritual 
situations will be criticized as que li (act without proprieties) or bu dong li (not 
understand proprieties) (King, 1991; Fei, 1992; Yan, 1996). So in Chinese society, 
people sometimes present gifts at different situations, e.g. birthdays, important 
festivals, ceremonies and funerals, mainly for maintaining the order of relationships. 
The connotation of this kind of relationship is full of moral responsibility, personal 
sentiment and human affection. Youqing youyi (having human sentiment and having 
righteousness) is highly appreciated by a moral person or a good man in Chinese 
society.
In theory, we can easily construct the dichotomy between instrumental guanxi 
and moral guanxi. In practice, it is difficult to separate them clearly. The motivation 
of cultivating is also not necessarily purely instrumental or moral all the time; rather, 
the elements sometimes coexist in different contexts.
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Zeren in Guanxi as a Principle of Social Contract
Guanxi as a principle of social relationship constrains and determinates forms 
of social interaction among Chinese, in which there is a expectation of mutual 
obligation. Local Chinese term this mutual expectation as "zeren". Zeren can be 
translated as "obligation" and "duty", or "responsibility" in English. When people say 
someone has zeren to somebody or to do something for somebody, it implies that 
person must act based 011 the social, legal, or moral ties, e.g. contract or promise. 
Zeren can be defined in law or regulation. In the so-called "modem" society, different 
aspects of zeren have been legally defined in terms of citizenship by the state, e.g. 
taxation, military service, and so on. But zeren is not necessarily defined by law, it 
can also be defined in morality, sentiment, and so on. For instance, our zeren to our 
family or to our friends is seldom defined by law, but by social norms.
Zeren implies guanxi (personal or social relationship) and vice versa. When 
people say they have some kind of zeren to someone, we know they have guanxi with 
that person. If people have the guanxi with someone, this also implies they have to 
fulfill zeren for that person. So the production of guanxi simultaneously creates 
human feeling {ganqing) and obligation {zeren). For either moral or instrumental 
guanxi, there is a principle of reciprocity or mutual exchange underlying people's 
relationship. People engaging in guanxi would expect a response and return from 
others in the guanxi network (Yang, 1957). The return or response can be both 
material and affectionate. Anyone failing to respond or give a return properly would 
hurt the guanxi, even breaking down the guanxi ties. Many scholars have make 
efforts to understand the association between guanxi and other indigenous notions 
such as renqing or ganqing (human feeling), mianzi (face) and bao (indebtedness). 
These three words refer to three different levels of people's feeling towards their 
relation with others (King, 1991; Yan, 1995; Yang, 1994; Kipnis, 1997). They are 
treated as three important factors driving people to maintain the link of guanxi. 
Staying in Ku Village, I sense zeren is another important factor binding people's 
guanxi. Zeren in guanxi is a noun of reciprocity which defines people's obligation to 
others. For instance, in father-son guanxi, both father and sons have some kinds of 
defined zeren to fulfill. The definition of zeren rooted in the local culture which is 
shared by the members of the community. Chuanzhong jieclai (reproduction of family 
line), as a kind of social norms, is sons' zeren for repaying their parents' yangyu zhi en
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(kindness of rearing); baiji (offering sacrifice) is also the villagers' obligation of 
returning to gods who protect and bless their production.
Most of anthropological studies have told us that there is a similar practices in 
other societies. They articulated a principle of social contract or reciprocity 
underlying the practices of gift exchange and other economic activities in "primitive 
society" (Mauss, 1967; Malinowski, 1926; Firth, 1959; Sahlins, 1978). Malinowski 
argues that in Melanesian society, the binding force of economic obligations lies in 
the sanction either side may invoke to sever the bonds of reciprocity. One gives 
because of the expectation of return and one returns because of the threat that one's 
partner may stop giving. All rights and obligations are "arranged into well-balanced 
chains of reciprocal services" (1926:46). Firth and other anthropologists also draw 
similar conclusion. Many ethnographic accounts also deal with the reciprocal 
relationship between the patron and client in non-westem societies (Scott, 1972; 
Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980). According to Scott, the patron-client relationship can be 
defined as dyadic (two-person) ties involving a friendship in which an individual of 
higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide 
protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, 
reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to 
the patron (Scott, 1972:8). Although there is a basis of social inequality in patron- 
client dyad, people involved into this relationship are bound by the moral principle of 
reciprocity.
Most of the above studies about guanxi emphasize the level of guanxi between 
person to person. However, in Ku Village, I find the villagers often have extended 
and applied the principle of zeren to define guanxi between villagers and ancestors, 
villagers and gods, villagers and nature, and villagers and state. The main focus of my 
thesis is the study of guanxi between the state and villagers. Unlike person-to-person 
relationships, in the contractual relationship between villagers and the government, 
reciprocity or mutual responsibilities are based not so much on renqing or ganqing, as 
on the notion of zeren or mutual obligation, responsibilities and duties, especially in 
the reform era. As Li and O'Brien state,
Since the introduction of the household responsibility system, more 
and more villagers appear to conceive of their relationship with the 
state in contractual terms. Under the current grain purchase policy, for 
instance, fanners commonly enter into contracts with township
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governments that oblige them to sell grain to the state but that also 
oblige the township governments to supply production materials (Li & 
O'Brien, 1996: 40-41).
People in Ku Village hold a similar view in perceiving their guanxi with the 
government in terms of "zeren". They often state that they are willing to fulfill their 
zeren only if the government does so, too, or provides additional benefits in return. 
But I would like to remark that the definition or connotation of zeren is not fixed. It is 
never a static and unchangeable external norm/value or institution/system, 
constraining people's behaviors and actions. Rather, it is defined and re-defined by 
the villagers in everyday life practice. By saying zeren is thus defined, I also want to 
emphasize that its content and definition is situationally dependent upon the interests 
of human actors — villagers.16 In the post-reform era, for example, when villagers 
sensed their entitlement to social services and welfare is being evaporated, they 
questioned the government's zeren in their daily conversation. When the villagers 
resisted additional taxes and fee collections, they also invoked a reciprocal logic to 
justify their actions. The logic of their argument is that they may accept extraordinary 
exaction only if the government has fulfilled their zeren or provided additional 
benefits in exchange.
Defining zeren involves quanli guanxi (power relationship), in studying zeren, 
it is necessary to ask: who has power to define whose zeren, in terms of law, in tenns 
of morality, in terms of economy and so on? And how is zeren defined? To 
understand the concept of zeren, I will endeavour to contextualize the discourse of 
zeren in the political and economic transformations in the reform era. It will be fully 
discussed in Chapter 5.
Defining Zeren as a Subversive Practice
According to Foucault, power cannot be exercised without establishing the 
regime of truth through creating a rejectable other (1980). To the CCP government,
16 . Though this study is indebted to the insight from those who have interpreted Confucian ideas of 
human relationship and diose who have analyzed guanxi in socialist China, I am not satisfied to view 
Confucian "culture" or "tradition" as a sort of abstract "social structure" that works outside of or above 
the human subjects, and which structures people's guanxi. Instead guanxi is the result o f purposeful 
efforts of die human actors through defining and re-defining their zeren to each other at specific 
historical moments.
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the rejectable others is the old regime and the old society (jiu shehui). Since the great 
upheaval of the revolution in 1949, the CCP government has made a gigantic effort to 
reject the dominant culture in old society. Guanxi practices, which are rooted in 
conventional kinship and friendship, were also criticized as an obstacle to Chinese 
modernity. Throughout the official discourse from 1949, renqing guanxi was narrated 
as a negative social phenomenon against proper socialist ethics. Socialist ethics were 
defined by Mao as "dagong wusi" (selflessness) and "wei renmin fuw u” (serving the 
people). In Mao's famous article In Memory o f Norman Bethune, he summed up the 
essence of his moral teaching as follows:
We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness... A man's ability
may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-
minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests,
a man who is of value to the people (Mao, 1961-65: 337).
The CCP government made a tremendous effort to create a morally upright "new 
man" and transform the social relationship in "new China". In Mao's view, the new 
man embodied the socialist ethic of altruism and self-sacrifice. People were required 
to work hard and show helpfulness for its own sake. They are discouraged from 
thinking of how they could get ahead and acquire things for their own interests. A 
universalistic ethic of "comradeship" came to displace the personalist ethics of 
friendship and kinship. "Comradeship" declared that a person should treat all social 
relationships equally. Any private ethic had to be rejected (Vogel, 1965; Gold, 1985; 
Yan, 1996). At different stages, in the countryside or city, the CCP government put 
systematic efforts to destroy renqing guanxi and traditional kinship bonds among the 
people via different political campaign like land reform, rectification campaigns 
(sanfan wufan), Smash the Four Olds (po sijiu), Cultural Revolution and so forth 
(Madsen, 1984; Vogel, 1965).
The CCP government's enthusiasm for eliminating of traditional practices was 
based on the linear Marxist historicity which presumes that there is a historical 
trajectory from feudalism, to capitalism to socialism. As Kipnis states, "since the 
CCP's mission was to lead China to the future heaven of Communism, any 
theorization that linked peasants to feudalism or capitalism implied they were 
backward-looking and bad, while those that linked them to socialism or communism 
implied the opposite" (1997:167). In the official discourse, the tenns "feudal" and 
"capitalist" were used to denounce practices of renqing. In rural villages, the practices
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of guanxi like gift exchange, ritual and filiality and desire for many children and so on 
were described as feudal remnants (fengjian canyu)\ in cities, practices of guanxi like 
consumer goods, going through the backdoor (zou hounien), banqueting and so on 
were called capitalist or bourgeois individualism (zichan jieji geren zhuyi ). The 
ideology of the CCP has remained fairly consistent. In Deng's era, the criticism of 
guanxi practices has prevailed in official discourse, especially since the mid-1980s. A 
typical sample of the official perception of guanxi practice was cited in Yang's book. 
It states:
The so-called guanxi network is the main manifestation of the deviant 
winds blowing within the Party and in society today. It is the remnant 
of traditional China's feudal and clan systems' way of thinking. It is 
also a product of the intermingling of [feudal thought] with radical 
bourgeois individualism and selfishness, which has occurred in the 
process of the reforms for "enlivening the domestic economy and 
opening up to the outside world." "Guanxi network" is found where, 
for narrow individual and small group interest, [people] connect 
together in mutual dependence and mutual utilization. (Yu 1987: 103 
cited in Yang, 1994:58).
Guanxi practice was condemned as "deviant winds" (buzheng zhi feng) which means 
immoral or incorrect behavior. It was seen as the "backward" (luohou) and "feudal" 
(fengjian), "feudal remnants" (fengjian canyu) or "feudal poison" (fengjian liudu), 
counter to "modem" socialist ethics. In the above narration, guanxi practice is also 
said to stem from the persistence of a backward ethical system whose particularistic 
ethics of interpersonal relations prevent the development of universalistic loyalty to 
the country and the "socialist system". There were several campaigns in the 1980s 
like "Construction of Socialist Civilization" (shehui zhuyi wenming jianshi), and 
"Anti-Capitalist Liberalization" (fan zibenzhuyi zhiyouh.ua), which aimed to cleanse 
the poison and remnants of capitalism and feudalism. In order to reconstruct the 
guanxi between the state and masses, rejecting the traditional ideology became 
necessary. In the reform era, Deng's government devoted itself to redefining the state- 
masses relationship in the new language of modernity and citizenship. In official 
discourse, submission to state policies, e.g. birth control and taxation, is often defined 
as part of national citizens' zeren in the new century. I will discuss this in more detail 
in Chapter 6 and 7.
It is quite interesting to think why the "poison" or the "remnants" could not be 
cleansed by the CCP government throughout nearly half a century, and the villagers'
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"backwardness" stubbornly persisted throughout Mao's era, and revived in the reform 
era. My case provides the evidence that socialist ethics never obtained the consent of 
the villagers, and never totally replaced villagers' conception of renqing guanxi, and 
zeren. The underlying moral codes of reciprocity and mutual obligation are still 
strongly rooted in their mind.
Putting guanxi practice in the context of the socialist economic system, Oi and 
Walder, adopting a functionalist view, perceive guanxi (personal networks) as an 
integrated feature of the socialist state's capacity to rule; the patron-client system is 
created by the communist system as well. Through the patron-clients relation or 
guanxi network, the group of non-elite are able to affect the policy implementation 
process and to further their particular interests, deflecting direct and formalized state 
control (Oi, 1989; Walder, 1986).17 Similarly, Yang argues that gift economy in 
terms of guanxi network emerged to defuse and subvert the power of the state 
redistributive economy. She suggests that the construction of subjectivity in the "art 
of social relationships" not only helps dismantle the state-centered subject, but may 
also form the basic texture and fabric of a "civil society" beginning to untangle itself 
from the state. The art of guanxi in this sense constitutes an infonnal power in 
opposition to the power of the socialist state (Yang, 1994). However, I think it is 
mistaken to romanticize all guanxi practice because gift economy and other 
instrumental guanxi practices, like walking through the back door, to large extent 
empower the gatekeepers (e.g. officials and cadres) who occupy the key positions in 
the state organizations, rather than the ordinary people. Of course, cultivating guanxi 
through gift giving and other practices seems to provide alternative means for some 
groups of people to seek their own interest within the socialist system. But it seems to 
me only to strengthen the power structure and power relation in the socialist state, as 
well as to threatens the interests of people who have no guanxi network.
Borrowing Foucault's version of power/knowledge, I would like to argue that 
people in Ku Village subverted the power of the state not through gift-giving and 
engaging in instrumental guanxi, but through the discursive practice of moral guanxi, 
e.g. defining and redefining zeren between the state and the peasants based on their
17- For example, in Oi's book, she explains the deviant behaviour of local cadres keeping grain from 
the state is not simply a case of personal greed but a desire of peasants to consume more grain. She 
argues that it is a form o f peasant participation and strategy for survival.
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own conception of reciprocity. To the villagers, zeren is never an unconditional 
obligation. They grant rights to the government to collect grain tax and other fees 
only when the government and cadres fulfill their zeren first. They clearly articulate 
their entitlement to social security and welfare as part of a social contract between the 
government and the villagers. A government that failed to fulfil its zeren for 
providing these benefits would be constructed as "bad government", and vice versa. 
Similarly, cadres who failed to carry out their zeren to serve the village and act as the 
protective cadre would be termed as "bad cadres". Their own contracted model of 
"good government" and "good cadres" become frame of reference to judge the 
government and village cadres. The defining of zeren is a complex process in which 
villagers selectively articulate different kinds of comparative knowledge from 
different sources, e.g. television programs, Party propaganda, and newspaper, to serve 
their own purpose.
Villagers preach their idea of moral zeren and zeren of the government and 
local cadres in everyday discourse and attempt to get others to accept their particular 
frame of meaning and point of view, in order to justify their active resistance to state 
policies, e.g. taxation and birth control. They seem to view taxes, fees, and other 
exaction in terms of exchanges that imply mutual zeren. They see their guanxi with 
government and cadres partly in terms of enforceable contracts and fulfill their zeren 
so long as government and cadres treat them as equals. I agree with Feierman that 
"when people select a particular form of discourse, when they shape a political 
argument in a particular way, this is by no means a passive act" (1990:3). In Ku 
Village, I often heard the villagers criticize the instrumental guanxi between some 
villagers and local cadres. They reproached those villagers who sought to cultivate 
guanxi for self interests; they rebuked the village cadres who violate the village 
interests by appointing the village head according to their personal preference; they 
blame those village cadres who abandon their zeren as village leaders; they also 
question the government who violate the state-peasant guanxi by abandoning their 
zeren. This is not to say that the villagers, who criticized other's immorality, do not 
cultivate or engage in instrumental guanxi. But I am curious to know the following in 
the coming chapters: how did the villagers come to imagine themselves as "moral 
peasants" and to define a "peasant" moral outlook; why did they form their discourse
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of zeren and guanxi like that; what's the significance of this discourse in their 
resistance to the state’s policies?
1.6. Overview o f  the Thesis
This thesis is based upon fieldwork earned out between the autumn of 1993 
and June of 1996. For the first two months (between autumn of 1993 to spring of 
1994) of this period, I conducted my research for the fulfillment of my M.Phil. thesis. 
After this period of data collection, I had got a contour of the village and got to know 
some of the villagers.
I returned to the village in July of 1995 for the fulfillment of my Ph.D. thesis. 
During most of the 12 months of my field, I stayed in the same village. From July to 
August, I visited the editorial office of local history of the Guangdong Provincial 
Government. In their office, I found some information about the local history of Mei 
County. I tried to interview the officials of the Guangdong Provincial Government. 
But the official of the editorial office suggested I interview the officials at the county 
level because they should understand the local situation better. In September, I went 
to Mei County and contacted some officials of the county government. Several 
interviews were arranged by my relatives in order to listen to the official voices about 
the local development and their opinion on several policy issues such as taxation, 
birth control and so on. I also often visited the library at Mei County, in which I 
reviewed about ten years of the local newspaper for the sake of acquiring the 
necessary background documentation on the topic and getting a rough picture of the 
development of Mei County in these ten years. The rest of the time I stayed in the 
village. Sometimes I visited other villages for comparison. The eveiyday interaction 
with the villagers enriched my understanding of their world view, their feeling and 
perception on different kinds of issues. Eveiyday I recorded my dialogue with the 
villagers and the important events that happened in the village. I also participated 
into their activities and festivals. In the village, I was not only the observer, but also a 
participant who was observed by the villagers.
This thesis has been divided into nine chapters including the introduction and 
conclusion. In Chapter 2, I would like to invite the readers to Ku Village where I 
stayed and studied. I will present the social-economic setting and the legacy of Ku
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Village which formulated the special social and historical context of my study. In 
addition, I will describe how the conception of guanxi and zeren is produced and 
reproduced in important ceremonies and everyday life occasions.
In Chapter 3, as the title states, I will try understand the history of Mao's China 
from the Ku villagers. Staying in the village, I find that talking about Mao's era is the 
main content of their everyday narration. Putting their discourse of Mao's China into 
context, I find that past experience or history is very significant in their resistance 
nowadays. There is a contradiction in their discourse about the past. They criticize the 
CCP government by recollecting the past painful experience under Mao. But 
sometimes they praise Mao's China as a way to negate the government in the reform 
era. In short, they always construct and reconstruct their own history always for their 
own interests.
Chapter 4 talks about the economic transformation of Ku Village. In the first 
part, I will look at how the CCP government diffused the knowledge of the market 
economy and capitalist ideology into the village and how 'making money' became the 
fashion in Ku Village. In the second part, I will look closely at how the villagers 
reformulated the state constructed economic development model and created their 
own which in some aspects clashes with the interests of the state. From the view of 
the villagers, I tiy to understand the economic logic of the villagers, e.g. their view of 
land, labor, profit, etc.
In Chapter 5, from the everyday narrative of the villagers, I will see how the 
villagers construct their model of "good government"/ "bad government" and "good 
cadres"/ "bad cadres", through defining zeren of the government and local cadres. In 
this chapter, I will pay much attention to how the villagers articulate the information 
for constructing their model through different sources such as mass media, overseas 
relatives and so on.
In Chapter 6 ,1 will focus on the specific issue of peasant resistance to taxation. 
I will decipher how the villagers and their households organize themselves 
individually and collectively with a variety of tactics to resist the tax collection of the 
state. I will pay much attention to how the villagers formulate the rationale for their 
action discursively in terms of'reasonable tax' and 'unreasonable tax'.
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Chapter 7 talks about the controversial issues regarding population policy in 
China. Apart from examining the peasants' resistance in action, I will also examine 
the cultural meaning of having a son in rural China and its relationship to their family 
and kinship, economic structure of rural society and local religion. The different 
strategies the villagers employed to maintain their family line will also be carefully 
examined.
In the first part of Chapter 8 ,1 will closely examine the village election and try 
to understand why the election made the villagers turn to new tactics — sidelining 
government — to protect their own interests. In the second part, I will go beyond the 
household or individual resistance, I will look at how the Ku identity is formulated in 
the reconstruction of the ancestral hall and other village temples. The revival of 
traditional organization also implies the struggle between the state and the peasants. 
The villagers in the process are able to articulate different resources, e.g. overseas 
Chinese networks, to support their movement for their own interests.
Chapter 9 will conclude the whole project. In the Appendix 1, I will rethink 
the problem of representation and my subjective position as a sub-indigenous 
anthropologist.
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Chapter 2: Mapping Ku Village - The World of Guanxi and 
Zeren
To the Ku villagers, October was an important month because it was the
harvest season o f Shatian pomelo which was their primary income source. Around 
the lunar day o f shuangjiang (Frost’s Descent - 18th solar term), every household 
was busy in collecting their fruit and nobody was free to chat with me during the 
daytime. One day when I  was reading a book in my room, someone knocked my door. 
I  opened the door and found Uncle Chang’s wife stood in front o f my door. She held a 
basket and there were some bananas and pomelo inside. She smiled with a little bit 
embarrassment. I  invited her to come in and chatted about everything under the sun 
with her. But I  still remembered what she praised me, "Hi, Hok-Bin. You're so nice 
and different. Many young people came from city could not get used to the 
environment o f village. It is so amazing that you can stay in the village for such a 
long time without a haughty manner like the urban people." ... There was no way to 
tell the methodology o f anthropology and to explain to her why I  stayed in village for  
such a long time.
Chatting for a while, she told me that she had to prepare the lunch for her 
husband, who worked in the power station, and she wanted to leave. She took the 
fruit out from the basket and said, "These fruits are produced by our family. They are 
worthless. Please take them." I  said, "You are so keqi (polite). You Imow, Uncle Si 
also has Shatian pomelo." She insisted to leave the fruit, "I laiow Uncle Si plants 
pomelo too. Try my pomelo. Maybe there is different taste." I  felt thankful and 
accepted the fruit because I  thought that rejecting the fruit would hurt the ganging. 
My mother often told me that in village, gift-giving and gift-accepting perform the li. 
I f  someone sends you a gift, you have to send something back. In Chinese, that is 
called "ging lai li wang" (human affection comes, gifts must returns).
Gift-giving and gift-accepting constitutes a social debt between Uncle Chang's family 
and me. I  always bore in mind that I  had to repay the social debt o f Uncle Chang. I  
had an opportunity to join the period market in Songkou Township. So I  bought some
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biscuits and sweets for them in Songkou town. When I  sent them gift in return, they 
were vety happy and praised me in front o f the other villagers. My uncle also 
appreciated my deed and though I  understood the li well.
*  *  *  *
People in Ku Village practice this kind of gift exchange so often. In everyday 
life, they cultivate and reproduce guanxi, zeren, indebtedness, and reciprocity through 
gifts-giving and banquets. It seems to me that their gift exchanges are for maintaining 
good feeling and relations rather than for pursuing self-interest. In my case, there is 
no reason to treat Uncle Chang's gift-giving as an instrumental guanxi practice. They 
sent me fruit only for the sake of showing their love and concern, and showing that 
they treated me as their zijiren (one of them) and qinqi (relatives), rather than for their 
own favor. In this situation, I could not reject their gift because it would hurt the 
affection (ganqing) and break our guanxi, and make them think mistakenly that I did 
not want to have guanxi with them. Sending them a gift in return implied li, at the 
same time, it affirmed that I have accepted the good will conveyed by their gift.
Ku Village is a guanxi-based society in which people are bound by different 
kinds of guanxi as well as zeren. People in guanxi-bonds seldom question their zeren 
to each other. They try their best to fulfill their zeren on different occasions for the 
aim of maintaining for long-tenn relationship, although they sometimes work it out 
unconsciously. But through daily life practices, their knowledge of zeren and 
principle of social contract has been confirmed and regenerated. In this chapter, I 
only approach an understanding of how the villagers cultivate and maintain guanxi 
with others, and define their zeren in everyday life. In latter chapters, I am going to 
see how the villagers extended and applied the principle of zeren to define their 
guanxi with the state, and justify their resistance to the state policies. Before coming 
to the theme, I would like to provide some background information about my field 
site.
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2.1. Introducing the B rie f Local H istory o f  M eixian
Meixian Prefecture is located at the northeast of Guangdong and at the border 
region of Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi provinces (see Map 1 & 2). It is a hilly 
region situated at south of the Wuling Mountain Ranges and topographically slopes 
from north to south with the Yimia Mountains lying in the middle. About 85% of the 
area are hills which are less than 500 meters above sea level. Most of the arable land 
is scattered in the hilly area. So local people describe Meixian as 'ba shan, yi shui, yi 
fen tiari (eight mountains, one river and one piece of land). There are three major 
rivers (Meijiang, Tingjiang and Hanjiang) and 51 small rivers running across Meixian 
(see Map 4). The terrain of Meixian historically inhibits with its communication with 
the outside world. Therefore, in the reform period, improvement of transportation has 
been the main task of the Meixian government. Many highways have been 
constructed and Guang-Mei-Shan railway was completed in 1995. The terrain of 
Meixian physically thwarts the cold currents from the north and checks typhoons from 
the south. Meixian has a subtropical monsoon climate with an annual mean 
temperature of 20.6-21.4 degrees centigrade. The frost-free period of the year lasts 
about 310 days. The annual precipitation of Meixian approximates 1500 mm. 
Rainfall is plentiful during the typhoon season of June, July and August. This natural 
condition is favorable for the development of fanning and forestry (Meixian Local 
History Editorial Committee, 1995).
Meixian has a long history. Before the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C. - 206 B.C.), the 
region south of the Wuling Mountains was known Nanyue and regarded as a 
"barbarian and uncivilized land". According to the record of local history, 
Qinshihuang, the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, sent Zhao Tuo to develop Nanyue 
and set up three prefectures, namely, Guilin, Xiang and Nanhai. The area around 
Meixian first belonged to Nanhai Prefecture. Then the administrative division 
changed time and again due to the development of economy and the growth of 
population. The name of Meixian was first used in the early years of the Republic of 
China. At present, Meixian Prefecture consists of one city and six counties (Meixian 
Local Histoiy Editorial Committee, 1995).
The majority of the population in Meixian is Hakka, which is a special group 
of Han people in China. There is a consensus among the scholars of Hakka studies
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that the Hakka are descendants of the Han nationality migrating southward from 
central China in ancient times.1 Around the 4th century, in central China, the political, 
economic and cultural center at that time, there were increasingly sharp national and 
class contradictions and endless internal wars. To avoid the war devastation, a great 
number of local people in central China migrated southward across the Yangze River. 
During the Tang and Song Dynasties, places south of the Yangze were subjected to 
wars and natural disasters, which once again forced these people to move further 
southward. Because Guangdong was not their place of origin, they became the guest 
{ke in Mandarin, hak in local dialect) of Guangdong.2 In the reign of Emperor Yuan 
Di of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, local government described these immigrants from 
north in registration books as "Hakka household" (guest households) in local dialect. 
So the term "Hakkas" {ke jiciren) came into being.
On their way, they found 110 places for them to live on plains and most of them 
had to settle down in hilly areas and mountainous regions. For the sake of self­
protection, these "Hakkas" mostly lived in groups in out-of-the-way mountains and 
led a life of seclusion. Therefore, the Hakkas often say that "there must be guests in 
mountains, and no guests live in places other than mountains". Geographic limitation 
prevents the Hakkas from interacting with local people of Guangdong. So they are 
not totally assimilated by the local culture. They practice many traditional rituals and 
customs. According to many linguistic studies, the Hakka language almost 
completely retains the pronunciation of ancient Chinese (e.g. Lai & Ye, 1994; Liu, 
1994; Luo, 1994). The Hakkas are proud of their language. Huang Zhun-xian, a 
famous Hakka poet in the late Qing, stated in his poetry: "fangyan zhuzheng
1 People interested in Hakkas can read Xie and Zheng edited (1994) The Proceedings o f the 
International Conference on Hakkaology.
2 Recently, there are some scholars such as Wu Fu-wen begin to question the origins of the name 
"Hakka". As he says: "Most scholars say it refers to the 'guest' status of the Hakkas, or else to Xiajia 
or the 'Hele'. I believe these views to be wrong. Hakka is more than just a word; it is a cultural 
symbol, unique in content, and a name that the Hakka themselves accept. It is particularly noteworthy, 
with regard to this Hakka sense of self-identity, that the further south the Hakka live the stronger is this 
sense. The other is that tire She people also call themselves \She guests' or 'Mountain guests'. This is 
because the destiny of the She and that of the Hakka is the same." (Wu, 1994:25).
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zhongyuanyun, lisuyoucun Sandaiqian" (the Central rhyme can be discovered in local 
dialect, and the ritual of the Sandai dynasty can be found in the local customs).3
Due to the above historical background, Hakkas have a tradition of paying 
much attention to education. In addition, the Hakkas' predecessors were new-comers 
to the region and most of them inhabited poor mountainous areas where farmland was 
scarce. So the only way for them to improve their livelihood and social status was to 
undertake the imperial examination. This situation forced the Hakkas to form the 
tradition of sending their children, especially the sons, to schools even though their 
lives were usually hard, even if this meant having to sell their houses and land. There 
were also many schools built in the region and many Hakkas passed the imperial 
examination. In the middle period of the Qing Dynasty, education in the area was 
quite advanced. Because the males used most of their time in preparation for 
imperial examination, the females had to perform, both household and farm work. It is 
well known that the Hakka women do as much manual work as the men. The 
migration of the Hakkas males made the females become the heads of families and 
households. They took up the role of their husbands, e.g. farm work, teaching and 
raising their children, looking after the parents of their family, and making decisions 
for the family.
Meixian Prefecture is one of Guangdong Province's renowned native homes of 
overseas Chinese (<qicioxicing). About 1530,000 Chinese who reside overseas are 
Hakka. They are scattered in more than 50 countries and regions such as Mauritius, 
Australia, U.K, U.S.A, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Macau and so on. 
The main reason for the migrations was poverty. Meixian Prefecture used to be a 
poor hilly area with little arable land. When natural calamities came, many people 
had to leave their native places to make a living in Southeast Asia and other places. 
The overseas Chinese had a close connection with their native home. The majority of 
overseas Chinese are small businessmen or laborers who work hard to collect money 
to support their families or support public welfare (such as setting up schools and 
building bridges, roads and hospitals) in their native home (see Picture 2.1). This has
3 . The people in Meixian speak Hakka dialect. Hakka dialect still does not have standard translation in 
alphabetic writing. To avoid any confusion, I translate all speech from Hakka to Mandarin.
become the tradition of overseas Chinese. For example, in Meixian, three concrete 
bridges connecting the city and Songkou Town on the Meijiang River were built 
before the Communist China with the funds collected by overseas Chinese. The city's 
29 high schools all received financial support from overseas Chinese.
The hardship of life also forced the Hakkas to resist the heavy taxes of the 
government throughout the dynasties and to join in revolutions when they faced the 
survival crises because of natural disaster. There were many leaders in China's 
different revolutions who were Hakka, e.g. Hong Xiu-quan in the Taiping revolution, 
Sun Yet-sen in the Revolution of 1911, Ye Jian-ying, Chen Yi, Zhu De and Deng 
Xiao-ping in the Revolution of Communist. Erbaugh (1994) in her article The Secret 
History o f the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as A Hakka Enterprise has identified 
the common bond among these leaders. She tried to articulate the Hakka connection 
as a vital factor in the CCP revolution. As she declares,
Hakka ties matter for at least three reasons. When Hakka networks are 
uncovered, many vital political connections appear. Second, Hakka 
ethnic solidarity reveals the synergy between a cultural tradition and a 
historic moment. Hakka poverty made land reform worthwhile. 
Socialist revolution desperately needed traditional Hakka mobility, 
military prowess, and its strategically useful common language. Third,
Hakka history of the Long March era has been transformed into an icon 
of dissent which Deng Xiao-ping and his associates have promoted as 
an alternative ideal to Maoist invocations of Yan'an. Since the 1989 
Beijing massacre Deng's allies have yet again reprocessed these 
Hakka-based symbols in order to praise the military and solicit 
overseas investment (Erbaugh, 1994:758).
But any intention of essentialising Hakka as some kinds of outside rules or principles, 
which creating some kind of social behaviors, would be misplaced. To me Hakkas are 
more than a language ethnic group; they are a cultural resource which is articulated by 
human actors purposefully in the pursuit of their interests at specific historical times. 
So we cannot draw a simple conclusion that Hakkas as such are more rebellious and 
insurgent.
Now the Hakkas mainly concentrate in Meixian of Guangdong, and some are 
scattered in Hunan, Jiangxi, and Sichuan provinces. According to the Meixian 
almanac of 1995, the population of Meixian is about 580.5 thousands in 1994. The 
agricultural population occupies 86.99% (505 thousands) of the total population. In
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the reform period, its agriculture got rid of the former model of "grain only", and 
transformed into diversified commercial economy. Fruit production has become the 
dominant agriculture since the mid-1980s. In 1994, the fruit tree covered 324.1 
thousand hectares and the output was about 207.6 thousand tons. The Shatian pomelo 
occupies 141.6 thousands hectares of fruit production area and has become the pillar 
of the local economy. The township enterprises and industries also flourished in these 
ten years.
2.2. The Contour o f  Ku Village
Ku Village comes within the jurisdiction of Songnan Township. Songnan is 
one of the townships in Meixian, which is located at the northeast of Meixian (see 
Map 3 & 4). It's other name is "poor nan" (qiong nan) which means that this place is 
very poor. Before the rural reform in 1978, the income of Songnan villagers mainly 
depended on rice production. Due to the hilly area and limited arable land, the 
average income of Songnan was lower than national average income before rural 
reform. Most areas of Mei county were defined by the government as "poor mountain 
regions" (pinkun shanqu). Songnan is in charge of 13 administrative districts 
(guanliqu) and 148 village committees with a population of 1.6 thousand. Before 
Deng's reform period, paddy cultivation was the dominant fanning activity. Like 
other townships, after Meixian was designated as the country's major commercial 
pomelo-producing base in 1986, pomelo plantations became the most important 
income source of every peasant household.
Under the new administrative system which was established in the early 
1980s, there are two types of Cun (village) — the administrative village (xing zheng 
cun) and the natural village (zi ran cun). A natural village is mainly defined by 
territorial occupation, while an administrative village usually consists of several 
natural villages. A natural village may be divided into several "villager groups" {cun 
min xiao zu). According to this definition, Xiaohuangsha, my field area, is an 
administrative village; and Ku Village, where I stayed, is a natural village. The 
government now calls the administrative village a new name: "administrative district" 
(guan li qu). Based on the administrative hierarchy of the Chinese government, guan 
li qu is the organization of government at the lowest level (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1. New Administrative System
Province (Sheng)
City (Shi)
County (Xian)
Township (Xiang)
Administrative District (Xing Zheng Cun)
Natural Villages and Groups (Zhi Ran Cun & Cun Min Xiao Zu)
Xiaohuangsha is one of the administrative districts of Songnan Xiang, which includes 
eight natural villages (including Ku Village) and eight village committees with 11 
surnames (Map 4). The population of Xiaohuangsha is about 1,200 and its 
households total 269. Ku Village was divided into two cun min xiao zu. Like other 
administrative districts, almost all the villagers of Xiaohuangsha mainly engage in 
agriculture. The main grain is paddy rice although the cultivating area has been 
decreasing over the past ten years (see Table 2.2). Now the dominant crop is Shatian 
pomelo which is the main income of peasant households.
Ku Village is a localized residential unit which is clearly separated from the 
other adjacent lineage villages by a narrow village lane. It is a small natural village 
with a single-surname (Ku) lineage, as is common in rural China. All male members 
of the same generation within a given lineage consider themselves to be brothers and 
they often use appropriate fraternal forms of address. All the members of the same 
generation consider themselves to be sisters or brothers and employ the same terms of 
address as those used by real brothers and sisters. The different generations, in the 
same way, use appropriate kinship terms, calling one another uncles and nephews, and 
aimt and nieces, so that eveiyone within Ku Village is incorporated linguistically into 
a family-like group. But the lineage is not the extended family. It is a corporate 
group with economic, ritual, political, religious, and military functions.
In Ku Village, the population was about 260 in 1992 and its households 
totaled about 61 (see Table 2.2). According to the former accountant, who keeps the 
census data and statistical data of Ku Village, the number of households and the 
population of Ku Village stayed constant during these forty years. Although some
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young people have become migrant labourers in the Pearl River Delta (PRD), Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) and Guangzhou in the reform era, because of the hukou 
system (household registration), it is difficult for them to change their official identity 
as nongmin (peasants). Even though they have worked full-time in a factory for a 
long time and de facto they no longer participate in agriculture activities, they are still 
labeled as nongmin because it is inherited. There are some exceptional cases like 
Brother Ming, who joined the Liberation Army and gained a non-peasant hukou after 
he was assigned a job in the city by the government. Succeeding at school is another 
way the villagers are able to change their household registration. If the young 
villagers can enter the university, they are assigned a job in a city after graduation and 
given a non-peasant hukou. At present, the villagers can also use money to buy an 
urban hukou.
Table 2.2. Selected Statistics of Songnan Township and Ku Village
Year Total Population Total Household Total Manpower Arable Area
Ku Vill Songnan Ku Vill Songnan Ku Vill Songnan Ku Vill Songnan
1978 255 I 61 / 90 / 246 /
1981 / 16,515 / 4,044 / 6,541 / 13,772
1985 / 15,924 / 3,823 / 7,286 / /
1992 260 16,723 61 4,090 95 7,535 228 12,848
Source: Commune Statistic Data of Mei County in 1981; Statistics of Income Distribution of 
Agricultural Economy in Mei County in 1985; The Data of Basic Situation of Mei County’s 
Villages in 1992. The data of Ku Village is provided by the former accountant of Ku Village.
All the villagers are engaged in agriculture in Ku Village. The predominant 
crop before 1978 was paddy rice. The minor crops are vegetables, sweet potatoes, 
peanuts, bananas, sugar cane, oranges, tangerines and so on. There are only about 200 
mu of arable land scattered in the mountain village, averaging 8 fen  per villager (see 
Table I). But after the introduction of pomelo plantation projects in the mid-1980s, 
the villagers opened up the wasteland at the hillside. Now there are 4 households 
owning 8 mu private plots. The economic transformation of Ku Village will be 
presented in detail in Chapter Four.
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Ku Village is surrounded by a range of craggy mountains as in Chinese 
painting (see Picture 2.2 & Picture 2.3).4 Although in mountainous area, Ku Village 
is not so remote. But the transportation of Ku Village is poor since there is only one 
small path from Ku Village to Songkou town (the nearest market town). After a rain, 
the road will become muddy and rugged. People easily get stuck in the mud. The 
mountain interferes with Ku Village's communication with the outside world. Some 
old female villagers told me that they have never been to Meixian. To the villagers, 
the nearest town is Songkou Town. If riding a bicycle, people have to spend 30 to 45 
minutes to get there. If walking, people have to spend more than an hour. If villagers 
go to the county seat, they have to take the long-distance bus in Songkou township. 
Traveling to Meixian from Songkou still requires half a day.
There is a small stream running across Ku Village and field. The villagers told 
me that the stream joins with the main river {Mei Jiang) of Mei county. The river is 
the primary water source of Ku Village. Women wash their clothes, vegetables, 
dishes, and cooking instruments at the riverside (see Picture 2.4). They also irrigate 
their fields and trees by using a small electric pump to extract water from the stream. 
The river also provides the electricity for the village because they have built a small 
dam and electricity station at the upper reaches of the river back in the days of the 
communes. The river also provides much fun for the children for, fishing, and 
collecting stones and shells. But the villagers complain that in these ten years, 
chemical fertilizers which are popularly utilized for the pomelo plantation have 
polluted the river. Many households have dug the wells for drinking water.
In the village, the pomelo trees almost cover all the arable land and lower 
hillsides. Looking down at the mountain, we can find the village is very green and 
lush. The traditional buildings and the modem story buildings are mixed together. 
There are many modern two-stoiy houses being built in the village after the rural 
reforms in Deng's era. To me the outstanding styles are still the traditional palace-like 
house and "circling dragon" house (see Figure 2.1).
4. For protecting tlie informants and the village, I change the name of the informants and tire original 
name of the village to Ku Village.
skylight
skylight
threshing ground
Figure 1. The Structure of Palace-like House
The palace-like house is similar to the mansions of the Han people in central China. It 
employs a combination of building techniques, such as the "pillar and beam 
construction" and "pillar-and transverse tie beams", which are traditional Chinese 
architectural features. The building places emphasis on layout, direction, priority, 
symmetry and outlook. The house is characterized by numerous halls and skylights 
(see Figure 1). The three main halls are flanked by two or four wing chambers 
serving as living quarters, which are divided into several rooms centering around 
sitting rooms.
Generally, the new house is only occupied by one household, but there are 
four to five households living in a traditional house, which the villagers call a clawu 
(big house). People living in the same big house have a closer kin relationship. The 
"circling dragon" house is located at the center of the village, which is the ancestral 
hall of the Kus. The main features of the circling dragon house include a back
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enclosure in the shape of a horse's hoof which is popularly known as the "circling 
dragon". The front hall of the circling dragon house is used by the villagers as their 
ancestral hall. The villagers called the ancestral hall zugong ting in local dialect, 
where is the important location for collective activities in the village such as collective 
worship. In front of the ancestral hall, there are two fishponds which are for the sake 
of fengshui (geomagnetic omen). In Ku Village, every big house has its own name. 
There were six big houses, e.g. Shan Yu House, Chen Qing Estate, and so on.
2.3. Genealogy o f  Ku
Every village has its own story about its history. Ku Village also has the tale 
of the Ku lineage. All the males are descended on their fathers' side from a common 
ancestor. The name of the ancestral hall in Ku Village is called "Xin-an Tong" (see 
Picture 2.5). The ancestral cult was a central component of the villagers' worldview. 
To honor their ancestors and affirm their common roots in the past, the Kus built an 
ancestral hall within the village which kept the sacred tablets and records containing 
the genealogies of their village. The written genealogy (zupu) was kept by the elders 
of each lineage; it includes the names of all the male members of group down through 
the generations. These registers serve as legal documents which defined the exact 
membership of the lineage and its various sub-branches and specified who could share 
the ancestral estate owned by the lineage. There was a zupu including the members of 
the whole village, and there was also another kind of zupu that includes only the 
members of the sub-kin which live in the same clawu (big house). Ku's zupu of the 
whole village was burnt in Cultural Revolution. So in fact, the younger generation 
had never seen their Ku genealogy before. In the 1990s, the elderly in Ku Village 
began to organize the villagers to reconstruct their ancestral hall. They also planned 
to reconstruct their zupu. They told me that some overseas villagers still maintained 
their sub-genealogies. It was quite time-consuming to collect the sub-genealogies and 
rebuild the zupu of the whole village. When I had left the village, they still had not 
started to do this.
According to the inscription on a tablet in the Ku ancestral hall, "the scions of 
Ku Village originally lived in Xin-an township of Da-tong Prefecture ifu) in Shanxi
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province. Now the name of Xin-an township has been changed to Wei township. 
Their ancestor, Ku Bi, in Bei-wei of Nan-bei Dynasty was a Minister (Shangshu) of 
the Ministry of Official Personnel Affairs (libu). A Minister in the Bei-wei and Bei 
Dynasty was equal to a Prime Minister (Zaixiang). Ku Bi Gong's title was Ling Shou 
Hou (noble). The emperor of Wei Dynasty praised him: 'An official like Ku-Bi Gong 
is a treasure of the state'. The founder of Ku Village was a successful candidate in the 
highest imperial examination (Jinshi) of Ming Dynasty. He was the 41st descendant 
of Ku Bi Gong. They have been settled at the present location for several hundred 
years.
Comparatively speaking, the women of the village showed little interest in its 
origin 01* its genealogy. But the old men often told me stories about the ancestry and 
origins of the village. Some like Uncle Bin, one of my informants who is a active 
informal leader in Ku Village, were keen to let me see the Ku genealogy. On the first 
day I arrived at the village, Uncle Si brought me to visit the ancestral hall and worship 
the ancestors. In their view, I need to know the history of the my ancestors and the 
village because I am a male descendant. They also perceived my coming as renzu 
guizhong (acknowledgment of ancestor). Like the female villagers, some young male 
villagers in their twenties 01* thirties had little interest in their genealogy. They never 
talked with me about their ancestors or their origins.
The ancestral hall was also an important economic organization in the village 
before 1949. There was a collective ownership of ancestral estates attached to 
ancestral halls. The ancestral hall elders rented out their public land, orchards, and 
fishponds, and used the income to finance the ancestor-worshipping ceremonies. 
Dming Chinese New Year or other important traditional festivals, like yuanxiao and 
zhongqiu, the villager would offer sacrifices to their ancestors. The ancestral hall also 
played the function of social welfare. The collective property was partly used for 
supporting the education of young villagers, as well as supporting the widows and 
orphans who were in need.5 The ancestral hall became public property after
collectivization in the 1950s. It became the granary for the production team.
5. The importance of kinship and lineage in local political economy has been affirmed by many studies 
of South China's villages (Whyte & Parish, 1978; Potter & Potter, 1990).
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Religious activities were also totally banned by the government in the collective era. 
The hall was returned to villagers in the late 1970s and was repaired by the villagers. 
In Chapter Eight, I will discuss how the Ku villagers reconstructed their ancestral hall 
and organized the Management Committee of the Ancestral Hall after the rural 
reforms.
Before 1949, like the other areas of rural China, the formation of the 
traditional authority in rural China was partially based upon the differences in terms 
of generation, age and sex. These differences among the individuals either in a 
domestic group or in a larger kin group determined the hierarchical position in the 
rural communities (e.g. Baker, 1979; Potter & Potter, 1990; Huang, 1985). 
Additionally, the traditional authority was based on the economic power, education 
level and political connections of the individuals. As Schunnann pointed out, "the 
local leaders' economic power was based on land ownership, its political power was 
based on its relationships to the state bureaucracy, and its social power was based on 
its traditional status" (1968:497). The economic power made some households 
capable of holding expensive ceremonies, making large religious contributions and 
giving personal loans and donations. The connection with local government also 
made some households able to represent them in bargaining with the state. So in rural 
China during the pre-communist period, the legitimacy of local leaders was granted 
by villagers based on their contribution to the village (Duara, 1987; Siu, 1989; Zhang, 
1991; Fei, 1992). Basically there were two kinds of leaders in Ku Village. The 'elder' 
of the lineage, the oldest men in the most senior generation, were the ritual leaders in 
the ancestor-worshipping ceremonies in the hall. They also helped to manage the 
ancestral property. The other kind of the leaders was the wealthy men of high status. 
They included the landlords, local despots, and gentry graduates of the nationwide 
civil service examination, who qualified for official office. For instance, the 
households of Yu Qing House earned the respect of the villagers because most of their 
male members had high education; the households of Chen Qing Estate occupied high 
social hierarchy because of their economic power.
58
Hakka people pay much attention to fengshui.6 Fengshui is a very abstruse 
philosophy about how to maintain harmony between nature and human beings. As 
Feuchtwang (1982) states, in south China, people's graves, houses, and ancestral halls 
are located and constructed conforming to the rules of fengshui. Fengshui is strongly 
believed to be a primary source of luck and efficacy, which will affect their wealth 
and the continuity of the line of Ku. Success is associated with the control of good 
fengshui, and vice versa. Fengshui could be a beneficial force if it is properly handled, 
but instead, it could also be extremely dangerous and destructive if it is used 
improperly or clumsily. Fengshui teachers or specialists are employed to design 
villages, houses, tombs, ancestral halls, and other structures so that they will draw 
maximum power from the invisible currents flowing over the earth, while avoiding 
the bad influences. The villagers believe that if the fengshui design is wrong, it might 
lead to the death or impoverishment of the inhabitants. So within each village the 
ancestral halls, and even the doors and windows of houses and the shape of their 
roofs, are determined by advice from fengshui specialists. To "modem" people, 
fengshui is regarded as "backward" and "uncivilized", but to the villagers, it is 
essential for their survival.
My informant, Brother Li, told me a story about Ku Village's fengshui. 
According to his father, he said, Ku Village was not a single surname village. There 
had been three lineages of other surnames when their ancestor settled there long time 
ago. But after several generations, the other lineages disappeared because of their bad 
geomagnetic omen (fengshui). Brother Li explained to me:
The discontinuity of other lineages was because of their wrong 
fengshui. Those lineage with a strong fengshui will overcome the 
weak ones. The other lineage couldn't get their male descendants, and 
generation after generation, their lineage was eventually wiped out.
You see, the fengshui of Ku's ancestral hall is very good according to 
the fengshui teachers (xiansheng). They told us the range of mountains 
surrounding Ku Village looks like an ancient folding chair, and the 
stream running across the village is like a jade waistband of traditional 
officials. This kind of fengshui makes many descendants obtain high 
honor in education and become officials.
Readers interested in Chinese geomancy (fengshui) can see Stephen. D. R. Feutchwang’s book An 
Anthropological Analysis o f Chinese Geomancy, 1982 or Stephen Skinner, The Living Earth Mannual 
o f Fengshui.
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Like other Hakka people, Ku villagers also pay much attention to education. 
The Songxi Primary School was set up by the Ku villagers in the late Qing. At the 
time, the villagers were poor and they could not raise enough funds among the 
villagers. So Uncle Si's grand father went to Indonesia three times to raise funds 
among the overseas fellow villagers (tongxiang). My relatives asked me to remember 
the contribution of my great-grandfather (zengzufu) and continue his honourable 
work. The local school was located at the center of Xiaohuang for the sake of 
providing education for the children horn other neighboring villages. The school was 
run and funded by the local people. It was one of the important local organizations in 
the village because most of their teachers are people with prestige and influence in 
their villages. They are involved in many important affairs in the village. But the 
school was handed over to the Communist state after 1949.
2.4. The World o f  Guanxi and Zeren
To the villagers, Ku Village is a world of multiple guanxi and zeren. Most of 
their guanxi networks are ordained e.g. kinship guanxi, parent/children guanxi, 
husband/wife guanxi, and ancestor/descendant guanxi. Within guanxi circles and 
networks, their mutual zeren and rights have been pre-defmed. By saying that their 
zeren has been pre-defmed, this implies there is a norm or principle of mutual zeren 
which was collectively constructed and shared by the members in the community. 
Nevertheless, the pre-defmed zeren is never static. It is socially constructed and re­
constructed in everyday practices through which their conception of zeren within 
guanxi was transmitted from generation to generation. On many different occasions 
the Ku villagers perform and fulfill their zeren within the ordained guanxi. Broadly, I 
classify these occasions into two kinds: important ceremonies and everyday life.
Performing Mutual Zeren in Important ceremonies
The Ku villagers usually call the important events and ceremonies "dashi", 
which includes funerals, weddings, birthday celebrations, and ancestral worship. 
Dashi mostly involves a lot of people. The original meaning of the Chinese word shi
60
can be interpreted into English as "affair”, or "matter" or "business". It is dashi not 
only because it is important, but also the expenditure is huge and needs support from 
other households. As the villagers are required to perform rituals and celebrations in 
dashi, so professionals concerning rituals, e.g. fengshui masters, monks {he shang), 
and nuns (ni gu), will be invited to hold the ceremonies. Gift exchange is also veiy 
important in dashi. As Sahlins states,
The connection between material flow and social relations is 
reciprocal. A specific social relation may constrain a given movement 
of goods, but a specific transaction - by the same token - suggests a 
particular social relation. If friends make gifts, gifts make friends 
(Sahlins, 1972:186).
So gift exchange in itself reflects an expectation of keeping a long-term relationship 
between the giver and recipient.7
Funerals
Funerals are, to the villagers, or generally speaking to Hakka, a very important 
dashi. Many scholarly efforts have been devoted to the Chinese death ritual (e.g. 
Watson & Rawski, 1988). Some have argued that the funeral is an important arena to 
reinforce guanxi (e.g. Yan, 1996; Kipnis, 1997). Ku Village does not display 
significant differences from other places of rural China, but the detail of procedure or 
ritual is somewhat different.
During my fieldwork period, I have participated in and observed two funerals 
which involved almost all the households in the village. In the funerals, we can 
discover the reciprocal relationship between the living and the dead, and between the 
living and the living (see Picture 2.6). To the villagers, the death of their parents or 
grandparents does not imply that they have finished their zeren. As Watson notes, 
"death does not terminate relationships of reciprocity among Chinese, it simply 
transforms these ties and often makes them stronger" (1988:9). The offerings of food 
and paper models e.g. paper money, paper maids and servants, paper TVs, paper cars 
and so on, constitute the most important part of the funeral, which also constitute part
7. Anyone interested in the practice of gift exchange in rural China can read Yan (1996).
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of the children's zeren to their parents. They believed that if they do not offer enough 
food and things to their parents, they will become hungry ghosts and unhappy in 
yinjian (the nether region), because the paper models represent the basic needs of the 
afterlife. The children who do not fulfill their zeren would be condemned as unfllial 
children (buxiaozi). They will lose face (mianzi) and could not raise their head (tai bu 
qi ton) in front of the other villagers. Children express their filial piety (xiaoxun) 
through offerings; at the same time, they also expect future blessings from the dead.
At the funeral, most households in the village send at least one representative 
to pay respects to the dead (see Picture 2.7). The households which have closer 
guanxi with the deceased or its household would send more people to help the funeral. 
The agnates and affines of the deceased also make every effort to participate in the 
funeral. Absence from a funeral is considered an extremely unfriendly gesture and 
may destroy the existing interpersonal relationships. Offerings were not only 
presented by the family members, but also from the members within Ku Village, and 
the agnates and affines from other villages. Some present food; some present flags; 
some offer paper models; some burn joss sticks and candles; some only come to 
kowtow (,koutou). It depends on how close their guanxi is with the deceased or that 
household. The villagers or other relatives and friend (qinqi pengyou) attend the 
funeral not only to show their respect to the deceased, they also came to give some 
material and emotional support to the household of the deceased. Most of them sent 
baijing (white moneys).8 The amount depends 011 their economic capability, from 5 
yuan to 200 yuan. A gift-list book was often prepared to record the name of visitors 
and the amount of money they contributed. For showing the appreciation of the 
deceased’s survivors, a simple meal 01* banquet was often provided at the end of the 
final day of the funeral in return. As Yan (1996) says, the banquets can be viewed as 
an immediate reciprocity made by the host to the guests.
During the funeral, there are some ritual specialists who were in charge of all 
the ceremony. Not only the old people participated into the funeral, the young 
people also helped a lot. They moved the table, earned the coffin, beat drums and
8. White money (baijin) was sent to the household of the deceased for support. Red money (hongjin) 
was sent at weddings. White in Chinese signifies something bad or unfortunate. Red in Chinese 
signifies something good and happy.
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gongs (qiaoluo dagu) and did other heavy work. Anyone giving assistance would 
receive the red pocket money (hongbao) in return for good fortune (Ushi). The 
children also came to join in fun (cou renao). The local primary school also sent a 
team of student representatives to pay respect to the deceased. The process of the 
funeral constitutes part of their experience in which the younger generation is 
socialized. They learn the norms and values of the village through the funeral rituals 
without any formal training.
Wedding
According to other studies of rural China, weddings are considered as one of 
the most important rituals in rural China (Baker, 1979; Whyte & Parish, 1980; Potter 
& Potter, 1990; Yan, 1996; Kipnis, 1997). However, in Ku Village, not all the 
households have wedding ceremonies. During my stay in Ku Village, I did not have 
opportunity to participate in any weddings, so all the information about weddings is 
based on the narration of my informants.
The reasons for not having a wedding ceremony were complicated. Some did 
not hold a ceremony because of financial difficulties, and some were married secretly 
due to poor relationships with many villagers. Some kept their marriages in low- 
profile to avoid the attention of village cadres because they were getting married 
earlier than the legal marriage age. As Brother Xin told me, “Having a wedding 
means that we announce our engagement openly. They (village cadres) then have 
right to investigate our marriage certificate and fine us. You know, we violate the 
Marriage Law.”
Others chose not to have a wedding because they got their wives from poor 
remote areas in other provinces, e.g. Jiangxi and Hunan.9 To them, it was something 
not very honourable, in their words, diulian (losing face). In their eyes, only poor 
families had to get wives from other provinces. In Ku Village, some marriages were 
still arranged by parents through the matchmakers (meiren). The old villagers told me 
that they still preferred their son to get married with fellow villagers or with girls from
9 . To my knowledge, at least six brides came from poor areas in other provinces.
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neighbour villages. The reason was that they could thus know the girls and their 
family backgrounds better. However, today this preference has become more and 
more difficult to fulfill as most young village girls like to get married with city guys 
or those from rich villages. As Aunt Shu-zhen said, “Ku Village is too shan (remote 
and mountainous). The girls aren’t willing to stay here.” 10
The villagers told me that there were no more traditional wedding rituals in Ku 
Village because most of them thought it was outdated (guoshi) and some thought it 
was too expensive; therefore, they only invited close relatives to have a simple meal 
or banquet. As with funerals, the households sent only one representative to join the 
banquets. Most of the time, the representative was a male family member. The guests 
of the wedding also brought a gift in return. Popular gifts were clocks, furniture, 
family appliances and jingkuan (glass-framed artwork) 011 which were words of 
greeting. Gift could be cash. There was no fixed amount of cash, it depended on the 
degree of closeness between the givers and the recipients. The villagers called going 
to banquets "chi xijiu" (drinking the wine of happiness). At the banquets, wine and 
cigarettes had to be prepared for the guests because most of them were male.
Traditionally, the bride and groom had to perform kowtow which represented 
repaying parents' kindness in rearing them (fume yangyu zhi en). The groom and 
bride also received monetary gifts (hongbao) from their parents in return. The bride 
also had to worship her husband's ancestors, through which the villagers would 
recognize her as the member of the Kus. In Ku Village, the young 110 longer perform 
kowtow, but the ritual of worshipping ancestors still maintained. The formal wedding 
often involves many helpers, like cooks and musicians, who work for the family 
during the wedding. The host family gives cash gift to them in return.
10 . Now more and more young villagers would like to choose their partners by themselves. I know of 
some villagers met their partners in schools and some chose their partners in factories. This caused 
some conflicts between parents and children. Sometimes I heard the old villagers complain about the 
disobedience and unfilial piety of their son/daughter-in-law.
64
Childbirth
Childbirth celebrations are mainly held for a son. The birth of a girl is not a 
cause for rejoicing to the villagers under the birth control of the Chinese government 
because a girl would use up their birth quota. Getting a girl means they lose an 
opportunity to have a son.
To Hakkas, and maybe not just Hakkas, bringing up a girl is a losing 
proposition (ladben shengyi). As they say, daughters do not belong to them. They are 
reared for other families because they have to follow their husbands. In Ku Village, 
daughters are often likened to spilled water (pochuqu de shui). In contrast, sons are 
not only important for the continuity of family line, but also to the reproduction of Ku 
kinship. So in rural China, getting a son is not only one’s own business (zijici de shi), 
but also the business of whole village. It is part of children's zeren to their parents and 
ancestors. "Bu xiao you san, wu hou wei da” (there are three kinds of unfilial piety, 
but not producing male offspring is the most serious one) is a famous aphorism in 
Chinese society, which reflects that Chinese value highly the continuity of family line.
So relatives and friends come to visit the newborn baby boy and to bring gifts 
to the family. The gifts consisted of various kinds of food and appliances. Chicken is 
the most popular food because the people think chicken is nourishing (bu) and good 
for the mother's health. The blanket and baby clothes are often the preferable gifts. 
Banquets are also offered by the host family in appreciation for the coming of 
relatives and friends. The celebration of a son’s birth is an occasion of regenerating 
their conception of getting a son, and the idea of zeren between parents and children.
Mutual Visiting in Festivals
The important festivals, e.g. Lunar New Year, Mid-Autumn, and Yuanxiao, 
are the best times for mutual visiting. With regard to gift giving, lunar New Year 
visits is particularly receive attention by the villagers. From the 1st day to the 10th 
day of lunar January, the relatives and friends visit each other. Generally, the days of 
people visiting each other corresponds to their closeness. The first day of the first 
lunar month is often reserved for one's parents and grand parents, brothers and sisters, 
and the closest matrilateral relatives; the next several days are devoted to the close
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agnates and friends; and then the last several days are for the less close relatives and 
friends. Under normal situations, the senior villagers do not visit the junior relatives. 
They stay at home and wait for the juniors to come to them.
No one must arrive empty handed at the visits relatives and friends during 
Lunar Chinese New Year. They bring different kinds of gifts, including Chinese 
cakes, wine, cigarettes, sweets, biscuits, fresh fruit and so forth. When the guests 
come, the host normally serves them tea, sweets, biscuits, or dessert. Sometimes, they 
also invite the guest to have lunch.
During my fieldwork, in Lunar New Year, I found the villagers did not take all 
the gifts from the guest. They just took some of the gifts out of the container and 
replaced their own gifts in. The guest normally asked the host to receive the rest of 
the gifts, and the host would say that their good feeling has been conveyed by their 
gifts and insist that the guest should take the rest back. Repeatedly expressing 
gratitude to each other usually happens before the guests finally leave. To the Ku 
villagers, the guests' container should not be empty after visiting. This represents the 
immediate reciprocity between the villagers. The adults also normally give yasuiqian 
(money) to the children in Lunar New Year.11 I noticed that if both guest and host 
had children, the value of their ycisuiqicin was almost the same.12 The gifts were 
normally exchanged between the same generation {pingbei) and friends. If the young 
people came to visit the senior ones, like children to parents, gifts were not expected 
in return.
Returning of Huaqiao
As I stated, Meixian Prefecture is one of Guangdong Province's renowned 
homes of overseas Chinese (huaqiao). To the villagers, return visits by huaqiao are a
11. Readers interested in the gift-exchange in Chinese Lunar New Year can read Yan (1996) and Cohen 
(1990).
12. According to Ye and Wu, the custom of Yasui can be traced back to the Han dynasty. The word 
yasui means to repress the devils or ghosts. In Chinese, ya  means 'repress' and sui originally means 
'devils' or 'ghosts'. The Money is used to protect children from wandering ghosts. But nowadays, 
people seldom know the meaning underlying die practice. They just think money is given for good 
luck in the coming new year.
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dashi, especially at the beginning of the 80s. This is because the closed-door policy 
of the Communist government in Mao's era had limited the interaction between the 
rural population and their overseas relatives for about 30 year's. The news of returning 
huaqiao often quickly spreads through the village, even outside villages. The 
returning huaqiao would obtain high respect from the villagers. Culturally speaking, 
those returning to the village were regarded as renzu guizong (acknowledging their 
ancestors and roots). To Ku villagers, it is one kind of virtue. In addition, huaqiao 
often bring benefits to the village.
There was a similar phenomena that the huaqiao often brought many 
expensive gifts, e.g. foreign style clothes, foods, bicycles, sewing machines, radios, 
televisions, even videocassette recorders, to their village relatives. The xiangqin 
(fellow villager), qinqi (relatives), pengyou (friends), and other agnates and affines 
from outside villages all came to visit the huaqiao. They often brought some 
homemade or local products (jiaxiang techan) to the huaqiao for showing their love 
and affection. Meanwhile, the huaqiao had to give something in return But the value 
of their gifts reflected the closeness between the huaqiao and the visitors. The close 
family members could receive an expensive gift, like TV, from the huaqiao, and the 
remote friends and relatives could get only sweets and biscuits. Through the gift 
exchange, we could find that guanxi in village society was just like Fei's analogy of 
throwing the stone into a lake. As he said,
Social relationships in China possess a self-centered quality. Like the 
ripples formed from a stone thrown into a lake, each circle spreading 
out from the center becomes more distant and at the same time more 
insignificant (Fei, 1992:65).
Most often the huaqiao family has to offer a banquet for the fellow villagers, relatives 
and friends. Since Ku Village is veiy small, there is no need of formal invitations. 
The people invite their guests by mouth (kouxin), even inviting the relatives and friend 
of other villages. The host must invite a small group of assistants, including cooks, to 
prepare the food. They can be the members of Ku Village or villagers from other 
villages. They are also paid a hongbao by the huaqiao. The size of the banquet is 
usually determined by the number of tables served. The number of tables is treated as 
an indicator that reflects the financial capacity (caili) of the huaqiao. The villagers 
would like to compare the value of huaqiao's gift and the size of the banquet in their
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daily life chatting. Sometimes they discuss the banquet in minute detail, like how 
many dishes for each table, and what brand of wine and cigarettes the host served. To 
not lose their face (diu lian), the huaqiao must at least offer ten tables at the banquets. 
When I was staying in the village, within a month, there were two huaqiao returning 
to village. Uncle Si's older brother came back from Indonesia for his father's funeral. 
He provided a big banquet (14 tables) for the fellow villagers and relatives (see 
Picture 2.8). After one week, Uncle Qiang's brother also came back from Indonesia 
hut only offered five tables. Uncle Qiang was very angry and cursed his brother for 
losing the face of his family {din zijijia de lian). The villagers were also gossiping, 
comparing the two huaqiao.
Huaqiao are often requested by the villagers to make some financial 
contributions to the village. Different village organizations, e.g. the ancestral hall 
committee, the house of the old people, schools, and the village committee, will send 
their representatives to visit the huaqiao and ask for donations. For honoring and 
appreciating the contribution of the huaqiao, the organizations will write a letter of 
thanks on a large red paper and put in on the wall in order to let all the people know 
the contribution of the huaqiao (see Picture 2.9). The economic power of huaqiao 
makes them or their family members in the village to become the village leaders, and 
sometimes influence the decisions of the village. In Chapter 8, I will explore 
formation of the new village leaders and how the huaqiao factor was articulated as a 
political resource of the villagers to fight against the local government and cadres.
Practicing Guanxi in Everyday Life
In addition to important ceremonies, villagers practice guanxi and perform 
zeren in everyday life. By contrast, there is no performance of a formal ritual or 
celebration in the practice of eveiyday life. But because there is no formal ritual and 
performance, people can cultivate their guanxi with others and perform their zeren. 
Similar to the occasion of ceremonies, their practice in daily life also plays an 
important role in creating life meaning and reinforcing of guanxi in village society.
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Mutual Visits
Mutual visit among the villagers and relatives is a popular practice in daily 
life. The Ku villagers would like to visit each other after lunch and dinner. In Ku 
Village, I could easily identify which families were welcomed by villagers because 
every time I went to visit them, many people had gathered together there. The host 
often making tea (paocha) for the guests and the men also shared their cigarettes with 
other. They chatted about anything under heaven and earth (tantian shuodi). Mutual 
visiting is not only regarded by the villagers as a crucial means of meeting each other 
and maintaining a good relationship (lianluo ganqing), but also as an important 
occasion for sharing and spreading news about the market situation and the state 
policies. Sometimes they reminisce and sometimes they debate with each other. The 
old villagers like to tell their own stories, talk about the history of their ancestors and 
Ku Village, and their life experiences under Mao. They made comparisons and 
judgments about the government under Mao's and Deng's leadership. So in political 
sense, mutual visiting is not an unimportant occasion for forming their discourse and 
arriving at a consensus among themselves. In the later chapters, I will discuss the 
important role of everyday gathering and visiting in the peasants resistance.
Visiting the Patient
Visiting someone who falls ill is another occasion for showing friendship and 
maintaining good guanxi. Ku villagers, think that it is their zeren to take care of 
unfortunate villagers and comfort their families.
When I conducted my first field research in Ku Village, Brother San was 
seriously hurt by a falling tree at the hillside. When the villagers found him, he was 
unconscious. The villagers sent him to the hospital and some of them took care of 
him in hospital over night in shifts. The villagers visited him so often while he was 
staying in hospital. Some sent him money and some bought him nutritious foods. 
Some also voluntarily assisted and supported his family during the period of harvest. 
As the villagers told me, Brother San was a nice and helpful young person in Ku 
Village as he often actively helped others and thus had built up a good guanxi with the 
villagers.
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When the old people in the village fall ill, the Old People’s Association will 
send representatives to visit the sick and send them gifts. The relatives and friends 
will also come to show their regards and good feeling. In Ku Village, the villagers 
also perform zeren by supporting the old people who are without children. In short, 
visiting the sick is also an occasion in everyday life to maintain the mutual 
relationships and emotional ties among the villagers.
Exchange of Products
After de-collectivization, the villagers obtained the freedom to differentiate 
their production. In Ku Village, although the Shatian pomelo plantation has become 
the dominate production since the mid-1980s, they also produce some other kinds of 
fruits, e.g. bananas, oranges, yangtao, longyan, watermelon, wuhuali and so on. 
Some families also maintain a small piece of land for vegetable growing for self­
consumption. When the villagers collected their fruits, they would send some of their 
products to those in their social network.
The villagers would also share their garden products, like vegetables, with 
other families, who have not produced that kind of product, when they cannot 
consume all the vegetables. When I was staying in Ku Village, the villagers 
sometimes sent their vegetables and fish to my uncle to show their love and concern 
to me.
Exchange of Labour
In Ku Village, people have a mutual zeren to help each other in harvest period. 
They do not calculate the exchange labour in wages. Their performance of labour 
exchange is based on the moral principle of reciprocity, e.g. mutual aid, obligation 
and so on. I noticed that even if households have enough labor, they still exchange 
their labour with other households. It is, I think, because their motivation for 
obtaining labour is partially for the sake of promoting of good human relationship, 
rather than obtaining profit.
Some households without sufficient labour still obtain the assistance from 
other households which have good guanxi with them. They are normally paid but the
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wage is not precisely calculated. As the villagers said, it was only for ritual. The 
daughters, who are living in other villages, will also come home to help during 
harvest. Their zeren to their original family never ends, even they have got married. 
Sometime the relatives also come to help them in harvest.
Instrumental Guanxi in Ku Village
In Ku Village, the villagers sometimes also cultivate guanxi with others for 
personal favors. If someone suddenly presents a gift to someone with whom they 
have no previous interaction or good relationship, their motives will be suspected. The 
villagers seem to disappreciate instrumental guanxi building. To them, searching for 
self interest through inappropriate means, in their terms “bu zhengdang shouduan”, is 
immoral and against the principle of justice and equity. The villagers also believe that 
something relating to personal moral standing and overall capabilities should not be 
exchanged for material objects.
In Ku Village, I heard several cases about villagers who tried to cultivate 
guanxi with the local cadres for their own interest. For instance, last year when the 
public fishpond was inviting tender (zhao biao), for obtaining the contract, Liang (a 
villager) directly approached the village party secretary by presenting her gifts. In the 
end, the fishpond was contracted out to him without public bidding, but some 
villagers were very dissatisfied. I also heard some villagers, who wanted to go to 
dagong (work) in Special Economic Zone (SEZ) or Pearl River Delta (PRD), would 
present gifts to the cadres in order to get a certificate of single status.13 There were 
also some villagers who presented gifts to school teachers and principals for their 
children's college admission or graduate certificate. Uncle Si angrily told me 
something concerning the new village head who obtained the contract of school 
expansion project from Uncle Xiang, who was the principal of Songxi primary school, 
by sending him good wine.
In short, anyone practicing instrumental guanxi would be despised by the 
villagers. In such cases, the recipient and sender are both the target of public
l3. For controlling the birth of the migrant labour, the Chinese government stipulates that labours have 
to show their certificate of single status, which is issued by the village committee.
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criticism. The villagers often gossip and criticize these people in their everyday 
chatting. There are several people who have a bad name from other villagers because 
they have presented gifts to the cadres.
2,5 Discussion
In traditional anthropology, especially among the stractural-functionalists, 
kinship was considered as the structural basis upon which social relations are built. 
Following the suit of this tradition, Maurice Freedman (1958, 1966) developed a 
lineage paradigm of Chinese society, which greatly affected all the major studies of 
lineage organization in south China (e.g. Baker, 1966, 1979; Liu, 1985; Potter, 1970; 
Watson, 1975), In recent years, alongside the general critique of structuralism, the 
conventional anthropological concepts like "kinship" and "ritual" have been under re­
examination. The universality of the lineage system in Chinese society has been 
challenged, and kinship is not treated as the only working system that binds people 
together (Chun, 1996). Rather, kinship or lineage is a cultural product which is 
created and recreated in practice. The social relationship in kinship is never static and 
stable. Getting insight from Bourdieu's concept of practical kinship, we know people 
in eveiyday life-world use kinship in practical ways. They go beyond the boundary of 
the kinship to build networks through all kinds of interpersonal relations. So kinship 
in this sense is situational and flexible.
In Ku Village, the conception of guanxi and the principle of mutual zeren 
which is partially generated from the kinship system is also not static. In the everyday 
world, Ku villagers consciously or unconsciously cultivate their guanxi and perform 
their zeren. As Bourdieu asserts, the social world does not work in terms of 
consciousness, but works in terms of practices. The villagers never systematically tell 
you about their philosophy of guanxi and zeren, but they practice it in daily life. 
Through the important ceremonies, their social relations are confirmed and 
strengthened. And through eveiyday life practices, the knowledge of zeren and the 
culture of reciprocal relations have been reproduced and generated. People 
participating in rituals also leam and regenerate their view of guanxi and zeren, and 
this becomes their frame of reference for making judgments about others’ behavior 
and conduct.
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As active agents, the Ku villagers strategically apply their principle of zeren 
and guanxi. They go beyond the limitation of application of this principle and 
manipulate it to examine their guanxi with the government and local cadres. Different 
to the person to person relationship, they define their relationship with the government 
not in terms of renqing or ganqing, but in terms of zeren or obligation, responsibilities 
and duties. In the contractual relationship between villagers and the government, 
reciprocity or mutual exchanges, which extends from person to person, are based. In 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, I will focus on how the Ku villagers constitute their discourse in 
resistance by using their own principles of social contract or reciprocity.
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Chapter 3: The Villagers1 View of the Maoist Past -- 
Remaking History from Below
A fter staying at Ku Village for about one month, I  had got to Imow the village
and the villagers well When I  had time and felt bored, I  would like to visit the dawu 
(big house). Some dawu were still occupied by the villagers, but some had fallen 
down and become desolated. Like the face o f old man, the desolate house recorded 
the historical changes o f Ku Village. The wall slogans, which were painted in 
different campaigns in Mao’s era, were still remained, but the colour was diluted by 
time and tide (see Picture 3.1 & 3.2). I  still could read ~what the slogans said.
Long long live the Chinese Communist Party!
[Zhongguo gongchandang wansui]
Long long live Chairman Mao!
[Maozhuxi wansid]
All for revolution!
[Yiqie wei geming]
Carry the revolution through to the end!
[Yongyuan ganggeming]
Never forget the class struggle!
[Qianwan buyao wanji jieji douzhen]
The People's Commune is good!
[Renmin gongshi hao]
Serve the people!
[Wei renmin fuwu]
Be united, alert, earnest and lively!
[Tuanjiejingzhang yanshu huopo]
Unity is strength!
[Tuanjie jiushi liliang]
Cany forward the spirit o f solidarity and militancy!
[Fayang tuanjie zhandou de jingshen]
Unite with all the forces that can be united!
[Tuanjie yiqie keyi tuanjie de liliang]
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Rally around the Party's Central Committee!
[Tuanjie zai dangzhongyrang zhouwei]
Long long live the great union o f the people o f the world!
[Quanshijie renmin datuanjie wansui]
Self reliance!
[Rili gengsheng]
Selfishness, slowing down in work, corruption and degeneration, windism and 
so on are the most contemptible things; otherwise, the spirit o f selflessness, 
worldng hard, whole hearted devotion to public duty and so on are 
respectable.
Because we are the ones serving for the people, i f  we have any wealmess, we 
will not hate anyone's criticism. I f  the criticism is positive, we will correct 
ourselves.
I f  the village does not become socialist, it will become capitalist. Can we say 
that we neither become socialist nor capitalist?
Every time when I  took the picture and recorded these slogans down, the 
villagers thought I  was strange and curiously asked me why I  recorded them. At the 
time, I  did not Imow how to answer their questions because I  had no clear idea that 
these material would be part o f my thesis. I  only knew that they reflected part o f the 
history o f Ku Village. These remained slogans aroused my in terest. I  had several 
questions in my mind: when were these wall slogans painted? What did the villagers 
think about these slogans? Why didn ’t they paint over these wall slogans?
I  tried to get answers from the villagers. The villagers seemed to be unable to 
answer my first question. The younger generation basically did not Imow about these 
slogans. They only told me that according to their parents, they were painted in the 
Cultural Revolution. The old villager's, who had personal experiences in M ao’s era, 
also could not remember clearly the time these slogans were painted. Some told me 
during “tugai” (land reform); some told me during “siqing” (the Four Cleanups); 
some told me during "gongshe de shihou ” (the Commune era); some told me during 
‘ ‘wenhua dagem ing (the Cultural Revolution)... Their memory o f history under Mao 
was fragmented.
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Regarding the second and third questions, I  also could not get a consistent 
answer. Some told me they never thought about this question; some said that they 
just had not any intention to clear these slogans; some told me dawu was not their 
own property, they could not change anything without the consent from other 
households; some told me that the slogans were painted by the brigade, so it was the 
brigade’s obligation to clear it; some told me they did not want to arouse any trouble. 
People in Ku Village had different attitudes toward these slogans. But I  still 
remembered one o f the old villagers said “I f  you forget the past, you cannot learn the 
lesson from it”. This was a sentence filled with wisdom. I  wondered if  he meant they 
wanted to keep the slogans as the reminder to themselves and to the younger 
generation, and hoped they would not repeat the history.
*  *  *  *
Most history has been written "from above", from the perspective of 
the powerful, privileged few. In re-writing history "from below", oral 
history can create a more accurate and authentic picture of the past. It 
can give back to people a sense of the historical significance of their 
own lives and make the practice of history more exciting and available 
to all (Humphries, 1984:x).
The old villager's memorable sentence reminded me of a Chinese phrase, ‘gu 
wei jin yong\ * Yong’ can be translated as ‘use’ or ‘consume’ in English. ‘Gu wei jin  
yong’ means make the past serve the present, or use the past for the present purpose. 
This phrase tells us something about the relation between the past and the present. As 
Femand Braudel (1977) points out, there has never been a total break and an absolute 
discontinuity between the past and the present. Indeed, the past experiences continue 
into the present and add to it. In addition, "gu wei jin yong” also tells us the function 
of history that it is fundamental to the fabric of everyday life, which “help to give us 
our sense of identity, telling us who we are, where we are from and where we are 
going” (Jordan & Weedon, 1995). This phrase points out another important aspect 
that historical knowledge is a cultural product which can be used and consumed by the 
people. So history is never natural and given, nor does it reflect the fact of the past. It 
is always selected and produced for the specific interests of the present. In Weedon’s 
word, “whether public or personal, history is always an interpretation of the past,
80
constructed in the present on the basic of a selective range of source materials” 
(Jordan and Weedon, 1995:117). But ‘who’ produces historical knowledge, and 
‘who’ validates it for general consumption is the other important question which is 
connected with power relations and interests.
Mao’s death symbolized the end of the first ‘dynasty’ of the Chinese 
Communist state. How to understand and make judgments of this phase of history is 
still controversial. As Weedon says, dominant narratives of history always tend to 
naturalize the social relations of the present by showing how they have evolved 
naturally out of the past (Jordan and Weedon, 1995). To the Communist state, for 
maintaining its power, the state apparatus should interpret this phase in an 
‘appropriate’ way. Firstly, it is necessary to negate the past for the sake of 
legitimating the rule of Deng’s new government; besides, Si Ren Bang (the Gang of 
Four), as scapegoat, must to be condemned as the "sinners of history” (I is hi zuiren). 
In mainland China, there were many historical studies published after Mao’s death, 
but the focus was on the political struggle among the leaders at the central level (e.g. 
Gao & Yan, 1986; Cong, 1989; Lin, Fan & Zhang, 1989; Wang, 1989). In the 
mainland, the interpretation of history still could not go beyond the official version. 
The socialist state still controls the production of historical knowledge.
There were also some studies, conducted by local and foreign scholar's, about 
the life of the youth and the Red guard (hong wei bin) in Mao’s China (e.g. Zhao, 
1994; Liang, 1988; Yang etc. 1992; Bernstein, 1977). They provided the broad 
picture of the life of the young Chinese urban citizens in this chaotic period. Recently, 
more and more ethnographic accounts of peasant life in Mao’s era have been written 
(e.g. Potter and Potter, 1990; Chan, Madsen & Unger, 1992; Siu, 1989; Whyte & 
Parish, 1978; Mosher, 1983). There are also some scholars who started to understand 
Mao’s China through the views of the local people (e.g. Pickowicz, 1994). Their 
descriptions provide some points of comparison and their writings also contribute a 
lot in the reconstruction of the history of Mao’s China at local levels.
Living in the village, I noticed that talking about Mao’s era was an important 
part in the villagers’ everyday discourse. They recollected how the land reform 
transformed the rural society via destroying the traditional organizations and power 
structures, and redefining the social and economic relationship through the
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redistribution of land. They also expressed how class-struggle campaigns and rigid 
class labels divided the community and hurt the ganqing and guanxi among the 
villagers. They still clearly remembered the economic disasters in collectivization, 
and told how they struggled for survivals by using different kinds of strategies. They 
also made comments on village cadres who derived authority from their ability to 
monopolize resource distribution and to influence the life of peasants. They often 
compared the present government in the reform era with the Mao’s government which 
fulfilled its zeren of provision of minimal protections to them, such as provision of 
education, medical services, basic grain and other social security. The information 
they provided was so fragmented, and sometimes contradictory. On one occasion, 
they praised Mao’s government; on another occasion, they condemned it. The 
contradictions in their discourse provoked my interest to dig in-depth to disclose the 
underlying meaning of their historical narratives — What was life like for them in the 
last decades? What were their personal feelings? Why did the villagers configure the 
Communist government like that? How to make sense of their contradictory 
discourse? How did the villagers think and remember in terms of changing 
relationship between the state/cadres and peasants? How did the villagers’ memory of 
the Maoist past serve in the formation of their perceptions of the state and cadres at 
present? Some of these questions I will try to answer in this chapter and some will be 
discussed in coming chapters.
In this chapter, from their eveiyday narratives, I mainly wished to get a 
glimpse into the lives of my relatives, and to take myself back to those past times, and 
to get the feel of what they were like. This is a history constructed by the collective 
memory from below. It is their own history full of their feeling, which embodies their 
hopes and disappointments, joy and bitterness, pleasures and fears, praise and 
disapprobation, and most important of all, their personal deep feelings and their 
impression of the world they live in at present. I try to integrate it under four topics 
based on the fragmented narration by villagers: 1) the period of fear; 2) the period of 
hunger; 3) the period of chaos; 4) praise for Mao’s China.
3,1, The Period o f  Fear
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‘Unless the resistance o f the exploiters is crushed, the victory o f the revolution can 
not be consolidated. ’
The above slogan was painted during land reform (tugai) after the triumph of 
the CCP. In villagers’ daily chatting, I found that land reform was one of the periods 
the old villagers still had a clear memory of. Every time I mentioned the land reform, 
the feeling of fear was palpable.
About one year after Lin Biao's triumphant march southward in 1949 into 
Guangdong Province, the villagers realized that the Nationalist Party had been 
defeated by the Communist Party. It was said that the 'old China' had gone and the 
'new China' had come. "Old China" (jiu zhongguo) or "old society" (jiu shehui) was 
signified as the one which was full of exploitation and inequality. As Cohen 
accurately states, the domination of a new regime established in 1949 rested not just 
on coercion, but also on cultural domination. For legitimizing the new regime, the 
Communist government had to establish the "regime of truth" through creating the 
rejectable others and inventing and constructing the powerless peasantry. The aim 
was to obtain consent from below and support from the masses. As Cohen points out:
... the characteristics of the old society have to be formulated in 
sufficiently convincing detail that they come to form a meaningful 
negative image assimilated into the consciousness and cultural outlook 
of the ordinary person. At the same time, the assertion that there is 
now a new society must be backed by cultural innovations that take 
firm and positive hold among the masses (Cohen, 1993:152).
People in "old China", especially the rural population, in official or academic 
discourse, were described as living in “deep water and scorching fire”, i.e. an abyss of 
suffering (shui shen huo re). "They were no longer to be blamed for China's 
weakness, but to be pitied as victims of soluble oppression" (Cohen, 1993). The 
mission of the CCP was to save the powerless people from suppression and 
exploitation of ‘three big mountains’ (san zuo da. shan) — imperialism, feudalism, and 
bureaucratic capitalism. For the intellectual or political elite, the traditional cultural 
practices in rural society, e.g. lineage and kinship, ancestral worship, and religion, 
were also redefined as feudalism, and as major obstacles to national development and
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salvation, which had to be rejected. In short, the peasants were also constructed as a 
culturally distinct and alien "other" — passive, helpless, unenlightened, superstitious, 
ignorant, and inert.1 So they were in need of education and cultural reform. For 
improvement in their circumstance, they were totally dependent 011 the leadership and 
efforts of rational and informed outsiders. Mao writes:
The gods? Worship them by all means. But if you had only Lord 
Guan and the Goddess of Mercy and no peasant association, could you 
have overthrown the local tyrants and evil gentry? The gods and 
goddesses are indeed miserable objects. You have to worshipped them 
for centuries, and they have not overthrown a single one of the local 
tyrants and or evil gentry for you! Now you want to have your rent 
reduced. Let me ask how will you go about it? Will you believe in the 
gods or in the peasant association? (Mao, 1972)
Without the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, without the 
Chinese Communists as the mainstay of the Chinese people, China can 
never achieve independence and liberation, or industrialization and the 
modernization of her agriculture (Mao, 1967).
The Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the whole 
Chinese people. Without this core, the cause of socialism cannot be 
victorious (Mao, 1967),
These quotations are examples of how the traditional culture was negated, and how 
the new regime was legitimized and morally confirmed.
Besides religion, the old economic system, represented into exploitative class 
relations and class polarization, also had to be eliminated. So after the Liberation of 
1949, the CCP moved immediately to destroy the socio-economic basis and 
production relation of rural society by redistributing the lineage’s corporate lands. 
The CCP also put much effort in deconstructing the moral basis of the lineage and 
transforming the traditional pattern of guanxi to a universalistic morality under the 
name of “comradeship”. This transformation of personal relations was achieved 
through a combination of intimidation (e.g. political campaigns) and the promotion of
Cohen states that many of the intellectuals were hostile to village popular culture like religion; they 
encouraged die destruction or conversion of local temples and shrines. They inclined toward the 
reconstruction of rural Chinese society and its reintegration into a renewed national cultural framework 
(1993). Duara (1995) in his new book Rescuing History from the State also explores and exemplifies 
how the intellectuals and reformers urged a break widi the past, employing the "end of history" rhetoric 
in their campaign to destroy a world of popular religion which they condemned as superstitious and 
backward.
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a socialist economy (from land reform to collectivization) that diminished the 
importance of personal connections (Vogel, 1965; Yan, 1996; Yang, 1995). How the 
land reform worked in Ku Village was told by the old villagers, e.g. Uncle Bi, Uncle 
Si and Aunt Shu-feng, who at that time were around twenty years old.
One day in 1950 there was a team of outsiders coming to Ku Village. 
Someone told the Ku villagers that they were the 'work team' (gong zuo dui) sent by 
the Communist government. They came to organize the Fanner Association (nong 
hui) and earned out the land reform in the village.2 The members of the work team 
lived with the poorest villagers' in order to obtain the information about the class 
structure in Ku Village. This was in accordance with Mao’s policy of “relying on 
poor peasants, uniting middle peasants, separately eliminating the exploitative feudal 
system step by step, and then developing agricultural production” (yikao pingnong, 
tuanjie zhongnong, you buzou de, you fenbie de xiaomie fengjian zhidu, fazhan 
nongye shengchan).3 They had the same meals and slept on the same beds with the 
poor villagers to earn the trust from them. They wanted to know how many landlords, 
rich peasants, business men and former Nationalist officials there were in Ku Village. 
At first the villagers did not dare to talk to outsiders — the 'work team' cadres. After 
living with cadres for a period, and after the day-to-day, heart-to-heart talks with 
them, the villagers thought that the members of work team were nice and reliable. 
They began to trust the 'work team' cadres.
Then the cadres tried to mobilize them to join into the Farmer Association and 
to convince them to attack the landlords. They persuaded the poor villagers to fight 
against the landlords and divide the land by telling them that they would become the 
owners of society, which gave the villagers hope for a better future. Initially, most of 
the villagers did not want to attack the landlords and the rich peasants because they
2 .On 28th of June 1950, the People’s Central Government Committee discussed and passed the Law o f  
Land Reform o f People 's Republic o f China (zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi gaigefa). On 30th of 
June, Mao ordered the formal implementation of the law. According to the Law, die aim of die land 
reform was to “abolish the exploitative feudal landlord ownership of land, and implement the peasant 
ownership of land, in order to emancipate the rural manpower, development agriculture production and 
open die way for the industrialization of new China.”
3 . Readers interested in die policy of CCP can see Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dashiji (The 
Chronicle o f Events o f CCP II is to ty) 1989, edited by the Office of CCP History or Jianguo yilai 
zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selections o f the Important Documents since the Establishment o f  the 
Nation) 1992, edited by Office of CCP Document Studies.
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knew that it would hurt the guanxi (personal relationship) and ganqing (affection) 
between the Ku villagers. "We are brothers and sisters. There is no reason to attack 
one of us (ziji ren),n the villagers often said.
To solve this problem, the work team cadres had to recruit and train a reliable 
group. They chose the marginal villagers as their targets group to break the solidarity 
of lineage. Uncle Bi was one of the targets because he was an adopted heir (linyang) 
in Ku Village. His family had been ritually humiliated or looked down on when he 
was adopted into the lineage. Aunt Shu-feng was also chosen as one of the leaders in 
the coming land reform campaign because she was labeled as a 'suppressed woman' in 
'old society'. She was sold to Ku Village as one's wife and her husband left her in 
order to marry another woman. Both of them, at the time were in their twenties, 
became the activists in land reform. Uncle Bi, Aunt Shu-feng and other poor villagers 
became the ‘back-bone element5 (gugan fenzi) and enthusiastically assisted the work 
team cadres in collecting information about individual households and land 
distribution. But some other villagers like Uncle Si were veiy indifferent to this 
movement. He said he only followed the masses (sui dazhong).
To the villagers, land reform was a terrible experience. When the land reform 
began, he soldiers of the Liberation Army (jiefangjun) were sent with guns to the 
villages to assist the work team for organizing the land reform. The rich peasants, 
landlords, the old gentry, the former Nationalist officials and baozhang (Nationalist 
security personnel) were arrested. Their property — such as big house, money, 
jewelry, rice, fishponds, orchards, farm animals, farm tools, and land — were all 
expropriated. The ancestral hall was also confiscated by the Farmer Association.
Then the "mass struggle meeting" (qun zhong pidou dahui) was organized by 
the work team to attack the landlords and "bad elements" in front of the villagers.4 It 
aimed to raise the class consciousness of the villagers by helping them recognize the 
exploitative nature of the pre-Liberation social order. The mass meeting was held in 
the ancestral hall. During the mass meeting, the landlords knelt on the ground and 
bowed their heads. The poorest villagers were invited by the work team cadres to 
expose their crimes. They were also mobilized to bum the landlord's land deeds and
4 . The mass struggle meeting seems to be similar to other scholars’ accounts, e.g. Potter & Potter 
(1990); Hinton (1996); Vogel (1971); Schunnaim (1968).
shout slogans led by the work teams. In the meeting, nephews spoke out against 
uncles, and members of same lineage branch spoke out against their close kinsmen. 
At the time, “lineage branch membership did not matter anymore.”
If the "landlords" did not admit their guilt, they would be beaten by the work 
team members or some angry masses. After finishing the meeting in individual 
villages, several villages would join together to have another mass meeting. The 
landlord and "bad elements" were attacked in the meeting. Then the villagers from 
other villages were grouped together at the township level to suppress the counter­
revolutionary elements (zhenya fangeming). The old villagers said no one was able to 
control the anger of the masses when their emotions were stirred up. At the end of the 
meeting, many landlords’ heads were "broken and bleeding" (toupo xueliu) and their 
knees festered. The campaign was maintained for about six months. Day to day and 
night to night, the masses meeting never stopped. Some landlord's family members 
could not bear such treatment. They committed suicide: some threw themselves into 
the river and some hanged themselves.
In many villagers' minds, they knew that this was not the thing they wanted. 
They really did not want to participate in mass meetings, but for self-protection, they 
could only showed the same political gestures as others. When Aunt Mei-zhen 
recalled the land reform, her heart still fluttered with fear.
The mass struggle meetings were very fierce. Every time I was scared 
to death. They were so miserable. Nobody dared to be fair and help 
them. They were our relatives. We really sympathized with them.
In many villagers' minds, they also clearly knew that most of the landlords and rich 
peasants were not as bad as the official media described. Most of the landlords did 
not own very extensive land holdings as government mentioned. Uncle Si said:
Honestly speaking, during land reform, many innocent people were 
wronged. Many landlords owned only small pieces of land and had to 
work most of their lands themselves with the aid of hired helpers.
They worked like other peasants. Some were labeled as the exploiting 
class since they employed one or two servant girls. You know, they 
employed the servant only because there was no one could take care 
the elders. Their life were also hard and they had similar meals with 
other villagers. Some were counted as landlords only because their 
parents or their grandparents were landlords, but their family had gone 
bankrupt in their generation and they had no more land in their hands
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now. But the work team cadres said that they were still landlord 
households, but were bankrupt landlords (pochan dizhu). Funny! Our 
Gongchandang was veiy good at naming. Some were named only 
because they had worked for Nationalist government. Some landlords 
had many lands and big houses only because of their hard work. I 
really did not understand what they did wrong.
Some villagers took advantage of land reform to make reprisals based 
on personal resentment. Because my father lived in Indonesia, they 
said he was capitalist and planned to label me as one of the "black five 
categories" (hei wulei). They were very ignorant. They simply 
thought all the overseas Chinese were capitalists and had much money.
I told them that my father only worked for other people and was also 
exploited by others. They didn't believe me. But as my brother was a 
Communist party member and official in Shantou, they didn't dare to 
bother me.
Although many villagers knew that most landlords were unjustly treated, 
under the threat of a gun (qiang gan zi), they did not dare to stand out and defend the 
landlords. Most of them were full of discontent. Using their language, for self-safety 
they were "forced to keep their resentment to themselves" (gcinnu er bugan yciri). The 
land reform had hurt the guanxi and ganqing among the villagers . Even today, some 
villagers still remember how other villagers treated their family in Mao’s era, and they 
said that their ganqing with Ku Village had been cut off.
According to the reports from other Chinese rural areas, there were some 
peasants who resisted land reform. At the time, the 'work team' in Ku Village also 
faced some resistance. The landlord families did not passively hand over their 
property and power to the Fanners Association. Some landlord households tried to 
corrupt the work team cadres. Some cadres accepted the corruption and did not report 
the name of the landlord to the government. Some also organized and anned 
themselves in order to fight against the work team. Aunt Shu-feng recalled:
The government ordered the work team to finish the land refonn within 
three months. Any one who accepted the corruption of the landlords’ 
households would be seriously punished by the government. So we 
did not dare to accept the gift from the landlord although sometimes 
we really loved their gifts. The work was very hard. It was not a joke.
Some landlords also had guns. In the evening, we did not dare walk 
alone outside the village.
The radicalism of land reform reflects that the state did not have control over 
the action of local cadres. In the state documents, the government clearly stated that 
cadres could not use coercive methods, such as beating, killing, and corporal 
punishment, to implement the land reform, but violence and coercion was prevalent in 
land reform. In fact, on 1st, December 1949, the Communist government had passed 
a document entitled "Instruction on the Question o f Checking Village Cadres' 
Unhealthy Tendencies o f Worldng Attitude" for checking coercion and ceasing the 
revolutionary terror, but the radical behaviour of some local cadres still existed. In 
1950, a new land law was also formulated to stop the disruption of the villagers in the 
name of class war, as well as to guarantee the production and completion of harvest 
(Schunnann, 1968:434-437).
However, according to Uncle Bi, the new land laws and policies were not 
really adopted by the local cadres. The old policy of classification was still carried on 
and the rich peasants and landlord households were continuously mistreated. At the 
time, the social position of the rural population was also defined. Each family was 
assigned to one of the rural classes ranging from landlords to poor landless labourers. 
Those villagers who prior to the land reform had no land and were employed by 
others were labeled as lower peasants. Lower peasants were subdivided into poor 
peasants (pingnong) and farm labourers (gunong). The villagers who had just enough 
land to support their family were labeled as 'middle peasants' in which the category 
was subdivided into upper-middle, middle, and lower-middle. The lower-middle were 
those who had owned some land or veiy little land but had to supplement their life by 
renting land as tenants or doing some field labour for richer households. The middle- 
middle were those who had enough land for themselves and had no extra land to rent 
to others. The upper-middle (funong) were those who had little more extra land to 
rent to other farmer households. The poor and lower-middle peasants belonged to the 
'red class' and were qualified to join in the Fanner Association. In addition, there 
were others kinds of lower-middle peasants, e.g. workers (gongren), small peddlers 
(xiaofan), handicraft workers (shougongyi zhe) and so on.
The landlords were those who depended on collecting rent for supporting their 
family and were capable of employing labour for their field work. They were also 
capable of employing servant girls. The landlords was also subdivided into current
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landlords, overseas landlords (the landlords lived in overseas and authorizes their
relatives to collect the rent for them), bankrupt landlords and bureaucratic landlords 
(such as the heads of township who depended on their position to support their 
family). The rich peasants and landlords officially belonged to 'bad' or ‘black’ 
untrustworthy classes and were disqualified to join the Farmer Association. In Ku 
Village, there were five landlord and rich peasants households. Apart from the 
landlords and rich peasants, there were other different kinds of villagers who belonged 
to the bad category. They were former heads of the village, local tyrants, evil gentry, 
religious practitioners {mixin zhiyezhe) business men, soldiers of Nationalist party, 
and the former bureaucrats of the Nationalist government (jiuguanliao). The class 
labeling reconstituted the class structure in rural China, which determined how much 
political capital the villagers owned. This political capital could translated into power 
and could influence the life-chance of the villagers. Brother Wen faced bad treatment 
because of a bad class label. He said:
Because my father was staff for the Guomindcing, our family was 
labeled as “five black categories”. Our labour was only counted in 
half; even though we worked harder than others, we still bore hunger.
We could not raise our heads eveiyday, especially when the political 
campaign came.
After making clear the identity and class label, the Chinese Communist 
government began to keep their promise to Chinese peasants: the division of land. 
Uncle Bi was one of the leaders who participated in decision making of division of 
land. He explained to me how they divided the land.
After making clear the quantity and quality of the land in our village, 
we divided the land according to the individual households' 
information. We divided tire land on the table (zhuoshang fenzhuang).
It was quite complicated. Apart from the number of households, we 
had to consider the quality of the land. The head of each household 
was called to recognize the location of their land. If they did not agree 
with our arrangement, they could make a complaint. But at that time, 
most villagers learned the lesson to keep silence. There were some 
lands far away from our village, some were on the hillock, some were 
on the other side of the mountain. Who would get these land? 
Certainly the 'bad elements'. Landlords also had land because they had 
to feed themselves. They had to work and try the taste of poor people. 
Anyway, the worst land was given to the landlords.
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The Communist government not only divided the land to the poor peasants, 
they also divided the other property of the landlords, such as clothes, money, rice and 
so on. That was 1952. At the time, the poor villagers, who occupied a large 
proportion of the rural population, basically welcomed the land distribution as it 
served for their interest. Uncle Si often adopted Confucius' words "ren bu weiji, 
tianzhu dimie” (unless a man looks out for himself, Heaven and Earth will him) to 
justify why nobody came out to stand for the landlord and rich peasants.
One year later, the government sent another work team to see whether the land 
was really divided to the peasant households. At the same time, the work team made 
estimations on the yield of the village and set the quota of grain production based on 
the land area and quality. The estimation was based on the report of the village 
leaders. As Uncle Bi told me, the villagers leaders did not always follow the state 
policies. When the policy confronted the interests of the village, they would resist by 
using a safe strategy. He said;
We fried to lower the quota of grain delivered to the state. You know, 
the land was divided into different classes. The first class land had to 
submit more grain. The second class land would submit less grain. So 
we tried our best to define more land as second class. We knew most 
of the records had been destroyed in mass struggle meetings, They had 
to believe what we said. We also behaved very honestly and 
cooperatively. So they had no reason to doubt our report.
After the division of the land, 1953 was the year of establishing the 
'democratic' regime (minzhu zhengquan). At the local level, the township government 
was formally set up. The election of the head of the village and township, and other 
leaders such as the head of people's militia and so on were carried out under the 
guidelines of the upper government. After the governments at different levels were 
set up, the effort of the Chinese Communist state shifted to the development of 
agricultural production.
3.2. The Period o f  Hunger
"Nashihou shifengku, henduo ren e si," an old woman said.
(At the time, the situation was at the worst, most died in hunger.)
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One of the most remarkable things in Mao's era was the great famine which 
occurred in China between 1958 and 1962. Inside China, people rarely mentioned or 
discussed the famine. In the official version, this was merely three years of natural 
disasters. For over twenty years, much of the story remained in secrecy and people 
were not sure whether it had been taken place and how serious the situation was until 
1982 when the Chinese government released the statistical data about the total 
population and vital rate between 1959-1961. After several years, the Chinese 
government also published the rest of the data from 1953 onward. The demographers 
made a startling estimation that at least 30 million people had starved to death in this 
great famine (e.g. Aird, 1982 & 1984; Ashton etc. 1984; Banister, 1985; Liu, 1985). 
But as Kane pointed out, “(China’s) Population statistics were for many years 
considered controversial by those outside China: they appeared in fragmentary form 
and demographers were often doubtful about their validity” (1988: 2). So it was still 
difficult to obtain an accurate figure of the death in this secret famine. Some scholars 
have tried to reconstruct the picture of this phase of history via personal accounts and 
anthropological studies (e.g. Becker, 1996; Kane, 1988). It has become more and 
more clear that the greatest suffering in Mao’s China was the famine, and the peasants 
were the chief victims. Ku villagers shared the similar experience with other rural 
Chinese without escaping by sheer luck. For those who were in the village at the 
time, the horror of the hunger was indelibly imprinted on their memories. Even after 
three decades, their memories were still fresh.
After establishing the new regime, the Chinese Communist government began 
to develop their production. For the CCP led by Mao, China could not wait for 
mechanization and the creation of a modernized and scientific agriculture before they 
collectivized. So the second step was to eliminate private ownership and move 
forward to a new egalitarian and collectivist form of rural society (see Hilton, 1966; 
Schurmann, 1966; Selden, 1978; Shue, 1988).5 In 1954, Kus experienced another 
transformation. Mutual aid group (huzhuzu) was the initial structural form for the 
implementation of collectivization. The Chinese Communist government organized
5. There was a debate over the agricultural policy among the orthodox Marxists and Maoist Marxists. 
People wanting to know the debate in detail can see Yi-po Bo (1993) Ruogan zhongda jueceyu  shijian 
de huigu [The review of several important policy making and events ]. Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao publishing.
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the villagers' production in the form of mutual-aid team. Initially, the Communist 
government encouraged several households to join together in production in order to 
utilize the resources and mutually help each other. For example, if your family did 
not have farm cattle, you could join with the one that did. If your family lacked of 
farm implements, you could join with one that did. Moreover, they could also learn 
fanning techniques from each other. The villagers accepted this idea of cooperative 
production because they also practiced this kind of cooperation in eveiyday 
production and in the harvest period before ’liberation’.6 But the landlord households 
were discriminated against by the villagers. Xingu, an old woman in Ku Village, 
recalled:
At the time, the villagers liked to join with the households having good 
guaiixi, or join with close relatives. But most of the villagers weren't 
willing to join with the landlord households. On the one hand, because 
we were afraid of being involved into trouble (bei lian lei); on the other 
hand, because the landlord's land was far away from the village. We 
had to waste a lot of time in traveling. In the end, besides the very 
close relatives, the landlord households joined themselves together.
However, the Communist government found that the mutual-aid team was too 
small and it did not alter the structural primacy of the household as the basic unit for 
agricultural planning and production. So the CCP government then ordered several 
mutual-aid teams to join together to become a big mutual-aid team (lianzu). The 
number of people in each mutual-aid team was about 100 after joining. The 
Communist government still was not satisfied with the scale of production. In 
December of 1953, the Regulation of "Unified purchasing and marketing of grain' was 
issued to prohibit individual exchanges of grain. It established compulsory sale to the 
state of specified amounts of grain at low state prices. In 1955, the Communist 
government began to organize the early stage collective, and then the collective of the 
higher stage. And the 'three-fixed policy' — unified purchase quotas (tonggou), 
unified sale quota (tongxiao) and unified production quotas {clingchan) — were carried
6. As I mentioned in last chapter, in the past, kinsmen, friends, and close patrilineal relatives had helped 
one another during the busier parts of the agricultural year. To the CCP government, mutual aid 
groups were not their ideal forms of organization of production since it could not go beyond the pre­
existing cultural patterns. So that’s why the CCP moved quickly to the form of the Commune.
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out in the village.7 The government also required the villagers to sell their surplus 
grain. Eveiy village had its quota according to amount of arable land. This was the 
beginning of hunger for the villagers. Uncle Si said:
How could we have surplus at that time? This was the compulsory 
surplus grain purchasing. You know, the households which had many 
children were unable to have surplus. I was working in the secondary 
school in town. I had to save my food and sent it to my family. You 
say, was it possible that we had surplus? The gongliang (agriculture 
tax) andyuliang (surplus grain purchasing) almost took our lives!
In 1958, the introduction of the Commune system basically ended the 
collectivization movement, and the commune system founded the basic political and 
economic administrative system prior to rural reform in the early 1980s.
According to Uncle Bi, the Commune system was not suddenly introduced to 
every village. The government made experiments in several places. After getting the 
report of a successful Commune system, it was carried out to every village. At first, 
the Chinese Communist government encouraged the peasants to freely join the 
communes. In fact, the Ku villagers could not refuse to join the collective because the 
cadres would visit their homes and do ideological work (zuo sixiang gongzuo) with 
them everyday in order to straighten out their thinking. Uncle Ba shared this 
experience with me:
If you didn't join the commune, they (cadres) would come to your 
home everyday, Veiy annoying! They criticized you for lagging 
behind in understanding and persuaded you to throw off the weight on 
your mind (sixiang baofu). I was afraid of being criticized in the mass 
meeting. In the end, I joined it.
The activists who had joined the collective in the village would also isolate and 
discriminate against those who refused to join and criticized their 'backward political 
consciousness' (luohou zhengzhi juewu). In the villagers' recalling, I know that some 
villagers were not willing to join collective production. They did not want to give
7. It aimed to intensify its exploitation and control o f the rural society. To extract more from rural 
society, agricultural output had to increase. Land reform had given the peasants land, but did not lead 
to an improvement of the overall agricultural situation, and government could not easily extract the 
surplus from village. This was because the peasant producers still contr olled their means of production, 
production process, and the allocation of grain between on-farm consumption and market sales. For 
economic considerations, the communist government speeded up the pace of cooperation. Mao 
believed that collectivization seenred to be the answer to the pr oblem of increased need for agricultural 
surplus.
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back their land and turn over their private property, such as production tool and so 
forth to the collective, especially the relatively rich households. For peasants, land 
was very important. They hated any government who occupied their land. From land 
reform to collectivization, the Chinese Communist party began losing her 
trustworthiness. Some villagers even thought that they were cheated by the Chinese 
Communist Party. Granduncle Wen-de was angry when I talked with him about the 
commune system. He originally stayed in Singapore before 1949. When he heard 
that land was divided by Communist Party, he returned to Ku Village. But the land 
reform only made him happy for a short period. He said:
Don't believe the Communist Party. They often change their policy. I 
think I wouldn't have come back to Xiaohuang if they didn't tell me 
lies.
I didn't know what happened. The government always said the new 
policy was good for us. All! No matter good or bad, they have guns, 
we have no choice.
A commune was divided into a number of production bridges, which were 
further sub-divided into production teams. In Meixian, there were 32 communes. Ku 
Village belonged to Songnan commune, which included 13 production bridges. Ku 
Village was divided into two production teams under the jurisdiction of Xiaohuang 
bridge. The production team was the basic production and accounting unit, which 
owned the land and was responsible for all the decisions involving distributing the 
income generated by the production team. In theory, the overall planning of 
production was subject to certain guidelines such as quotas for grain and basic 
commodities which must be sold to the state at fixed prices, and the quotas for other 
agricultural products such as fruit, vegetables, fish or meat. In practice, Brother Ming, 
a former vice brigade party secretary, said that the production team had some 
flexibility or discretion in meeting different quotas or exceeding certain quotas. The 
production team had substantial autonomy in making investment decisions involving 
its own manpower and organizing the production and resource arrangements.
The production brigade coordinated the annual production plans of the teams 
on the basis of quotas assigned by the commune, it also allocated certain agricultural 
inputs such as fertilizer and pumps. But its more important functions were to 
undertake investment and development activities. In addition, it provided certain
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social services like primary schools, health clinics, and entertainment activities. 
Brigades also organized credit cooperatives and militia units. The brigade also served 
as the seat of the party branch and was the lowest level at which the party operated 
through direct contact with the rural population. At the time, Uncle Bi had become 
the brigade party secretary.
The commune functioned to coordinate, supervise and guide all the activities 
of production teams and production brigades. It undertook larger projects requiring a 
considerable workforce or substantial financial resources, such as large water 
conservancy projects or rural roads and industrial units. In addition, it provided 
supplementary social services, particularly secondary education and hospital facilities. 
The main political function of the commune was to supervise and implement the 
political and administrative policies of the state and to strengthen the ideological and 
political basis of the rural society. The communes performed certain other functions, 
such as military training, control of the movement of population and the collection of 
state taxes. While in its political role the commune was responsible for implementing 
government policy at the local level, its economic role was to provide leadership 
guidance, and assistance for agricultural and rural development through production 
planning, provision of essential inputs, the diversification of the rural economy and 
provision of certain social services. In short, the People's Commune was a composite 
unit of local government that encompassed the whole range of economic, social, 
administrative and political functions for the rural community.8
Under the commune system, all the peasants were organized into the collective 
agricultural organization. The collective replaced the family as the unit of production 
and accounting. Their life was different from before since they no longer chose which 
crops to plant, when to harvest, who should work where, how much to spend on 
fertilizer, what was the price of the products and so on. Everything was planned under 
the control of the government. The lifestyle was standardized and no one could 
choose their livelihood. Uncle Bi recalled:
8. My account of the content and function of commune system is brief; interested readers may see 
Aziz's Rural Development: Learning from China, 197S.
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Everything was militarized. We had collective action, collective 
production, collective cooking.... When the gong was beaten, the 
villagers had to meet at the designated place and then work together 
under the direction of the leader. The elder one was responsible for 
cooking. When the gong was beaten again, all the people stopped and 
had the meal together.
In I960, the Commune system was pushed to extremes. That was the 
beginning of Daguofan (food prepared in a large canteen caldron) — The Great Leap. 
The villagers ate in the public canteen, just like everyone else. Every commune had a 
common dining hall with several cooks. Everyone could eat as much as they wanted 
each day. Unfortunately, the initial euphoria did not last long, and big problems 
began to emerge. To the villagers, it was a big joke of the Chinese Communist party. 
In their memory, HUNGER is the label they gave to this period. Followings are the 
memories of different villagers.
Uncle Si:
1960 was the most miserable year. At first, we all ate in the public canteen. There 
was lots o f rice and meat. We were very full eveiy day. The leftovers were fed  to the 
pigs. Nobody expected that those good days went on for just one month. After one 
month, we began to eat congee. Congee was free to eat, but rice was rationed. 
Everyone had a bowl o f rice per meal. I  remember that eight people sat around one 
table. Soon after everyone only had one rice cake per meal. And after that we began 
to eat chaff cake. The situation became worse and worse. Eveiy labourer had only a 
bowl o f vegetable soup and a piece o f chaff cake. The children had no ration because 
they were not labourers. Everyday when I  went home, I  found that the children were 
very hungry). So I  only drank the soup and gave the chaff cake to my children. We 
had no rice because all had been collected by the collective. Eveiyone had to bear the 
hunger. I  think you can’t believe that we ate roots o f papaya tree, heads o f bananas, 
and anything we could eat. It was really miserable! My brother helped our family a 
lot. He worked in Boluo township. He saved some grain coupons5 and sent them to 
us. These grain coupons saved our family's life. I  feel thankful to my brother even 
nowadays. You Imow, at the time, many villagers became dropsy, and many died in 
hunger.
y. People can only buy the grain with the grain coupon at the state's grain station.
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Aunt Shufeng:
The JDaguofan could only be maintained for 39 days. I  remember there was a very 
good Chinese New Year. We had pork, fish, radish cake and other food in the public 
canteen. But the good days were no longer. The eating quota was set quickly 
because there was not enough food storage. In 1960, it was miserable! Everyone 
was in hunger.
We had not enough food [rice] to eat So most villagers had to eat banana leaves, grass 
roots, and even chaff and wild herbs now eaten by pigs. Many villagers’ belly became 
bloated.
I  almost died. I  didn't die because I  was clever enough. I  didn't totally hand my grain 
to the collective because I  always doubted whether the Daguofan was workable. So I  
hid some rice under my bed. In the mid-night, I  cooked some rice to heal my stomach. 
I  didn't dare to let anyone Imow. The honest villagers who handed all the grain to the 
collective were really foolish. They were almost killed by hunger.
Uncle Bi:
I  was the party secretary o f brigade. I  felt very upset when the situation became so 
bad...
At first, not all the communes implemented the system of  Daguofan. The government 
only made the experiment in several villages. The villages sent several 
representatives to communes as test samples. Each representative had a half f in  o f  
rice. But the representative could eat only two to three Hang, then the government 
set two Hang per meal for each person. After the experiment, the commune ordered 
the villagers to hand over all their grain to the collective. But I  laiew some clever 
ones hid some grain. At first, everyone could eat as much as they wanted. Then 
everyone could only have a bowl o f rice. And then the public canteen only provided 
the congee. Our rice in public storage was finished within only one month. It was 
qidte ironic/ We began to buy the grain from outside villages — either rice or other 
food grain — because everywhere there was a shortage o f grain. 1960 was the worst 
year because there were serious floods and insect pests. Misfortunes never come 
singly (huo bu dan xing). Russia forced us to repay the debt. It made the bad
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situation much worse. Famines were everywhere. As I  knew, most villagers in other 
village left their home and begged in cities. In our village, many people fell into 
serious siclmess. There were 80 people who died in our brigade. Five were our 
villagers. Many people in our village became dropsy because they drank too much 
water. No other choices, when they felt hungry, they could only drink water... Every 
villager was in hunger, but they still had to work as long as before. They worked 
for several minutes, but had a rest for an hour. No one had any energy. We often 
saw the villagers suddenly fallen down...
Although we lacked grain, we still had to fulfill our quota to the state. At the time, 
there were many ‘blind orders from above ’. Because ofpressures from above to show 
that the policies o f the Great Leap Forward were producing extraordinarily 
successful results, the locals were required to report to the commune that they were 
producing 800 to 1,000 jin per mu per harvest. Crazy/ I  was also a farmer. O f 
course I  hiew it was impossible. At first, our brigade refused to follow what they 
required. We just reported 600 jin. You know, 600 jin was a lie, but we had been 
seriously criticized as luohou (backward). No alternative, I  had to report 800 jin in 
the end. At the time, commune was competing against commune to show increased 
production so as to prove the success o f the policy. What a pity/ Pretense and lies 
caused this serious disaster.
After the failure of the Great Leap, the system of Daguofan was canceled and 
the public canteen was closed. Every household cooked for themselves again. The 
unit of production returned to the production team. A ration system was also carried 
out. As Uncle Bi’s wife joked,
...everything was rationed. For example, each person had only two chi 
coupons of cloth. We didn't understand how to make clothes with two 
chi of cloth, not even underwear'. It's terribly funny!
The peasant households were still allowed to keep a little private garden plot (ziliu di) 
on which to grow vegetables and other crops such as bananas, sugarcane and peanuts 
for their own consumption. But it was still the collective’s production. Under the 
ideology of "a grain must be taken as the key link in agriculture" (yiliang weigan), 
nobody could cany out sideline activities as all the people were required to cut off the
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tail of capitalism (ge ziben zhuyi weibci). Anyone raising ducks, pigs and others 
would be labeled as walking on the road of capitalism (zon ziben zuyi daolu). When I 
mentioned about this, Uncle Si was still angry. He said:
At the time, no one had enough food to eat. I had five children. 
Depending only on the ration, it was impossible to live. So I decided 
to plant some sweet potatoes and sold them in the open market. But 
the leader of our team, I don't want to say who he is, didn't allow it and 
criticized me for walking on the road of capitalism.
Under the commune system, a clear distinction was always made between the 
cadres who ate 'state rice' (chi guojia fan) and those who ate ’collective rice' (chi jiti 
fan). All the commune cadres ate 'state rice'. But in the brigade, only some cadres ate 
state rice. The cadres who ate collective rice had to participate into daily production. 
At the team level, all cadres ate 'collective rice'. Their income was also counted into 
work points and was correlated to the collective income. However, regardless 
whether the cadres ate collective rice or state rice, to the villagers, their authority was 
appointed and paid for by the Communist government. The villagers often thought 
the village cadres in Ku Village did not really serve the village and protect their 
interests. To them, the village cadres were state agents who represented the state and 
implemented state policy. Although the village cadres came from the village, the 
villagers told me that they did not take care of the interests of the village, and the 
lineage relationship did not matter. The state interest always overrode that of kin and 
village, t heard several fellow villagers comment about the cadres as follows:
Kin? Relative? So what? They [local cadres] never take care of our 
interest. They only serve themselves.
Air! Don't mention about these people. When they became 
bureaucrats, they forgot their kin.
They never took care of us. Kin and relative? What's important to 
them? They did not go to trouble for you. You were very lucky.
But the village cadres told me that they could not do anything at the moment. To 
them, although the managerial and distributive power was concentrated in their hand, 
there were limitations 011 their power, and they were also clients to the upper 
government. As cadres, if they did not follow the policy of the state, they would be 
suffer disaster (zaoyang). Uncle Bi expressed his powerlessness:
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Ai! We had no alternative. I knew many villagers cursed us that we 
didn’t take care of the village. How could we, at the high tide of the 
campaign? They were suffering; me too. I had done many things to 
save our village. But they didn’t know.
They also complained that their opinion was difficult to pass along to those above, 
and the reality of the local situation was often ignored. The present village party 
secretary, Song-sheng, who was one of the brigade cadres, told me:
We have no choice. If we cannot fulfill the task and duties, we will be 
subject to sanctions and be criticized by the leader of the higher level.
If we failed to meet quotas, we would lose face (diulian).
Song-sheng showed me an example of how the local government responded to national 
trends blindly. In the campaign of Xue Da-zhai, when the state advocated planting 
cotton, the commune compelled the brigade to follow the policy. But they argued that 
cotton planting was impossible in Ku Village because the climate and soil were not 
suitable for planting. But fixed quotas made resistance impossible because the local 
cadres heavily depended 011 the state for privilege and legitimacy. The team leaders 
depended 011 the brigade for his office and the right to distribute the goods available 
within the team, and thus ultimately for his power.10
After the failure of the Great Leap, the Chinese Communist government no 
longer advocated equal distribution, but the "distribution according to work" (anlao 
fengpei) and “the more you work, the more you get" (duolao duode). Villagers' daily 
incomes were calculated as working points (gongfen). The calculation of working 
points was different in the slack season (nongxian) and the busy season (nongmang). 
According to Brother Ming again, in the slack season, a villager who contributed 
labour to the collective could receive 8 working points. In busy times, a villager 
could receive 10 working points per day. Ten working points were equal to 0.4 jiao 
renminbi. Not all the villagers were able to earn the full work points because the 
labour was divided into full labour, semi-labour (elderly and young), and non-labour. 
In the collective, the grain, oil, vegetables and other rations were distributed to the 
peasant households. The amount of ration was based on the labour of that household. 
If the peasant household had more labour, their life might be better. O11 15 of July
10. Oi in her book point out :"if the upper level decide to reduce agricultural inputs, cut the team budget, 
demand higher grain sales, and lower grain rations, the team leader, as a subordinate, has no choice but to 
cany out such directives” (Oi, 1989:145).
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and 25 of November in every year, the collective distributed the grain to individual 
households based 011 how many working points they obtained. In theory, the 
villagers’ excess working points can be exchanged to cash. But Aunt Shu-feng, 
Uncle Bi and Brother Ming witnessed that in fact only few villagers could earn many 
work points. Brother Ming told me that the cash value of work points was diverse in 
different brigades, which depended on the total production of that brigade. Some 
brigades' cash value of working points was even lower than 0.4 jiao. If the villagers' 
working points could not cover the cost of rations, they had to pay the collective. 
Another old villager, — Uncle Qiang, told me that many villagers always owed money 
to the collective.
In formal and informal interviews, the villagers and local cadres (former and 
present) described that the local cadres as powerful in controlling the activities of the 
villagers in the collective agriculture. They called them "local emperors" (tuhuangdi). 
This was due to their ability to control the subsistence and livelihood of the peasants. 
After collectivization, participation in collective labour was the only means of 
obtaining grain. Although the illegal black market always existed, the supply was 
unstable and the price was higher. If the villagers exited from the collective, their 
subsistence would reach a crisis.
According to different villagers' recollections, every morning, through beating 
the gong, the team leader awakened the villagers. Then they met the villagers under a 
tree or at the village entrance. The day's work was assigned by the head of the team. 
Some transplanted rice; some sowed the seeds; and some looked after the farm cattle. 
Occasionally, the morning political lessons were earned out and the state policy was 
also passed to the peasants. Eveiy day after contributing the labour to collective, the 
villagers carried out some sideline activities on their private plot. The work-point 
value and difficulty was different in various tasks. In order to obtain the high work- 
point value and easy tasks, the villagers tried to keep a good personal relationship 
(gaohao guanxi) with the cadres by sending the small gifts, e.g. chicken and fish, in 
order to obtain the high work-point values and easy jobs. According to Brother 
Ming, some jobs, such as carrying the stones, cutting the tree and so on, were worth 
few work points and were both difficult and time-consuming. This job was often 
assigned to the ones they termed as 'mischievous elements' {tiaopi fenzi). In contrast,
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some prestige jobs, such as tractor driving or herding the cattle, which required little 
energy but paid high working points, were often assigned to the ones who had good 
relations with the cadres. Brother Ming did not deny this fact. He said:
We often assigned the good job to our family members, or to the close 
relatives, or to those who had good relationships with us. It was just 
the way of the world (renzhi changqing). If you were me, you would 
also do that.
Songsheng also declared that they were powerful in the collective era:
In the collective era, when we said "yes", no villagers dared to say 
"no". It was because the villagers begged for everything from us.
I think "everything" included the grain, work distribution, private plots, welfare, 
sidelines and so on.
Apart from the power of work allocation, the local cadres also controlled the 
job opportunities outside agriculture. Sometimes the factories in cities would employ 
contract labor. The contract labour jobs in urban areas were particularly attractive 
because they provided the opportunity for peasants to move to the city even 
temporarily. Sometimes, the peasants would have the opportunity to become part of 
the permanent urban population if they could establish a good network in the city 
when they were working in contract jobs. The competition for these prestige jobs was 
keen as there was little job opportunity. Those villagers who had no personal 
relationship with the cadres would not be able to obtain the opportunity. The brigade 
leaders and team leaders played an important role in selecting the workers. The 
recommendation of the team leader was usually a precondition.
In addition, the village leaders allocated welfare as well as other collective 
resources. The “economically distressed households” (kunan hu) would be 
particularly dependent on the local leaders. They had to approach the team leader so 
often, tell him their problems and request a loan or subsidy. For instance, when they 
could not afford the education fee of their children, they would ask the leader to issue 
a certificate for the exemption from school fees. A villager, Uncle Qiang, told me that 
he "felt himself like a beggar" when he approached the cadres. For the education of 
his children, he could only beg for aid from the team leader. Officially, though the 
team leader needed higher approval before the loan could be granted, loan
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applications never reached the higher levels for approval without the team leader's 
recommendation.
Furthermore, the local cadres also controlled the migration of villagers by 
means of the household registration system. In Mao's China, both urban and rural 
populations had no freedom of internal migration from one region to another. The 
people had to get the certificate (zhengming) of permission sealed by the local 
government. Because the chop was held in the hand of local cadres and the certificate 
was issued by them, in order to make things convenient, the villagers always tried 
their best to keep good relations with local cadres. Uncle Wu told me that he had to 
bring some gifts to cadres of the brigade leaders after he visited his brother in 
Shantou. The "chop" power of local cadres also influenced different aspects of 
peasant life such as marriage, birth and so on. The marriage and birth certificate were 
also sealed by the local cadres. Li-qing and Brother Ming's marriage had been 
reviewed by the brigade. Since Li-qing's family was labeled as "black five 
categories", the brigade warned Brother Ming to consider the marriage carefully as the 
marriage would influence Ming's prospects. But Ming insisted 011 marrying Li-qing. 
In the end, he had to resign his post in the brigade and joined the army.
In Mao’s era, although the structural disadvantages constrained the political 
action of the villagers, their everyday life resistance persisted, but in a safe and 
hidden way. They clearly knew that open, organized and radical confrontation would 
bring a tragic outcome. So to them, everyday forms of resistance were the most 
significant way and safe technique for avoiding armed force and bloodshed, and 
minimizing their losses. It appeared to have mainly taken the forms of passive non- 
compliance, withdrawal of effort, slaughter of farm animals and so on.
I11 the collective production, the villagers often took small effort because the 
income was not positively related to how much effort they put out, but related to how 
much time they spent 011 the collective work. So the villagers often had a long rest in 
working while the cadres did not pay much attention to them. In summer, they often 
enjoyed the cool shade and chatted with other villagers under the trees. But under the 
surveillance of the team leader, they pretended to be working hard. This action 
influenced the production of agriculture, and to some extent reflected the discontent of
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the villagers with the collective system. Uncle Xiang told me how they worked in 
collective production:
...we worked when the cadres were around, then we were relaxed when 
they went away. We made sure that we always looked like we were 
working hard when the cadres were there. So they had no excuse to 
deduct our working points.
Feigned sickness was rife in Ku Village. After the failure of the Great Leap 
Forward, the peasants households were allowed to keep a little piece of private plot. 
So everyday after contributing the labour to collective, the villagers carried out 
sideline activities on their private plot. The villagers who wanted extra time for 
sideline work often went to the team leader and asked for time off and left from their 
collective duties by saying “I am sick” (you bing). Generally, the team leader 
approved their request by 'opening one eye and closing the other'. Of course, the 
villagers would send gifts in return.
The villagers tried different ways to fight for survival in Mao’s era. Pilfering 
grain was popular. Uncle Si told me that when the villagers who were responsible for 
carrying the grain to state grain station, they put some bricks or bottles into the grain. 
The staff in state grain stations would return the overweight grain to the villagers. 
Moreover, some villagers stole the grain at the public granary in the middle of the 
night.
The villagers would take chances to get revenge on the cadres via slandering 
the "unfairness" and "corruption" of the leader. During political campaigns, the 
villagers exposed the wrong things of the team leader and attacked the cadres in 
public meetings. According to the villagers, if they dared to adopt this defensive 
strategy, it was effective in protecting themselves and their families from 
discrimination by the cadres. But most peasants were afraid of the vengeance of the 
cadres because there were many opportunities for the cadres to take revenge such as 
assigning them heavy work.11
1'. The situation was similar in Chen Village; the interviewee of Chen village stated: "Most of the masses 
were afraid. The cadres were like emperors: brigade emperors and team emperors. If you complained
about them, they might want to take revenge, something very frightful. Because a peasant has no way of 
leaving a village. A cadre's revenge could take die form of assigning diem heavy work for years to come" 
(Chan, Madsen & Unger, 1992:47-48).
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The village cadres sometimes also colluded with the villagers to carry out 
resistance. Their positional advantage helped them to further their own interests and 
practice favouritism. Brother Ming told me that there were different strategies the local 
cadres employed to search for self-interest. For example, an accountant often counted 
more grain on his family's quota. The register staff often cheated in the working points 
register. The store keeper sometimes stole grain and fertilizer, and sold them in the 
black market.
In short, the Great Leap Forward disappointed the Ku villagers and the local 
cadres. It also discredited the legitimacy of the CCP, although the CCP tried to re­
establish the faith of the Chinese through different political campaigns, e.g. the Four 
Cleanups movement. As Ku villagers drew the lessons from past experiences, in the 
political campaigns afterward, they knew how to play the game with the government 
and protect their own interests.
3.3. The Period o f  Chaos
XHenduo zhengce women dou bu mingbai, dan gen dazhong, zongmeicuo,i a former 
village cadre said.
(Most o f the time I  didn't understand the policy, but it would not be wrong to follow 
the masses.)
In 1964, there was another political campaign: the Four Cleanups campaign.12 
One day there was a team of cadres accompanying the brigade cadres who entered 
into Ku Village. The ‘Four Cleanups’ work team announced that firstly they came to 
clean up the politics; second to purify ideology; third, to purify the local party 
organization and the corrupt practices of local rural officials; fourth, to improve the 
working of the rural economy. As with the land reform, the first important task of the 
work team was to gain the trust and support from the masses — good-class peasants. 
According to a member of Four Cleanups work team, Uncle Xi-xiu, they made every 
effort to practice the ‘three together’ (san tong) — living together, eating together, and 
working together — with the poor and lower-middle peasants. They often chose the
l2. For a detailed account of the Four Cleanups, see Chan, Madsen & Unger (1992) Chen Village.
106
poorest family to stay with, to show the villagers that they had no bureaucratic style of 
work (guanliao zuofeng). So they paid the family for everything they consumed. 
After the work team arrived in the village, they convened a mass meeting for all 
peasants except the four bad elements who were strictly excluded from all forms of 
political participation. In the meeting, the work team cadres announced the aim of the 
Four Cleanups and transmitted the document of the Central Committee and the talks 
of Chairman Mao. In the villagers' memories, there were many mass meetings in this 
campaign. In addition to the mass meetings, the work team also earned out many 
propaganda activities. Most of the wall slogans were painted during the ‘Four 
Cleanups’, through which the Ku villagers had learned how to assess which way the 
wind was blowing.
At the first stage of this campaign, the villagers kept silence because they had 
learned the lesson from the land reform and they were afraid that the village cadres 
would take revenge. The members of the work team tried to persuade the villagers to 
speak up by guaranteeing their protection in future from the cadres' revenge. Some 
villagers had learned the lessons from the previous campaigns. They did not want to 
have any troubles and refused to attack the village cadres. But by daily 'heart-to-heart' 
talking, the cadres again won the trust from some yomig villagers and gathered a 
picture of village affairs. Songsheng was one who began to get in step with the 
political platform through this campaign.
To re-empower the villager’s faith in the Chinese Communist Party, one 
important purpose of this campaign was to stamp out corruption at the local level. 
The targets, at the team level, were often the team leaders, warehousemen, cashiers, 
accountants or other local village officials. All officials in the mass meeting were 
required to make a public self-examination. Aunt Shu-feng was a team leader at that 
time, who was attacked by someone in the mass meeting. She recalled:
The bridge cadres and us were assaulted in the Four Cleanups. Some 
young activists came out and brought a false charge against us. They 
said that I took advantage of my position to corrupt the public goods.
They threatened to cut my hand off if I didn't confess. I thought I had 
displeased the villagers in the land reform. Nobody came out to defend 
me. At that moment, I knew I couldn't escape by this campaign. For 
survival, I took the self-criticism. Then I lost my position as a team 
leader. I though it was good for me. You know, there were many 
political campaigns thereafter.
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As a warehouseman, Uncle Si was also asked to make self-examination in a mass 
meeting. He was in charge of overseeing his team's granaries and the distribution of 
grain rations to all the team's households. It was relatively easy to appropriate a little 
extra rice for himself and his family and to weigh out slightly bigger portions to close 
friends and relatives. Although he told me in fact he had done so, he thought it was 
exceedingly common in China especially during the period of hunger. But he refused 
to tell the truth in the mass meeting because he knew honesty would only get him into 
trouble. As he was an honest person in the village, nobody came out to criticize him. 
But the bridge cadres still fried to find out this wrongdoing. Uncle Si recalled:
The Communist Party always bullies the weak and fears the strong (qi 
shun pa e). One day, brigade's cadres called me to the office. They 
asked me if I had stolen the state's lumber. I firmly said "no". They 
warned me that somebody had witnessed that I had done so. I still 
firmly said "I never did it”. They asked me what I was doing on a 
certain day. I suddenly remembered that I went to collect the firewood 
with Wende on the hill. But eveiy one collected the firewood! Why 
did our collection suddenly become stealing the state's lumber? But if 
the Communist Party was out to condemn somebody, it could always 
trump up a charge. I thought the best I could do was to confess my 
'wrong' action. Finally, I paid the fine. But nothing happened to 
Wende.
After the Four Cleanups, several brigade cadres and team cadres were replaced by the 
younger activists. In addition to "cleaning up the corrupt officials", "class struggle" 
was always a main theme in different campaigns. In the Four Cleanups campaign, the 
work team re-examined class identity in the village. Those upper middle peasants 
who were not defined as landlords had to be re-examined. Uncle Gong recalled how 
they resisted being defined as landlords class in the Four Cleanups.
Our grandfather was a teacher, belonging to free occupation; my father 
did business in Indonesia, belonging to overseas capitalist; my mother 
employed a servant girl. They said we belonged to the landlord class.
But my older brother was employed by someone; my younger was a 
former guerrilla and became the member of the Chinese Communist 
Party. We asked the work team cadres if our class identity was the 
same as the head of household. They said 'yes'. My older brother was 
the head of household. He was exploited by the capital and he was 
working class, so of course we were also working class. They pointed 
out my father was an overseas capitalist. We argued that he didn't 
exploit Chinese. After re-examination, they found difficult to define 
our family as landlord class. It was very precarious. We were lucky to 
avoid this disaster.
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Several households were redefined as landlord class. In the mass meetings, the old 
and new 'four bad elements' were attacked publicly just as before.
The famous Cultural Revolution happened in 1968.13 To the Ku villagers, they 
only remembered that many people died in this period. Many landlords and "four bad 
elements" were killed. Uncle Si recalled:
The village was also influenced by the Cultural Revolution. Many 
'monsters and demons' (class enemies of all descriptions) were arrested 
and became the target of struggling again. The work teams entered 
into the villages again. Many bad elements were executed by shooting. 
Everyone was very scared. The bad elements and the counter­
revolutionaries were paraded through the street to expose them before 
the public.
The Red Guards also went to Ku Village to look for remnants of the old feudal 
culture and for bourgeois influences. The genealogy of Ku Village was considered as 
decadent and superstitious; it was confiscated and burned. The religious books were 
taken as symbols of superstitious feudal thinking, too. All evidence of religious 
activity was destroyed or confiscated. The statues in Guanyin temple and other local 
shrines were destroyed. Even the traditional activities, like ancestral worship, were 
banned. The ancestral tablets were taken from the altars. In short, the efforts to 
eliminate traditional rituals were sweeping.
Indeed, the villagers had learned the lesson from the land reform and the Four 
Cleanups. Apart from a few young activists, the villagers did not participate in the 
Cultural Revolution actively. So, in a relative sense, the Cultural Revolution
had less impact on Ku Village than land reform and collectivization. Although I 
could see the wall slogans of the Cultural Revolution elsewhere, the cadres said that it 
was only the fulfillment of the state policy in form. During the Culture Revolution, 
the activities changed Rom attacks on superstitious practices and former landlords to 
gang fighting. There was serious fighting between two parties — the Red Flag 
(hongqi) and the Eastern Wind (Dongfang) in Meixian. Many people were killed only 
because they joined into either party. The members of these two parties came to the 
village to mobilize the brigade and production team to join their party. However, the
13. For general account of Cultural Revolution, see J. Chen, 1975; Myrdal & Kessle, 1970; Selden, 
1979; Potter & Potter, 1990).
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village cadres of Ku Village had lost their enthusiasm. Uncle Bi, as a party secretary 
of the brigade, firmly refused to join any parties. He said:
The Red Flag and Eastern Wind came to our village for establishing 
revolutionary ties. I refused to join any group because I had got the 
lessons. I found many people died in the fighting. Very terrible! They 
criticized my backward ideology. For the lives of our villagers, I 
insisted my stand. I gave orders to the production teams that no team 
was allowed to join any party. So our village was less affected by the 
campaign.
In the villagers' mind, it was an insane period. There was 110 truth, no order, 
and no security. Everyday you were in danger of becoming the "counter­
revolutionaries'. They told me a story that happened in Cultural Revolution.
There was a villager. He had prepared a coffin for his mother. One 
day he found there was a layer of dust on the coffin. So he cleaned the 
coffin. He tried to find some paper to cover the coffin. Suddenly he 
found there was a big picture of Chairman Mao 011 the floor. He just 
picked it up and used it to cover the coffin. In the Cultural Revolution, 
someone found the picture of Chairman Mao was 011 the coffin. He 
was arrested and executed as an active counter-revolutionary (xianxing 
fa  geming).
The villagers told me another joke about "recalling past suffering and thinking 
over the source of present happiness" (yiku sitian).
When we were told to "recall past suffering and think over the source 
of present happiness", an old woman was asked to tell of her suffering 
in the "old society" (jiu shehui). But when she told about the Yuan 
Shi-kai era, she couldn't help saying that people were full in the Yuan 
era, but hungry nowadays. So the old woman said the Yuan era was 
the new society, but the Mao era was the 'old society". In the end, the 
old woman was criticized as "anti-revolutionary".
Dazhai was set up as a national moral model at this time. "In agriculture learn 
from Dazhai" was painted in large red characters over the walls of Ku Village (see 
Picture 3.3). But the local cadres and villagers had leamt how to "yangfengyin wei” 
(overtly agree but covertly oppose, or feign compliance). When the policy was 
imposed from above, they only performed the ritual work (biaomian gongfu) like 
painting the slogan and organizing the mass meeting. In most mass meetings, the 
cadres read out the policy document or newspaper, and explained the directives from 
higher levels of government. But the villagers often fell into silence and seldom
expressed their opinion. Some talked among themselves, some slept, and some
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knitted. They seldom actively listened or responded in a meeting. Even if called 
upon to speak, they would not express their true feelings in the meeting. To the 
villagers, the meeting was just a ritual. It was meaningless and a waste of time. They 
also created doggerel to make fun of state policy. They said "nongye xue dazhai, fu  le 
yishen zhai" (In agriculture, learning from Daizhai, we are heavily in debt). The 
doggerel spread among the villagers and everyone sang it everyday. The doggerel 
was the wisdom of the villagers, which reveals their views of state policy and their 
discontent with it. This can be also treated as everyday resistance by the peasants, 
which forms part of their counter-discourse. After the Cultural Revolution, the 
villagers wanted a stable environment for developing their production. From the mid- 
1970s to the early 1980s, it was a period for calm.
3.4. Praise o f  M ao’s China
FEAR, HUNGER and CHAOS were the general feelings of the Ku villagers to 
Mao’s China. But sometimes I heard a different voice from some villagers, who 
praised Mao’s China. Initially I felt puzzled by these contradictory voices. Putting 
their discourse in context, I noticed that the villagers' praise of Mao was situational. 
By saying ‘situational’, I mean that their praise of Mao was purposeful, which was to 
accompany their dissatisfaction with Deng’s China. In the coming chapters, I will 
explain how they adopted the histoiy of Mao’s era to negate the government of Deng. 
In this part, I will just broadly outline what the villagers praised about Mao’s China.
In the economic sense, although the life of the villagers was very hard in the 
Maoist past, they thought it was more equal among the villagers than in Deng’s era, 
except the ‘black class’. The government guaranteed their basic grain (jiben 
kouliang). They would not feel inferior when they compared with each other. As 
Brother Wen-hua said, “Everyone was poor and everyone was equal.” They occupied 
a similar social status - nongmin - which was defined by the CCP as the "Reddest" 
class and the most revolutionary class in "new China". It was quite popular to hear — 
“peasants are the eldest brother, workers are the second eldest” {nongmin shi dage, 
gong ren shi erge).
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They also though that Mao’s government was more responsible because it 
took care of the poor. Before the rural reform in the 1980s, the mountainous region of 
Meixian was classified as a poor-difficult region (pingkun diqu); the government 
subsidized this region every year. The Ku villagers also remembered that the 
government was responsible for providing social and welfare services to the villagers. 
For instance, the government provided free medical services by sending the "bare­
foot doctors" (chijiao yisheng) to villages. The bare-foot doctors publicized 
information about maternal and child hygiene and taught the villagers how to prevent 
disease; also, they gave inoculations to the children. For another instance, Mao’s 
government also took up zeren of talcing care of the elders. Wubaohu (five guarantee 
households) and kunanhu (difficult households) could also receive different kinds of 
subsidies from the collective. So the elderly did not have to worry about their future. 
Free education was also provided by the government. The old villagers told me that 
students from the poor-difficult household could receive a subsidy from the 
government.
Several large-scale projects were constructed by the collective in Mao's era. 
The reservoirs, levees and canals were constructed for increasing the amount of 
irrigated land and protecting against floods or droughts. The hydro-electric station 
was also built in the collective era. All of these were regarded by Ku villagers as 
contributions by Mao’s government, which had improved the living environment and 
agricultural technology.
The Ku villagers thought that social conduct was better in Mao’s era rather 
than Deng’s present. To them, people at that time were more chun (honest, simple or 
unsophisticated). There was less wickedness, e.g. social violence, robbery, plunder, 
rape, fraud and so on because the crimes were punished severely. In addition, there 
were less corrupt behaviour from the cadres. ‘Lianjie’ (integrity) was a Chinese term 
the villagers adopted to describe the cadres in Mao's era. The villagers attributed the 
cadres’ integrity to the frequent political campaigns which provided the opportunity 
for the villagers to fight against the corrupt cadres. During the campaigns, the 
villagers had an opportunity to expose the wrong things done by the local cadres to 
the work team which sent by the upper government.
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The villager's historical narration was analogous to an Impressionist painting, 
mixing their feelings and imaginations. Whether negation or praise of the past, it was 
necessary to put their discourse into the historical context of social transformation in 
Deng's present. The historical experience not only greatly influenced the Ku villagers' 
perception of the Chinese Communist government, but also became part of their 
information to construct their ideal of good government. In their everyday narratives, 
the old villagers often recalled the experience in Mao's era and adopted it as a point of 
reference to compare the situation between Mao and Deng, and re-configure the image 
of the Chinese Communist government. This image and knowledge was transmitted 
through oral narration by the senior villagers to the younger members day to day. In 
Chapter 5 ,1 will discuss how the Maoist past became a point of reference to compare 
with the present government.
5.5. Discussion
It is widely shared by scholars that before the rule of the communist 
government, the traditional state did not reach below the level of the county (xian). 
Yamen, a state administrative organization, set up at county level, was the 
representative of the state. The Yamen office symbolized the relationship between the 
state and society. There the leaders of society and the officers of the government 
met. The traditional state was mainly concerned with the maintenance of order and 
the collection of tax. The agrarian economy was chiefly an object of taxation, and 
peasants were chiefly a source of tax revenue. Aside from tax collection, the 
traditional state did not interfere much with agriculture and peasant life. During most 
of Chinese history, the state let society organize itself. Villages developed various 
forms of cooperation based on kinship, religion and other social ties (e.g. Huang, 
1990, Duara, 1988; Schunnann, 1968; Zweig, 1989; Hsiao, 1960).
If these interpretations of relationship between the traditional state and rural 
society are right, we will find that the new regime was more ambitious than simply 
extracted surplus from the countryside. In last three decades, the CCP and its state 
machine’s chief effort had been to reach out to control more and more aspects of 
economy, polity and culture. In Zweig’s word, ‘at no time in the past 350 years has
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the state exercised as much power over the lives of its citizens” (1989:151). The land 
reform introduced by the CCP was designed to destroy the traditional elite and the 
local gentiy, and to free people from tradition and superstition through redefining the 
social relations and meaning of life, as well as the redistribution of land. The 
collectivization further transformed rural China by integrating private property into 
the collective and creating an all-village collective economy, in order to produce food 
for its growing population and provide savings for industrialization. The state not 
only extended its vertical reach down to the village, but also the horizontal scope of its 
powers to the daily life of Chinese peasants, e.g. dress, sexuality, diet, health, and 
spiritual well being (Shurmann, 1968; Huang, 1990; Shue, 1988, Mueggler, 1991). 
The party branch committee secretary became the post-revolutionary equivalent of the 
old administrative village head(s). Based on my informants1 recollection and other 
scholars’ accounts, the power of local society was shared by different parties, e.g. local 
elite, elders, gentiy, baozhang, clerks, and religious specialists. In the commune 
system, real power rested with the Party which made decisions in regard to all major 
activities of the rural society. The Party organization paralleled the formal apparatus 
of the government at every level. It represented the ideology of the central 
government and the link between the leadership and the masses.
The collectivization had not eliminated the fact that a new privileged class had 
emerged. The village cadres became the new patrons of rural society, who derived 
authority from their ability to monopolize resource distribution and to influence the 
life chance of peasants. In the collective, villagers lost their control on resources and 
means of production , their labour process, their products and interaction with the 
market. Participation in collective production became the only source of subsistence. 
So the villagers economically depended on their production, and personally depended 
on the village cadres for more benefits. For loyalty and support from the peasants in 
the political campaign, the local cadres exchanged resources with the villagers. So as 
Oi point out, the structure of the socialist system determined the patron-client relation 
in rural China (Oi, 1989).
The role of the new patron, in socialist society, however, was somewhat 
different from the traditional one. Many scholars have mentioned the dilemma of 
local cadres in rural China (e.g. Shue, 1988; Zweig, 1989; Huang, 1990; Oi, 1989).
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Some scholars (e.g. Shue) argued that the local cadres in Mao’s era somehow still 
acted as traditional gentry who often protected the local interest of their fellow 
villagers by employing different kinds of strategies such as withholding the truth, mis- 
reporting data and other strategies to resist the state policy. Shue stated very clearly in 
her small book The Reach o f the State:
It seems quite clear that local cadres in horizontally regarding or 
regional units who stayed in their positions for any length of time 
inevitably came to identify with and represent the interests of their 
localities and regions. Their own careers and reputations were, after 
all, intimately tied to the fates of those areas and regions. The mind set 
of these local officials was strongly characterized by an inclination to 
pursue the interests of their own areas against other areas and, when 
necessary, against the demands of the vertical state apparatus 
(1988:56).
Zweig held a similar view. As he stated:
The cadres monitored local activities and used their party authority to 
dominate village politics. They were also the major agents of state 
interests in the countryside. However, team and brigade officials’ 
positions in local society also force them to consider the interests of 
their fellow villagers (1989:155).
Although there were some similarities between local cadres and traditional 
gentiy or patrons, we still could recognize the difference between the two. As 
Schurmam point out, the gentry’s economic power was based on land ownership, its 
political power was based on its relationships to the state bureaucracy, and its social 
power was based on its traditional status (1968:497). In additional, their legitimacy in 
villages was granted by villagers based on their ability to hold expensive ceremonies, 
make large religious contributions and give personal loans and donations (Duara, 
1988). In contrast, the authority of village cadres derived from their positions in the 
administrative hierarchy. The structural limitation lowered their incentive to protect 
the interests of the village. When the policy was imposed from the upper government, 
they often complied with the requirements of the state.
I am not interested in the debate of whether village cadres still play the role of 
traditional elite or not. To me, the role of the village cadres is never static, but 
dynamic and fluid. They situationally decided which role they want to play. In the 
case of Ku Village, sometimes the local cadres colluded with the state; sometimes
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they colluded with their co-villagers. It mostly depended on the situation in different 
campaigns. They would calculate the cost and benefit of their choice. When they 
ensured that their collusion was safe, they would do their best to protect the interests 
of the village. So I would not say that the common clan or lineage guarantees the 
collusion between the villagers and the cadres. The sense of identity and solidarity 
among the villagers should not be romanticized as something autonomous and given. 
It is also dynamic and fluid. In the villager’s narration, I knew that sometimes village 
solidarity and identity forced the cadres to refuse to implement the state policy 
properly; but sometimes it did not matter anymore.
Moreover, the case of Ku Village suggests that the achievement of 
collectivization was superficial, without obtaining consent from below. The everyday 
narrative of Mao's past can be also treated as part of their cultural resistance. Their 
discussion of rural relations before and during Mao's era discredits the official 
discourse on class struggle that is still taught in schools throughout China. To the 
villagers, the village was not made up of wealthy landlords and rich peasants pitted 
against a ruthlessly exploited mass of decent poor and lower-middle peasants. It was 
common poverty, not exploitative class relations and class polarization, that 
characterized village life. In the eyes of the villagers, the class-struggle campaigns 
imposed by party outsiders were always counterproductive, because the rigid class 
labels divided rather than united the community, which hurt the ganqing and guanxi 
among the villagers. Although the compulsory commune system had replaced the 
traditional rural organization, the social relation or the traditional guanxi had been 
redefined in terms of ‘comradeship’, and religious belief had been banned under the 
ideology of atheism or materialist Marxism, we could find the CCP government could 
not totally change the villagers' worldview, their conception of morality and guanxi 
ties. People’s guanxi ties still influenced their operations in everyday life, e.g. job 
distribution. The quick revival of the traditional organization and religious activities 
further proved the failure of the CCP government in cultural project. I will discuss it 
in Chapter 8. Villager’s eveiyday resistance in collective production also reflected 
their dissent from the policy of the socialist government. There were no open and 
noisy confrontations because the state had controlled the means of production and 
forces. As Havel states, people kept in silence in the socialist country not because
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they had been persuaded, but due to the police force, coercion, violence and threat 
(Havel, 1991), They always resisted in hidden, umioticeable, and safe ways. It was 
the "hidden transcript", in Scott’s term (Scott, 1990). It also reflected what Gramsci 
said, domination without hegemony (Gramsci, 1991).
In short, this chapter just aims to, understand how the Ku villagers read their 
history and how they perceived their life in Mao’s era. The question of how history 
was consumed by the villagers, and served for the present purpose, will be discussed 
in coming chapters.
3.1. slogan I
3.2. slogan II
3 .3. slogan III
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Chapter 4: Zhifu -- The Making and Unmaking of Local 
Development
In  Ku village, I  had several good friends who were around 25 to 28. Maybe 
because we had similar age, we could share many things with each other. Brother Li 
was o f them. I  remembered the first time I  stayed at Ku Village, he wasn’t there. His 
father told me that he went to work (dagong) in Guangzhong’s foreign-invested 
medicine factory. I  met him when I  returned to Ku Village again. According to the 
sub-genealogy, we had a close Idn relationship because M>e had the same great-grand 
father. I  was older than he. He came to visit me for the sake o f courtesy (li mao).
One night when I  was relaxing and listening to the popular music, Brother Li 
came in and we started to discuss popular music. The young people in Ku Village 
now listened to pop music, had fashionable haircuts, wore fashionable T-shirts and 
jeans, and rode motorbikes. The youth culture was changing, as they say, ‘not much 
different from the urban ’.
Brother Li, aged twenty-eight, had worked in the medicine factoiy for about 
three years. Before that, he had worked in two electronic factories in the Pearl River 
Delta. All o f these jobs were introduced by relatives who had guanxi connection with 
the supervisors or administrative personnel o f the factories.
uAfter my schooling, I  stayed at home to help cultivate my family's field and 
plant the Shatian pomelo. At the time, villagers still didn’t grow pomelo on a large 
scale. Each family only had ten to twenty trees. You know, there is a harvest season 
and a slack season in farming. In the slack season, I  had nothing to do. It was so 
boring... ” Brother Li was happy to tell me about his past.
“Some o f my classmates and fellow villagers at my age went to dagong in 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, PRD or Shantou. They wrote to me and told how exciting life 
was in these cities. They sent money back to their parents at important festivals. 
They also brought expensive things back, e.g. radio recorders, TVs, electric fans and 
so on. I  felt so envious and useless... After consideration, I  told my father I  wanted to 
go out to find jobs elsewhere. I  remember my father kept silence for a while when he
119
heard what I  said. Then he turned to me and said, "I'll write to your uncle. ” After 
about a month, I  was introduced by my uncle to work in an electronic factory in 
Dongguan. The boss was a Xianggang ren (Hongkongese). ”
Brother Li had changed his job in several factories. Sometimes because the 
factoiy was banlcrupt; sometimes because he couldn’t get used to the environment o f 
that factory. I  interrupted him: “Your father told me that you wouldn’t go back to the 
factory. Why didn’t you stay longer? ”
“Yes, I  decided to stay at home, ” he stopped for a while and then said, 
“Before I  went to dagong, I  was very excited and imagined life in the factory would be 
very good. I  was so happy that my dream o f becoming an urban worker had been 
achieved... After worldng in the factory for about a month, my fresh feeling and 
excitement gradually went away. I  felt bored and meaningless. I  worked in a pacldng 
department. Everyday I  almost did the same job and worked more than twelve hours. 
The work M>as so tiring and stressfid. Each month I  earned only several hundred 
reminbi. But the expenditure was large in the big city (dachengshi). There was no 
fun, no freedom. At first I  though maybe it was only the case o f this factoiy. But after 
changing several factories, I  Jmew everywhere was the same. I  missed the freedom o f 
the rustic life ... Last month I  got a letter from my father. He told me the market o f 
Shatian pomelo was quite good in these years. The villagers grew more and more 
pomelo trees. My father also had planted more than 50 trees and needed many hands 
to till it. I  am the only son in our family. I  think I  have zeren to help my farther. So I  
quit my job and came back. ”
“Comparing the industrial life with the rustic life, I  think I  enjoy life in 
village; at least I  have much freedom. I  can decide when to work and when to stop, 
when to get up and when to sleep. It is said, ‘dangguan jiaohua lan zuoguan ’ (a 
beggar cannot adapt to be an official). Countiy folk (xiangxia ren) don’t like too 
much limitation. Now the pomelo has a good price. The income won’t be lower than 
working in factories. ” Brother Li repeatedly to emphasized why he returned to the 
village... Brother Li was not an exceptional case. In Ku Village, there were about 10 
young people, same as Li, were fed  up with working in factories and had returned to 
the village.
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The mobility of the agricultural population was one of the remarkable 
characteristics in the era of China’s "gciige kaifang" (reform and open door). It was 
described by the government as "mingong chao" (tide of migrant labour) or, 
pejoratively, as "mangliu" (blind flow). Yes, they are like the tide, flowing and 
ebbing. But they are by 110 means blind. They left the village for living out their 
dreams. Some remained in the city, and some returned home. Some became rich, and 
some stayed as poor as before. But whether the people went to the city or stayed in 
the village, they had the same dream, that is — making money {zhuanqian) and getting 
rich (zhifu). Zhuanqiang and zhifu are the dominant rhetoric which represent the 
social characteristics in the era of gaige kaifang. Basically these two terms are 
interrelated and interchangeable. Zhuanqian is the means for zhifu, and zhifu is the 
aim of zhuanqian. People have a common desire of making money because they 
recognize the power of money. I often heard these statements in Ku Village:
“Youqian neng shi gui tui mo ” (Money can make the ghost turn the millstone)
“ Youqian haobanshi” (Money can make the things easily done)
“Xianzhai shenme dou jiangqian, meiyou qian, shenme dou buyongjiang” (Now 
everything is money; no money, no talk)
Desire, in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, is neither biological instincts, nor 
metaphysical energy, nor a symbolic structure. Rather, it is created, planned and 
organized in and through social production. They have made a precise and 
appropriate analysis about how desire creates by making social lack. They state:
Lack (manque) is created, planned, and organized in and through social 
production. ... It is never primary; production is never organized on the 
basis of a pre-existing need or lack (manque). It is that infiltrates itself, 
creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance 
with the organization of an already existing organization of production.
The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the 
art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants 
and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making all of 
desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one’s needs 
satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that 
is supposedly exterior to desire, while at the same time the production 
of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy (1983:28).
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In China, to understand how the desire of making money and getting rich was 
created in the era of gaige kaifang, we have to understand how the social lack was 
made and conditioned by the historical factors and the existing social relation.5 If 
Deleuze and Guattari are right in saying “the deliberate creation of lack as a function 
of market economy is the art of a dominant class”, then creation of desire of 
zhuanqian and zhifu is no more natural or just for fun, it serves the regime of Deng 
and its development policy. The material poverty of Chinese peasants is more than a 
social fact, rather it is the mnemonic sign which can be used by the power for 
naturalizing the rural reform in the post-Mao period, as well as used by the people to 
delegitimaze the regime. How the ‘social lack5 was consumed by the government in 
the making of the rural development will be discussed later in this chapter.
Superficially, zhuanqian or zhifu is the common passion of the Chinese in the 
reform era. But I doubt whether the meaning of zhuanqian or zhifu is totally the same 
to all the villagers; I also suspect villagers' desire for zhifu is static and unchangeable. 
In villagers' everyday practices, I found that the meaning of zhuanqian to a peasant is 
quite different among the villagers; and the implication of zhifu to a peasant is also 
different from what the government claimed. In the reform era, the "new" knowledge 
of development, e.g. the concept of a socialist market economy in terms of 
commodity production, profit maximization and large scale of production, was 
invented by the government and has been deployed in the countryside of China. The 
rural reform dming the first stage has seduced villagers' desire of making money. 
However, the real economic and social situation constrained their desire and 
awakened their dream of becoming urban residents and making money. Therefore 
somehow the villagers still persist in their own views of economy, e.g. land, labour, 
time, consumption and production relationship, which are the result of a negotiated 
process of meaning making in their everyday life. Their fear of food shortage and 
subsistence crisis still can be glimpsed in their daily conversation. The "safety first" 
principle is their first consideration rather than profit maximization. Moreover, most 
of the time they likely define their guanxi in production and economy in terms of
h As the details of history under Mao has been presented in last chapter, in this chapter I only outline 
several important points.
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zeren, rather than wage and profit, among the family members and among the 
villagers.
In this chapter, I will see how the economic changed at local level in the 
reform era; how the villagers practice their economic production in everyday. I will 
also focus on examining the villager’s view of zhifu and zhuanqian, and to what 
extent their conception of zhifu and ways of practices differ from the official version. 
Another important purpose of this chapter is try to investigate how villagers' 
conception of guanxi and zeren constitutes their economic practice in everyday life, 
which is extended and applied in defining their guanxi with the government.
4.1. The Creation o f  Social Lack
Many scholars of China studies share a view that the poverty of rural society 
in Mao’s China was institutionally created (e.g. Selden, 1993; Riskin, 1991; Solinger, 
1993). It was basically due to the ideology of developmentalism which was built on 
the imagining of a utopia of a highly industrialized nation.
In the Chinese Marxist view, the primitive accumulation of socialist capital in 
China had to be through collectivization, in which the state confiscated all the land 
from the villagers and planned all the production of rural society. Its aim and strategy 
was to extract raw materials and resources from the rural to support the urban 
industrialization (Selden 1988, 1993; Riskin, 1991, Schunnann, 1968; Solinger, 
1993). In Mao’s design, "(t)he peasants’ collective economic organizations are just 
like factories. They are also units of production. Within these collective economic 
units the relationship between the collective and the individual must be properly 
regulated and properly managed" (Mao, 1988:720-744). More importantly and often 
hidden, villagers working in the collective or agricultural factories would prevent their 
hiding surplus grain. The ‘three fixed policy’ — unified purchase quota, unified sale 
quota and unified production quota -- was the chief policy to guarantee the extraction 
of surplus from rural society. Private marketing activities and sideline production 
were further curbed. The purposes were to assure ample cheap food for urban 
residents and to channel agricultural surplus from the countryside towards industry 
and the cities (Mueggler, 1991; Cheng and Selden, 1994; Schunnann, 1968).
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The development policy of Mao’s government created a deep split between the 
rural and the urban. From 1950s onward the gap in income and benefits grew 
significantly in favor of the city over the countryside. According to a report from the 
World Bank in 1983, it was estimated that the urban-rural income gap was 2.2 to 1. 
But some scholars like Rawski calculated the gap at 3.4 to 1 excluding subsidies, as 
high as 5.9 to 1 with subsidies included (1982:12-26). In addition to the income gap, 
the urban workers won a considerable amount of social welfare and hinge benefits, 
e.g. lifetime employment, retirement pensions, free health care, housing and food 
subsidies, that the rural population did not enjoy. According to Mark Selden, by 1978 
these subsidies averaged 526 yuan per state worker, 82% of the average nominal 
wage, and accounted for 13% of national income (Selden, 1993:168). For the 
collective peasants, Nicholas Lardy (1983) estimated that the total package of price 
subsidies and fringe benefits was less than 10 yuan per person. Of course the 
extraordinary subsidies for state-sector workers were made possible by the 
appropriation of rural resources via the compulsory sale system.
Moreover, the hnkou system further strengthened the urban-rural chasm. The 
hukou system was implemented in the late 1950s which made the division between 
the nongcun (rural) hukou and the chengshi (urban) hukou. On 9th January 1958, the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress promulgated the Regulation 
on Household Registration in the People’s Republic o f Chinar This system was 
formally backed up by military and public security forces. The hukou system was 
related to the ration and welfare services. Without a hukou, one could not officially 
be eligible for food, clothing or shelter, one could not obtain employment, schooling, 
many or join the army (dangbing). Hukou also made the urban-rural hierarchy. 
Those people with nongcun hukou were not eligible for enjoying the same sort of 
benefits as the urban citizens. This system was strictly implemented, especially in 
times of famine in the early 1960s, for preventing the villagers from flowing to cities 
in order to reduce the pressure on the urban areas.
Hukou system also functioned very well to control the population mobility in 
Mao’s era. It gave clear instructions concerning registration of temporary residence
2 . see Gu-cheng Li, 1992, A Glossary o f  Political Terms o f the People's Republic o f China. 
Hongkong: The Chinese University of Hongkong Press.
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among the floating population. According to the Article 15 and 16 of the Registration 
Regulation,
Citizens who temporarily live for more than three days outside the 
county or city of permanent residence need to be reported to the 
household registration organs for registration of temporary residence 
by the head of the household at the place of temporary residence or by 
themselves, with three days, and report for cancellation before 
departure.
When citizens leave their place of permanent residence for private 
matters and the period of temporary residence exceeds three months, 
they must apply to the household registration organs for extension of 
the period or go through the procedures for migration; if they neither 
have reason for extending the period nor the conditions for migration, 
they should return to their place of permanent residence.
In the late 1950s, the socialist state well demonstrated how they controlled the 
population migration through the hukou system. The Great Leap Forward provided a 
great opportunity for the rural-urban migration because of the sudden explosion of 
urban industrial jobs and construction jobs. At the time, the urban enterprises 
required abundant temporary labour from rural areas. In autumn 1958, it was 
estimated that 38 million people mobilized to leave their villages (Cheng and Selden, 
1994:665). However, the failure of the Great Leap Forward forced the state to send 
the rural population back to the countryside by using rigorous administrative measures 
(.xingzheng shouducni). The hukou system guaranteed the state to clear up a messy 
situation. Obviously, peasants were nothing, but merely the agents of extraction of 
surplus labour. When they lost their utility, they became scrap materials which would 
be thrown back to the countryside.
The hukou system not only created the urban-rural chasm, but it also produced 
the sense of loss and inferiority of the villagers. In the Foucauldian sense, the state 
institutions not only created ‘peasant others’ through the “dividing practice’ and 
“scientific classification”, it also helped the peasants to turn themselves into subjects. 
In Chapter 3 ,1 have mentioned how the CCP government established the ‘regime of 
truth’ via creating the rejectable others - the old society and backward social groups. 
The formation of the discourse basically was under the ideology of developmentalism; 
more specifically, Marxist historical materialism. The official discourse assumed a 
teleology in which human societies would follow a historical path from feudalism to
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capitalism to socialism to communism. Peasant values and culture were frequently 
attacked as residues of feudalism, and the peasants were represented as backward and 
pitiable. So the CCP’s mission was to rescue the Chinese from the old society. 
Beyond the discourse, the mode of social existence under Mao also provided peasants 
the authentic living experience which reinforced their sense of powerlessness and 
inferiority. As a result, they accepted themselves as backward, lacking high 
education, high technology, urban life style and so on. In Ku Village, people often 
compared their life with those of the urban citizens. In our dialogue, I could still 
sense their sad feelings as peasants.
Hok-Bin, nongmin is the lowest category (zui xiajian). It is looked 
down on by everybody. Do you know what the urban people say 
about us? Peasants' legs are filled with cow dung {Nongmin yijiao 
niufen).
Doing fanning work is good for nothing {mei chnxi). Peasants suffer 
poverty throughout their life (yibeizi aiqiong).
Staying in the village is good for nothing. I hope my children can 
succeed in education and ichu ren ton d i’ (rise head and shoulders 
above other i.e. stand out among one’s fellow).
In the village, I had also some opportunities to share with the young villagers about 
their views of livelihood, economy and the development of Ku Village. My good 
friend Brother Xin's view in some sense reflects how the young villagers view 
themselves and their expectation of life in future:
Xin: Brother Hok-Bin, how do you feel this time? Is there any change in the village?
Hok-Bin: Well, I  find there are more pomelo trees, aren I  there?
Xin: Yes, every household plants as many as they can. I  have planted about 200 
pomelo trees. No alternative, in the village, we can only depend on the fruit trees.
Hok-Bin: Not bad, 200 trees must earn a lot o f money per year.
Xin: No, there are only about 80 trees bearing fruit. The other trees had to wait for  
three to five years. It is my shiye (career). I  have invested a lot o f money in it. I f  the 
market is good, I  will concentrate on Shatian pomelo. I  have many plans, building 
another new house for my brother, getting a wife for my brother, and getting a 
motorbike.... Acting as the head o f family is uneasy.
Ho-Bin: I  think life in the village isn 7 bad. Your income isn 7 less than a putong 
gongren (ordinary worker).
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Xin: I  can only agree with you partly. Now we have what the urban citizens had, but I  
think village is always village, there is still some urban-rural gap. In the village, 
there is not much development, only Shatian pomelo. Although it has a good price, 
there is no guarantee in future. Now I  try to make as much money as possible. I  plan 
to send my son to the city and accept education there. Staying in the village is without 
future (mei chuxi). The life in the village is still hard. Stop worldng, stop eating.
The open door policy of Deng Xiao-ping weakened the ability of the socialist 
government in controlling information and its system of ideological control. It further 
strengthened villagers' feeling of lack because the villagers, especially in coastal 
provinces, were able to obtain the comparative knowledge about the city life in China 
and foreign countries. Becoming an urban citizen or having an urban life is still a 
goal some villagers pursued, especially the young villagers. Through the mass media 
and their own visits to the cities, they knew what city life was like. In their view, high 
buildings, convenient transportation, western dress, electric housing appliances, 
facilities and so on symbolized the modern city life. The affluent city life became the 
goal of the villagers, which seduced the desire of villagers to zhuanqian for the sake 
of, in some villagers' term, "becoming more modem" and "having a city living- 
standard".
In short, the desire of the Chinese peasants was somewhat produced by the 
social void which was conditioned by historical factors. They had a common passion 
to ‘elm ren tou di ’. ‘ Chu ren tou di ’ to Chinese peasants implies the desire to move to 
city, to become urban residents, to improve their life, to have an urban life style, to 
have income similar to the urban citizens and many other things. Deng’s policy 
coincided with the peasants’ desire, which provided an opportunity for the mral 
population to live out their desires. In some sense, peasants’ desires were made by the 
Deng’s government to serve for its new development policy or serve for the interest of 
foreign capital.
4.2. Who M ade the Rural Reform
The Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party in 
1978 symbolized the new age and the beginning of gaige kaifang. The whole nation 
celebrated the new beginning and the passing of the old regime. The new socialist 
state imagined itself as rational and progressive, and claimed as its mission to
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transform the rural society and lead the peasants out of the poverty. People imagined 
that the new regime would bring them to good future.
For the new regime, to naturalize its new policy, past ‘others’ had to be 
dispelled from the new-age present. In Deng’s China, the present ‘others’ were two: 
Mao’s regime and traditional Chinese society, which constructed the opposition to 
modernity. Examining the docmnent of the CCP and the opening talks of Deng in the 
early 1980s, it is not difficult to find that Deng’s new regime tried create an image 
that the backwardness, poverty, and stagnation of the country was owed to the 
personal mistakes of Mao Ze-dong, or the ‘extreme leftist route’ of his government. 
For example, in the “Resolution of Certain Historical Problems of the Party since the 
Establishment of the Nation”, it is stated:
In 1958, the 2nd Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Party 
approved the basic line and direction of the socialist construction. It 
correctly reflected the universal will and demand of the people to 
transform the backward economy and cultural condition of country. 
However, its drawback was due to its neglect of the objective 
economic rules.
... due to the lack of experience in socialist construction, and the lack 
of recognizing an economic development rule and the basic condition 
of China’s economy, and due to the pride and complacency of 
Comrade Mao Ze-dong, and the intoxication in victory of many central 
and local comrades. The subjective will and subjective effects were 
exaggerated because of the urgent need to make achievements. 
Without serious investigation, research and experiment, the ‘Great 
Leap Forward’ movement and the rural collectivization movement 
were earned out soon after the launch of General line. Thus the leftist 
orientation, characterized by high goals, blind direction, exaggeration 
and the ‘communist wind’ was extensively prevalent.3
In the Resolution, Deng’s government also attributed the backwardness and 
poverty of the country to the ‘anti-revolutionary” activities of Lin Biao and “the Gang 
of Four”. He insisted that economic growth had to take precedence over the class 
struggle which was advocated in Mao’s era. Mao was criticized for the mistake of 
mobilizing the Cultural Revolution, which seriously created political and economic 
disorder in the country. Deng’s openly recognizing the mistake of the CCP and 
pointing out the mistake of Mao was simply for the sake of legitimating the new
\  see Sanzhong quanhui yilai: Zhongyao wenxian xuanbian xia (Selected Important Documents since 
the Third Plenum). Beijing,: Renmin Chubanshe. 1982:805. My own translation.
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reform policy of his government. But he did not negate Mao and his policy totally, as 
they inherited the common root of socialist revolution. Totally negating Mao would 
also threaten Deng’s legitimacy, so that he concluded that Mao’s merits occupied 70% 
and faults occupied 30% (qifen gong, sanfen guo).A
In the mainstream academic discourse, most of the mainland scholars 
maintained the view that there were three factors that caused the stagnation and 
failure of agriculture development in the Maoist past: 1) the mistakes of the state 
policy; 2) the low education level of the peasants; 3) the selfishness of the small 
peasant ideology (e.g. Lu, 1992; Shi etc. 1990; Huang etc. 1991; Guo, 1992; Wang 
etc. 1992; Chen etc. 1992), Chinese peasants in these discourses are not only the 
victims of the wrong state policy, they themselves are also the obstacles of rural 
development. So the backward looking peasant needed the help of the CCP -- the 
unproductive resources had to be developed, and the past systems had to be 
denigrated, dismantled and replaced by a rational policy designed by an enlightened 
ruler. Hence the legitimacy of the new government was naturally grounded on their 
ability to effect development of China. All of these messages can be conveyed in the 
following quotation:
In the 70s and 80s of 20th century, Chinese villages experienced a 
great and deep transformation. This transformation had a deep impact 
and important historical meaning although people were unable to make 
a fair judgment at the moment. But we can see 0.8 billion peasants 
have obtained the guarantee of food, clothing, shelter and 
transportation. The spirit of science, democracy, competition, and 
creativity have taken root and rapidly developed in Chinese villages.
The dejected Chinese peasants reveal smiles on their faces. The 
sleeping villages are now glowing with vigor. Therefore, at least we 
can say the rural reform is the turning point of Chinese rural 
development in history. It implies that Chinese peasants start to 
control their own fortune and walk on the road of bloom and opulence.
Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP, our 
Party based on the real situation of the countryside and systematically 
carried out the policy of enriching people. The central idea is comrade 
Deng Xiao-ping’s ‘let some people first become rich’.... Under the 
guidance of the direction of zhifu, Chinese villagers will achieve
4. see Deng Xiao-ping Wen Xuan (Selected Essays of Deng Xiao-ping) 1994, Beijing: Renmin 
Chnbang She.
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modernization, Chinese peasants will walk to the socialist future with 
the same heart (Shi, etc. 1990:1-11. my own translation).
To Deng Xiao-ping, the aim of gciige kaifang was to “develop economy, and 
achieve four times (fanliangfan) the national total output value at the end of this 
century, that is about 800 US dollars per person.”5 The strategies of gaige kaifang 
was to let part of the people and part of the regions get rich first {rang bufengren he 
bufeng diqu de ren fuqilai). In rural areas, the first thing was to dismantle the 
collective and release the labour of production. The other important things were to 
cany out the household responsibility system, develop a commodity and market 
economy, and develop township and village enterprises. In sum, the whole discourse 
not only afforded a new vista of China’s development, but also provided a new 
justification of the new regime.
Deng is regarded as the ‘Architect of the Economic Refonns’ of China. The 
economic development and “success” of China in these twenty years is intuitively 
considered as the result of right and brave policy of Deng and his government. 
Chinese peasants are “normally” treated as a powerless and unorganized group, and as 
nearly irrelevant to political and economic outcomes. However, in my view, history 
is created by the people, not merely made by any single individual, no matter how 
great. However, many studies have pointed out that the household responsibility 
carried out in gaige kaifang was invented by the Chinese peasants. They showed 
evidence that before the rural reform was formally carried out in nationwide scope, 
the family responsibility system was widely adopted by the peasants in secret in
different areas of China (e.g. Kelliher, 1993; Vogel, 1989; Zhou, 1996; Johnson,
1982; Wang, 1992). The most famous case was Fengyang in central Sichuan 
province, which was the pioneer of the household responsibility. Vogel’s study of 
Guangdong province also provides us stories of how the villages in poor mountainous 
areas divided their land without the permission of the upper government:
In early 1979 Guangdong provincial officials received reports that in 
very poor areas like Haikang County (Zhanjiang Prefecture) and in
remote mountainous areas like Zijin County (Huiyang Prefecture),
local teams had taken the initiative on a wide scale in assigning land to 
households even during rice-growing season. Official policy did not
5. see Deng Xiao-ping’s Jianshe you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi (Construction of the Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics). p58-59.
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yet permit this, and local officials tried to clamp down. In Zijin, 
higher-level cadres went down to villages to stop it in March, June and 
September 1979, and yet over the year, as they later discovered, the 
number of teams practicing it increased from 1300 to 3700. An 
investigation of the situation there and in nearby Henyuan and Heiping 
counties began on June 10, 1980, led by the head of the provincial 
Agriculture Commission, Du Ruizhi. At meetings from June 19 to 25, 
the team members discussed their findings with officials. Du reported 
back to the province that the assignment of land to individual families 
was even more widespread than previously reported, that the peasants 
were pleased, and that despite bad weather, production had improved 
substantially (1989:95).
Johnson (1982), also found that more than 20% of the work teams had already 
secretly adopted the family responsibility system in the PRD region. The work teams 
divided the land and led the peasants to develop different kinds of sideline activities, 
e.g. growing sugar cane, bananas, and other fruits. Throughout the 70s, there was 
everywhere a ‘silent5 revolution at the bottom. I agree with what Zhou said: “Without 
fanner’s initiative in baochan daohu and without the baochan daohu demonstration 
effect, Wanli and Beijing intellectuals would not have discovered baochan daohu ” 
(1996:8) Thus the rural reform initiated in the early 1980s by Deng’s regime were 
simply an acceptance of the invention of the Chinese peasant. Of course, the state 
intervention accelerated the scope and rate of the change
4.3. Ku Village in Econom ic Transformation
In the early 1980s, when rural reform began, the peasants in many areas 
moved quickly to dismantle collective fanning and chose instead to farm as individual 
households. According to Croll (1994), the legitimization of rural decollectivization 
and the adoption of production responsibility system after 1981 resulted in the 
dismantlement of more than 50,000 communes within two years.
The core of the new agricultural policy adopted was the so-called "production 
responsibility system". The central theme was to reorganize production from one 
based on the collective to one based on the individual households. It aims to stimulate 
the enthusiasm of peasants in production and increase the agricultural productivity 
because peasants will earn whatever they can get from the land and their income is 
once again related to their effort and performance. There were enormous kinds of
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responsibility system occurring from 1979 to 1985 such as: specialized contracts, 
compensation linked to output (zhuanye chengbcio, lianchan jichou); unified 
management, output linked to labour {tongyi jingying, lianchan jichou); production 
contracted to groups, compensation linked to output {baochan daozu, lianchan 
jichou); production contracted to household {baochan daohu) or linking output to the 
household {lianchan daohu)’, tasks contracted to household {baogan daohu) or big 
contracting of production {dabao gan) (Hartford, 1985).
Different teams employed different kinds of systems in the early 1980s. But 
in Songnan commune, all the brigades adopted the "big contracting of production" 
system in 1981 (See Table 4.1). The change of mode of production remolded the state 
and peasant guanxi that was defined in the notion of contract. According to Ross, 
since the introduction of the household responsibility system, more and more villagers 
appeared to conceive of their guanxi with the state in contractual terms (Ross, 
1989:63). For instance, under the grain purchase policy, villagers commonly entered 
into contracts with township governments that obliged them to sell grain to the state 
but that also obliged the township governments to supply production materials, 
including low-priced fertilizer, seeds, and so on. However, the local practices were 
not exactly the same in rural China, In Meixian, at least in Songnan township, the 
villagers did not receive any other production materials except the contracted land. In 
Songnan's household-contracting system, an individual household received a contract 
for fixed plots of land in return for a fixed payment and obligation to the state, 
including grain taxes, welfare funds, collective investments, procurement quotas and 
so on. The household keeps all other products for its own use or for sale. This 
method implies that there is no more "unified distribution" of the teams' products. 
Villagers basically become self-employed and they "compensate" themselves directly 
with their own output. They have also responsibility for providing their own food 
needs.6
6. People interested in the details of other kinds of responsibility systems can read Kathleen Hartford, 
1985, p.p.31-61. "Socialist Agricultural Dead: Long Live Socialist Agriculture! Organizational 
Transformation in Rural China" in EJ. Perry and C. Wong Eds. The Political Economy o f Reform in 
Post-Mao China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. People interested in the details o f the division 
of land and responsibility system in rural China can also read E. Croll 1994. From Heaven to Earth. 
London: Routledge; G. E. Johnson, 1982. "The Production Responsibility System in Chinese 
Agriculture: Some Examples from Guangdong." Pacific Affairs 55:430-451; E. R. Judd, 1992. "Land 
Divided, Land United." The China Quarterly 130:338-356; A. Lu, 1987. "The Reform of Land 
Ownership and the Political Economy of Contemporary China." Peasant Studies 14:229-249; J. Unger,
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Table 4.1. Production Responsibility System in Mei County 1981
commune brigade teams typel type2 type3 type4 type5 type6 type7
Chengdong 13 163 2 1 160
Chengbei 20 289 9 1 3 276
Cheng jiang 16 229 4 7 218
Meijiang 13 193 1 192
Shishan 12 246 2 244
Meixi 15 224 5 2 217
Shikang 14 177 177
Shuiku 2 9 9
D aping 12 161 1 160
Nankou 18 285 5 280
Yaoshang 14 167 3 164
Hesi 15 198 1 195
Jingyi 5 56 56
Fangjiang 17 273 273
Shuiche 18 217 1 216
Meinan 13 143 218
Changsha 12 106 1 104
Xiyang 14 127 127
Baigong 14 170 2 168
Bicun 22 266 1 2 1 16 246
Yanyang 16 182 34 1 4 143
Sancun 12 116 2 114
Songkou 16 205 1 204
Songdong 11 105 1 104
*Songnan 13 149 149
Songyuan 22 376 5 371
Longwen 14 227 3 224
Taorao 15 161 161
Baidu 24 278 5 3 270
Fuda 4 58 2 56
Songkou 2 22
Total 428 5578 81 2 1 8 6 36 5443
Source: Mei County Statistic Bureau, 1982. Agricultural Statistic Data o f All Communes in 1981.
Note: Typel - Collective Production
Type2 - Partial Contracting out System
Type3 - Specialized Contract, Compensation Linked to Output
Type4 - Production Contracted to Groups, Compensation Linked to Output
Type5 - Unified Management, Output Linked to Labour
Type6 - Production Contracted to Household
Type7 - Linking Output to the Household or Big Contracting of Production
The "big contracting of production" were accompanied by land redistribution. 
In Ku Village, the responsibility system and land redistribution was earned out in 
1981. According to Uncle Bi, the policy of "big contracting of production" (dabao
1985-6. "The Decollectivization of the Chinese Countryside: a Survey of Twenty-eight Villages." 
Pacific Affairs 58:585-606.
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gan) was not implemented smoothly because there were different reactions and 
responses to this policy among the villagers and cadres. The villagers, brigade and 
team cadres popularly accepted and welcomed this policy. But the commune cadres 
were not willing to carry out this system. He said:
At the time, the commune cadres could not straighten out their 
thinking. They thought it was only taking the road back to the "old
society" if all the collective land was distributed to individual. But we
[brigade cadres] strongly welcomed the policy because it was the way 
for bringing us to riches. In reality, dividing the land to the household 
only means renting the land to the individual, not the individual having 
the ownership of the land. Their thinking is so foolish! But they were 
under the pressure from upper government and local masses. In the 
end, the land was divided to individual households.
But in Uncle Nian-hua's interpretation, the commune cadres in fact did not worry
about "taking the road back to old society" (zou huitou lu), but they worried that the
central government would change their policy again and they also feared that they 
would lose their power and authority. He told me another stoiy about the land 
division.
They [commune cadres] weren't willing to carry out the policy because 
they worried they would lose their power to control us. After the land 
division, the commune no more retained their role in centralized 
planning over the production and unified distribution of the resource.
We [the brigade] did not need to listen to their orders any more.
Some local cadres felt depressed since they felt they were the losers and the 
scapegoats for past mistakes. After the decollectivization, these cadres lost the most 
because the collective economy which had given them power was dismantled.
In 1981, the production teams in Ku Village adopted a responsibility system 
locally referred to as "divide the land to the households" (fentian daohu). The land 
includes wet fields {shut tian) and dry land (han di). The wet fields and dry land were 
divided into three grades, determined by quality, productivity, degree of slope, and 
irrigation conditions. Land was allocated to each household based on the number of 
mouths to feed and its available labour supply. Household representatives drew lots 
for plots in each grades. In Ku Village, the wet fields occupies about 210 mu, and the 
dry land is about 37 mu. Each person can receive only 0.8 mu cultivated land in 
average. Since all the arable land had been distributed, so the newborn family
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members could not receive any additional land. The villagers called the principle as 
‘sheng bu bu, shi bu shou ’ (110 additional land to the newborn, no confiscation of the 
land when the old die).7 The land divided by drawing lots would make the household 
receive their allotment in scattered pieces, but the villagers believed that it was a fairly 
easy arrangement for the division of land. More important, they believed that this 
method would reduce dispute and conflict among the villagers because it was decided 
by their fortune (yunshu). Nothing was to blame except their own fortune. Some 
villagers abandoned their assigned fields which were located at remote areas.8
After the division of land, each peasant household had to meet the compulsory 
rice purchase quotas. The purchasing price of grain was 28-30 yuan per 100 jin. 
Before 1992, the villagers had to meet the compulsory rice purchase quotas in kind. 
They were required to pay 30 jin each mu. But in 1992, a new rule allowed them to 
pay their rice-delivery quotas to the state in cash, rather than in rice. The taxes are 
collected by the administrative district committee. According to a former team leader 
Uncle Leng, the cadres took up this task because the cadres could earn the 
commission from the tax bureau. This policy resulted in releasing peasants from the 
rice production and allowed them to shift to more profitable commercial agriculture. 
Some households began to grow more fruit and vegetables on their contracted land. 
Apart from the compulsory grain purchase quotas, Ku villagers were also required to 
pay the five-guarantee grain (yvubao Hang),9 education grain (jiaoyu Hang) and 
favouring treatment grain (youdai Hang), The money in the name was used for public 
works, for education and for different social services. For instance, the money of five- 
guarantee grain was allocated to the old peasants supported by the collective under the 
five guarantees program. According to Uncle Wen-de, the old peasants of "five
7. Basically it is a local policy. People can compare the practice in other areas of rural China. See 
Mueggler 1991 Money, the Mountain and State Power.
f 8. Some other villages in other parts of China also used the similar method. People interested in 
details can also read K. Li, 1986. Chinese Peasants Life in Social Transformation -Case Study o f  
Taoyuan Rural Community. Hunan People Publisher; I. Thireau, 1988. "Recent Changes in a 
Guangdong Village." Australian Journal o f  Chinese Affairs 19: 241-268.
9. The childless and infirm elderly who are guaranteed food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial 
expenses by the government.
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guarantee household" were all sent to the elderly house in xiang.10 Each household 
would receive a card issued by the local government, which proved that they had 
fulfilled their task (see Picture 4.1).
The other properties of the village also had been distributed to the villagers. 
Farm implements, from shoulder poles to winnowing baskets, were sold off to all of 
the families. Even the expensive ones, such as tractors, were sold to the villagers 
whose cash came from their overseas relatives. The villagers without overseas 
relatives were unable to afford the cost. The threshing workshop also was contracted 
out to the villagers. Furthermore, the production teams and brigades’ fruit trees and 
fishponds were contracted out to the villages. The contracted households had to pay 
each year the siun they had bid, and in exchange they gained total right over the yields 
of the trees and ponds. In Ku Village, five public fishponds had been contracted out 
to the villagers from 500 yuan to 1,000 yuan per year. The total contract fee of all 
collective property is about 5,200 yuan per year. The expenditures of the villagers' 
committee mainly came from this fee. In sum, the village's assets were totally 
parceled out piece by piece.11
Yao Zhifu, Zhong Guoshu
“Ba qionggeng, kai fulu; zai fugeng, jian jinku. Ruo yciofu, zhong guoshu; jia  zhong 
baitiao shu, dengyu jian jinku. Fangqian fanghou cluo zhongshu, dongnuan xialiang 
hao juzhu. Guoshu jiushi yaoqianshu, shui xian zhongguo shui xian fu. ”
(Pulling out the root o f poor, opening the way o f riches; growing the root o f riches, 
establishing the storage o f gold. Wanting to get rich, planting the fruit trees; family 
planting hundred trees, equal to establishing the storage o f gold. Growing more trees 
before and behind the house, warm winter and cool summer being good for living. 
Fruit trees being money tree, who grows fruit first gets rich first.)
l0. There are a variety of peasants' responsibilities to government in different places. According to the 
villagers, they think the burden is not too heavy when compared to other rural areas in other provinces. 
It is reported that the peasants are subsidizing the heavy burden of government. There are different 
items they have to afford. The heavy burdens have aroused the discontent and resistance of peasants. 
The central government has paid attention to this problem and advocated a reduction in the burden of 
peasants and prohibited die local government from collecting unreasonable taxes (Farmers Daily, 
1993).
". It is reported by different scholars (e.g. Siu, 1989; Chan, Madsen & Unger, 1992; Hartford, 1985) 
that the responsibility system was not always done voluntarily. The reports reflect resistance not only 
from high-place cadres, reports also indicate diat the resistance came from local villagers. Some 
peasants were not willing to divide up their teams' land and equipment and refused to go draw lots for 
the parcels of land. This situation is quite different to Ku Village.
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The above is a popular doggerel in Meixian’s rural area. It is talking about the 
advantages of growing fruit trees. It is said that this doggerel was written by Li Zan- 
fang, the former vice-chairman of the Agricultural Committee of Meixian. lYao zhifu, 
zhong guoshu ’ (want to get rich, plant fruit tree) had been a slogan promoted by the 
Meixian government in the mid-1980s. Planting pomelo trees was regarded as a hope 
of the people in poor and difficult mountainous areas to walk out from poverty, in 
official term “tuo ping”. After ten years, Shatian pomelo plantations now have 
become the dominant farming activity in the villages of Meixian. They also have 
become the main income source of the peasant households. But the Shatian pomelo 
plantation programme was not simply a state planned intervention, rather it was a 
complex process which involves the planned intervention by government and the local 
response of the villages. The transformation of the economic structure in Meixian 
was an outcome of the struggles and negotiations that took place between 
government, local cadres and villagers with differing and conflicting social interests.
According to my informants, the initiatives of planting Shatian pomelo came 
from ‘below’ rather than from ‘above*. Before the policy of "opening out the 
wasteland and planting fruit tree" (kaihuang zhongguo) was formally earned out in 
1985, the peasants of Mei comity had widely planted the Shatian pomelo in some 
villages. I had a chance to interview secretary Li Zan-fang. He was one of the leaders 
who strongly advocated the development of Shatian pomelo. He told me many stories 
about Shatian pomelo.
Shatian pomelo was the original product of Shatian Village of Rongxian in 
Guangxi province. It was imported to Meixian by a villager of Bing Village in the 
1910s. Before 1949, pomelo planting had been quite popular in Bing Village. In 
Mao’s era, due to policy of "grain must be taken as the key link in agriculture", the 
pomelo planting was treated as the tail of capitalism {ziben zhuyi weiba) and was 
totally cut down.
In the late 1970s, there was a doggerel spreading among the villagers. That 
was “zhenshi qi, zhen shigui, Songnan chu le ge Lidapao ” (It is so wonderful and so 
strange, a big gun Li occurred in Songnan town). Big gun (da pao) in Chinese means 
one who speaks boastfully or who noisily overstates things. Li Zan-fang was
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gossiped as ‘big gun’ because he advocated growing fruit trees in Meixian. At the 
time, no cadres dared to think about formally developed fruit plantations in Meixian 
since it was still the age of lyi lian wei gan ’ (mono rice production). But in fact, in 
the 1970s, as Li told me, some villages secretly had carried out their sideline 
activities. The local cadres kept one eye closed and one eye opened, and hid the fact 
from the above. Yanyang town was the first town in Meixian re-planting Shatian 
pomelo in 1973. The pomelo planting activity brought the improvement in living 
standards of the Yanyang peasants. The experience of Yanyang told Secretary Li that 
to bring Meixian to riches, the only way was to develop fruit plantation. In 1974, 
when he was the leader of Yaoshang commune, he encouraged the brigade to develop 
Shatian pomelo as a sideline activity. He said, “Depending on rice jar to exchange oil 
and salt, is just like paring the iron from the head of needle: very limited.” That 
meant that depending on the rice production could not solve the problem of rural 
poverty. So he bought the fruit saplings from Guangzhou for Yaoshan Commune. He 
also invited the fruit fanners from Guangzhou to give the lesson to the villagers in 
Yaoshan. Because of the increase of Yaoshan5 income, suddenly, Yaoshan became 
well known in Meixian. But as they said, “ren pa chaining, zhu pa fe i” (men are 
afraid of becoming famous, pigs are afraid of becoming fat). His idea was seriously 
criticized by his supervisor. He was very angry and came to see his supervisor. He 
argued: “My heart was so painful when I saw the villagers such poor. So I boldly 
encouraged them to grow fruit to supplement the oil and salt money (you yan qian). 
What5s wrong with that?” In the end, he was ousted from his position and in 1978 he 
was sent to the poorest commune — Songnan.
The bad name of Songnan was ‘Qiong nan5. Qiong in Chinese means ‘poor5. 
In the collective era, the average income of each villagers was lower than 70 yuan. 
How to help ‘Qiong nan55 becoming ‘Fu nan5 was the first question facing Li. He 
brought his experience of Yaoshan to Songnan. He called a meeting of village cadres 
at an orange garden in Changshan. He showed the fruit trees to the village cadres 
from other villages and said, “In this garden, there are about 500 orange trees. Those 
who contracted the garden and put some capital into it, they could easily become 
wanyuanfu (Ten thousand yuan households). Do you think it is worthwhile?” Some 
village cadres were encouraged by Li and started the fruit plantation in their villages,
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and they got very good results. For example, Liao Zhi-liang, a village in Dahuang 
brigade, got 18,000 yuan in 1985.
Li’s name became more and more well known in Meixian, but some people 
still doubted that the feasibility of his idea of developing fruit plantations. So 
someone gave him a bad name, ‘big gun Li’. In a meeting at county level, in front of 
other officials, Li stood out and defended himself:
People said I am Big Gun Li. I think there are two kind of big guns.
The first is chedapao, this kind of big gun is untrue, empty, and 
hollow. I am not gonna to be this kind since it will bring calamity to 
the country and the people. The other kind is zhen dapao which is 
concrete and active, it can blow open the door of getting riches. I don’t 
mind being this kind since it benefits to the country and the people.
When some officials challenged his idea, he very angrily said: “Big gun or not a big 
gun, making an on-the-spot investigation will prove it. If you don’t believe it, please 
walk to Liao Zhi-liang’s place with your ‘noble feet’ and look around.” When the 
villagers heard the news that Li was attacked by the government, they felt this was 
unfair. Liao Zhi-liang even made a doggerel to support him. That was “Li shuji da bu 
da pao, qie dao wo jia  jian cheng xiao” (Whether secretary Li is a big gun or not, 
please come to my house and see the result). The doggerel was sung and spread from 
one village to another. The leaders of county government also heard the song.
In the rural reform of the 80s, under the banner of socialist market economy, 
the Meixian government enthusiastically developed the agricultural-commodity 
economy. The local newspapers and official publications provided the official version 
of the development strategy in Meixian:
In the process of developing the commodity economy, it is necessary 
to strengthen the cadres and masses’ knowledge of the route and 
direction of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. It is also necessary to destroy the subsistent petty 
production ideology and establish the value of socialist commodity 
production.... We had to help the peasant form the concept of 
investment, encourage the peasant to audaciously expand their 
reproductive investment... We also have to help the peasant accept the 
idea of efficiency, market value and the idea of competition (Mei Jiang 
Daily, 26th January 1988).
The socialist agriculture is not based on the petty peasant economy, but 
on the development of commodity production.... To break away from
139
the poverty, the mountainous region has to commercialize the local
economy (Liu, etc. 1992).
The county government was eager to find a way out poverty for Meixian. After a 
serious debate in a meeting at county level, the government finally decided to adopt 
Li’s idea of developing fruit plantations in Meixian. Pomelo was chosen as the 
longtou (dragon head, i.e. major) commercial produce, which was promoted to grow 
in large scale. In 1986, Meixian was designated as the country’s major commercial 
pomelo-producing base by the provincial government. It was planned that the acreage 
growing Shatian pomelo would be expanded to 6,666 hectares in 1987 with 
government loans. The aim was to increase to more than 10,000 hectares during the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan period.
The policy of developing Shatian pomelo plantations was passed to the 
villages level-by-level. According to secretary Li, at first some of the villagers and 
grassroots cadres were unwilling to plant the Shatian pomelo because they worried 
about the market and wonder whether the trees would bear fruit. No one wanted to 
take the risk of planting pomelo because of their experiences in the Maoist past. So 
they waited and saw what happened to the other households. When the programme 
encountered the resistance of the villagers, the socialist government adopted the 
method of persuasion and compulsory means to impose this policy on the villagers. 
The policy of “who reclaims the wasteland, owns the land” was earned out for giving 
villagers incentive to grow pomelo. Villagers who planted one sapling would also be 
subsidized four or fiVQ jiao. The credit cooperative also provided low interest loans to 
the villagers to purchase the fertilizer, saplings and other resources. The village 
cadres had to play the leading role and took the lead to grow the Shatian pomelo. 
Each team also had to fulfill the quota of plantation. If any teams failed to fulfill the 
target, the village leaders would be punished with the deduction of bonuses. To 
enhance the confidence of peasants and grassroots cadres, secretary Li organized the 
villagers to visit the planting situation of a model village in Yanyang town. There, 
the villagers saw the trees bearing full fruit. The trip strengthened the confidence of 
the villagers. Li stated: “Village watch village, household watch household, masses 
watch cadres. Villagers strive for direct observation. If you can show them a good 
model, they will follow.”
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Village party secretary, Song-sheng, described the similar situation in Ku Village:
When the policy was transmitted to the village in 1981, the villagers 
responded coldly because they couldn't be assured that planting pomelo 
could earn money. We had to take the risk first. In 1984 or 1985, we 
got the first good harvest. Then the upper government official visited 
our village and appreciated our result.
Our slogan was "want to become rich, plant the fruit pomelo" 
(yaozhifu, zhongguoshu). Our villagers were very "clever"; from that 
time on, more and more villagers planted Shatian pomelo.
Uncle Nian-hua presented the similar story to me.
At the beginning, even if you freely sent the sapling to the household, 
no one picked it up because no one knew whether the tree could bear 
fruit. So the government had to subsidize the villagers. If you plant 
one sapling, you would be subsidized five jiao and a half jin fertilizer.
The Kus were as timid as mice. Only a small group dared to try. In 
the early 1980s, when the policy came down, we had to persuade them 
about planting pomelo household by household.
The statistical data shows the income of peasants of Mei county increased 
quickly in these sixteen years. In the Table 4.2, we can find the average income of 
Songnan sharply increased from 62 yuan in 1980 to 1230.3 yuan in 1992, increasing 
nineteen times. Compared to the average income of Songnan township, Xiaohuang 
was higher, which was 1565 yuan in 1992. Compared to the whole Xiaohuang 
Administrative District, the average income of Ku Village was even higher, which 
was 2000 yuan in 1992 (Mei County Agricultural Committee, 1992). In 1995, the 
average income of Meixian’s rural population had reached 2,800 yuan.
Table 4.2. Average Income in Different Townships of Mei County from 1980-92 (miit: yuan)
Commune 1980 1981 1984 1989 1991 1992
Chengdong 64.4 91 386.0 773 925 1141
Chengbei 96.6 128.9 355.5 / / /
Chengjiang 103.3 110.9 435.5 758 1038 1323
Meijiang 67.4 103.8 404.1 / / /
Shishan 83.6 117.5 506.6 874 916 1178
Meixi 81.1 110.5 365.7 608 794 985
Shikang 56.2 69 236.0 586 721 882
Shuiku 61.7 76 / / / /
D aping 88.5 96.9 334.6 735 961 1334
Nankou 86.1 89.1 365.5 676 902 1232.2
Yaoshang 52 66.6 264.6 574 734 1008
Hesi 75.2 96.9 332.0 676 888 1107.3
Jingyi 88.6 88.7 251.7 493 653 905
Fangjiang 67.2 95.8 282.4 563 783 1154
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Shuiche 67.3 102.9 321.7 573 854 1068
Changsha 90.6 94.1 356.0 / / /
Xiyang 87 99.8 343.0 569 780 1063
Baigong 93.6 107.2 385.0 660 951 1216
Bicun 105.6 112.3 349.1 804 1001 1228
Yanyang 112.9 125.6 515.5 873 1324 1630
Songbei 81.5 117.3 366.0 664 952 1232.3
Songdong 72.8 88.0 340.4 612 931 1160
*Songnan 62.0 94.2 376.2 702 966 1230
Songyuan 60.6 91.6 244.0 517 781 988
Longwen 86 93.4 340.0 716 936 1201
Taorao 81 116.2 374.0 620 863 1081
Baidu 70.7 101.7 401.6 728 1036 1318
Fuda 85.5 96.7 399.2 743 968 1210
Songkoutown 49.3 60.8 254.4 579 852 1107.1
Meinan 64.7 76.3 312.3 592 861 1089
Average of Meixian 78.7 100.2 357.9 668 916 1178
Source: Mei Comity Statistic Bureau, 1982. Agricultural Statistic Data o f  all Communes in 1981. 
[meixian yijiubayi nian gegongshe nongye tongji ziliao]; Agricultural Economic Productivity 
Distribution Statistical Report in 1985 & 1992. [yijiubawu he yijiujiusan nian nongye jingji shouyi 
fengpei tongji baobiao]
There was another indicator of the importance of pomelo planting in Mei 
county. In Table 4.3, the data shows that the area of pomelo planting increased from 
875 mu in 1978 to 112,279 mu in 1991. The income of fruit occupied 13.1% of total 
income of Mei county in 1992. In Songnan township, the income of fruit occupied 
about 61% of its total income and the area of fruit increased from 833 mu in 1986 to 
3385 mu in 1989 (Mei County Statistic Bureau, 1992).
Table 4.3. The Area and Production of Shatian Pomelo in Mei County. (Selected Years).
1949 1957 1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Area (mu) 530 1005 875 19725 63945 88867 96469 88767 104535 112279
Total
Production
(tons)
362 599 80 814 1946 2924 4312 5485 16594 31000
Source: Liu et.al, 1992. The Rich Road o f Mei County [Meixian zhifu zhi ru]. Beijing: Red Flag Press. 
Wen & Chen et.al, 1992. The Shatian Pomelo o f Mei County [Meixian Shatian You]. Guangzhou: The 
University of South China Polytechnic Press.
In Ku Village, the total income of the individual household was also striking. 
Last year, according to my own small survey, there were 57.7% of 40 households 
getting total income more than 10,000 yuan in 1995 (see Table 4.4). The villagers 
attributed the sharp increase of income to the pomelo planting. They often told me 
that the Shatian pomelo brought them riches.
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Table. 4.4. Total income of individual household in Ku Village, 1995 (total 40)
Income Frequency Percentage
under 5000 4 10
5000 to 10000 10 25
11000 to 15000 11 27.5
16000 to 20000 10 25
21000 to 25000 1 2.5
26000 to 30000 1 2.5
above 30000 3 7.5
source: my own survey
Shatian pomelo production partially met the villagers' desire to improve their 
material well-being. Some of them were able to purchase the same luxurious goods as 
urban citizens. In Ku Village, there were 20 households that had their own 
motorcycles; two households with tractors; 28 households with their own televisions; 
21 with radios; and three households with washing machines. In the village, I found 
that there were 35 (57.4%) households that had built new houses since the 80s. "The 
new house is being built by Shatian pomelo" was a popular saying in the village. 
Some of the young villagers imitated the interior decoration of urban houses, with 
sofas, chandeliers, new style cupboards, and other furnishings.
In a material sense, the villagers obtained a lot of improvement in their life. 
They were proud of it. To them, it was their own effort. But to the government, it was 
due to rural reform and the correct policy of the government. In the interviews with 
cadres and villagers, I heard two different voices. They both constructed their stories 
based on their respective interests. To me, whoever made the rural development 
seemed not such important. But to the villagers, this is an important question since it 
related to the taxation of pomelo. In Chapter 6 ,1 will disclose how the villagers and 
the cadres made their story to justify their action in the issue of taxation.
4.4. Villagers ’ Econom ic Practices in Everyday Life
The ‘state-made’ development programmes or economic models have changed 
the local economy from rice production to cash crop plantation and also incorporated 
it into the market economy — in the name of socialism. However, if we can take
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villagers' everyday practices more seriously into account, we will find the villagers 
still maintain their own conception of economy which is revealed in their daily life 
practices. They have a different logic of economy which is quite divergent from the 
official notion of market economy. It comprised of their beliefs and morality, their 
conception of land, profits, and labour, their perception of guanxi and zeren. I do not 
intend to exaggerate that shifting from rice production to pomelo plantation had no 
effect on the villager’s economic practices and conception, but they were not simply 
passive recipients of intervention of the state, but active participants who processed 
information and strategies in dealing with the state policy through making them 
something quite different from what the policy makers had in mind, and adapting it to 
their own interests as well as their own ways of life.
Land and Natural Resource for Survival
Based on Polanyi’s interpretation, to a formal economist, value is determined 
by scarcity and use is made of the concepts of supply and demand, price, capital, and 
other words like profit, maximizing and so on which represent tools of economic 
inquiry. Land is treated by economist as a resource and capital factor which is to 
invested and reinvested for profit (Polanyi, 1949, 1959). To Ku villagers, land was 
the central resource which was the root of their livelihood. From generation to 
generation, they depended on land for survival. Their life was bound up with the soil. 
In their everyday conversation, they shared with me their view of land. I remembered 
that Uncle Jin said "having a piece of land, you can survive in any condition.” Aunt 
Lan also made a metaphor of land as such: "What do fanners rely on? A piece of land 
and two hands. Land is like the milk, we are like the baby; without milk we cannot 
survive." The barren and sterile land was analogized as cmeinai de ma ’ (the mother 
without milk) or ‘ying)>ang buliang’ (the mother lacking nutrient). I think these 
metaphors, made by a woman, to some sense revealed their guanxi with land. People 
in Ku Village have a deep sentiment and respect to land. They treat land as their 
mother and themselves as children. Mother feeds the children and the children will 
feed their mother in return when they grow up. It is a mutual obligation. Land 
provides food to them, and in return it is their zeren to maintain the fertility of land. 
Their guanxi with land is moral rather than instrumental; in other words, land is for
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survival, but not for profit maximization. In the village, there was a custom of 
worshipping tudigong (earth god). On the side of field, on the hill, imder the tree, 
they set the shrine of tudigong. They offered them sacrifices just as offering to 
ancestors. They humanized the land rather than treated it only as material or means of 
production.
Land provided a sense of security to the villagers. Although under the 
influence of industrialization, many young villagers left their land and entered into 
factories, their life was bound up with the land as before. The job insecurity and high 
pressure alienated them from city life. The hukou system also made it difficult for 
them to become real urban residents. Most of them knew that the city was only a 
temporary place to stay. They made money in factories only for building new houses 
in the village. After several years, most of them returned to their homeland and 
rebound themselves to the soil. Jing, Li, Liao-ma and other young villagers were all 
the cases. To them, factories were not their eternal guisu (home to return to). I have 
interviewed some of them. Let us hear what they said.
Jing: It is meaningless to work in a factory. There is no security. I  entered a factory 
only because I  wanted to see the world and enrich my experience. I  returned home 
because my root is here. I  feel the soil gives me security.
Li: Comparing my life in factory, I  prefer the life in village. I  work freely. Having a 
piece o f land, I  will not die.
Liaoma: This is my home. I  feel my affection is deeper to the land than to the machine 
in factory.
Of course not all young villagers thought this way. In Ku Village, Uncle Man's three 
sons did not want to return to the village. They identified themselves as urbanites. 
Uncle Man's youngest son told me, "the village is so backward (luohou), I cannot get 
used to staying in the village any more."
Because the villagers treated land as their means of survival rather than capital 
for accumulation or making profit, the Ku villagers did not try to control land as 
much as possible. People controlling extra land would be criticized or gossiped as 
‘shengren ba shidi’ (the live man occupies the dead land, i.e. greedy). Their area of 
land was often determined and correlated to the number of family members and 
household labour forces. In Table 4.5, we can find that most of households only have 
3.1 to 4 mu in contracted land and 2.1 to 3 mu in private plot.
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Table 4.5. The Land Area and Village Household
Land Area Number of Households (total: 45)
Contracted Field Private Plot
no land 2 11
Less than 1 mu 7 5
1 to 2 mu 6 9
2.1 to 3 mu 7 12
3.1 to 4 mu 16 2
4.1 to 5 mu 5 1
5.1 to 6 mu 1 /
6.1 to 7 mu / 1
7.1 to 8 mu / /
more than 8 mu 1 4
Sources: my own survey.
As a person who came from urban and capitalist society, at first I really could 
not understand why some villagers in Ku Village disposed of or decreased the amount 
of land. Land was one kind of scarcity which could make high profit in city. But 
villagers, like Uncle Si, had transferred the contracted land to other households who 
had sufficient labours. The new landholder took up the zeren to pay the agricultural 
tax for Uncle Si. One day when I was walking with Uncle Si along the small path in 
the village, I asked him why he was so nice to transfer his land to other households 
without any reputation. He laughed and said: "My brother's son, I know what you 
mean. But don't be foolish, as the saying goes, 'you brought nothing to this world 
when you was bom, and you would not bring anything back when you died' (sheng bu 
dailai, si bu daiqu)." Brother Kan also lent out two pieces of land to a couple coming 
from Jiangxi province without charging rent. As I knew, the five guarantee 
households and the households — just having one or two old family members — 
which, lacking of labour forces, also transferred their land to other households. And 
the new holders only had to pay the tax of the contracted land and afford the living 
expenses of those old people. The money the new holders paid was not our concept 
of rent or profit. The underlying idea was the relationship of reciprocity and zeren 
among the kinship group, but not market relations and profit maximization. Because 
of that, there was no any formal contract to bind their zeren and land giving-returning. 
They made an oral promise based on mutual trust. To this day, there are still no 
conflicts between the villagers regarding the land exchange.
146
In Ku Village, there are four kinds of land -- wet fields, dry land, private plot 
and wasteland. To the villagers, wet fields and dry land belonged to individual 
households after dividing the land to the household. To the old villagers, they often 
perceived this only as the returning the land, which was seized by the Communist 
government during collectivization. There was a severe discrepancy in interpretation 
of land ownership between the state and the villagers, which caused conflicts in land 
taxation during 1985 (I will discuss it in detail in Chapter 6). To them, wasteland and 
other natural resources like rivers and forests were freely available for use and 
everyone had rights of access to it. They adopted the principle of ‘first come, first 
serve’. While the land was being used, one had exclusive right to it. The forest was 
also an integral part of their subsistent base. Although the forest had been defined as 
the state's property in terms of forest law12, to the villagers, the forest was a natural 
resource which belonged to nobody. They collected the firewood in the forest as 
usual. The villagers did not know when they began this practice because collecting 
firewood was 'as natural as eating and shitting'.
It was often reported by the Chinese press that there was serious poaching in 
the state's forest area. The government had ordered the concerned department to 
punish poachers severely. In Ku Village, poaching in ‘state's forest’ area was also 
serious. As the wood could be sold a high price in market, the young villagers often 
felled the trees in back mountains of the village. According to Brother San, a young 
villager, one cubic meter of wood could sell for about 300 yuan. As it was strictly 
prohibited by government, they usually took action at dusk and late at night. But 
actually, all the villagers, even the village cadres, knew they were felling trees at the 
back mountain. But poaching in villagers' mind was not a crime since they actually 
did not think the forest was state’s property; rather, it was only part of natural 
resources and cutting down the trees was only part of their traditional practices. But 
now the state redefined the forest as government property and then imposed a whole 
series of ‘regulations and law’ to the rural society. Villagers practicing their routine 
life now suddenly were committing what Michel Foucault called "state created
12. 1 will discuss the villagers' poaching in Ku Village in detail in coming chapter. In the behaviour of 
poaching, we can find the battle of knowledge between peasant society and the state.
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crime". In this sense, I agree with E. P. Thompson (1991) that the most important fact
about poaching is that:
The activity itself was part of the traditional subsistence routine of the 
rural population, an activity embedded in customary rights. Poaching 
as crime, therefore, entails less a change of behaviour than a shift in the 
law of property relations. It is the state and its law which suddenly 
transforms their subsistence routines into everyday forms of resistance 
(Thompson in Scott, 1989:9).
The river to Ku villagers also had special meaning, because it was also the 
source of their life. It brought up the Ku villagers from generation to generation. The 
Ku villagers related the river to the fengshui (geomagnetic omen) of Ku Village. 
Fengshui to Ku villagers was veiy essential important because it would affect the 
continuity of their kin line. Following is a short dialogue between Brother Li and me 
at the hillside.
Li: Brother Hok-Bin, look at the river.
Hok-Bin: What’s different?
Li: My father told me that the river is the root o f our fengshui. Can you see that the 
range o f mountains surrounding Ku Village is like an ancient folding chair, and the 
stream running across the village is like a jade waistband o f traditional officials?
Hok-Bin: It looks like what you said. But what is the relation to fengshid?
Li: This natural geography brings our village good fengshui. The teacher offengshui 
told us that this land o f fengshid makes many descendants obtain high honours in 
education and become officials. The founder o f our village was the successful 
candidate in the highest imperial examination (Jinshi) o f Ming Dynasty.
I repeatedly heard the same story from other older villagers. Through fengshui 
I think we can in some sense grasp the villagers' cosmology which reveals their view 
of nature as an organic world. Fengshid stands for the power of natural environment. 
To them, violating the guanxi with the natural environment will bring bad fortune. 
Apart from the religious meaning, the small river closely influences their everyday 
life. In Ku Village, the river provides the drinking water for the villagers. The river 
also provides irrigation for the fanning. Every day and every year, the women in the 
village washed their food and clothes in the river. In leisure time, people also fish and 
swim in the river. So the river is part of their life. But after the construction of the 
dam for the hydroelectric power station, there was a great impact on their life. In a 
later chapter, I will explain the conflict between the hydroelectric power station and
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Ku Village on the issue of electric fees, through which we can understand the 
villagers' view of the river and their relationship with the river. After the introduction 
of the pomelo plantation, people increasingly used the chemical fertilizer and 
pesticides in production which had polluted the water. The villagers no longer got the 
water from the river for drinking. The people in village also told me that swimming 
in river would cause their skin to itch. It was the cost they had to pay for making 
money. But in recent years, some villagers consciously and actively decreased using 
chemical fertilizer and pesticides for the protection of the environment. They bought 
the chicken feces from the chicken farm instead of using chemical fertilizer. I think 
the idea came from their indigenous idea of guanxi between nature and human beings 
which is rooted in their living experience, rather than the modern concept of 
environmentalism.
Labour without Wages
Labour in Ku Village can be divided into three types. The most important one 
is the family labour or self-employed labour; the second type is the exchange labour; 
the third type is the hired labour. In Ku Village, the family is the basic unit of 
production and consumption. Before the introduction of pomelo plantations, village 
households employed no hired wage labour and they depended solely on the work of 
their own family members. In harvest, all the family members had to participate into 
the collection except the children and the elders. In harvest season, most of the 
village households chose the day of collection of pomelo on Sunday because their 
family members who were away, studying in secondary school or college, would 
return for assistance. The married daughters also came home to help the harvest. 
Some daughters also came home accompanied by her husband and his family 
members. All these labours are non-wage labour.
Wage is an important concept in the capitalist economy. The essential 
characteristic of capitalist enterprise is that they operate with hired workers in order to 
earn profit. However, in the villagers' conception of economy, they had no idea of 
wages for individual family members. We inevitably had to take the entire family 
household as a single economic unit. Because of the absence of wages, other 
concepts like net gain, rent and interest on capital, could not work out for peasant
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farms. In my small survey in Ku Village, the result showed me that the villagers 
could not divide clearly the income of an individual item of production. They could 
only tell me a single return based on their annual product minus their output such as 
the seed, fertilizer, pesticide and so on. For them, there were neither wages nor net 
profits because the family members knew roughly how many days they had worked. 
By its nature, their return was unique, indivisible and undifferentiated. In other 
words, it could not be broken down into wage and other factor payment.
In the harvest season, exchanging the labour between households was a 
popular practice in Ku Village. The exchange labour could not be calculated in 
wages. It was based on the principle of reciprocity such as mutual aid, obligation and 
so on. To most villagers, the exchange of labour was one of the important ways for 
them to maintain and promote their guanxi and ganqing with other family. Therefore, 
even if a household harboured sufficient labour, they still exchanged their labour. Of 
course, some villagers’ motivation for obtaining the labour assistance was only for 
rapidly harvesting a ripened crop. Last year when I was staying in the village, I 
noticed most village households exchanged their labour with other households in the 
harvest of Shatian pomelo and in the spring ploughing. They cooperated in a proper 
way (see Picture 4.2). In the grove of pomelo tree, there was lots of laughing: some 
were working, some were sharing jokes with each other; some were sharing their 
news of harvest or other households' matter; some were just engaging in a small talk; 
some were also making fun of each other. They really enjoyed their work. They did 
not intend to make accurate calculations of how many tasks the exchanged labourers 
had done or how much effort they had made. They only roughly knew the number of 
days they would exchange. Of course, it cannot made sense from the logic of wage.
After the pomelo plantation becoming the dominant activity, hired wage 
labour had occurred in Ku Village. But it would be a mistake to think that there was a 
new mode of production accompanying the new production relationship in Ku 
Village, because the operational logic was still the same as the other form of labour 
that aimed at seeming the family's needs rather than making profit. In Ku Village, the 
households hired the outside labour for a short term. Only two households employed 
labour longer than one month. Brother Kan employed two long-term labourers. 
Brother Xin employed three short-term labourers for less than half year. All the hired
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labour came from other provinces such as Jiangxi and Fujian. They set the payment 
not 011 the basis of maximizing profit, but on the basis of giving a reasonable 
payment. Brother Kan paid his hired labourers three hundreds reminbi per month 
including three meals. Brother Kan told me:
I think my payment is quite reasonable. It is higher than the salary of 
some workers in the factoiy. Compared to other villages, my payment 
to my labour is acceptable. We do things in all fairness. Everyday I 
also do as much in the field as my hired labourers do.
In Ku Village, the social relationship bound the people and placed different 
social and moral demands on its members. They could not set the price of labour for 
their own sake of interest without considering the public opinion of the other 
villagers. As I knew, people in the village would like to compare with each other. 
When Brother Xin set the wage for his labours, he took Brother Kan's payment as 
reference. He also paid the same price to his hired labour. He could not arbitrarily 
minimize the price as he wanted. As Brother Xin said, "I will not lose our family's 
face. They pay how much, I will pay the same. I don't want others to look down us." 
"Face" to Chinese is so important, and it is embedded in social relationships and is 
emotionally tied to personal obligations as defined by those relationships. Whoever 
fails to fulfill zeren and social demands will think that they lost 'face ' for their family. 
Adopting the view of maximizing the profit to understand the hired labour in Ku 
Village will cause one to misconstrue its underlying meaning.
The Labour- Family Demand Balance Principle
In the local newspaper, the official voice 011 development is always to promote 
the large-scale production in agriculture. The government encourage the villagers to 
expand their pomelo plantations to the scale of manors. This is based on the logic of 
economy of large-scale in terms of maximizing and profit. At the first stage of rural 
reform, almost all the villagers were subject to the desire for the maximization of 
wealth. However, the uncertainty and fluctuation of market made many of the 
villagers seriously lost in pomelo investment in recent years. Some of the villagers 
had readjusted their strategy of investment. Interviewing with the villagers, many of 
them told me that subsistent security is more important than maximization of profit.
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Broadly speaking, their conception of subsistence is defined by the labour-consumer 
balance.
The villagers did not blindly expand their production beyond their ability of 
control; in other words, the scale of production of each village household was greatly 
limited by the number of their family labourers and its product, but not the capital. 
The amount of labour product was mainly determined by the size and the composition 
of the working family, and the number of its member capable of work. It was also 
determined by the productivity of each labour unit, the degree of labour effort and the 
degree of self-exploitation.13 The degree of labour effort and the degree of self­
exploitation was determined by a peculiar equilibrium between family demand 
satisfaction and the drudgery of labour.14
The family demand is still greatly influenced by the family cycle. The family 
at different stages had its different size and composition which will determine its 
demands. Brother Xin shared with me his experience as father, husband and head of 
family.
Now I am the head of family. My father asked me to determine 
everything of our family. I find now I have to put many things into 
consideration such as my son's milk, my brother's marriage, and my 
family's salt, sugar, rice, oil and so on. I know I have to work harder 
than before. So I do anything I can, like carrying the sand and cement 
with my tractor for other people. I also planted 100 more pomelo trees 
this year. You know, my kid's expenditure is more than an adult. And 
my brother is at the time of marriage. I think I have to build a new 
house for him.
At this stage, Brother XiiTs family had two full labourers ( he and his brother), three 
half labourers (his parents and his wife) and two non-labourers (his son and daughter).
The concept of'degree of self exploitation' is drawn from Chayanov (1986). The extent to which 
die members of die family actually work under given conditions he called die degree of self­
exploitation of family labour.
14. The labour-consumer balance between the satisfaction of family needs and die drudgery of labour is 
the central concept of Cliayanov's dieory of peasant economy (Chayanov, 1986). According to my 
observation and conversation with the villagers, I found Cliayanov's theory is still valid. As Chayanov 
stated: “As long as die equilibrium is not reached between the elements being evaluated (i.e., die 
drudgery of the work is subjectively estimated as lower than the significance of the needs for whose 
satisfaction the labor is endured), the family, working without paid labour, has every cause to continue 
its economic activity. As soon as this equilibrium point is reached, however, continuing to work 
becomes pointless, as any further labour expenditure becomes harder for the peasant or artisan to 
endure than is foregoing its economic effects.” (Chayanov, 1986:6).
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So the degree of self-exploitation in his family was higher than other families. He had 
to work harder and longer to meet the increasing family expenditure.
Some households decided to decrease their scale of production after their 
children left the village for study or marriage. For example, Uncle Xiang's family had 
planted about 100 trees of pomelo. After his sons left the village and entered into 
colleges in Guangzhou city, he sold the trees to other households and kept only 60 to 
70 trees for himself Uncle Si only kept the number of his trees around 35 because all 
his sons and daughters had left the village. Uncle Bi expanded his production after 
his son, Brother Li, returned to the village from the factory in the Pearl River Delta 
(PRD). The market situation and natural disasters also determined their degree of 
self-exploitation. In recent years, the market price of Shatian pomelo was constant 
and declined,. For coping with the inflation and maintaining the family standard of 
living, some Ku Villagers planted more pomelo trees and work longer and harder 
hours. Some family restrained their consumption demand a bit, e.g. delaying to buy a 
colour TV. However, I want to say that villagers will self-exploit and put forth 
greater efforts only if they have reason to believe it will increase their output which 
could be devoted to greater family consumption or /and to enlarged investment in the 
farm, and vice versa. For example, Brother Xin time and again told me that, "If I 
cannot get any results from my investment, I would feel very meaningless (;meiyisi) 
and lackadaisical (meijing). I would not do any more investment."
In addition to family cycles, the family demand was also socially constructed. 
Mass media was one of the important tools in constructing people's desire, taste and 
then demand. After the delimitation of rural-urban migration and the introduction of 
radio and TV to rural society, people in the village could access the information from 
the outside world easily. They compared their life with that of urban citizens, with 
foreign countries, with other villages, and with the fellow villagers. The chasm 
created mixed feelings of Ku villagers. When they compared themselves with the 
poor villages, they felt proud and superior; when compared themselves with richer 
areas, in material sense, the Ku villagers felt insufficient and inferior. The social lack 
seduced their desire. Their demands were no longer limited only to the fulfillment of 
basic necessity. They began to think about improving their living standard or having 
a comfortable life like urban citizens. Among the villagers, there are diverse views
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on the comfortable life which influenced the formation of their family demands. To 
Uncle Si, food was more important than a TV, a new house and other things. He 
taught his philosophy to me:
What do we pursue in our life? Nothing is more important than food 
and drink. If I have cash, I will not spend it on constructing a new 
house like they (other villagers) do. I will spend it on food and drink -- 
at least it is good for health. I don't know why they are so foolish. All 
of this cannot be brought away after we die.
To some villagers, building a new house was their most important family 
demand. They worked hard and made money for building a two-storey house. 
Building a new house was part of parent’s zeren for their son. As Uncle Jiong stated, 
“My last will was to build two new house and get wives for my sons. After that, I 
have fulfilled my obligation.” To other villagers, education of children was the most 
important demand. They worked very hard for the sake of supporting their children 
studying in universities and colleges. In Table 4.6, we can find that the expenditure on 
education occupied a large percentage of family income.
Table 4.6. Villagers' Expenditure in Education
Number of Households (total: 45)
no expenditure on education 24
less than 500 yuan 1
510 to 1000 yuan 2
1100 to 1500 yuan 4
1600 to 2000 yuan 2
2100 to 2500 yuan 1
2600 to 3000 yuan 1
3100 to 3500 yuan 1
more than 3500 yuan 4
university expenditure 5
Source: my own survey.
To the younger villagers, their demand satisfaction was quite different. Brother Mei 
told me his plan as such:
In our village, almost all the households have constructed their new 
"houses". Most of the households have television, motorcycle.... I 
think I cannot be looked down on by others; I will also buy a 
motorcycle this year.
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In sum, the family demand of the villagers is never fixed, i.e. it is constituted by many 
different factors. The relationship between labour and family demand is dialectic. 
The family demand will determine the degree of labour exploitation; on the other 
hand, the number of labourers will limit the family demand in return. Of course, I 
cannot say that this principle of labour-family balance applies to eveiy villagers. 
Some village households in Ku Village still continue to take risk of expanding their 
production for maximization of profit.
Time Spending of the Villagers
In Ku Village, people’s time is mainly spent 011 the pomelo plantation. 
Broadly speaking, the activities in the planting cycle of Shatian pomelo includes the 
sapling planting, turning up the soil, fertilizing, artificial pollination, weeding, 
eliminating the insects, irrigation and harvesting. The villagers' conception of time is 
quite different from urban citizens. They seldom use the ycingli (Western calendar) to 
calculate their year cycle. Yinli or nongli (Chinese calendar) is mainly adopted to plan 
their fanning activities. In daily life, they only calculate the day by using the cycle of 
the periodic market. For convenience, I broadly transfer yinli to yangli to present their 
work cycle in a year.
January is the slash season of the villagers. The work they mainly to do is 
fertilizing and spraying pesticide. In February, the main task of the villagers is to take 
care of the flower buds. The sapling is sometimes planted in this month because the 
rainfall is concentrated. In March, when the flowers open, the villagers have to keep 
the good flowers and pluck the small flowers off. Then they will do the artificial 
pollination. Artificial pollination requires much time and labour, so this is a busy 
season for the villagers. According to the villagers, artificial pollination is very 
important because it will affect the amount of the fruit. At this stage, they also have 
to eliminate the insects and protect the flowers. In April, the trees begin to bear fruit. 
The villagers’ main task is to take care of the infant fruit and prevent insects and 
disease. The task in May is similar to April. At this stage, the fruit grows up quickly. 
In June, the fruit become bigger, but they easily get diseased because the rainfall 
concentrates in this season. Villagers have to apply fertilizer and spray the pesticide 
to the pomelo frees. They also have to cut down some of the branches and leaves for
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the circulation of the air. The sick fruits will be cut off. In July, the fruits grow up 
quickly. The important task is to keep humidity in the soil for maintaining the 
juiciness of fruits. The irrigation of the pomelo mainly depends on the rainfall. In 
the dry season (mainly concentrated in July, April and September), the villagers often 
pump the water from the river in the village. So all the households in Ku Village have 
electric pumps. August and September are the hottest months, villagers have to 
prevent the heatstroke and fever of the fruits. So they can only spray the water in the 
early morning. They keep up with the application of fertilizer and pesticide as usual, 
but they reduce the quantity of the fertilizers and pesticide for keeping the sweetness 
of the fruits.
In October, the fruit gradually become mature (see Picture 4.3). It is the 
important month of the villagers. Any natural disaster like typhoon will destroy their 
harvest. So there is still great uncertainty among the villagers; they said, “We won’t 
have a good sleep before the pomelo is sold.” "Living off nature" is the rule of 
agriculture. In October of 1993, when I was staying in the village, it was raining 
everyday. The peasants worried very much about the harvest because before the 
harvest, the pomelo tree cannot absorb too much water, or the fruit will become 
rotten. Eveiyday, they discussed the situation of the pomelo tree. Each household 
had different degrees of lost harvest. From late October to early November is the 
harvest period. They visited the pomelo trees twice per day. Some villagers even set 
up beds under the pomelo trees because the fruits sometimes were stolen by other 
villagers or outsiders. Most of Ku villagers collected the pomelo after Mid-Autumn 
festival. They immersed the fruit with the preservative immediately to prevent the 
loss of moisture and the rotting of the fruits. The trading of Shatian pomelo is a face- 
to-face transaction process. Town merchants come to the village, and directly collect 
the fruits from the peasant households for resale or export. After getting an agreement 
on price, the buyers pay immediately and transport the pomelo away (see Picture 4.4). 
If the villagers cannot sell out the fruit, they have to package the fruit with the plastic 
preserving bag and store it until they can get a good price (see Picture 4.5). There is 
some fluctuation of the purchasing price of Shatian pomelo in these several years. 
From 1992 to 1995, the price had little increase. In 1992, the purchasing price was 
about 1.2 yuan to 1.3 yuan per jin; in 1994, the average purchasing price was about
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1.8 to 2 yuan per jin; in 1995, the price decreased to 1.5 to 1.8 yuan per jin. The Ku 
villager’s production of pomelo for 1995 is summarized in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7. The Production of Shatian Pomelo in Ku Village in 1995. (miit: jin)
No. of Households Percentage
No Production 6 13.3
Less than 5000 or equal 14 31.1
5100 to 6000 4 8.9
6100 to 7000 2 4.4
7100 to 8000 2 4.4
8100 to 9000 4 8.9
9100 to 10000 4 8.9
more than or equal to 11000 9 20
source: my own survey.
Most villagers did not dare to take the risk of storing the fruit and waiting for a good 
price. Uncle Chang expressed his thinking:
Villagers do not dare to take risks, as you know; we have worked hard 
for a year. Although the fruit has been collected, if the money is not in 
our pocket, we don't set our mind at rest. While the pomelo is still 
stored at home, my wife cannot get to sleep. But some villagers dare 
to store the pomelo and wait for the good price. In our village, 
someone sell 1.8-2.2 yuan per jin. In Chinese New Year, they even 
sell 3.3 yuan per jin.
In November and December, after the collection of the fruit, the villagers 
begin to turn up the soil and spread the fertilizer on the soil. They also cut the old 
branches and clear the weeds. They called this procedure as qingyuan (clear the 
garden). Fertilizing, eliminating the insects, irrigating and weeding is done 
throughout year.
Basically, pomelo planting is not a time and labour intensive production. One 
person can manage 30 to 40 trees. In the slash season, two or three family members 
are quite enough in the planting process. So the pomelo plantation releases more 
labour from the planting process and allows people to engage in other sideline 
activities such as trading or participating into industry.
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To me as an urbanite, a whole day working or a whole week working is quite 
normal. But time to the villagers is not just for work, but also for leisure. Living in 
the village, every day I foimd that they spent much of their time in leisure. Eveiyday 
the adults work between eight to eleven o'clock in morning. After lunch, some 
villagers like to join together and have a chat or play Chinese cards. Some like to 
take a nap until two or three o'clock. They often work again after three o’clock and go 
home before six o'clock. In summer and winter, they work even shorter. Of course, 
in harvest season, they will work longer. On rainy days, they often stop their work 
and rest the whole day. Most of time, the men just work half a day and the women 
work the whole day. When friends or relatives are visiting their family, they also stop 
working. Every day after sunset, they do not work any more. After dinner, some 
watch television; some drop in other villagers' homes; some chat with family 
members. To a neo-classical economist, there is a lot of potential surplus labour in 
the village. But the villagers have a different concept of time and work. To them, 
there is not something called ‘surplus’. They work for subsistence. Although the level 
of subsistence is not fixed, it is never for accumulation of capital or maximization of 
profit. How long they work is greatly influenced by their family needs. They do not 
work more than their needs required only when they are forced to. Uncle Chang and 
his wife often work longer than other households as his son studied in the University 
of Jiaqing in Mei county, which costs around 8,000 yuan each year. Brother Xin 
works harder and longer because he has a son now. When their need is met, they stop 
working.
4.5 Villagers9 Strategies fo r  Survival
The villagers’ income has increased at least 20 times over the past ten years, 
but this does not mean they have solved the problem of survival. In the village, I still 
often heard their "complaints" about the hardships of life. They complained that 
"everything is expensive" (baiwu tenggui) and that "there is never enough money" 
(rubufuzhi) in Deng’s era. According to my survey, 11 households borrowed money 
from the credit co-op {xinyong she) and ten households borrowed money from the 
other villagers (see Table 4.8). But the villagers are not passive victims of 
development, they have their own strategies to cope with difficulties of life.
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Table 4.8 Number of Households Getting a Loan from Bank and Private (unit: yuan)
No. of Households 
(Bank Loan)
No. of Households 
(Private Loan)
1100 to 2000 1 1
2100 to 3000 / 2
3100 to 4000 5 2
4100 to 5000 1 2
5100 to 6000 / /
6100 to 7000 1 /
7100 to 8000 / 1
8100 and above 3 2
Source: my own survey.
Maintaining the Subsistent Economy
Although the dominant economic activity has shifted from rice production to 
cash crop plantation, Ku villagers still maintain many characteristic of subsistence 
economy. For subsistence security, many households did not totally abandon rice 
production. They clearly knew the fluctuation of price of rice in the market, so they 
kept some rice fields for self-consumption. Brother Xin explained why he went on in 
cultivating rice.
Our rice is for self-consumption, not for selling. The price of rice is so 
low in market. Nobody want to produce too much rice. The output is 
just enough for our mouths.
We still keep some fields for rice production. It is for security. You 
know, Shatian pomelo’s production and price is unstable. Even if we 
lost in pomelo production, we still can survive.
Sister Feng also stated the same reason:
Yes, the price of Shatian pomelo is good in these several years, but 
who can guarantee what will happen in future. Maybe you can say 
peasants are danxiao rushu (as timid as mice). We are different from 
urban citizens; we have to feed ourselves. I don’t want to take any 
risk. So we still keep some land for rice cultivation. You know the 
price of the market always changes. With rice, you will not become 
hungry ghost.
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In Ku Village, I also found that every household kept a piece of land for 
vegetable growing. It was for self-consumption. They seldom bought and sold 
vegetables in the market town. Vegetables were the basic dish of every meal in Ku 
Village. The villagers grew a variety of vegetables on small pieces of land. It ensured 
that they could supply themselves with vegetables in different seasons. In everyday 
talking, they often discussed the fluctuation of vegetable prices in market. They also 
made fun of the urban people that bought the vegetables at a high price.
Aunt Guang: Hi sister, my husband just came back from Meicheng. He told me the 
vegetables are very expensive in Mei county.
Aunt Si: Really? How much per jin?
Aunt Guang: Really terrible, Chinese cabbage is about 1.2 yuan per jin. The
chengshiren (urbanite) is so foolish. How can the Chinese cabbage be worth 1.2 per 
jin? I f  your Chinese cabbage is sent to market, I  think you can earn much money.
Aunt Si: Don’t be silly. My Chinese cabbage is just for self-consumption. So little 
cannot make any money.
Actually, the villagers seldom sell their vegetable in market because it is not for 
making profit. If they cannot consume all the vegetables, they will send some to their 
close relatives or the villagers with whom the villager has good relations.
The Drudgery of Labour
Generally the village family experiences a life-cycle starting with the marriage 
of the original nuclear couple, going on through child-bearing and rearing, the 
maturation of the children and their splitting off from the original family to start new 
families of their own elsewhere.15 The family at different stages have their different 
demands. The villagers usually says, “The only thing we have is our labour." When 
the demand and consumption increase, self-exploitation or drudgery of labour 
normally becomes the strategy of the village household to cope with the increased 
burdens or to keep up the family's standard of living. The village households most of 
the time are in position either to work more hours or to work intensively, sometimes 
even both.
15. I surely understand that there are variations between village households. There can be different 
organizations of families such as single family and so on.
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Basically, the drudgery of the work is the subjective estimation of each village 
household. The subjective evaluation is often based on their life and production 
experience. So there is not any rigid rule or law for calculation. The villagers will 
put greater efforts only if they have reason to believe that it will increase their output 
which can be devoted to greater family consumption. They will not push the drudgeiy 
when they feel that there is no possibility of increasing in output. This output is often 
calculated into a single return as there are neither wages nor net profits in the 
villagers' conception. They do not concern themselves about how much effort they 
put into their work, but only the total output. One afternoon, when I was chatting with 
Brother Xin, he expressed the idea of labour drudgeiy.
Hok-Bin: Xin, how are you feeling after you became the father o f a son?
Xin: I  suddenly found my burden become heavier. Before I  dared to take risks, but 
now I  have to behave myself I  have to work harder than before. I  have to save some 
money for my son's education.
Hok-Bin: What a great father! Very good.
Xin: To me, I  have my labour with two hands, there is not any other way to make 
more money. But I  have to make sure that my effort is worthwhile. I f  I  find my whole 
year o f worldng cannot increase my income, I  will be very depressed and will not work hard 
any more.
Drudgery of labour is also the strategy of the villagers to cope with the fluctuation of 
market. To tackle this problem, the villagers often work harder and plant more pomelo 
tree to maintain their income and standard of living. In my conversation with Brother 
Li, he reflected their logic of calculation.
Hok-Bin: As I  know, the price o f pomelo is lower than last year. Will you still expand 
on your pomelo plantation ?
Li: Even though the price is lower than last year, i f  my yield is higher than last year, I  
still don't lose. For example, this year my yield o f pomelo is 1,000 jin and I  sell one 
yuan per jin. Then I  can earn 1,000 yuan. But i f  next year my yield o f pomelo is 
10,000 jin, even I  only sell 0.5 yuan per jin, I  still can get 5,000 yuan. Although the 
average price is lower this year, my total income is higher. My life will be better.
In sum, the village families can work longer hours, sell at lower prices, and 
obtain no net surplus in order to maintain their standard of living in the fluctuation of 
market.
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Undifferentiated Role of the Labour
After the dismantling of the collective production, the villagers can freely 
make decisions about what to grow and what to do, when and where. They have 
freedom and flexibility to decide their time usage. In the village, the villagers do not 
only participate in agricultural production, if it is feasible, they also engage in 
different kind of jobs for improving their standard of living or meeting the needs of 
family, especially in a bad harvest year or if there is an increase in the family 
demands. In the Table 4.9, we can find that in addition to fanning activities, the 
villagers also participated in business and other economic activities. In the village, 
many households have motorcycles. The motorcycle are not just used for self­
transport, but also for carrying passengers. Wen-ming owns a motorcycle. Anytime 
when other villagers asked for transport to township, he would put aside his work at 
hand because money was easily made in transporting passengers. Brother Xin owned 
a tractor, any time the people in the village or outside village asked for transporting 
the sand, cement, fertilizer and so on, he also set aside his family's work.
Table 4.9. Other Economic Activities in Ku Village
No of Households
Industry 3
Business 10
Education 3
Transport 1
Construction 1
Services 1
Others 2
Sources: my own survey.
In the harvest, some villagers collect the pomelo from other households and 
directly trade to town and city. According to the villagers, most pomelos are re-sold 
and exported to Pearl River Delta, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Shantou. Some even 
export to Hong Kong and overseas. The teachers of Songxi primary school, such as 
Uncle Xiang and his wife, and Wen-ying and his wife, also participated in sideline 
activities. Some young villagers left the village and went to work in factories in PRD, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and other cities, and some of them sent money back to support 
their family.
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In sum, the differentiated role of the villagers also causes them to suffer less in 
the bad year of harvest or natural disaster because their income from sideline 
activities supplements their loss from the natural disaster.
Diversification of Production in Ku Village
The local government continuously encouraged the villagers to expand their 
production on pomelo. But in recent years, the price of Shatian pomelo began to 
drop. Some villagers in Ku Village begin to diversify their plantations. They foresaw 
the market of Shatian pomelo would be saturated in coming several years. That 
means the price of the Shatian pomelo would not rise. Meanwhile, they found that the 
price of other kinds of fruit was attractive. So some of the village households limited 
or reduce their plantation of Shatian pomelo.
Table 4.10. Number of Household Planting Orange and Other Fruits
Number of Households
Orange Trees Other Fruit Trees
no plantation 25 27
less than 10 0 3
11 to 20 1 9
21 to 30 3 1
31 to 40 2 1
41 to 50 5 0
51 to 60 0 0
61 to 70 2 0
71 to 80 0 1
more than 80 7 3
Sources: my own survey.
In my own survey, I found there was a increase in plantations of summer 
oranges and Sanhua plum in Ku Village (see the Table 4.10). The villagers also made 
the experiment of planting watermelon. One day while I visited Brother Kan in his 
field of Luojiang oranges, he told me about his views of plantations:
I think one of the important things of plantations is fully utilizing the 
time of the whole year and diversifying the crops. There are different 
times of growth and harvest among different fruits. If you can fully 
utilize the time gap of growing of different fruits, you will not waste 
your time. Such now I am busy with summer oranges. In autumn, I
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will be busy with Shatian pomelo. In spring, I will be busy with 
ploughing rice. So I will not waste my time.
I also like to try many different new varieties of fruit. New fruit often 
can be sold at a good price. So updating the market information is also 
veiy important. After many people plant that kind of fruit like a swarm 
of bees (yi wo feng), the price will become low. So now I will not 
increase my Shatian pomelo trees any more.
Diversifying the crops can guarantee our income. Because when there 
is any natural disaster like parasites on one kind of fruit, the other kind 
of fruit can supplement the loss.
4.6. Discussion
Getting insight from Foucault's notion of power/ knowledge, some scholars 
(e.g. A. Escobar, 1995; D. Ludden, 1992) have treated development not only as a 
question of political economy, but also of culture. Escobar pays much attention to 
how the West dominated the third world through constructing the discourse of the 
"developed" and "underdeveloped". Ludden shows us how modem state and 
government grounded their legitimacy through establishing the regime of 
development for the sake of obtaining the consent from below.
Since the 1980s, one of the important tasks of Deng’s government is also to 
construct the regime of development. New types of knowledge about development 
have been deployed in rural China which try to insure the conformity of Chinese 
peasants to a certain type of economic and cultural behaviors. Modernization in terms 
of privatization (division of land), marketization and commercialization was the 
"regime of truth" in Deng’s era, which presumed that history had a one-way 
progression — passing through the stages which lead from a society without a market 
economy to a civilized society with a market economy. In the official discourse, it is 
only through the modernization led by the CCP, that the Chinese peasants have a way 
out of backwardness and poverty. The construction of the discourse of gaige kaifang 
is never constructed without foundation. It is connected to the concrete living 
experience of the peasants, e.g. the social lack, urban-rural chasm in Mao's China. 
The peasants’ desire of escaping poverty forced them to resist the collective system 
and search for alternative modes of production. Their resistance to the collective
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economy forced the CCP government to abandon the collective production and adopt 
the peasant invented household contracting system at the first stage of gaige kaifang. 
In the reform era, the new knowledge of development, e.g. the concept of a socialist 
market economy was invented by the government, which emphasized commodity 
production, profit maximization, large scale production and efficiency. The Meixian 
government’s idea of Shatian pomelo plantation programme basically came from the 
concept of a socialist market economy.
Following the suit of Mao's government, the new plantation programme 
became the region-wide development project which was imposed on every village. 
But as Long has said, any top-down and planned interventions by the government 
cannot totally shape the local society, and can never succeed in controlling the daily 
life of the local people, since local people actively formulate and pursue their own 
"programme of development", which may clash with the interest of central authority 
(Long, 1992, 1993). Although the local economy was transformed from rice 
production to pomelo plantation, the commercialized economy still cannot obliterate 
the subsistent oriented-economy in Ku Village. To the villagers, the Shatian pomelo 
plantation programme only provided them a new chance of making money — not for 
reinvestment or accumulation, but for maintaining livelihood, children's education, 
building new houses, and purchasing TVs, furniture, video players and other 
luxurious goods. The villagers still maintain their conception of land, labour, wage 
and so on, and economic practices in everyday life. The 'safety first' principle is still 
rooted in their economic practices. They prefer to avoid economic disaster rather than 
taking risks to maximize their profit. They have their own rationality and way of 
calculation which is different from the modem economic model in term of labour, 
wage, profit and rational calculation.
The state is not only unable to totally shape the economic life of villagers, the 
pomelo plantation programme also created another unintended consequence — eroding 
the authority of the village cadres. After the decollectivization, the means of 
production were no longer controlled by the collective. From an economic 
perspective, the local cadres no longer acted as the middleman in allocating work 
assignments, administering work points and regulating private plots. The villagers 
freely obtained their resource of production like seed, fertilizers and pesticide in the
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opening market. It was no longer necessary for the villagers to exchange their support 
and loyalty for obtaining more resources and benefits from the cadres. The 
abolishment of the ‘three fixed policy’ also gave the villagers autonomy in the 
agricultural production and transaction. Before the introduction of Shatian pomelo 
plantation programme in 1986, the villagers still depended 011 the contracted rice field 
for survival. The village cadres to certain extent still maintained the power of 
controlling the ownership of land. Any unruly and tricky fellow (tiaopi fenzi) would 
have his land contract canceled for punishment. However, the development of 
Shatian pomelo further eroded cadres’ power of controlling the contract of land. This 
is because most of the land for pomelo plantation was reclaimed by the villagers. 
Under the government policy of “whoever reclaims the wasteland, own the land”, the 
local cadres had no right in controlling the land opened up by villagers. After the 
Shatian pomelo became the dominant income source of the villagers, the contracted 
rice field became less important. This implied that the local cadres lost an important 
control mechanism. In 1992, the Guangdong government changed its regulation of 
paying compulsory rice purchase quotas in grain to paying in cash, which further 
released Guangdong peasants from the rice field. They enjoyed much freedom to 
engage in sideline and non-agricultural activities. The local cadres could not 
intervene in the production of villagers any longer.
In sum, the case of Meixian reminds us firstly to pay attention to the 
dialectical relationship between the constitution of development policy and the 
operation of power; secondly not to oversimplify the complicated set of processes 
which involve the struggle and negotiation of interpretation of the meaning of policy 
during the implementation process; thirdly to pay attention to the local social and 
cultural processes in which the local society and people actively adopt their own 
culture to formulate, reshape the policy and pursue their own ‘programmes of 
development”.
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Chapter 5: Defining Zeren — Villager’s View on "Good 
Government" and "Good Cadres"
The sunshine was so lovely in the dusk. Many hues o f rosy clouds were
floating in the sky. Birds flew and insects chirped. It's getting dark. Villagers had 
put down their farming tools. Smoke was spiraling from Idtchens o f every household. 
I  was walldng on the small field path. Sudden ly I  heard the sound o f a hoe from the 
field. “Who’s that? Why still worldng?” I  thought. I  walked toward the field and 
found that it was Sister Ying.
“Hi, Sister Ying. How are you doing? ”
“Hi Hok-Bin, where 're you going? ”
“Ijust came back from the reservoir. I  am going home. ’’
“Oh, ” she continued worldng without saying anything more.
“Sister Ying, why are you worldng so hard? It is getting dark, ” I  tried to continue our 
dialogue.
She stopped and looked at me. Then she slowly said: “You Imow our family only have 
two pairs o f hand, but six mouths to feed. We have no alternative. ”
I  kept in silence and felt helpless.
“Now everything is expensive. Our income really cannot cover our expenditures, ” 
she continued to say.
“Do you mind to tell me how much your income was last year? ” I  made bold to ask 
this question.
“ It is difficult to say how much. This year we almost get 5,000jin o f Shatian pomelo. 
Generally, the purchasing price o f Shatian pomelo is 1.5 yuan per jin ..." Sister Ying’s 
family still kept about 4 mu o f field for grain cidtivation. They could harvest more 
than one thousand jin o f grain per year which was sufficient fo r self-consumption.
“ Not bad, you are a wanyuan hn (10 thousand yuan household) too," I  said.
“In our village, most people are wanyuan hu. Now wanyuan hu means nothing. Our 
expenditure is so huge. Our three children are all still in school. The oldest one has 
to du gaojiashu. Besides the 1,000 yuan school fee, I  must give her another 500 yuan 
for food each term. Two younger ones ’ school fee is about 300 yuan per year. I  also 
have to give them 20 yuan for food each week... ”
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I  could not help to interrupting her, ‘'what’s the meaning o f gaojiashu? ”
“When the children fail to reach the mark line (fengshu xian) o f the school in the open 
examination o f senior middle school (gaokao), they can buy a position with a higher 
school fee, ” Sister Ying explained.
“Does the Chinese government provide free education, or doesn ’t it? ” I  asked.
“Pian shiren (Lie to the dead)! Today the government only recognizes money. No 
money, no talk, ” she said angrily.
“Do you think i t ’s the government’s zeren to provide free education? ” I  asked.
“O f course, Before we spent little money on education. The government also 
subsidized the poor children. Now everything is expensive. Like seeing a doctor 
(kanbing) is terribly expensive. My mother was sick these two months and we have 
spent a lot o f money. We don't dare to see the doctor even when we were sick, unless 
we cannot get up from bed. ”
“Is it also very expensive in the public hospital? “
“Not only expensive, their service and attitude is also the worst. "
“Is there any medical welfare for the elderly from the government? " I  kept on asking.
“Now the government does nothing for us, we depend on ourselves. ”
“You just say 'before What does that mean ? Do you mean in M ao’s era?
“Yes." .....
*  *  *  Sfc
It is said that Gaige kaifang brings Chinese to the way of riches. It is 
promised by the "new" Socialist regime that there is a better future for China in terms 
of rapid economic progress, better education, health services, and so forth. Indeed, 
some people and regions have got riches as Deng Xiao-ping said, but contrary to what 
he said, the rich region is not bringing along the poor areas to walk out of poverty. 
There is an increasing gap between rich and poor individuals, as well as between 
wealthy and impoverished provinces. Rural incomes also lag far behind those of city 
residents. According to statistics, per capita income in the countryside was only 
1577.7 yuan a year in 1995, about 40% of the urban average of 3892.9 yuan. It was 
also reported that some 65 million straggled to survive on income below the official 
poverty line (pingqiong xian) of US$ 64 a year (China Statistical Publishing House,
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1996). The ailing state enterprises also cause a lot of problems. These decrepit firms, 
employing some 100 million workers, are swamped by debt, surplus labor and bloated 
inventories. Although the government has been pumping billions of dollars into them 
to stave off their bankruptcy, the out-of-date equipment and corrupt and incompetent 
managers of the state enterprises still make them hopelessly uncompetitive, and they 
operate at a loss. The cutting off of the subsidies has aroused the discontent of the 
state workers. The shutting down of the big, inefficient and monopolistic enterprises 
also threw millions out of work. Already, the serious unemployment has caused 
wild-cat strikes and noisy demonstration which have disrupted several regions.
Corruption is another serious problem in the reform era, which is biting into 
everyone’s purse as petty officials, communist bureaucrats, soldiers and policemen 
and middlemen greedily siphon off anything they can stuff into their own pockets. 
The new regime experienced its second legitimacy crisis in the late 1980s. The 1989 
democracy movement in Tiananmen Square directly challenged the authority of the 
socialist state, and questioned the zeren of the government to maintain social integrity 
and equality. This was in direct response to the perceived increase in corruption and 
social inequality. In front of Renmin Dahui Tang (People’s Conference Hall), the 
student representatives bowed down to petition the People's Representative Congress 
to fulfill its zeren of anti-corruption and political reform. However, the 1989 
democracy movement did not bring great transformation to the central political 
system of China. It was labeled by the socialist government as anti-revolutionary 
“dong luan” or “bao luarC*. “Luan” can be translated as “chaos”, which describes the 
breakdown of the natural order of things. The government drew a picture of a chaotic 
China without future and gave warning that the dongluan would threaten the fruit of 
gaige kaifang and modernization process of China.1 The collapse of Communism in 
the former Soviet Union and the economic hardship of the former Soviet empire also 
became the cultural sign adopted by the CCP government as evidence to justify its 
1989 crackdown. Afraid of chaos, the breakup of the country , and economic hardship, 
the Chinese people remained in silence and the country maintained surface stability.
1 . See the document of CCP’s propaganda department Bixu qizhi xianming di fandui dongluan 
(attacking the chaos and violence firmly and clearly) and Jianjue yonghu dangzhongyang juece, jianjue 
pingxi fangeming baoluan (Firmly supporting the decision of the Central, firmly suppressing the anti­
revolutionary violence).
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But it would be a mistake to assume that it implies the socialist regime has obtained 
consent from below. As Vaclav Havel states,
After every social upheaval, people invariably come back in the end to 
their daily labors, for the simple reason that they want to stay alive; 
they do so for their own sake, after all, not for the sake of this or that 
team of political leaders (1991:50, my own emphasis).
Moreover, the political system of China prevents the emergence of any organized 
opposition inside or outside the Party, as Liu Bin-yan said, “leaving no room for an 
alternative” (1992:6). After the 1989 Tiananmen event, Chinese people do not 
directly confront the government for sake of avoiding the armed force crackdown and 
bloodshed.
If students of peasant politics look for the movements involving direct, often 
violent, confrontations between the wielders of power and dissident groups, they 
would feel that peasants are apolitical and passive. However, if they shift their focus 
to everyday life occasions, they will find that peasants are not as powerless as our 
what we imagined, which constrained by the theoretical limitation of social protest. 
In mainland China, scattered reports of dispersed protests never stopped coming to 
our ears in recent decades, although they have not yet come together and remain 
fragmentary and contingent. They thus fail to cohere into any form of systematic 
understanding within public knowledge. Staying in Ku Village for more than a year, 
I felt that the guanxi between the state and peasants has become worse and worse in 
China, because the voices of discontent with the socialist government and its local 
cadres persist.
Ku Village is a village which has benefited from the gaige kaifang. The 
average income of the village household has increased many times and there is a 
remarkable improvement in living standards. But the "economic achievement" does 
not guarantee that the socialist government gets the credit from the villagers. The 
villagers never stopped complaining about the government and its local cadres. They 
were aware that they had lost something time-honoured. They, including the village 
cadres, found that they were being forgotten by the government. They sensed that 
rural reform had violated the former, maybe their ideal, govennnent-villagers guanxi. 
They have begun to question about the role and zeren of the government in the 
reform era. Villagers’ awareness, or consciousness if you like, is comiected to their
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concrete living experiences and other information which is obtained from different 
sources. As active actors, they are capable of appropriating means and information 
for their own sake; they are capable of constructing their own philosophy on such as 
what a “good government” and “good local cadres” look like. They never 
systematically tell you what is a good government and good cadres, but express and 
reveal their view in everyday discourse, sometimes in grumbling, sometimes in 
disputes, and sometimes in praise. So in this chapter, I will pay much attention on 
villagers’ daily conversations in order to let the silent voices of the villagers speak out, 
through which we can understand their sense of risk and insecurity in the post-reform 
era and how they constitute their ideal of good government and cadres through 
defining zeren.
To make sense of the villagers' everyday discourse of "good government" and 
"good cadres", we must locate their daily conversations in the specific social and 
historical context of China in the reform era. For instance, in the new administrative 
system, the local governmental organizations no longer totally control the means of 
production nor directly intervene into the daily production of the peasants. The new 
Constitution has redefined the roles and functions of the new local administrative 
organizations, the ADC and villagers’ committee, which were continuously entitled 
to provide social welfare and manage the public utility. However, different from the 
old system, the ADC and villagers’ committee got no financial support from the 
government due to the fiscal reform in the mid-1980s. All these made them difficult 
to fulfill their zeren and aroused the discontent of the villagers. The economic reform 
in terms of the household responsibility system has also changed villagers’ 
perception of their relationship with the state. They have tended to perceive their 
relationship with the state in contractual terms. In land contracts there is public or 
government ownership of the land with peasant households entitled to user rights and, 
in return for these rights, villagers are obliged to contract a portion of the produce or 
pay a cash fee to the government. Besides the relationship in land contracts, the 
villagers continued to articulate their entitlement to social security, which had existed 
in Mao’s China, as part of a new social contract between the government and villager. 
Moreover, in the reform era, the open door policy have decisively created some free 
space for Chinese rural society, in which the rural population is able to access
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different sorts of information for comparison and articulate their own interest after 
comparison. Their awareness of entitlement to social security and services from the 
government was fostered or reinforced by comparative knowledge or new kinds of 
knowledge of social security and seivices provided by other local government within 
China or by the national government outside of China. So in this chapter, I will also 
examine how the intervention of mass media, the relaxed restrictions on rural-urban 
migration, the returning of the overseas Chinese, and the free interaction between 
village and village made comparative knowledge available to the villagers and help 
the formation of villagers’ conception of “good government” and “good cadres”.
5.7. M ass M edia Unbound: From Radio to Satellite TV
One day afternoon, I  heard someone cried loudly on the roof 
“Hi, is the screen clear? ”
“Not yet, turn the TV antenna to another direction, ” someone replied loudly.
“Is it all right? ”
“Yes, seems to be better. Move it slowly.... Okay! Stop! ’’
I  came out to see what was happening. Oh, brother Hong just bough t a new Sanyo 
colour TV and now was setting up the TV antenna on the roof. He asked me to set up 
the TV programmes for them because the menu was in English. The villagers liked 
Japanese products rather than the ones made in China because they thought the 
quality o f Japanese products was better even though they were much more expensive. 
The villagers often made the antenna by themselves with a long bamboo pole and 
some copper pipes. Because the TV signal is not so clear in the village, most o f the 
villagers have set up their pot-like satellite antenna which can receive programmes 
from more than 15 TV stations o f different provinces (see Picture 5.1).
Television and Satellite TV was an unthinkable to Ku villagers in Mao’s era. 
At that time, in Ku Village, there was only one old radio which belonged to a 
landlord family, but later was confiscated by the government. In the socialist state,
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one of the important ways of domination was to dictate an authoritative interpretation 
and discourse by controlling mass media. Since 1949, the socialist government 
actively set up the wired broadcast network for the sake of reaching people directly 
(Lull, 1991). Radio stations and programmes were strictly under the control of the 
CCP. Radio signals from Beijing were transmitted to villages throughout China via a 
series of repeater stations that fed the signals to loudspeakers which hung in villages. 
The socialist government propagated its policies and social campaigns through the 
loudspeaker broadcasts eveiyday. The villagers recalled that the broadcasts talked 
everyday about Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze-dong thought and socialism. The 
remarkable thing was that the radio broadcasted the music of “Dong Fang Hong” (The 
East is Red) everyday in the early morning. Apart from the radio, the CCP 
controlled the newspapers and most of the publications in order to unify ideology and 
interpretation. In Mao's China, only the rural cadres were eligible to read the official 
newspaper.
The CCP government not only strictly controlled the mass media, but also 
migration of the population. Household registration and travel policies promulgated 
in 1955-1956 tied peasants to the farming land and limited the freedom of migration 
of the rural population. Villagers who wanted to go to the city or other provinces had 
to get the certificate issued by the brigade or commune. This policy was to prevent 
the explosion of urban population, but the hidden purpose was to prevent the 
circulation of information between the urban and the rural, the central and the 
periphery.
The closed door of mainland China also limited the interaction between the 
rural population and the outside world. The overseas Chinese were not allowed to 
visit their homeland until the mid-1970s. Different kinds of political campaigns 
stopped villagers from contacting their overseas family members or relatives since 
everyone having haiwai guanxi (overseas network) would probably be labeled as tewu 
(spy) — one of the five bad categories (hei wulei). So villagers in Mao's era almost did 
not know what happened outside China and what the foreign countries really looked 
like. They had only one source of information from the government. As Uncle Nian- 
hua said:
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Gongchandang (CCP) told us that the capitalist society was an 
exploitative society. The people in capitalist society lived in deep 
water and scorching fire (shenghuo zai shuishen huore zhizhong). We 
didn't know whether it was true. But we couldn't imagine there was 
any people living in more suffering than us.
The open door policy in the late 1970s has transformed rural life in China. 
Compared with Mao's China, there is more free space in Deng's China. At least three 
remarkable features can be identified:
1) Modem technology such as television, radio and video has entered into everyday 
life of Chinese villagers during the past decade. The remarkable improvement in 
living standards of the Chinese peasants, especially the peasants in South China, made 
more and more rural households capable of purchasing a TV set and radio. According 
to my investigation, in 1996, there are about twenty-nine (64.4%) households in Ku 
Village having television — many have colour models; there are twenty-two (48.9%) 
households in Ku Village having radio set; and there are about ten (22.2%) 
households having video cassette recorders (VCR).
Although the CCP government still can control the programmes of official 
stations, e.g. CCTV and CC radio, and make use of the TV or radio to convey its 
policies, many channels are beyond its control. Today there are many TV and radio 
programmes produced by different provinces, cities and counties. According to Wang 
(1988b), there are more than 800 FM and AM radio broadcasting stations in China, 
and more than 624 short-wave stations, including three channels that cover the entire 
country. In Ku Village, I found that the villagers could easily receive radio 
programmes from other provinces as well as from Taiwan and Hongkong. For 
example, in 1996, the Ku villagers directly learned the result of the Taiwan 
presidential election and Li Denghui's inaugural speech through the Taiwan's radio 
channel. The next day they discussed the election among themselves. They also 
made comparisons between the CCP government and the Taiwan government. I 
heard some villagers said, “Their government is elected by the people. Our 
government is inherited. No matter whether it behaves good or bad, we cannot 
change it.”
In the 90s, China quickly expanded telecommunications satellites. I was so 
surprised that in Ku Village, many households had set up satellites TV. The 
establishment of satellite TV makes the villagers not only receive local TV
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programmes, but also access information from other provinces. Now they have many 
different choices of TV programmes. According to Lull (1991), there are more than 
400 television stations broadcast throughout the country. In addition to locally 
produced programmes, there are many movies and TV series imported from 
Hongkong, Eastern Europe, Britain, and the United States. The Hongkong TV series 
and movies are the most popular one. The VCR also becomes more and more 
popular in the village too. They easily get the video from township's video shops, and 
Hongkong's Gongfu video is the most popular one.
2) Newspaper is another important sources for the villagers to access information of 
outside world. Comparatively speaking, the socialist government in Deng's era has 
released its news control, especially in coastal areas. In Meixian, besides the official 
newspaper, there are several other kinds of newspapers published by a private news 
agency. The young villagers call these newspaper xiaobao (small-sized newspaper). 
Most of them like to read xiaobao rather than the official newspaper because xiaobao 
often expose the inside story (neimu xiaoxi). To them the official newspaper is 
boring, as it is mainly for conveying state policies. Some old villagers still get used to 
read official newspapers. In Ku Village, at least five households subscribed to the 
local official newspaper — Meizhou Daily. They have a habit of circulating the 
newspaper to other households with good guanxi, or to share the news with others in 
their everyday chatting. The local residents can also get overseas newspapers like 
Hongkong's Wen Hui Bao from Mei city. Through the Hong Kong newspaper, they 
can obtain the information which is impossible to get from the local newspapers.
3) The relaxation of rural-urban migration also promotes the communication between 
the rural and the urban areas. The young villagers working at cities and Special 
Economic Zone would bring the news of cities and the outside world back to the 
village. Overseas Chinese are another information source. Since the late 1970s, many 
overseas Chinese have visited their homeland. They brought many material goods, 
e.g. foreign style of clothes, bicycles, sewing machines, radios, televisions and VCRs 
to their relatives. In Ku Village, the first black-white television set was brought by an 
overseas relative in 1981. Their overseas relatives from Indonesia, Hongkong or 
Singapore and Malaysia also introduced their countries, their government and their 
life in foreign countries to the villagers. I, as their relative, coming from Hongkong
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and studying in England, also became a source of information. Everyday when I was 
chatting with them, they would ask me something about the life of overseas people 
and overseas governments.
More and more information has been made available to the rural population. 
To become more knowledgeable, the villagers may subscribe to newspapers and 
magazines, listen to radio broadcasts, watch television news, and gather stories from 
villagers from villagers returning from other places. Even though the socialist state 
still intends to manipulate the mass media to serve a unifying ideological purpose and 
cultivating "spiritual civilization" after the 1989 democracy movement, the aim seems 
to be difficult to achieve. As de Certeau (1984) claimed: “since the images broadcast 
by television and the time spent in front of the TV set have been analyzed, it remains 
to be asked what the consumer makes of these images and during these hours.” The 
consumers are not just passive receivers, even the dominant group totally control the 
data of information, they still have their free space of interpretation/ reinterpretation or 
imagination. In Ku Village, I found that the villagers were capable of making use the 
official information, e.g. official news reports, TV programs, and policy statements, to 
serve their own interest. In short, no totalitarian government can successfully control 
"What do they make of what they 'absorb', receive, and pay for? What do they do with 
it?" In sum, as the villagers said, “you bijiao jiu zhidao” (comparison makes things 
clear). Information from different sources enriched their knowledge of the outside 
world, which became their frame of reference in defining the government’s zeren. 
They are able to appropriate the information as their schema for comparison; through 
comparison, the villagers construct their model of "good government" and "good 
cadres".
5.2. Redefining the Functions o f  the Local Adm inistrative Organization
Accompanying the economic reform, one of the other obvious changes in 
reform era was the reconstruction of the local administrative organisation. State 
power-holders declared the political reform in rural areas as the "decentralisation" of 
power, with “limitations” on excessive state interference. According to the Law of
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1982, the formal governmental organisation returned to the xian or zhen level. The 
state's agents at zhen or xian (township) level no longer interfered with rural economic 
life, and the villagers were offered autonomy in production and almost all aspects of 
life (White, 1990; Wang, 1992; Gong, 1990).2 From 1958 until 1982, the lowest 
level of government used to be the commune. It was the grass roots government 
below the county level and it functioned as the collective economic and management 
unit. The combination of government administrative and economic management 
(zhengshi heyi) created a number of problems. As Wang states, "many of the 
problems stemmed from the over concentration of decision making powers in the 
hands of a few commune leaders. Particularly troublesome was the interference of the 
commune, in its role as governmental administrator, in the activities of the production 
team" (Wang, 1992:161-162). One of the goals of the restructuration of local 
organizations was to promote village level autonomy.
In 1983, the policy was transmitted from Songnan commune to Xiaohuang 
brigade, and then to the production teams in Ku Village. The villagers heard of the 
reconstruction of the local administrative organisation during a mass meeting held by 
the production team. But according to the villagers, they were not so excited because 
they knew the government often changed its policies and the policies were difficult to 
fulfil at the local level.3 As they said, “the government always says one thing and 
does another (Jiangyitao, zuo yitao). We do not totally trust the state policies.”
Under the new arrangement, the political and administrative authority of 
Songnan Communes transferred to Songnan xiang or township government, with 
economic functions transferred to subordinate economic management committee 
(jingji guanli weiyuanhui). It aimed to separate the politics and economics, and to
2. Some scholars argue that the communist state increasingly loses its ability to reach rural society based 
on die evidence diat die distortion of policy often occurs at local level (Zweig, 1983 & 1984). But some 
argue tiiat tins should not mislead us in to think tiiat die state has retr eated from die village. They hisist 
diat die party-state still influences die life of the peasant when it wants to do so, and die introduction of 
market forces exposes peasants to less predictable economic conditions in which the central government 
can intervene more directly (Shue, 1988).
3. Some scholars have commented diat tiiis is only die revival of traditional government which does not 
directly intervene die village below xian. Shue (1988) basically takes die opposite standpoint. She 
believes tiiat die dismantling of collective economy will shake botii die organizational skeleton of 
honeycomb polity and the morality of localism. The solidarity of die village permits die state to penetrate 
into rural communities and strengtiiens die state's influence on village society.
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permit a greater degree of independent management of the rural economy.4 Under the 
new local government arrangement, the township people's congress elects the 
township people's government. The township people's government, formally defines 
different committees discharging responsibilities in the areas of dispute mediation, 
public security maintenance, tax collection, education, public health, and family 
planning. At the same time, Xiaohuang production brigades were converted to 
administrative villages (.xingzhen cun) led by villagers’ committee {cunmin 
weiyuanhui), and production teams in Ku Village were converted to village small 
groups {cunxiao zu). But in 1989, Guangdong government modified the structure of 
local administrative organisations. The administrative districts committee (guanliqu 
weiyuanhui) replaced the villagers’ committee at the level of the pre-reform 
production brigade, while the villagers’ committee replaced the village small groups 
which set up in natural village.
According to Article 111 of the 1982 constitution and the “Organic Law 
Governing Village Committees of the People's Republic of China” in 1987, the law 
provides a grass roots level of local self-government below the township structure in 
rural areas. The township government is formally regarded as the lowest organ of 
state power. The ADC and the villagers’ committee are defined as a mass 
organization of self-management at the grassroots level. Although the villagers’ 
committee is not recognised formally as a local government unit, it is still required by 
the government to undertake a number of administrative tasks (,xingzheng zeren) in 
areas such as — water conservation, villagers’ welfare programs, mediation of civil 
disputes, public order, and rules governing villagers’ conduct. So the guanxi between 
the village committee and the township government becomes ambiguous. From 1986 
to 1987, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress debated questions 
concerning the guanxi between the villagers' committees and township government.
Finally, according to the law, the role of the ADC or the villagers' committee 
is to serve as a "qiao Hang" (bridge) between the villagers and local township 
authorities, and the ADC or the villagers' committees are not a governmental organ 
but a mass organisation. Their task is defined to assist local government in
4. More important, as White states, power is decentralized or redistributed in favour of individual villagers 
and autonomous villagers' committees (White, 1990).
182
administrative work and leadership over production. Their relation with township, as 
officially defined, is “one between those who guide and those who are guided”, but 
not between the leader and those who are led (Zhang & Bai, 1989; Xie, 1991). The 
chairman, vice-chairmen and members of ADC or villagers' committee are to be 
elected by the villagers. Any villager over age 18 is qualified to participate in village 
congress to discuss and decide village affairs. The law states that while villagers' 
representative congress may dismiss the elected cadres, the village regulations may be 
promulgated only with the approval of the villagers' representative congress, and the 
expense needed to run public utilities must be discussed and approved by the congress 
(Zhang & Bai, 1989; Xie, 1991). In sum, based on official interpretations, the 
reconstruction of the local administrative organisation aims to allow peasants to 
exercise autonomy over their own affairs. Additionally, it provides an opportunity for 
the 800 million peasants to learn and practice democracy through election of village 
committee. I will describe how the grassroots democracy practised in Ku Village in 
detail in Chapter 8.
The law also summarises the duties and responsibilities (gongzuo he zeren) of 
the local administrative organisation as — people's mediation, public security, public 
health and other matters in order to manage public affairs (such as road and bridge 
repairs). It is also to provide social services (such as nurseries and homes for the aged, 
organising the cultural and recreational activities in their areas), mediate civil disputes, 
help maintain public order, convey residents’ opinion and demands, and make 
suggestions to the people's government as a channel between the government and the 
masses (Zhang & Bai, 1989; Xie, 1991; Wang, 1992).
In contrast to Mao’s China, the local cadres no longer monopolise the sources 
of information and interpretation of state policies and laws. Now, through the mass 
media, e.g. newspapers and magazines, the villagers also know the state policies in 
detail. Some of them are able to compare the local practice with the policy. To Ku 
villagers, there was a great discrepancy between the state’s declared goal and the real 
situation. In Ku Village, the separation of politics and economy is still not clear. The 
Party Secretary Songsheng continues to intervene in the economic activities in the 
village. The grassroots democratic practices, in villagers’ eyes, seem to be 
undemocratic. Some of the village leaders are still appointed by the local government.
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Many statements in the constitution are a mere formality. For example, the villagers’ 
representative congress actually did not exist in Ku Village. This implies that the 
villagers have no right to dismiss the village cadres, and that the decisions about 
public affairs are made by the cadres, not by the villagers’ representatives. The ADC 
and the villagers’ committee also have not fulfilled their zeren, e.g. social security and 
public affair, as defined by the government All of this has caused dissatisfaction 
among the villagers who time and again question the zeren of the government and 
challenge the legitimacy of the local government and its agents. In following sections, 
I will tiy to illustrate how the villagers perceive their government and village cadres 
through their everyday conversations.
Before coming to decipher the villagers' view of the "good government" and 
"good cadres", I would like to clarify the ordinary language the villagers used to refer 
the state or government. For the villagers, they indiscriminately referred the state 
(guojia) to the government {zhengfu) or Chinese Communist Party (gongchandang). 
Sometimes they interchanged in using these terms. But sometimes they used the 
specific term to signify a specific kind of government. I found when they referred to 
the bad government or irresponsible government, they seldom used the broader term 
like "guojia" or "z h e n g fu instead, they employed the term "gongchandang" (CCP).
When they used the term zhengfu, most of the time, they also did not clearly 
divide central government {zhong)>cing zhengfu), provincial government {sheng 
zhengfu), township government {zhen zhengfu) and the administrative organizations, 
e.g. administrative district committee (ADC, guanli qu) below the township 
government. They usually used a broader term “zhengfu”. However, in some 
situations, they would identify clearly which level of government they criticized. For 
instance, when I purposefully asked them to clarify which level of government they 
criticized in their complaint about heavy levies, after considering this a few minutes, 
they carefully settled on the zhen zhengfu (township government) or local government, 
as their answer. The villagers explained that the local government in China often 
made tu zhengce (local policy) which distorted the objectives of the central 
government, and it was reasonable to resist the tuzhengce. I do not know whether this 
was their view originally or if it was their strategy for the sake of safety. But at least I
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know that holding this view is safer for them because this view is confirmed by the 
central government. In the official newspapers or TV programmes, sometimes the 
misconduct of the local cadres was exposed and judged. The miscreant local cadres 
was criticized by the central government as an obstacle to Chinese modernization. In 
this sense, employing the “central government” to back up their resistance is one of 
their strategies.
I also found that old habits died hard and the villagers continued to employ the 
old name of local government and administrative organization in Mao's period. They 
continuously used gongshe (commune) to refer to the township government as well as 
used dadui (brigade) and shengchan did (production team) to refer to guanliqu 
(administrative district) and cunwei (villagers' committee). The underlying meaning 
of their “stubbornness” maybe tells us something about their attitude toward the new 
local government in Deng’s era. There was also ambiguity in the villagers' defining 
of ganbu (cadres). Formally, in the state's hierarchical system, the township 
government is the lowest level of state administration. Only township-level officials 
are considered "guojia ganbu" (state cadres), receiving salaries from the state payroll. 
In contrast, the cadres o f guanliqu and cunwei are considered as " difang ganbu" (local 
cadres) because they do not receive the state payroll. But the villagers do not divide 
guojia ganbu or difang ganbu clearly. They regard all the officials as ganbu. But 
when they talked about the ganbu, they often referred to the local cadres of guanliqu 
or cunwei. This was because in rural China, the conflict and struggle over land, 
resources, harvests, water management, child bearing and daily activities between the 
state and villagers take place at these two levels, but not at the higher level. The 
villagers' interactions with the state are filtered through these difang ganbu. These 
difang ganbu engage in day-to-day relationship with the villagers and routinely 
interpret state policy and control the upward flow of information.
5.5. Questioning Zeren o f  the Government
This section consists of a series of dialogues and conversations in Ku Village. 
It attempts to reveal the villagers’ sense of insecurity and their view of the socialist 
government under Deng via their everyday narrative. Villagers did not systematically
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state their political philosophy, such as what a good government looks like. They also 
did not define government’s zeren in terms of regulation clearly. They produced their 
model of good government as well as bad government collectively on everyday 
occasion. Oman men kou (mutual visiting) is a very important practice for them to 
produce their shared knowledge. Although it is difficult to argue that they preach 
their idea of the government consciously in political sense, it cannot be denied that 
unintentionally they arrive a consensus among themselves.
Sense of Insecurity in Daily Conversation
Dialogue I - On Eldercare
Oman menkou (visiting relatives and friend from door to door) is a daily 
practice o f the Ku villagers. I  also formed the habit. After lunch and dinner, I  would 
visit different villager households. We chatted about anything under heaven and earth 
(tan tian shuo di). Today I  visited Uncle Wen’s family as usual. Uncle Wen was about 
60 years old who returned to Ku Village from Singapore when he was 15 years old. 
He still had some relatives staying overseas. Since he was well educated, he became 
the accountant o f the ancestral hall committee. He actively participated into the 
activities o f the "laoren zhi jia" (recreation center o f the elders). He was the one who 
liked to know the things o f other coun tries.
There is no starting and ending in everyday conversation. I  could not 
remember how we started to talk something about the eldercare.
Uncle Wen: "Hok-Bin, does your government provide pension for the elderly?” 
Hok-Bin: ‘‘Yes, it does. ”
Uncle Wen: “How much o f a pension?”
Hok-Bin: "Nh, I  think it depends on different situations. Generally, when you are 60 
years old, you are qualified to get the pension. I f  you are single or you haven't any 
children, you can get much more. Each old person can get around 2,500 to 3,000 
Hongkong dollars per month. ”
Uncle Wen: “Wahl I  think their monthly pension is enough for my whole year 
expenditure. ”
Hok-Bin: “But, I  think two or three thousands isn ’t enough for a person living in 
Hongkong. ”
Uncle Wen: “But i f  they come to the mainland, they will be the rich people. ”
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“Yes, that’s so. B u t...” Hok-Bin kept in silence.
Uncle Wen: “Hok-Bin, how about England's situation ? ”
Hok-Bin: "I am not quite sure, but I  think it is better than Hongkong. Hongkong’s old 
people are among the most miserable in the world. ”
Uncle Wen: “No, at least your government puts some effort to take care o f the elderly. 
But what about our government? Is there anything it does for the rural old people? 
Nothing! We are different from the elderly in cities. They have retirement pay, but 
we have to depend on ourselves. My relatives from Singapore told us that the 
peasants in Singapore have retirement. How good they are! H ey don’t need to 
depend on their children when they retire. ”
Hok-Bin: “I  think the pension is not totally paid by the Singapore government. They 
have to pay the tax when they’re still young. ”
Uncle Wen: “We would also willingly pay the tax if  the government provided such 
welfare to us. ”
Hok-Bin: “But as I  know, every? Administrative District in Mei County has its own 
'elder’s house' (laoren zhi jia); your government still provides something for the old 
villagers. ”
Uncle Wen: “D on’t you believe it. Our government didn't build Xiaohuang's elder 
centime. Gongchandang is so poor and petty. The funds for our elders’ centre were 
donated by many overseas villagers like your father."
In our dialogue, we also talked about the question o f Hongkong's 1997.
Uncle Wen: “Will Hongkong return to China in 1997?”
Hok-Bin: “Yes, 1st o f July in 1997.”
Uncle Wen: “Are Hong Kong people scared 1997 or not? ”
Hok-Bin: “I  am not sure. But I  think there’s nothing to be afraid of. ”
Uncle Wen: "Do you think the social welfare will be maintained or not after 1997? ”
Hok-Bin: "The Chinese government said eveiything will be maintained for 50 years. ”
Uncle Wen: “Do you believe that? Gongchandang is hard to predict (hao nan 
jiang).”
I  did not Imow how to respond because I  agreed with Uncle Wen to certain extent.
Dialogue II - On Eldercare
One afternoon when I  stayed in Ku Village for second stay for fieldwork, I  met 
Uncle Huang in the garden o f pomelo. Uncle Huang was about 60 years old. He was 
a former brigade secretaty and had retired after the government’s division o f land.
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He invited me to his home. I  was not on familiar terms with him. But I  Jmew I  had to 
visit him for the sake o f limao (courtesy or politeness) because in the village it was 
not so common for senior villagers to invite a junior one unless they had good 
feelings towards you. After dinner, I  kept my promise to visit him. The whole family 
was watching TV. As usual, we chatted about the daily life o f the family. Once again, 
we came to the topic o f eldercare in rural China as we were talldng about the birth 
control policy. I  was not surprised that they woidd ask about the family planning and 
elder sendees in Hongkong.
Uncle Huang: “Hok-Bin, is there any family planning (jihua shengyu) in Hongkong? ”
Hok-Bin: “Sure there is. But it isn’t compulsory. The government only encourages 
the family to make family planning. ”
Uncle Huang: “Ha Ha. In our country, the people can only have two children. After 
having the second birth, the women have to be sterilized like a cat (van jiya, van 
maogou). You Imow, after sterilization, no more pregnancies. ”
Suddenly his son, Haiping, interrupted into our dialogue and asked, “In your 
Hongkong, who supports the elderly after they cannot work? "
Hok-Bin: “They mainly depend on their family. They also get a pension from social 
welfare. ”
Haiping: “What about the ones without children? ”
Hok-Bin: “I  think they will live in a home for destitute old people. ”
Uncle Huang: “But our government does nothing for the aged people in the 
countiyside. We haven't old-age pensions. We haven't any old-age welfare. That's 
why every family in the countiyside wants to have a son. We have to depend our son 
fo r our old age. I f  not, we will be veiy pitiful when we become old. From the 
newspaper and television, I  laiow many countries' governments provide welfare for  
the elderly and the elderly often enter into homes for the aged. They don’t need to 
wony about their old age. ”
Uncle Huang's wife: “What a good government! ”
Hok-Bin: “But I  Imow that there is a home for destitute old people in Songnan. ”
Uncle Huang: “Yes, but that isn't a place for the elders to have a easy life. As I  Imow, 
the elders still have to work there. They raise pigs, grow vegetables and so on. 
Basically, they still depend on themselves. ”
Uncle Huang's wife: “They are really pitiful/ They have to work until they die. ”
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Dialogue III - On Education
Sister Xue-mei had been accepted by the Teachers University> o f South China 
in Guangzhou. I  though that her parents would be very happy because first it was an 
honourable thing, second their daughter had an opportunity to "churen toudi" (stand 
out among one’s fellows). To them, "churen toudi" meant Xue-mei could change her 
status as rural resident to an urban resident and had a good state-arranged job in 
future. It is a dream o f the villagers — "urban life" and "high status job".
After dinner, I  came to congratulate their family. When I  dropped in their 
house, Uncle Chang and his wife were watching TV. I  could not sense any happiness 
at all. But I  still offered my congratulations.
Hok-Bin: "I am so happy to hear that Xue-mei will enter into Teachers University o f 
South China. It is a veiy good college. ”
Uncle Chang’s wife: '‘We are also veiy happy too. But it is just like one’s hope come 
to naught (yichang huanxi yichang kong). ”
Hok-Bin: "What’s your meaning? ”
Uncle Chang was still watching TV and his wife said: "If Xue-mei was admitted to a 
university, it would be a veiy good thing. But now the situation is different. ”
Hok-Bin (puzzled): "What’s different?”
Uncle Chang: "Now the education system has changed. There are different kinds o f 
university student. Some study the zhuanke (diplomas course), some study the benke 
(undergraduate course); some are dadao fenshuxian (arriving mark line), some are 
zjfei (self supporting), while others are gongsi baosong (recommended and supported 
by the company or worldng unit)... ”
Hok-Bin: "What land o f student is Xue-mei? What’s the difference? ”
Uncle Chang’s wife: "She is in the diploma’s course and self-supporting. The 
difference is that such student cannot change their resident status and cannot get a 
job assignment from the government. ’’
Hok-Bin: "Really?”
Uncle Chang’s wife: "Yes, the school fee is very expensive. We have to spend about
8,000 per year, but with no guarantee o f a job. After three years, she still has to find a 
job by herself. The government really cheats us to death. I f  we laiew the policy had 
been changed, we woulcln ’t send Xue-mei to university. ”
Hok-Bin: "Which subject does she study? ”
Uncle Chang: "English. ”
Hok-Bin: “Don’t wony. English is a good subject. Now there are so many foreign 
companies in China. They often recruit people good in English. ”
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I  could only try to comfort Xue-mei’s parents, but I  knew she still had to face the 
uncertainty o f the labour market. As a staff member o f the village hydroelectric 
station, Uncle Chang earns less than 200 yuan per month. His wife is the only full 
labourer in farming activities. As they said, the government gives no financial support 
fo r the self-supporting students. They really face econ omic hardsh ips at this stage o f 
family cycle.
Dialogue IV - On Education
Brother Xian suddenly returned home from the Jia-ying University in Meizhou. 
The next day he returned to the University quickly. I  guessed that something happened. 
Today I  met his mother. I  tried to investigate what happen ed in their family. But she 
told me that it was nothing. Brother Xian only came home to get some money for  
some extra expenses at school. His mother could not help complaining about the 
heavy burden o f her son’s education.
Brother Xian's mother: "Now the expenditure on education becomes higher and 
higher. Xian last week just got 300 hundreds for living expenses. This week he comes 
to get another 300 hundreds to buy the headphones. ”
Hok-Bin: "Why does he need to buy the headphone? ”
Xian's mother: "He is studying English in the university. He said it was required by 
the university."
Hok-Bin: "How much have you spent on Xian's education ? ”
Xian's mother: "About 8,000 yuan per year. You Imow, our total income is just about
18,000 yuan per year. His expenses occupy a large proportion o f our income. ”
Hok-Bin: "Is there any subsidy or grant or loan from the government? ”
Xian's mother: "You must be joking (Kaiwanxiao). I  have never heard about it. 
Today's government doesn’t care whether we live or die.
Hok-Bin: "But how about the student from poor families? Can they afford to study in 
university? ”
Xian's mother: "Nowadays, no money, no study. What about Hongkong's children? 
Do you need to pay for school fees?
Hok-Bin: "The Hongkong government provides nine years o f free education for the 
children. Poor families still can apply for a living subsidy. ’’
Xian's mother: "How good o f your government! The Gongchandang also said they 
provide free education, but actually the school fee is higher than before. ”
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She stopped for a while and asked me: “How about Hongkong's university students? 
How much are their fees? ”
Hok-Bin: “I  am not sure o f the current university fees. But a student can apply for a 
grant and loan from government. ”
Xian’s mother: “How about you? Do you need to pay much money?
Hok-Bin: “Ah... My situation is quite different. ”
Dialogue V - On Medical Service
One morning, I  got up at nine o ’clock as usual. The difference was that Uncle 
Si did not go out to work. He stayed at home and was reading the newspaper. I  
looked out the window. It was a sunny day. I  heard Uncle Si had a dry cough.
Hok-Bin: “Hi, Uncle Si, what's wrong with you today? ”
Uncle Si: “I  feel sick. I  think I  have a cold. ”
Hok-Bin: “You better go to see a doctor in hospital. ”
Uncle Si: “Doctor? Hospital? The world has changed. No money, no talk. Seeing the 
doctor in hospital will cost you a lot o f money. The simple medicine for a common
cold will cost a very high price. There're many other additional charges such as a
procedure charge and other items you don't understand. It is often said the hospital 
was 1jiusi fushang’ (healing the wounded and rescuing the dying), but now the 
hospital only heals the people for money. Gongchandang are only concerned with the 
money. Last time your aunt (his wife) had a massive gastric hemorrhage. When we 
sent her to hospital, the first thing they asked was whether we were able to pay the 
operation fee. We had to pay the fee first, and then they gave the operation. What 
land o f world is this? I  didn't think there was any public hospital like this. ”
Hok-Bin did not laiow how to reply ....
Uncle Si: "How about Hongkong's hospitals? ”
Hok-Bin: “In Hongkong, there are different land o f hospitals. One type is public 
hospital and the other is private hospital. The private hospital is also very expensive. 
The charge o f public hospital is quite low. I f  you are aged people, you are basically 
free o f charge by claiming via social welfare department. "
Uncle Si: “The Gongchandang always criticizes the bad side o f capitalism. But I  
think the capitalist countries are better than socialist countries in this aspect. "
Dialogue VI - On Medical Service
Many people gathered at Uncle Xiang’s house after dinner. No one had any 
pre-set topic. They only joined together for cultivating guanxi and whiling away 
their time (xiaomo shijian). I  cannot remember who began the conservation o f 'shui
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huo ’ (fake). And then villagers were from criticism o f general fakes to criticism o f  
fake medicine and poor medical service in China.
Uncle Xiang: “Have yon read the newspaper in recent days? There are a lot o f fakes 
in market. ”
Uncle Si: “Yes, fake chemical fertilizers, fake electrical equipment, fake cigarettes, so 
on and so forth are filling the market. My son bought a washing machine last month. 
When they opened the package box, they found the model in the menu was different 
from the model on the machine. They couldn’t do anything because they said 'goods 
cannot be returned after leaving the store ’ (huowu chumen, shu bu tuihuo). ”
Xiang’s wife: “What m il! (da dan). I t ’s robber)* in fac t.”
Uncle Si: “Today’s society is very* luan (chaotic). People dare to do any wicked 
things. ”
Uncle Dung: “I t ’s government’s zeren to keep the order and attack these criminals. ”
Uncle Xiang: “Don’t mention about our government. Don’t you Imow what’s 
‘collusion between the official and businessmen' (manshan goujie)? I f  there is no 
support o f the corrupt officials, the wicked businessmen wouldn’t dare to do these 
things. ”
Uncle Si: “Now conscience is unworthy . It is imported that some hospitals gave fake 
medicine to the patients. It really does people a great harm. ”
Uncle Xiang: “It is also due to money. Fake medicine is cheaper. ”
Xiang’s wife: “Yet the price o f medicine inflates a lot. Last week I  got some cold 
tablets from public hospital. Comparing the price from the private medicine store, I  
found the price nearly double. ”
Uncle Si: “The Gongchandang only recognizes money. Their hospital opens for the 
rich people, but not the poor. ”
It is impossible for me to record down all the eveiyday conversations the 
villagers had among themselves and with me. But it is possible to suggest that 
through their fragmented eveiyday voices, it is villagers who make comments on their 
government; it is villagers who identify their self-interest; it is villagers who speak out 
their ideal of "good government"; it is villagers who draw upon a rich variety of 
knowledge in constructing their political model. It was also through their daily 
conversation that their sense of insecurity and risk was conveyed. In their daily 
conversations, the villagers did not often directly use the term “zeren”, but they 
repeatedly pointed out what kind of social security the CCP government failed to 
provide. In the eyes of villagers, providing social security is the government’s zeren. 
A government that failed to provide these services would be regarded as a bad
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government. The villagers’ idea of social security comes partly from their experience 
in Maoist China as well as their knowledge of other foreign governments, e.g. 
Singapore and Hong Kong.
In China the term social security (shehui baozhang) is one of the most 
inclusive of terms to refer variously to social protection, income maintenance and 
welfare, educational and health services and provision of public utilities to meet the 
need of the elderly, children, the poor and disable (Leung, 1995). In Ku villagers’ 
daily conversation, time and again, their definition and scope of social security usually 
refers to income support for the elderly in the form of pensions and/or allowances, 
social relief for the very poor, subsidies to reduce the cost of health care and education 
and fees charged for public utilities, e.g. hospital. In the face of greater vulnerability 
and uncertainty due to the rural reforms, Ku villagers constantly felt that income 
maintenance or "money in their pocket” was threatened by rising costs of services and 
lack of protection in times of illness or other need. Simultaneously, they sensed many 
of the time-honoured sources of security were also increasingly at risk. Their nostalgia 
for Mao’s China revealed their sense of insecurity and discontent with the present 
reforms. Their own past experience under Mao was articulated to negate the present 
government who has forgotten its zeren for maintaining social security.
Employing History to Negate the Present
The fact was too obvious that the Maoist government had brought great 
suffering to the rural Chinese. In their eveiyday narratives, the chaos, hunger and 
revolutionary terror of land reform and the Cultural Revolution was still fresh in the 
old villagers' mind. Sometimes, intriguingly, there were some contradictions in their 
narration in which they praised the Maoist government. However, we should not 
make the mistake of thinking that villagers’ praising the Mao’s China implied they 
wanted to keep the commune system. Maoist past had become a sort of cultural code 
which was employed by the villagers to negate the present government and serve their 
own interest. As the villagers often said “...we don't care about communist 
government or Guomindang government. Whichever government can provide more 
benefits to us, we support.”; “ The changing of local government (they mean local 
administrative organization) brings nothing to us; I think today's government is worse
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than the Maoist one”; “The Maoist government took care of the poor and elderly, 
today's government take care of the money.”
It could not be denied that the Chinese Communists had heroically built up its 
image as saviour in resisting the ruling landlord class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, 
and opposing the occupation of the country by Japan. Their also gained credit from 
their achievements in the first few years of the People's Republic. Selfless and 
principled service on the part of Communist officials further strengthened the image 
of the Communist Party as the "great liberator" of the people. By 1953, the 
restoration and reconstruction of the national economy, and the rural cooperative 
movement, which was also a big step forward in land reform, had proved to some 
extent successful. The provision of education, medical services and some social 
security had established the patron-client relationship between the socialist 
government and the villagers. For instances, in Mao's China, the collective also took 
care of the elderly who were childless and infirm. The government labeled this 
household as a “five guarantees household” (wubao hu). The household enjoyed the 
five guarantees of food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses. On the 
aspect of public health, the medical service was not totally free in Mao’s era, but the 
fee was relatively low. The hospital did not dare to make any extra charge because 
the state set the fees. Sometimes when the villagers really could not afford the 
medical fee, they could ask the brigade to issue a certificate of their financial 
difficulty, and then they could obtain the free service in the hospital. Moreover, there 
were young “bare foot doctors” (cijiao yisheng) encouraged by the socialist 
government to come to villages to serve the villagers. The old villagers still missed 
their selflessness although their medical knowledge was not as high as the formally 
trained doctors in hospitals. On the aspect of education, the villagers thought Deng’s 
government had abandoned its zeren. As one villager said, "Although the [Maoist] 
government was not good enough, the government at least provided the basic medical 
service, free education and service to the elderly." Although schooling was not totally 
free, the fee was very low. The Maoist government also provided a schooling subsidy 
for the children coming for poor families.
The rural reform earned out after the death of Mao has changed the guanxi 
base between the villagers and the government. Although their living standard had
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remarkably improved, they still sensed “something” lost, and this increased the 
feeling of insecurity in Deng's China. Previously, the state had provided minimal 
relief in poor regions but its funding resources for even minimal “five guarantees" 
social security were threatened by a semi-crumbling fiscal system. The commune had 
been dismantled and with it the former collective support for the elderly and disabled 
while subsidies for health care and education had either decreased or were now non­
existent. In their absence it was left to the peasant household to provide the main 
forms of support and meet the costs of services. At the same time one of the most 
important repercussions of reform has been the increase in the number of nuclear 
households made up of the younger generation and their children after the 
introduction of stringent family planning policies.
The privatization and commercialization of the previous public organization 
further increased villager’s feeling of insecurity and dissatisfaction. In the reform era, 
the tuition fee inflated quickly in several years. The tuition fee of a kindergarten child 
and primary student was about 100 yuan and 500 yuan separately. The tuition fee of a 
secondary student also increased to about 1,000 yuan. The tuition fee of a university 
student was about 10,000 yuan, which really put a financial burden on villagers. 
According to villagers, there was a deposit system, so that each primary student was 
required to pay a deposit of 50 yuan and each secondary student was required to pay 
100 yuan. If the students did not pay the deposit, they would not be allowed to enter 
school. Villagers called this the "high priced education" (gaojia shu). Whenever they 
talked about education, the villagers sighed over their children's heavy school fees. 
Uncle Nian-hua expressed his dissatisfaction with the current education system as 
below:
... Nowadays, if you have money, you can enter any school you wanted. 
Songkou secondary school is a famous school in Mei county. Before, 
only the good students can enter this school. But now if you can pay 
1800 yuan, even if your score is below the score line, you still can 
enter Songkou secondary school. It is unimaginable that schools have 
become business firms.
Most of the villagers, with great effort, were capable of affording the various school 
fees such as book charges, snack fees, renovation fees and so on, but they often said 
the school fee almost made them “chuan bu guo qi” (out of breath). They began to
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question about the zeren of the government and criticized the commercialized 
education in a socialist country.
On the aspect of public health, after the rural reform in the 1980s, the 
government also no longer provided free health services to the villagers. The 
increasing cost of medical service made the villagers out of breath too. Time and 
again I heard Ku villagers’ complaint about the high charge of medical service. The 
primary teacher, Wen-ying (40 years old) expressed his opinion on today’s medical 
service:
Although the villagers get more income in planting the pomelo, their 
life is still hard. Any family member laid up will influence the 
economy of the family. You know the charge of medical service is so 
high today. Eveiy visit to a doctor cost several ten yuans. Some 
families owed others' money because one or two family members were 
laid up.
In our conservation, I often heard the old villagers condemn the money worship, 
moral degeneration and corrupt social values in Deng’s era, while they praised some 
of the good late doctors in Songkou hospital. Uncle Si expressed his nostalgia as 
follows:
In the past, the doctors cured the patient not for money but for their 
morality and their conscience. Healing the wounded and rescuing the 
dying was their first principle. I remember there were two doctors in 
Songkou hospitals. They were really good men. When the villagers 
couldn't afford the fee, they gave them free service. Today money has 
become the main concern of the doctors. What’s happened to the 
maimers and morals of the time!
The monetization of state organizations was due to the fiscal reform in the 1980s. By 
the mid-1980s, the state enterprises and organizations became fiscally self-sufficient. 
Provinces, municipalities, prefectures, counties, and townships were subject to a 
bottom-up revenue-sharing system that required localities to submit only a portion of 
their revenues to the upper levels and then allowed them to retain all, or at least most, 
of the remainder. If the organization can earn more money, their staff will get more 
bonus (jiangjing). So most of the state enterprises such as the schools and hospitals 
charge high fees for maximizing profit. They also invent different ways for making 
money.
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The financial difficulty also made the local government or village 
organizations fail to fulfill their responsibility for school construction and repairs. In 
Meixian, most of the funds came from the villagers' families and donations from 
overseas villagers. For example, Songxi primary school was built by overseas 
villagers. The frnids for extensions and repairs all came from the donations of 
overseas villagers. There were many other aspects of zeren that the villagers thought 
the government failed to fulfill in the reform era. The local government and its 
administrative organizations in village was often criticized as losing its function to 
manage public utilities like irrigation projects and road paving. The failure of cadres 
of the District Administrative Committee and the Villagers' Committee was often 
attributed to the shortage of public funds. For road paving, most of the needed funds 
came from the donations of overseas villagers and collections from individual 
households. The villagers were very dissatisfied with the fund collection because the 
villagers think that it was the local government's zeren to pave the way.
The return of the "social evils" such as prostitution (piao), gambling (du), 
corruption (tanwu), and rising rate of crimes has discredited the socialist state. To the 
old villagers, in Mao’s China, "shehui fengqi" (social conduct) was so good. But 
gaige kaifang of Deng made the society so evil and immoral. They told me that in 
Songkou town, most of the hair salons were "gua yangtou, mai gourou" (hanging up a 
sheep’s head and selling dog meat, i.e. trying to palm off something inferior to what it 
purports to be). In fact, they were running a prostitution business. There are 
increasing numbers of young people engaged in gambling and robbery.
In this social environment, in Ku Village, Mao's words have been brought up 
again and again by the old villagers. Quotes from Mao included "serve the Chinese 
people to heart and soul," "Our duty is to hold ourselves responsible to the people," 
"Serve the people" and so on. "Serve the people" (wei renmin fiiwu) was the famous 
slogan in Mao, which was Mao's call to his government and cadres. In daily chatting, 
the villagers would adopt Mao’s words to criticize the current government, such as the 
following quotation:
Mao said that the government had to serve the people heart and soul.
But what about today's government? They just serve themselves. Our
money serves for their pocket.
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This was not a unique phenomenon in Ku Village. In the late 1980s, there was a 
great mass fervor (rechao) of nostalgia in China. As Weller accurately observed, 
“This has been a problem for the current nostalgia campaign, as a recent T-shirt craze 
showed. Some T-shirts bore radical Maoist slogans from the Cultural Revolution days. 
Quotes from Mao included 'Never forget class struggle,' 'A single spark can start a 
prairie fire,' and 'Sweep away all vermin'” (Weller, 1994:211). Besides, "Lei Feng 
spirit" was re-advocated and Mao’s writings were re-printed in the late 1980s.5 There 
was another intriguing instance of popular co-option of official code in Meixian’s big 
streets and small lanes (dojie xiaoxian). I noticed the drivers liked to hang a small 
photo of Mao on the front window of cars. The drivers told me that they believed 
Mao’s photo had magic power to drive out the evil and to avoid ill luck (quxie bixiong) 
and to be efficacious in preventing accidents. Who are the evils and what is the ill 
luck are interesting questions we can further explore. But the resurgence of Mao's 
words and nostalgia seems not to be natural. Maybe the participants in the nostalgia 
intended to remind us of “something” or reaffirm “something”.
5.4. Villagersr Ideal Type o f  Good Cadres
In Ku Village, I frequently heard the villagers' commentary on their cadres. In 
their discourse, they not only disparaged the functions of the local cadres, but also 
denigrated their cadres’ images. These voices forced me to think: what does a good 
cadres look like in their mind? How do they constitute their ideal type of cadre?
Official Discourse of Good Cadres and Bad Cadres
Since the rural reform, some local administrative organizations at the village 
level have gradually lost their functions. The misconduct of village cadres has further 
lost the villagers’ trust and respect as well. The CCP government is aware that the 
low prestige of local cadres has influenced policy implementation. Therefore, since
5 . Lei Feng was a young soldier who was set up by Mao as a model of good CCP membership. After 
he died in a car accident, Mao advocated to learn from Lei Feng, which became a national wide 
campaign.
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the late 1980s, for the sake of maintaining the legitimacy of its representatives in local 
society, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee passed a 
resolution to strengthen the relationship between the Communist Party and the people. 
The official newspapers at each level reprinted the whole Resolution (Jiaying Daily, 
April 22,ld 1990), in which the CCP government pointed out the importance of 
establishing a good relationship between the CCP and the masses in the reform era. It 
also attributed the problems in the relationship between the CCP and the masses to the 
local level,
... Now some leaders are far removed from the masses and reality.
They only give the orders without considering the situation of the 
masses. They do not engage in practical work and do their work 
perfunctorily. Some even resort to deception. They report only the 
good news and not the bad, listen to the good and not the bad. They 
are not concerned about the local situation and the people's difficulties.
These harmful working styles have seriously cut themselves off from 
the masses and become an obstacle to CCP cause. It is the time to 
make change seriously... (Jiaying Daily, April 22nd 1990, my own 
translation).
There were different kinds of solutions proposed, e.g. unifying ideological work, 
cadres going down to the grass-roots level, spreading propaganda of state policies 
among the cadres, and so on. 6 In 1996, the CCP government re-emphasized on the 
“local construction”, in their term, “jicengjianshF. In the official newspaper, we can 
know that there are several important tasks defined by the CCP government in the 
jiceng jianshi, which including strengthening the village party-branch; building up a 
good image of village cadres; improving the quality of local leadership; developing 
potential successors of CCP members (Meizhou Daily, February 21, 1996).
Through the official mass media, e.g. TV programs and newspapers, the 
official version of “good cadres” was also conveyed to the public. For instance, in 
an official research report entitled “Nongmin Xinmuzhong de ‘Lingtouren’” (The 
"Good leaders" in Villagers' Mind), it summarized eight special qualities what the 
good local leaders must have in the new age of reform:
6 . Readers interested in the detail of die document can read "The Central Committee of the CCP's 
Resolution about how to Strengdien the Relationship between the Party and die Masses" in Jianying 
Daily, April 22nd 1990.
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1) Good local leaders must unite the villagers and lead them to the way of 
getting rich.
2) Good local leaders must have technical and professional knowledge which 
can help the villagers to solve their technical problems.
3) Good local leaders must be close (tiexiri) to the villagers and capable at 
ideological work.
4) Good local leaders must be creative and have enterprising spirits to explore 
economic opportunities.
5) Good local leaders must be able to develop the collective economy.
6) Good local leaders must have a head for business and have good 
communication skills.
7) Good local leaders must be good at management.
8) Good local leaders must be willing to offer themselves to the villagers and 
become the servants of the villagers.
(Meizhou Daily, February 1st, 1992).
The CCP government in the post-reform era paid much attention to the cadre's 
capability of developing the local economy and making money. Leading villagers to 
"get rich" was defined as one of the important zeren of the village cadres. In 
Meixian's official newspapers and TV programmes, those village cadres and party 
secretaries who were able to lead the village to walk out of poverty and develop the 
rural economy were construed by the government as models of “good cadres” in the 
new age. They were praised and honored in glorifying meetings (biaoyang dahui) 
held by the county governments. The local leaders were called to learn from these 
good models. In an officially published book entitled Meixian Shatian Pomelo, 
twenty-two good cadres' stories were recorded. All the stories talked about how the 
village cadres successfully developed the village economy (Wen & Cheng, 1992).
On the other hand, the official media criticized and judged the model of bad 
cadres. Corruption, which has stirred widespread public anger, was highlighted as a 
serious problem in reform era. To stop the corruption, the CCP government
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repeatedly attacked the miscreant cadres in the mass media. In the TV news, 
sometimes the villagers were able to hear of corrupt cadres at different levels being 
arrested and sentenced. In 1996, when I was staying in Ku Village, it was reported by 
the Guangdong TV that the vice-mayor of Chaoyang city in Guangdong was arrested 
and sentenced to death. The official report announced that the vice-mayor had 
misappropriated an “extraordinarily huge amount of money” and criticized his actions 
as causing “huge losses of public property”. The villagers were happy to hear this 
news and they discussed this case among themselves. Their comments were the 
following:
"The government did a good thing this time."
"This guy got what he deserved."
"As an official, he knowingly violated the law. I can only say he deserves punishment 
(zuiyou yingde)."
"In China, there are many corrupt cadres. The government just kills the chicken to 
frighten the monkey (shaji jinghou). I think he was an unlucky scapegoat."
In the reform era, in the official press, it was also reported that the local cadres 
violently mistreated villagers in implementing state policies, such as birth control. 
The mass media criticized these cadres who damaged the image of CCP government 
and destroyed the relationship between the government and the public, in their words, 
ganqun guanxi It also attributed the failure of the state policies to the misbehavior of 
the bad cadres. Thus the CCP government demanded that rural leaders meet a list of 
expectations: extract resources without using force, enforce birth control through 
persuasion, conduct democratic elections while preventing the selection of 
"untrustworthy" cadres, develop the village economy by relying on self-exploration. 
In Guangdong, for improving the ganqun guanxi and earning the credit from the 
public, the government set up boxes for accusation letters (jianju xiang) for the people 
to expose the bad behaviour of cadres. Anyone who wanted to complain of a local 
cadre could anonymously put an accusation letter in the box. Although the Ku 
villagers knew that they could make complaints this way, nobody really tided because 
they doubted the feasibility of the accusation box. Also they did not want to cause 
any trouble when they had no certainty of success.
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111 short, although the official version of “good cadres” and "bad cadres" is not 
necessary same as villagers’ view, they have seen television programs and read 
newspapers that depict appropriate work styles and model behavior by village cadres. 
What they learned has become one of their frames of reference in constructing their 
model of “good cadres” and "bad cadres". By adopting the information provided by 
the official press, the villagers develop their own criteria for judging their local 
leaders. In their daily conversation, I fomid that the villagers sometimes employed 
the official language to judge the village leaders (I will discuss this later).
“Bao Qing Tian” as an Ideal Type of Good Cadres
From 1994 to 1996, a long TV series "Bao Qing Tian" suddenly became 
popular in China. The series was reproduced and rebroadcasted by different TV 
stations in Hongkong and Taiwan. Some seminars were held to discuss the "Bao 
Qing Tian" phenomena in Hongkong’s academics. I think that stories of Bao Qing 
Tian, also known as "Bao Gong", were well known by Chinese. His stories have been 
presented in traditional operas, movies and television programmes time and again. But 
it has never been a craze such as in recent years. When I returned to Ku Village in 
1995, I found this TV series was also welcomed by the villagers who discussed the 
stories in their daily conversation.
Baogong was a civil official in the Song Dynasty. According to traditional 
novels, he was one of the gods, named Wenqu Star, in heaven. In the Song Dynasty, 
there were many corrupt and venal officials who often perverted justice for bribes and 
suppressed the common people. The cries of discontent rose all round. When the 
grumbling reached heaven, the Emperor of Heaven was very angry. So he appointed 
Wenqu Star to be bom as human being for the sake of assisting the king of Song 
Dynasty. Bao Zhen was the name of Wenqu Star on the earth. After he became an 
official in the Ministry of Punishment (.xingbu) of the Song Dynasty, people called 
him Bao Gong. "Gong" in Chinese means official. He was appointed as the head of 
the Prefecture of Kai-feng-- Kai-feng was the capital of Song. Kai-feng /h was similar 
to the court of justice or Supreme People's Court in Beijing. Baogong was not only 
strict and impartial in judging cases and meting out rewards and punishments, he was 
also fearless with powerfiil officials, even the emperor and the imperial family. In
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Kai-feng fu ,  he punished many corrupt and evil officials, and he also defended the 
poor against injustice. So people offered him a good name — Bao Qing Tian. "Qing 
Tian" can be directly translated into "blue sky". That means that when every 
mistreated and unjust case came to Bao Gong's hand, the justice would come out 
clearly like the "blue sky". The stories of Bao Gong were spread far and wide from 
then to nowadays. Bao Qing Tian became the symbol of justice and honest; and the 
savior of the poor. He was also constructed and viewed as the enemy of corrupt 
officials.
Associating the great mass fervor of Bao Qing Tian with the current nostalgia 
campaign in China, it was not surprising that the long Taiwan television series - Bao 
Qing Tian - suddenly became popular in the village.7 I think that the sudden 
resurgence of Mao, Lei feng and other traditional symbols such as Bao Qing Tian 
cannot be thought of as natural or ridiculous. If we read these resurgence within the 
context of serious corruption, stagnant economic development, and the widening gap 
between the rich and the poor since the mid-1986, we will find that the story of Bao 
Qing Tian relates to the recognition of the permanent problem of corruption in 
Chinese government and ubiquitous injustice in Chinese history. It also reveals the 
hope of villagers who expect there are some good officials like Bao Gong who will 
punish the evil officials and save the poor. Bao Qing Tian has become the model of a 
good official who is just and honest in performing his official duty; serving and 
standing for the interests of the poor; being selfless; and having high quality and 
talent.8 In everyday discourse, the villagers judged their village cadres according to 
these basic and simple criterion. Of course, I cannot deny that sometimes the 
judgment involved the villagers' personal preferences.
7. This series was very popular in Hongkong during these three years. It was veiy special that the 
television series could maintain popularly for three years in Hongkong. This television series was also 
presented in mainland China.
8. Baogong had a high qualification of education because he passed the official examination and 
entitled as “Jinshi
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New Model of “Good Cadres” in the Reform Era
The villagers' "good cadres" are never a total copy of the traditional model of 
good officials like Baogong. There have been many new factors added into the model 
of "good cadres" under the context of economic reform. The factors include the 
capability of making money for the village, of protecting the interests of village, of 
providing job opportunities and so on. The local cadres of "developed" villages in 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) have become the new models of "good cadres".
The PRD was the official model of Chinese rural industrialization. According 
to the discourse of the Chinese government, the PRD had successfully attracted 
foreign investments and achieved a high level of industrialization in which many 
foreign invested factories, joint venture factories and rural enterprises had been well 
established (Gu, 1985). The local government became powerful in the PRD because 
firstly they are capable of extracting a portion of the income of rural enterprises; 
secondly they were able to intervene in the management of enterprises and the use of 
profits to promote collective interests; and thirdly they redistributed that income to 
provide basic social services and care for members of villages (Oi, 1990). The local 
government’s ability to maintain effective control over the financial flow of village 
and township industries lies in the terms of the contract-responsibility system for rural 
enterprises. The rural enterprises and factories had to pay taxes to the state, rent and 
management and surcharges to the village or township government that owns the 
enterprises. So many village and township governments tried to maximize their 
revenues by promoting the development of rural industry and enterprises. The village 
leaders and township heads functioned like corporate boards of directors who made 
decisions ranging from spending, investments, and loans to hiring, and also made 
provisions to assist their enterprises in acquiring credits and needed inputs. They also 
controlled patronage, providing many job opportunities, impressive services and 
benefits to the villagers. As most of the rural enterprises and factories occupied land 
of the villagers, the villagers became shareholders of the rural enterprises and got 
bonuses eveiy year.
Through the mass media, and through the visits of villagers who worked in 
factories of the PRD, the villagers in Ku Village appropriated much information about 
what the village leaders in rich areas acted like. They compared their village leaders
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with other village leaders. The following quotations showed their admiration as well 
as expectations of the "good cadres".
Sister Lan: My son [working in Zhuhai] told me the villages in Zhuhai were very rich. 
Their village head cooperated with foreign businessmen and set up the village 
enterprises. Their villagers can get bonuses several thousand yuan every year...
Their local governments also provide welfare for the elderly. They also provide the 
subsidies for the villagers' education...
Brother Xin: I  don't Imow when our village can develop to the extent o f the PRD's 
village. I  always think maybe one day all these fields will become factories. But I  
also doubt there is any foreign businessman willing to invest in our remote village.
Uncle Huang: Their [PRD] villages can develop so well because they have leaders 
with great ability. But our leaders are ongdingding (foolish and stupid) and silingsi 
(useless).9
As I know, the cadres of the Xiaohuang Administrative District Committee 
intended to imitate the PDR’s village for setting up village enterprise. They planned 
to establish a cement factory, but the project was turned down because they lacked the 
funds and support from overseas villagers. The experience of the PRD's village was 
still distant and detached from the Kus. The neighbouring villages became a 
significant reference point, too. One day I visited Sister Hui with Uncle Si. Hui was 
Uncle Si’s youngest daughter who married to Pingshang Village which was not so far 
to Ku Village. During lunch time, Uncle Si tried to learn the situation of Pingshang 
Village from Sister Hui.
Uncle Si: “Do your village committee distribute huahong (dividends) each year? ” 
Hui: “Yes, we do. ”
Uncle Si: “We haven't got any bonus from our village committee for many years. He 
didn’t announce the financial situation o f the collective fund. Even i f  we haven't 
dividend, we still want to Imow the financial situation o f our village. But since he’s 
become village head, nobody Imow what happen."
Sister Hui: “Really? We still can get the dividend from our village committee."
Uncle Si: "How much?''
Sister Hui: “There is no exact amount. Depends on the income o f our village 
committee. Last month we got 300 yuan."
Uncle Si: "GreatI Not bad!"
9 . ongdingding and silingsi. are Hakka dialect. I could not find the suitable words in Mandarin to 
replace them.
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Any other village’s experiences can become their information for comparison. Now 
to the Kus, good cadres not only include the special quality like a good traditional 
official, they also have the characteristics of entrepreneurs who know how to do 
business or make money for their villages.
Village Cadres in the Eyes of Ku Villagers
The restructuration of the local administrative organizations seems to bring 
paralysis or semi-paralysis to the village organs, e.g. the ADC and villagers' 
committee. The obvious phenomenon is that the local cadres no longer intervene in 
the daily production of the villagers, and the village organs are no longer able to act as 
bodies which provide services and benefits to their village members or to manage 
public affairs. The remaining function of the village organs is to transmit state 
policies, tax collection, and implement birth control. The ADC and the villagers’ 
committee are continuously subordinated to township officials as before. They cannot 
refuse the township government’s directives and assignments. In some sense, they are 
still extensions of the state into villages and mouthpieces of the government. 
However, the dilemma is that there is no longer any guarantee that they can fulfill 
these tasks smoothly as before because they cannot obtain any financial support from 
the government. The local organizations became fiscally self-sufficient after the fiscal 
reform in the mid-1980s which aimed first to reduce the central state’s own financial 
burden and second to provide incentives for local authorities to promote economic 
development. Therefore, those villagers’ committees and the ADC without any 
enterprises and industries often cannot fund the welfare services and public affairs 
which have been defined as their zeren in the Constitution. Because of this, their 
authority has been undermined.
Although the institutional arrangement has been redesigned, the job 
descriptions rewritten, and the working relationship between the village cadres and 
villagers has changed, the villagers’ expectation toward the village cadres remains the 
same. Situated in this awkward position, some local cadres sometimes choose to 
collude with the state and sometimes choose to collude with the villagers. In the 
villagers' everyday discourse, time and again I heard their comments about village
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cadres. They demand the cadres to fulfill their zeren, which defined by the villagers 
for serving their own interest. Those village leaders who fulfill their zeren would be 
regarded by the villagers as "good cadres" and vice versa. What the villagers say 
about their village leaders was not necessary true. It could be libelous. The point I 
want to demonstrate is that making up stories and rumours is one of the tactics the 
villagers adopt to delegitimate the "bad cadres". Their comments also reveal their 
conception of "good cadres" and "bad cadres".
Songsheng
Songsheng, a female, was 52 years old. She had become the party secretary of 
the Xiaohuang brigade and Administrative District in 1980. In the eyes of the 
villagers, she was not a good cadre because she was one who did not represent the 
interests of the village. To Ku villagers, it was their leaders’ zeren to speak for them 
when their interests were threatened by the state policies, e.g. taxation and birth 
control. However, Songsheng often strictly carried out the state policies, especially at 
the high tide of the campaign. The villagers told me that she enthusiastically assisted 
the government to terminate illegal pregnancies and to compel sterilization. What she 
did hurt her ganqing and guanxi with the villagers. The villagers damned her with 
dirty language. Songsheng explained that it was her zeren to implement the state 
policies, but the villagers argued that, as a village leader, her zeren was to protect the 
interests of the villagers. Songsheng knew that the villagers did not welcome her and 
she tried to modify her way of work. She usually kept one eye opened and one eye 
closed. The change in her working style did not earn respect and credit from the 
villagers. The villagers often said of themselves -- “nongmin are so stubborn. When 
we have formed an opinion, it is difficult to change our minds.”
The villagers treated her as a bad cadre also because she lacked the art of 
leadership, which the villagers attribute to her low educational level. Like the official 
press, the villagers often emphasized the level of education of their leaders. As Uncle 
Wen said, “Now the cadres no longer rely on their red class origin, but on their level 
of education (zhishi shuiping) and their capability (<benshi).” To the Ku villagers, the 
level of education is related to capability. According to them, Songsheng went only 
to primary school. To them, that means she is without capability. When the villagers
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mentioned Songsheng, they shook their heads and expressed their discontent over her 
performance as a local cadre. For instance, Uncle Si criticized her as "mei wenhua, 
mei shuiping" (lacking in education, lacking in leadership). He also complained about 
her irresponsibility (bit fu  zeren) and gave me an example:
In our village, many public lands have been illegally occupied by the 
villagers. I complained about it to Songsheng. But she asked me to 
tell Wuqiang. I was very angry with her shirking her duty. It is her 
zeren (responsibility). She has the zeren to deal with it. How can she 
shift the zeren to other person?
The Ku villagers were also discontented with Songsheng's unfair management 
of village affairs. In 1995, an event regarding the public fish pond once again 
disappointed the villagers. The public fishpond in Ku Village was contracted out to 
individual household every three years. When the contract was to expire, according to 
the regulation, it was necessary to have open bidding by the villagers. However, this 
did not really happen. One day, I heard several women discussing something about 
the public fishpond in low voices. I asked them what happened. They told me that 
Lian (a villager in Ku Village) got the contract of the public fishpond again this year 
without going through public bidding. That was Songsheng's decision. They thought 
it was unfair and unjust. They also questioned her right to intervene into the affairs of 
Ku Village because the fishpond was not the public property of the ADC, but the 
property of Ku Village. In this event, justice and skill in management were the 
criteria the villagers employed to judge Songsheng.
Slander was a popular means of the villagers to delegitimate the local cadres 
whom they defined as the bad cadres. In Ku villagers’ daily conversation and 
dialogue, they gossiped about useless and irresponsible cadres like Songsheng. There 
was a joke about Songsheng told among the villagers, which really denigrated her 
image as a local cadre. I forgot who told this joke first, but it was circulated among 
the villagers.
The State Railway Bureau (SRB) planned to construct the Mei-Kan 
railway which will pass through Ku Village and the neighbouring 
villages. Some houses, fruit trees and fields of the villages will have to 
be removed. Songsheng's new house will be removed too. When the 
staffs of SRB came to investigate in the villages, Songsheng told them 
that she was the party secretary of the village and requested the staff 
for an exception in her favour to change the route of the railway. The
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staff told her: "Even if you are Deng Xiao-ping, the house still has to 
be removed." The villagers ridiculed her over that:" Ha! Ha! She treats 
her status as high as Jiang Ze-min (the current president of China) does.
Yes, she is number one, but count backwards."
Not only did the villagers look down on her, other local cadres like Yueshun (the 
accountant of the ADC) also made similar comments about her:
What a party secretary, with such low education and quality. Look at 
her ugly handwriting, just like a primary school pupil. She only knows 
how to indulge in idle talk, but doesn't have a practical and realistic 
style of work. She only knows how to follow other people, but doesn't 
know how to proceed from the actual situation.
Since Songsheng was not elected by the villagers, Yueshun was not convinced by her 
supervision. He time and again expressed his discontent to me over the unfair 
election system:
We are elected by the villagers, but she [the party secretary] is elected 
by less than twenty party members. No matter how good or bad their 
performance, we cannot make any change. It is characteristic of 
Chinese socialism...
...you know, she represents the communist party, so no one can 
challenge her, even if her performance is very poor.
Songsheng’s appointing of her personal favorites as village leaders also made the 
villagers very dissatisfied. Uncle Leng and Dongtou were both appointed by 
Songsheng as the heads of village committees. Because of that, the villagers 
identified them as Songsheng’s tongyihuo (same group). In the villagers' view, Uncle 
Leng and Dongtou were not ideal candidates to be village heads.
Uncle Leng
Uncle Leng was 60 years old. He was sold to Ku Village from Chauzhou 
(Chewchau) when he was two years old. As he was an adopted son, he was 
discriminated against by other villagers and treated as an inferior. In the Maoist era, 
due to his Red family origin, he was chosen by the brigade as a team leader of the 
people's militia and joined the Communist Party. But according to some old villagers, 
he began to take revenge on villagers who had bullied him. Since then, his guanxi 
with other villagers had become worse.
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Uncle Leng was appointed by Songsheng as the village head in the rural 
reform’s era. According to Songsheng, she appointed him not only because Uncle 
Leng was a Communist Party member, but also because he was an obedient and 
honest person. The villagers had a different perspective on him. They thought he was 
lacking in ability to act as a leader since he only had primary school education. I 
heai’d Yueshun’s remark about him as follows:
At the end of every year, the village heads have to report the income 
and expenditures of the village to me. I don't understand why she 
[Songsheng] appointed such people [Uncle Leng] as a village head. He 
has no mind of responsibility and has no prestige among the masses.
You know, every year he is the last one to submit the report form. The 
data of your village is often incomplete.
Yueshun also commented that Uncle Leng was lacking in ability to implement the 
state policies. He said most of the time Uncle Leng could not fulfil the tasks they had 
given him. I think his inability in doing tasks is related to his bad relationship with 
the fellow villagers. The uncooperation of the villagers made his task difficult to 
fulfil. So Uncle Leng showed no enthusiasm in carrying out tough jobs. As he said, 
they were “chili bu taohao” (entailing strenuous effort but without appreciation). He 
also was indifferent to village affairs, e.g. repairing the ancestral hall and paving roads. 
In the village, I found that he seldom participated in the public activities of the village 
such as funerals, ancestral worship, and so on. I tried to ask him why. But he avoided 
answering my questions directly and only told me all these things were “me/ yisi” 
(meaningless). I thought that the important events of Ku villagers were meaningless 
to him perhaps because of his personal background. As an adopted son, he did not 
identify himself with the ancestors and kin of Ku and thus he was not interested in the 
affairs of the kin. When there was a conflict between the state and the village, he did 
not tiy to protect the interests of Ku Village.
To some villagers, Leng was guilty of bad conduct too. They told me some 
bad stories about Uncle Leng. Uncle Si shared with me some secrets between him 
and Leng.
Hok-Bin, I tell you. Don't believe this guy [Uncle Leng]. He isn't a 
good person. He did many bad things behind other people's backs.
When he was a team leader of the people's militia in the collective era, 
he often stole other villagers' things. I remembered one night when I 
was sleeping, suddenly he knocked my door. He showed me a clock
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which was stolen from another villager's home and asked me to sell it.
I didn't dare to tell other people until now. He also often stole the
property of the public.
Uncle Leng's son was also considered as immoral as he was. The villagers knew that 
his younger son often stole people's pomelo in the harvest season. When they 
complained to Uncle Leng, he often showed partiality to his son. That was the reason 
why the villagers thought he was not a fair person.
Some villagers even suspected that Uncle Leng embezzled public funds. 
According to government’s regulations, the village head has to announce the financial 
report to the villagers every year. If there was a surplus in the collective funds, the 
villagers could get a dividend. But since Uncle Leng became the village head, there 
have been no announcements of the financial situation of the village, and the villagers 
received no more dividends. Corruption and embezzlement was often described by 
the official press as an unhealthy tendency of the local government. The villagers 
viewed their losing of dividends as the result of embezzlement of village leaders, too. 
Time and again I heard them grumble about Uncle Leng’s hiding of the financial 
situation of the village committee. Some villagers, like Uncle Si, even demanded 
Songsheng to order Uncle Leng to disclose all expenditures. But their demand was 
ignored by Songsheng. Thereafter, the villagers refused to pay any fees to villagers' 
committee, even if the fee was collected for public affairs. They told me, "They 
(village cadres) collect the fee every year in the name of paving the road. But we 
don't know where the money goes. You see, the road is still un-walkable."
Dongtou
Dongtou, about 32 years old, was another one appointed by Songsheng as 
team leader. He graduated from junior middle school. The villagers said that he 
became the team leader because he had close guanxi with Songsheng. Villagers 
described Dongtou as good at boasting and toadying. He often licked Songsheng’s 
boots by sending her gifts for exchanging the benefit in return. For example, in 1996 
Songsheng contracted out the project of constructing the new office for the 
administrative district committee to Dongtou. So the villagers called him “a lackey of 
Songsheng”.
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In old villagers5 opinion, Dongtou was not a good guy as he was fond of 
gambling and drinking. The villagers gave him bad names like drinking demon (zui 
xian) and gambling ghost (du gui). Eveiyday he gambled at cards with several young 
villagers until late at night. All the heavy work was put 011 the shoulders of his wife 
and brother. It seemed that gambling was the most important thing in his life -- more 
than his wife and children. His story became a big joke in the village.
One day when Dongtou was gambling, someone came to tell him that 
his wife was sent to hospital for childbirth. He just replied, "I know" 
and then continued his gambling. He stopped his gambling only when 
his mother came to berate him.
Besides his bad habits, in the villagers' opinion, he was not qualified as village 
leader because he was not a responsible person. Like Uncle Leng, Dongtou was 
indifferent to village affairs. He never acted as a leader in public activities, sometimes 
he even disappeared. Uncle Wen commented that:
How can he be our leader? He doesn't take zeren in anything. When 
we have problem, we don’t know whom we can ask for help. It makes 
no difference to have him as our leader.
To the villagers, he is not a protective cadre because he only follows what 
Songsheng asks him to do. For example, when the township government asked the 
cadres of ADC to collect the tax of pomelo, he actively gave Songsheng a hand 
because village cadres would obtain the bonus if they could fulfill the task on time. 
This also aroused discontent among the villagers.
Yueshun
Yueshun, 55 years old, is the accountant of the administrative district 
committee. He came from a landlord family. His father was an official in the 
Guomindang government. He and his brothers all received high education. After 
1949, his family suffered a lot in every political campaign in Mao’s era. Basically he 
hated the Communist government and its party members. That is why he often 
criticized Songsheng’s lack of leadership skills.
Yueshun seems to have good and close guanxi with other villagers. I often 
saw him playing cards with other villagers for fun. In the minds of the villagers,
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Yueshun was a decent, honest and impartial person. When there was any dispute 
among the villagers, the villagers would ask him to mediate the dispute. For example, 
one night in Shanyu House, there was a serious quarrel between Uncle Xiang and 
Uncle Leng’s family. Many villagers tried to mediate between the two quarreling 
parties. Nobody could state clearly the causes of the quarrel. But I still remembered 
the rude language Uncle Xiang used to play down the role of Leng. He shouted, “Shit! 
Don’t think you are superior! You are just same as us.” “Don’t be fierce! I am not 
afraid of you. Go! Ask Yueshun to judge who is right and who is wrong. Village 
cadres, shameless!”
The following are also villagers' comments about Yueshun:
Aunt Zhen: Brother Yueshun is a good man. He dares to speak o f the unfairness o f 
the government, not like Songsheng.
Uncle Wen: Yueshun is not bad. He is quite fair in managing the affairs o f village.
Brother Lian: I f  we have any problem, we will ask Brother Yueshun for assistance. 
He's quite helpfid.
Yueshun was a cadre who was willing to listen to the villagers’ opinions. 
When he thought their opinion was good, he would take it into consideration. In 1996, 
when Uncle Leng resigned, he nominated Wenming as the new village head of Ku 
Village because he had higher educational level (senior secondary school). Before he 
nominated Wenming, he went to seek advice from the old villagers. One day when I 
visited Yueshun with Uncle Si, Yueshun consulted Uncle Si's opinion about Wenming. 
Uncle Si replied, "Not bad, he and his brothers are ideal candidates for village head. 
But I don’t know if he is willing to take up the post." In the end, Wenming finally 
became the village head in 1996.
The villagers also thought Yueshun was a man of great ability. Yueshun 
planted the pomelo trees as other villager households. Because of his good skill in 
planting, his production of pomelo was higher than the other households. So the 
villagers would come to ask for assistance when they faced a technical problem. He 
was also willing to share his experience with others. Yueshun also had the quality of 
an entrepreneur. He not only engaged in fanning activities, but also participated in 
other business, e.g. trading pomelo and running groceries. He encouraged the young
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villagers to explore ways of making money. When they faced the financial problems, 
Yueshun would give them a hand. So he earned the respect from the young villagers.
The villagers also told me that Yueshun was also one who dared to speak and 
act (ganshuo ganwei). When he thought the state policy was unreasonable, he would 
stand on the side of villagers and represent the difficulties of the villagers to the 
township. But if he considered state policy acceptable, he would seriously carry it out 
although he knew this would displease some of the villagers. For instance, 011 the 
issue of birth control, he showed his sympathy to the villagers; but on the pomelo tax 
collection, he criticized villagers’ selfishness and stubbornness. So his position was 
ambivalent. I could not say he was welcomed by the villagers at every moment.
Wenming
Wenming was a man in his late thirties who was to become a team leader of 
Ku Village after Uncle Leng had retired. When the ADC appointed him as team 
leader, he insisted on holding a mass election. He knew that most villagers were 
discontented with Uncle Leng and Dongtou because they were not elected by the 
villagers. Although most of the Ku villagers often showed their indifference in 
cadres’ election, when those people they disliked became the village heads, they 
would use “not elected by us” as an excuse to delegitimate their leadership. The 
villagers recalled that in the election meeting, most villagers accepted Wenming as 
their village head.
In the village, I often heard the old villagers spoke appreciatively of 
Wenming’s enthusiasm in village affairs. “Wenming is very good. Now it is difficult 
to find a young man like him. He is very active and often takes the lead in village 
affairs,” Aunt Xin-gu spoke highly of his leadership. For example, Wenming was one 
of the organizers in paving the roads of village, in which he actively mobilized the 
young villagers to contribute their labour to this project. When Uncle Liu died in 
June of 1996, he helped his family to organize the funeral. When Brother San was 
hurt in lopping trees, Wenming sent him to hospital and took care of his family. All 
of these things were recollected by the villagers. As they often said, “We clearly 
know who treats us well and who treats us bad.”
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Wenming also acted as a protective leader, standing for the interests of the 
village, when there were conflicts between the government and the villagers. In 
autumn of 1996, the policy of pomelo taxation was passed to the ADC by the 
township government. When the cadres of the ADC came to Ku Village to organize 
the mass meeting concerning tax collection, Wenming refused to cooperate. “Don't 
trouble the villagers. This is the season of harvest. I will inform them about the tax 
policy of pomelo,” Wenming told Songsheng. He heard the villagers time and again 
complain about the pomelo tax, then he represented the villagers’ difficulties to the 
ADC. “The harvest of pomelo is so bad this year. I don't think it is right to collect 
the tax from the villagers. You know, it will discourage their enthusiasm in 
production. Don’t think they are rich. Some households’ incomes are falling short of 
their expenditures (rubu fuzhi)”, that’s how Wenming spoke up for the villagers.
Wenming’s personal qualities were also appreciated by the old villagers. In 
their view, this young man showed filial piety. He treated his parents and parents-in- 
law very well. In Ku Village, more and more young villagers liked to fenjia (divide 
up family property and live apart) from their parents when they got manied. 
Wenming still lived with his parents. He told me that it was his zeren to take care of 
his parents who were in their seventies. He also respected the old villagers, and he 
humbly asked some old villagers’ opinions when he faced problems. He said, “It is 
commonly said ‘experience is wisdom’. I cannot deny old people are more 
experienced and knowledgeable than I.” Filial piety and humility are personal quality 
the villagers highly appreciate.
To the young villagers, Wenming was one who had the code of brotherhood 
(yiqi). Yiqi is also a good personal quality in Chinese society. When the other young 
villagers needed his assistance, Wenming generously gave them a hand. I know 
Wenming helped several households work out their financial problems in investment 
production. Moreover, if the villagers had an emergency, he would send them to the 
township on his motorbike. In my conversation with Wenming, I found that he still 
had the traditional idea of “all are brothers at all comers of the land (sihai zhinei jie  
xiongdi)”. It is brother’s zeren to take care of other brothers.
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In sum, from the villagers’ comments, we can partly grasp how they view their 
village leaders, and we can comprehend what their view of “good cadres” and “bad 
cadres”. Generally a “good cadre” must have good personal qualities which include a 
higher educational level, the code of brotherhood (yiqi), filial piety, selfishless, 
responsible, having the capability of making money, and so on. More important, the 
villagers thought a good cadre must fulfil their zeren, which is defined by the villagers 
as mediating the disputes between the villagers, managing things impartially, acting as 
the bridge between the government and villagers, protecting village interests, and so 
on. The villagers hated those cadres who treated their jobs in terms of their own profit 
and their aim as cadres was to maximize the returns from their positions and bailiwick, 
in their words, “zhi gu ziji, bugu bieren de shihuo” (only concern their own interest, 
but not another’s death or life). The villagers were dissatisfied with these cadres’ 
standing on the side of state for self-security when there was a conflict of interest 
between the state and the village. On the other hand, the villagers appreciated those 
cadres who enthusiastically participated in and acted as heads of public affairs. They 
regarded these village leaders as their protectors because when there was a conflict 
between the state and the village, they chose to represent the interests of the village 
although sometimes they were not powerful enough to protect the interests of the 
villagers. Again, from villagers' comments, we can find that the villagers perceived 
their guanxi with the village cadres in terms of reciprocity that implies mutual zeren — 
if the cadres fulfil their zeren as leaders, they would show their respect and loyalty in 
return. I must also say the villagers' standards of comment on their cadres were 
sometimes uneven. They situationally adopted their criteria to judge the cadres for 
their own purpose. This is quite obvious in the cases in next two chapters.
5.5. Discussion
As Robert P. Weller remarked, ordinary language or villagers’ everyday 
discourses are not themselves political resistance or important in political resistance 
(1994). One of the most difficult things in fieldwork is how to make sense of their 
everyday life discourse and reorganize their fragmented voices. There are many 
interpretive possibilities in everyday action and ordinary language. The complaint of 
the villagers can be understood as only giving vent to their personal feelings or airing
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their genuine grievances without any hidden meaning. But there is another possibility 
— to construe these fragmented commentaries as peasants' critique of socialism and 
further interpret them as counter-discourse and cultural resistance against the official 
cultural domination. As Volosinov suggested, "in order to observe the phenomenon of 
language, both the producer and the receiver of sound and the sound itself must be 
placed into the social atmosphere" (1973:46). "Social atmosphere" to me is not only 
the speaking situation, but also the historical context. So the key to make sense of 
their discourses in resistance is to locate their everyday discourse in the historical 
process and relate it to other practices such as tax resistance, resisting birth control 
policy, emergence of ancestral committee and other different events in the village.
Since 1949, the socialist government has tried to make the Chinese believe in 
the superiority of the socialist system in comparison with capitalism. The legitimacy 
of the CCP was strengthened by the prospective economic and social benefits 
promised by the new socialist system, such as egalitarianism, food and shelter, 
medical care, education, job security, stable price, social stability, and elimination of 
social evils (e.g. corruption and ding addiction), all of which were lacking under the 
Nationalist regime (Liu, 1992; Zhong, 1996). As Yang Zhong remarked, “With the 
new communist system under the CCP emerged an informal "social contract" which 
became a main pillar* of legitimacy for communist rule in the PRC” (Zhong, 
1996:206). In the eyes of the Chinese, this informal "social contract" it was the main 
zeren of the communist government, to provide the socialist benefits or goodies and to 
eventually realize the communist paradise as promised in Chinese Marxism. Of 
course, the Pubic was expected to accept one-party rule and the loss of some liberties 
and political rights in return. The most significant strategy to guarantee this guanxi tie 
between the socialist state and the public was to shape people’s thinking through 
controlling the mass media for the sake of making the Chinese accept the superiority 
of Chinese socialism.
However, the open door policy of Deng Xiao-ping self-weakened the ability of 
the socialist government in controlling information and its system of ideological 
control, especially in coastal provinces. The intervention of modem technology, the 
relaxed restrictions on rural-urban migration, and the free interaction between village 
and village, all provided a variety of information for the villagers. The exposure of
217
many different sorts of information and knowledge have dramatically awakened the 
cultural and political consciousness of the people who living in Chinese villages, at 
the same time preventing the domination of an authoritative interpretation and 
discourse in rural China. As they said “youbijiao jiu zhidao" (comparison makes the 
thing clear’), one of the most common topics of conversation in Ku Village was about 
comparative types and costs of welfare, security, education, health and support for the 
elderly and others provided elsewhere and the role of other local and national 
governments in the funding and delivery of social security and services. As Ku 
villagers said “Ku Village is no longer a closed village, nobody can lie to us”. By 
comparing with other foreign governments, they learned to think differently about 
their government and self-interest, and they found incoherences and contradictions in 
the official discourse on the superiority of socialism. There were also everyday 
comparisons with the “iron rice bowl” of urban residents and with other more 
prosperous rural regions of China. Not so very distant from Ku Village was the PRD 
where “good cadres” were known to have established prosperous enterprises “to make 
money, provide jobs and provide services”. In comparison to such enterprising local 
cadres the Ku village leaders seemed “foolish, stupid and useless”.
There were three aspects — educational support, welfare for the elderly, and 
medical services — the villagers felt the Chinese socialist government was failing to 
fulfill. When the villagers compared the eldercare service of Singapore with China, 
they felt the Chinese government failed to fulfill zeren to the elderly. When we were 
talking about Hongkong's nine years of free education, the Ku villagers became aware 
that the socialist government's "ming bu fu  shi” (name does not match the reality). 
Referring to other country’s health services, they questioned about the zeren of their 
government to the people. To the villagers, the CCP violated and invalidated the 
informal contract which was set up in the Maoist past. An unnatural phenomenon 
which occurred in the reform era was that guanxi was determined by money rather 
than by zeren. From the above dialogues, we can hear time and again the local 
lexicon of money, e.g. "no money, no talk" (meiqian jiu  buyao shuo), "no money, no 
study" (meiqian jiu  buyao dushu), and "money can make the ghost turn a millstone" 
(youqian neng shi gui tuimo). To the villagers, it is the government's zeren to 
provide equal opportunity of education to both the rich and the poor. Education as a
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holy thing which should not be determined by any immoral factors such as "money", 
"zou houmen" (get in by the back door) and so on. Hospitals as public utilities also are 
to serve the people, not to make profit like private enterprises. They also think that it 
is the government’s zeren to take care the elderly.
In short, in the mind of Ku villagers, a "good government" is the one that has 
zeren to provide the social service and security such as educational support, medical 
service, and welfare for the elderly and other services for their people. “Good cadres” 
are those who are just and honest in performing their official duty and stand for the 
interests of the poor. Good cadres also have some characteristic of entrepreneurs who 
know how to make money for their village. Maybe their models of “good 
government” and “good cadres” are not as complex as the philosophers thought. But 
they are collectively constructed by the villagers in comparison to other foreign 
governments, Maoist government, historical stories and other villages gleaned from 
mass media, hearsay, and direct observation, which have become their own schema to 
judge the performance of the government.
In the villagers’ model of "good government" and "good cadres", the principle 
of reciprocity and mutual obligation is manifested again. That implies the villagers 
show their respect and obedience to their government and cadres, but rightfully expect 
protection and benevolence in return. The government and the cadres could lose their 
mandate and right to rale if they neglect their zeren. Surely these zeren are not fixed , 
but defined by the villagers through selectively and deceptively articulating different 
information for their own interests. I think that their construction of "good 
government" and "good cadres" were always purposeful. In the coming chapter, in 
villagers' resisting of tax policy and birth control policy, their models of "good 
government" and "good cadres" became very important because they played part of 
their arguments for legitimating their practices of resistance. Based on the villagers' 
framework, the state can only obtain their loyalty and support from the villagers by 
providing more benefits to them. Any party that failed to fulfill their zeren would turn 
down the exchange relationship. I will discuss in detail in the coming chapters how 
the models of "good government" and "good cadres" were employed by the villagers 
for justifying their resistance to the state policies.
5.1. satellite TV
5.2. old people’s house
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Chapter 6: "Reasonable” and "Unreasonable” Levies - Ku 
Villagers’ Resistance to Multifarious Imposition
One afternoon, I  wanted to buy something from the shops at Songkou town.
So I  asked Brother Moi to drive me on his new Japanese motorbike. The motorbike 
was fast and we soon came to the cross between the highway and the village path. 
Suddenly Moi turned to the small path which was along the river (see Map 5).
Songkou township
Guan K aj/
^ \G u a n y in  temple
Meijian
Ku Village
Map 5. The Route from Ku Village to Songkou Township
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"Moi, why turn to this way? ” I  asked because I  had never gone to the township this 
way. He switched off the engine and we stopped in front o f the Guanyin Temple. He 
said, "We have to stop here for a while. ” There was a small store beside the temple. 
Moi invited me to have a beer. We got in the store and sat in front o f the table. The 
storeowner was a lady who seemed to laiow Moi well and she made fun o f Moi. She 
teased, "What land o f wind blows you to my small and dirty store? ” Moi smiled and 
said, "Don’t talk so much. Please give me two bottles o f Zhujiang beer. ” The lady 
opened the bottle for us and asked Moi, "Who’s that handsome guy? ” Moi said, "My 
brother. ” Then he turned to me and ignored the lady's other questions.
I  still wanted to Jcnow why Moi had suddenly changed his route to the 
township and stopped here. So I  persisted, "People seldom get to the township by this 
muddy small road. Why did you...?” Moi seemed to know what I  was going to ask 
and interrupted me.
He said, "You know, Guangdong has been cariying out Yan da recently. At the 
highway, there is a check point (guanka) located at the strategic pass. Now, every 
motorbike and vehicles are being stopped at the checlqjoint and the driver’s license 
and vehicle registration are checked. Anyone failing to provide these documents will 
be fined. You Imow, I  don't have a driver's license and my motorbike still hasn't been 
registered (ruhu). So villagers like me often turn to a small road as this because the 
police seldom set up the check points on these roads. ”
Yan da was the short form o f "yanjun daji fanzui fenzi" which means seriously attack 
the criminals. In 1996, the Guangdong government carried out the movement o f Yan 
da. Based on the official propaganda, it attempted to maintain public order. In this 
movement, migrant laborers without temporary residential certificates would be sent 
back to their original province; gambling and prostitution would be attacked; and 
illegal driving would be fined. In short, any "criminal activities", by the government’s 
definition would be punished.
I  said, "But don't you think it is right to get a driver's license and have the 
registration? ”
Moi defended himself, "No, I  don’t think so. I  have never understood why we have to 
get a driver's license. In our village, people learn to drive on their own. It is quite
222
simple. Why do we need to get a license to certify our Imowledge o f driving? I  also 
don’t understand the purpose o f vehicle registration. This is my motorbike. It was 
bough t with my own money. Why do I  have to register it? This is just a way for the 
government to make money. The more fines they collect from us, the more money 
they can divide among themselves.
Ife lt that I  could not answer his questions. To keep on drinking was a way to 
cover up my embarrassment. At the moment, there was another motorbike passing 
the store. Moi ran out and shout, “Hi brother! Is there any check point at this 
moment?” The man on the motorbike shouted, “No! I  think they are having their 
lunch now. ” The motorbike was moving away and raising a cloud o f dust.
*  *  *  *
Not only the urban citizens and university students, but also Chinese peasants' 
dissatisfaction with the socialist government had received the highest level in the 
1990s. Although there was not a remarkable demonstration like the Tiananmen event 
in 1989 in rural China, it was reported by the scholars and journalist that violent 
clashes and rural unrest had grown in recent years (e.g. Li and Obrien, 1996; Liu, 
1992; Tang and Wang, 1989; Zong, 1997; Oriental Daily, December 5, 1997 & 
November 1, 1997; Ming Daily, October 11, 1997). The demonstrations and 
petitions of the peasants were to protest the exorbitant taxes and levies, the 
compulsory apportionment, the mistreatment of local cadres, and the violence of local 
forces. The central government had been aware that the conflict between the peasants 
and local authority was threatening its legitimacy. On October 15th 1990, the central 
government made a policy decision — "Jianjue zhizi luan shoufei luan fankuan he 
gezhong tanpai" (Insistently stop the unreasonable fee collection, fine and 
multifarious apportioned charge) — in order to stop the phenomena of "san luan" 
(unreasonable fee collection, exorbitant fine, and multifarious apportionment) for 
reconciling the dispute between the peasants and the government. Although the 
central government repeatedly stressed on lightening the burden on peasants, in fact, 
the burden of the peasants became heavier still, and the clashes and violence become 
more serious. On May 6th 1996, the central government made another Hongzhi”
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(announcement) concerning the reduction of the peasants' burden (Meizhou Daily, 
July 5, 1996).1 In the “announcement”, the central government repeatedly declared:
Every region and eveiy department must constantly implement the 
"yue fa  san zhang" (agreement on a three-point laws of reducing the 
peasant burden): Firstly, insistently stopping the unreasonable items of 
peasant burden, stopping the public collection of fund and 
apportionment; secondly, holding on to all the new items of collection, 
prohibiting any activities which required the contribution of peasant’s 
labour and money; thirdly, local government and departments had no 
right to reopen items stopped by the State Council.,,. totally 
prohibiting the misuse of the police and local security forces, not 
allowing to arrest, tie, jail the people and confiscate the property of 
peasants illegally... (Renmin Rebao, June 5, 1996. My own 
translation).
However, the peasants and the local cadres often stated “shangao huangdi yuan ” (the 
mountain is high and the emperor is far away). The central government seemed to be 
powerless in checking the decision of local government and the behavior of its policy 
implementers. Staying in Ku Village, the villagers' voices of discontent with taxation, 
multifarious imposition and mistreatment of local cadres have never stopped. They 
not only voice out their discontent, but also transform their voices into active 
resistance by kangshui (refusing to pay taxes), taoshui (taxes evasion), and jujiao 
kuanxiang (rejecting any imposed fees). Kangshui refers to the action when the 
villagers directly and openly refuse to pay taxes in front of the tax collector or local 
cadres. In contrast, taoshui is often earned out "offstage" in Scott's term (1985). That 
means, the villagers cany out tax resistance silently instead of openly for the purpose 
of avoiding notice and detection. Jujiao kuanxiang generally refers to the act that the 
villagers resist paying a variety of multifarious fees.
For the taoshui zhe (people who evade taxes) and kangshui zhe (people who 
reject to pay taxes) and people involved into different resistance, their actions are 
often for the sake of vital material gains or avoiding material loss. However, these 
actions are not intended subversion to the government and the whole system of 
taxation. So, their tactics of resistance are relatively safe even when earned out
1. The document called “nongyebu, jicinchabu, caizhengbu, guojia jiwei, guoMniyuan fazhiju guanyu 
dangdqian jianqing nongmin fudcing de qingkuan he jinghou gongzuo de yijian ” (The opinions of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Finance, State Planning Commission, and 
Ministry of Justice, concerning the task of reducing the burdens of peasants at the current and future 
stages.)
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openly. To avoid calling attention to themselves in Ku Village, there are no formal 
organizations among the villagers in their resistance. But the villagers practice their 
resistance with a fairly high level of tacit cooperation which relies on a common 
framework of argument constructed by themselves in everyday discourse.
I agree with Ross (1989:63) that since the introduction of the household 
responsibility system, more and more villagers appear to perceive their relationship 
with the state in contractual terms. After the Division of Land at the beginning of 
1980s, farmers in China commonly "entered into contracts with their governments 
that obliged them to sell grain to the state, but also obliged the local government to 
supply production materials" such as land (Li and O'Brien, 1996:63). When they 
thought the government did not provide any assistance — e.g. technical and resource — 
for their production, they would think that which claims on their products were 
unreasonable or intolerable; and when the government imposed new taxes on them 
without giving any returned benefit like social services, they would also treat it as 
unreasonable and such actions were attributed to the "greed" of government.
From the eveiyday conversation and discourse of the villagers, the villagers 
had constructed a framework of argument that divided taxes into buheli de shui 
(unreasonable tax) and heli de shui (reasonable tax) for mitigating or denying claims 
made on them by the government. The villagers defined unreasonable and reasonable 
tax in terms of their conceptions of social justice, rights and obligation, social 
contract, and reciprocity. As I presented in Chapter one and two, villager’s 
conception of mutual zeren is defined in term of guanxi. Anyone involved in these 
interpersonal ties are required to perform the specific prescribed actions for 
maintaining the link, and which are based on nonns of reciprocity and are defined as 
personal obligations on the part of each individual. The villagers extended this norm 
of reciprocity and mutual zeren to the guanxi between the state and the masses (laobai 
xing). Both have to fulfill their pre-defmed responsibility. The Chinese proverb 
"guanbi minfan" tells us that misgovemment drives the people to revolt. 
Misgovernment refers to the one which fails to perform its responsibility. In 
Confucian philosophy, an ideal government has to implement policy of benevolence 
(ren zheng) with kindheartedness. It is the government's obligation to help its people 
well-fed and well-clothed (fengyi zushi), as well as to assure subsistence of the
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masses. In contrast, a bad government is the one which oppresses and exploits the 
masses without considering their survival. Of course, as the mutual responsibility and 
the relationship is socially defined and constructed, although it preexists, the people 
still can redefine their relationship with others in the specific situation. In defining the 
conception of social contract, the villagers' framework of unreasonable and reasonable 
tax is also bound by their conception of "wo de" (mine) and "ni de” (yours). In daily 
language, they clearly divide "my money" and "your money". "My money" refers to 
money that is earned via my own work by using my own labour, resources, and any 
other input of production. If there is no form of benefit in return, they would say 
“women koudai li de qian, ni bie xiang na de dcio” (don't you dream of taking the 
money in our pockets).
This chapter is used to illustrate how the villagers struggle to re-define their 
relationship with the government and use their cultural framework for validating their 
resistance to taxation and multifarious fee collection. In this chapter, there are four 
questions that I will try to answer: 1) How do the villagers perceive "tax" and "fee"? 
2) What is the difference between the officials' and the villagers' conception of "tax" 
and "fee" conveyed through everyday conversation? 3) How do the villagers' 
conception of "money" and "state responsibility" influence their conception of 
taxation and different kinds of fees? 4) What tactics do the villagers employ in 
resisting the tax policy and imposed fees? In the following sections, I will closely 
study the villagers' resistance to land tax, pomelo tax, slaughtering tax, and other 
unreasonable imposition. To understand these taxes resistance, I think we cannot 
decontextualize the issue to understand "that" or know "how", but gather knowledge 
"from within" a situation or circumstance in Ku Village's context.
6.1. Official D iscourse on Taxation
Taxation reform was an important part of China's economic reform in the 
1990s. On April 1st of 1994, the new tax system was formally publicized and carried 
out by the State Council. In the new system, tax was divided into three levels — 
central revenue (zhongyang shui shou), shared revenue between the central and the 
local government {zhongyang difang gong xiang shuishoii), and local revenue {difang
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shuishou). The government stressed that the aim of new tax system was to increase 
and guarantee the tax revenue of the state; meanwhile, it offered financial autonomy 
to the local government (Meizhou Daily, April 24, 1996). But viewing it in a 
different light, taxation itself was an undisguised and “justified” way for the state to 
squeeze income from the masses. While its practice can be totally formulated within 
the framework of morality; it can also be defined into the guanxi between the state 
and its people in terms of "citizenship" , which is linked with the language of right 
and laws.
April of 1996 was a national propaganda month of taxation (xuanchuan yue). 
In Meixian, during this month, the county government widely publicized of the 
knowledge on taxation through the mass media. In big streets and small lanes, 
slogans like the following were written on hung banners and wall posters to teach the 
masses:
"M jingying wo zhichi, ni zhuanqian wo shoushui" (You do the business, I support; 
you make the money, I collect the tax)
"Aiguo aishui, shuli dishui xin xingxiang" (Love the country, love the tax; establish 
the new image of local tax)
“Shouru zhongdan dajia tiao, renren jianshang you zhibiao” (Everyone has to share 
the heavy burden of state revenue, everyone’s shoulders have to bear the quota)
"Reai dishui, zuo kua shiji rencai” (Loving the local tax, become the talent to cross 
the century)
“Shuishou, renmin de shuishou, guojia de shuishou” (Tax revenue, people’s tax 
revenue, state’s tax revenue)
“Shoufa jingying, zhaodang nashui” (Doing the business in accordance to law, paying 
the tax based on regulation)
Official newspapers were also one of the important ways in which we can see 
how the socialist state formed its discourse on taxation. Taxation was defined by law 
as the duty and obligation (yiwu he zeren) of the citizen (gongmin). The vice-mayor 
of Meizhou stated in a newspaper on June 6, 1996, "Based on the law, the PRC 
citizens have the duty of paying tax on time and reporting revenue accurately. 
Anyone who fails to fulfill these duties is violating the law and will bear the legal 
responsibility." Those who violated the law were labeled as "bufa fengzi” (illegal 
elements) and were criticized as having a "low consciousness of citizenship in
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taxation" (gongmin yishi di). Anyone refusing or evading tax was threatened to be 
punished and put into jail. Accompanying the “rejectable others”, the government 
established the “good models” of those who actively and willingly paid tax on time. 
The guangrong nashuihu (glorious tax-paying households) and xianjing nashuiyuan 
(advanced tax collectors) were praised and honored in glorifying meetings held by the 
county government. The masses were called to learn from these good models for the 
sake of “the construction of a socialist market economy.”
In governmental discourse, the idea of taxation in the language of modernity 
is also linked to economic development and market reform. As the head of the Local 
Tax Bureau of Meizhou said, "We have to point out the relationship between taxation 
and a market economy. In the process of development of the socialist market 
economy, tax collection system is an important mechanism of macro adjustment 
(hongguang tiaozhen), and becoming more and more important." The head of the 
National Tax Bureau of Meizhou made the similar address entitled 11 Da shuishou, Da 
gaige, Da fazhan” (Great Tax Collection, Great Reform, Great Development), in 
which he stressed the importance of the tax system to the development of a socialist 
market economy. To achieve the goal of economic reform, it was necessary to carry 
out three “ations” — liberation and transformation of the old mind, scientification and 
modernization of administrative methods, and the standardization of the law and 
regulation of tax.
For legitimating tax collection, the government also defined tax in terms of 
reciprocity. It said that “without accurate state policy, without becoming rich”, that 
meant the increase of income and the improvement of living standard was owed to 
the CCP’s "fumin zhengce" (policy to let people make money). Paying the tax was an 
act of repayment of gratitude to the state. It was a citizen’s zeren in the guanxi with 
the state. Thus “you making the money, I collecting the tax” {ni zhuanqian wo 
shoushui) become very reasonable in the state’s view.
6.2. K ang Shui I: The Dispute on Land Tax
In Chinese villages, after dividing the land to individual household in 1981, 
the basic responsibility of each peasant household was to meet the compulsory rice
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purchase quotas or grain tax (villagers called it gongliang, government named it 
nongye shut) based 011 the area of contracted land. At the beginning of rural reform, 
the Chinese government strongly emphasized “household contracting which meant 
that peasants contracted land from the collective for a limited period of time, and the 
land continued to belong to the collective”(Bernstein, 1992). The policy makers 
emphasized that, household contracting was a change in management, not a change in 
ownership (Li, L. T. 1992).
Apart from the compulsory grain quotas, peasants also had to fulfill some 
other responsibilities. In the villagers’ receipt of tax, I found there were three other 
kinds of tax. This included education grain (jiaoyu Hang), favoured treatment grain 
(youdcii Hang) which was used to subsidize those families having members in the 
army, and five guarantees grain (wubcio Hang) which meant that the childless elderly 
who was guaranteed food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses by the 
government. Basically, the introduction of taxes was a new practice that was based 
on expectations of a reciprocal relationship between the government and villagers. I11 
Ku Village, the villagers were witting and willing to fulfill their task of gongliang and 
the other three kinds of grains because the government had honoured its obligations 
by providing land to them, and then was entitled to receive return payments in cash or 
kind. Putting it into their framework, gongliang was a reasonable tax and they had the 
duty to pay it in return. Uncle Bi interpreted the gongliang as follows:
It is reasonable to pay gongliang. Just like renting land from a 
landlord. You have to pay rent at the end of the year. If we don't give 
tax grain to the state, where does the state get its income from?
Uncle Si also expressed his view on gongliang similarly:
Gongliang is something that we ought to hand in since we made an 
agreement of delivering gongliang to the state when we contracted the 
land from shengchandui (production team). If you don't want to 
deliver gongliang, you can choose not to contract the land from the 
state. It is fair enough (gongping).
In the interview with the village cadres, they also witnessed that almost all the 
villagers in Ku Village paid the compulsory rice quotas on time.
However, the newly instituted tax in 1985 was perceived by the villagers as 
something extra or unreasonable which aroused dissatisfaction from the villagers.
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The argument of "heli de shui" and "buheli de shui" was obviously manifested in the 
1985 dispute on new land tax. According to the villagers, before the mid-1980s, the 
contracted land (wet rice fields) was not allowed to change its usage in order to 
maintain grain output. Also not allowed was the transfer of contracted land to other 
households privately for blocking the full privatization of land. After the mid-1980s, 
there was some modification of the land policy in Guangdong where villagers were 
given the right to change the use of land as well as allowed to transfer the right of land 
to other households which have abundant labour. This was allowed with some 
compensation and the permission of the villagers’ committee. The villagers were 
given an extension of the contract for a period up to fifty years, which permitted the 
inheritance of the land and the sale of a land contract. The goal of this policy was to 
promote the enthusiasm and flexibility of agricultural production. However, in some 
cadres’ words, the unintended consequence was that the change of policy after 1984 
made some of the villagers think that the land had been de facto theirs (ziji de) or had 
become private property (siyou caichan). So in Ku Village, the villagers freely 
transferred their land to other households without the permission of the government. 
They also transferred the use of the land as they saw fit.
The practice of privatization of land in villages like Ku Village alarmed the 
government. In the official newspapers and publications, the government often 
commented that the idea of the private (si) was eroding the property of the public 
(gong) (Li, L. T. 1992). In 1985, the campaign for the "construction of socialist 
spiritual civilization" (shehuizhuyi wenming jianshe) was launched by the Chinese 
government in order to preserve certain socialist values and practices that were to 
enhance the consciousness of "state" or "public". Collecting a fee for contracted land 
was one of the ways the Communist government adopted to strengthen the villagers' 
awareness of the state's ownership of land. In the official interpretation, arable land 
theoretically remained under the ownership of the collective and could only be 
parceled out as usage rights to villagers.
After the policy had been transmitted to the local level, the township 
government decided to collect five dollars from each household. But implementing 
policies was not a simple task because there was no "one-way street from Beijing to 
the villages" (Bernstein, 1992:144). There was much variation in the capacity of the
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party-state to implement its goals in the villages depending on the role played by local 
cadres, geographical remoteness and so on. This policy was confronted with 
resistance from the villagers in Ku Village. Brother Wong recalled what happened 
when the policy was passed to the village.
When the villagers read the announcement o f collecting land fees from the red 
paper posted by the village cadre, everybody was talking about the matter. Some old 
villagers began to worry and fear about the durability o f household contracting. My 
mother came to tell me, “Ah Wong, the Communist Party's policy always changes. 
You'd better ask your older brother to find you a job in the city. We cannot trust the 
Gongchandang (Chinese Communist Party). Today they talk about collecting the 
land fee, and tomorrow they may decide to recollect all the land. ” I  think my 
mother's anxieties were rooted in fresh memories o f the policy fluctuation in the 
Maoist and early Deng’s periods. But I  comforted my Mother, "Mum, don’t worry too 
much. It is impossible for the government to abrogate the reform and return to the 
collective." Although I  comforted my mother like that, I  myself was actually a bit 
worried too. As you laiow, the Communist Party changes their policy all this time. 
Who can tell what will happen next? In our village, such worries prevailed at the 
time. It was unbelievable that there were so many old villagers, my mother included, 
worrying about retreat from reform. Some said they would stop spreading manure 
and apply fertilizer on the contracted land; others said they would cut their fruit trees 
on the contracted land; some said they would enjoy themselves before the policy 
changed... But I  know that they just talked. Chinese villagers are very careful. They 
were always going to wait and see.
As you hiow, we liked chatting together after lunch and dinner at someone's 
house. Now I  forget who began to question the rationale o f this policy. The villagers 
suspected that was not the policy o f central government, but the tuzhengce (local 
policy) o f local government. The villagers said with certainty that only the local 
government would do this land o f unreasonable thing. The villagers also argued that 
they had fulfilled their responsibility of  gongliang in respect to contracted land, so it 
was unreasonable for the local government to collect the land fee. They called the 
land fee "shuangchong shui ” (double taxes).
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The Day after, our discussion on this matter became a rumour which swept 
through the village. The villagers believed that the policy was made by the local 
governmen t and it was unreasonable to collect the land fee after they had paid the 
gongliang. When the village cadres came to collect the land fee, the villagers refused 
to pay by adopting the reasons o f local policy (tuzhengce) and double taxes. Some 
villagers asked the cadres to show the document o f the policy; some also questioned 
why the state did not collect the land contract fee at the beginning o f “division o f 
land” i f  the tax was reasonable. The village cadres were veiy angiy and cursed the 
savagery o f the villagers. But they really could not show us the document o f the 
policy. In the end they couldn't collect even a penny from the villagers.
The dispute of new land tax manifested the different interpretation of “tax” 
between the state and villagers. From the viewpoint of officials , land tax and 
gongliang are two different things. Gongliang is the absolute and unconditional 
obligation that villagers have to fulfill, but the villagers pay the land tax because they 
rent the land from the state. In a socialist state, there is no private ownership of land, 
but only public ownership of land. But to the villagers, the "division of land" implies 
that they de facto have the ownership of land. This conception became manifested in 
the villagers’ transmission of land to other households without the permission of the 
villagers' committee.
Wong's recollection of events also told me how they perceived the new land 
taxes and how they constructed the discourse of taxation in everyday conversation. 
The stoiy manifested a reflection of villagers' expectations of a reciprocal relationship 
between the government and villagers. The villagers did not regard the grain tax to be 
an unconditional obligation. They thought they had fulfilled their zeren through 
gongliang. Thus any additional imposition without any new return would be seen as 
"unreasonable", or as something "extra" that could not be tolerated. The Ku villagers 
also imagined and created their own story that the new land tax was not the policy of 
the central government but a violation of policy and law by the local government. A 
villager, Wen-da, questioned whether the levy was authorized by high levels.
The Central Government often advocates the reduction of economic 
burdens on the peasants. If s impossible for the Central Government to 
create such additional fees. We have the right not to pay the fee if the
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local government has broken the central directive. How can they ask 
me to honour it?
The local government and local cadres were made out as enemies of the villagers, as 
well as scapegoats of the new tax policy, even it was a state policy. In the Chinese 
countryside, there is a popular saying that "The center is our benefactor («enren), the 
province is our relative, the comity is a good person, the township is an evil person, 
and the village is our enemy". The central government was seen to be a loving being 
who would not cany out such an unreasonable tax. I think the villagers subtly created 
the stoiy like that not only for the sake of validating their resistance, but also to play it 
safe. In the village, everyone could be the story creator or the rumour maker, but no 
one person had to take the responsibility.
Regarding this event, I interviewed the village party Secretary Songsheng. 
When I mentioned the land fee collection in the mid-1980s, I stined up her emotions. 
She poured out her grievances and hoped I could understand the difficulty of the 
village cadres.
It is a tough job to be a village cadre. It is not easy for us to implement 
policy. We cannot use coercion to collect fees. Acting as the 
middlemen between the state and the villagers, we face pressure from 
two sides. The villagers are very savage and merciless. They say the 
policy is our policy. How can it be our policy! We explained again 
and again that it was the state policy. They didn't believe it. They 
asked us to show documentation. But all policy documents are 
confidential. How could we show them? They also said they had 
delivered their gongliang and it was unreasonable to pay shuangchong 
shui. But as you know, gongliang is the zeren of villagers. They pay 
the land tax because they rent the land from the state. Those are two 
different things.
She further interpreted the concept of "gong" (public) and "si" (private). She said:
Dividing the land among households does not imply the privatization 
of land. Most people misunderstand the concept of "public" (gong) 
and "private" (si). Although the land is distributed to individual 
households, they only have usage rights, but the state still maintains 
the ownership of the land.
However, the protracted struggle of the villagers made the village cadres look for an 
eclectic solution on this issue. The final consented decision of the cadres was to pay 
the land contract fee on behalf of all the villagers from their small collective revenue
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which was obtained mainly from the renting out of public fish ponds, fruit trees, and 
so on. The practice was to ask the representatives of individual households to sign 
their names on the name list for proving that they had paid the fee.
At the beginning of rural reform, the villagers had received dividends from the 
villagers' committee. But after Uncle Leng became the head of village, the village 
committee no longer divided the dividends. They always suspected that the village 
head embezzled the collective fund. In this event, the villagers supported the 
Administrative District Committee's (ADC) decision to pay the new land tax with the 
collective fund rather than lose all their dividends. In the end, the villagers paid the 
fee in name, but the villagers' committee paid it in reality.
The change of rice purchasing regulations also strengthened the Ku villagers1 
conception of the private ownership of land. Before 1992, the Guangdong villagers 
had to meet the compulsory rice purchasing quotas in kind and the villagers had to 
pay 30 jin grain each mu. But in 1992, a new rule allowed the peasants to pay their 
rice delivery quotas to the state in cash. The monetization of taxation released 
villagers from the rice production and allowed them to shift to more profitable 
commercial agriculture. In the village, most of the households changed the use of 
their contracted land to grow pomelo and other fruit because the price of fruit was 
much higher than rice. The freedom of land manipulation further intensified the 
villagers' idea of private ownership of the land as I often heard the villagers say “The 
land is ours, we can grow anything we like.”
6.3. K ang Shui II: Villagers' Resistance on Pom elo Tax
Pomelo tax has become an interface of struggle between the state and the 
villagers since 1992. Until today, the story still has no ending.
Late October of 1992 was the busy season for the villagers because they traded 
their pomelo with pomelo buyers from town. The village cadres were also busy 
because they planned to collect a tax on pomelo. According to the village cadres, the 
order was coming from the provincial government. The provincial government 
planned to collect tax on pomelo as they thought the villagers had benefited from the 
pomelo harvest. Uncle Chang and his wife recalled the collecting process,
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One afternoon, Songsheng and other cadres o f the ADC came to our village 
and visited us household by household. They visited our home when we were trading 
pomelo with the buyer. After the cash was passed from the buyer to our hands, 
Songsheng came out to collect the pomelo tax. She explained that it's the policy o f the 
upper government. She persuaded us to pay the tax by using many "sweet 
words ’’fhuayan qiaoyu). She acted like a beggar and asked us to cooperate with her. 
We assumed it was really the state policy, and therefore paid about one thousand 
yuan to her. But afterward’ we found many villagers had refused to pay the tax. We 
thought that we had been cheated by Songsheng.
According to the villagers, there were different forms of reaction to the 
pomelo tax collection at the time -- some were timid and overcautious (danxiao 
pashi), and paid the tax immediately though unwillingly; some simply refused to pay; 
some haggled about the amount of tax with the village cadres; others said they would 
only pay after they had verified that it was really state policy; some agreed to pay the 
tax only after all the other villagers had paid; and some threatened to cut all the 
pomelo trees if the government insisted on taxing on pomelo. Owing to a large 
proportion of villagers who refused to pay the taxes, the cadres reported the difficulty 
to the upper government and the tax collection was stopped. In this event, a purely 
economic account of this resistance is inadequate. Although there were varieties of 
practice, basically they had a unity of puipose and common reason in mitigating or 
denying the claim of tax made on them — the pomelo tax had violated their principle 
of mutual obligation. Therefore, the villagers thought that collecting pomelo tax was 
unreasonable and unjust. They often argued that the government did not provide any 
aid, including financial and technical support for them in the plantation of Shatian 
pomelo; in addition, the basic resource— land — was not provided by the government, 
but reclaimed on their own. Thus, it was unreasonable for them to pay the new tax.
In 1986, Mei county was designated by the government as the country's major 
commercial pomelo-producing base. Then the policy of “opening out the wasteland 
and planting fruit trees” (kaihuang zhongguo) was formally put in place. At first, the 
villagers and grassroots cadres were unwilling to plant the Shatian pomelo because 
they had never planted it in mass production. Besides, there was a lack of cultivated
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land in villages.2 No one wanted to take the risk of planting pomelo. As I stated in 
chapter four, the government used persuasion and compulsory means to impose this 
policy on the villagers. Villagers who planted one sapling would be subsidized four 
or five jiao. The village cadres had to play the leading role and took the lead to plant 
the Shatian pomelo. Each production team also had to fulfill the quota of planting. 
To encourage the villagers to plant the pomelo, the government launched a policy 
which indicated “whoever reclaims the wasteland, owns the land”. Since the 
government did not set up the tax policy in this plantation programme at the 
beginning, villagers thought it was unreasonable to extract the tax from them after 
they began to benefit from the pomelo plantation. They also accredited the taxation 
to the "greed" of the government. The Ku villagers made a joke about the socialist 
government, “Gongchandang is poor, so our money always attracts their attention 
(jianqian yankai).” Furthermore, the villagers refused to pay the tax because to them, 
the money earned from pomelo was "my money", not "your money". It was earned 
via their own land, their own labour, and a whole year of hard work, without any 
assistance from the government. Any policy intended to extract "my money" was 
intolerable and unreasonable within their framework. The villagers often said 
“Money is in our pockets, nobody can get it”, “The money is earned by our hard 
work. They don’t want to get it without a thank.”
Although the government failed to collect the pomelo tax in 1992, it did not 
mean it totally gave up the tax policy of Shatian pomelo. For further tax collection, 
the government ordered the local administrative organization to investigate (mo di) 
and provide statistics about the area and number of pomelo trees in villages. It was a 
hard task for the village cadres because they understood the difficulty and the 
dissatisfaction of the villagers during the last tax collection. But in this data 
collection, the village cadres failed to fulfill the task once again because the villagers 
adopted feigned ignorance as the tactic to resist the investigation. When I was staying 
in Ku Village in 1993, the investigation was in process. As I witnessed, when 
Secretaiy Songsheng went to inquire at the peasants’ household regarding the number 
of pomelo trees, the villagers did not often cooperate with her. Some refused to report
2. In Ku Village, each villager can only obtain 0.8 mu (1 mu = 1/6 acre) of land from a production 
team.
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the number, and some under-reported or mis-reported the number of trees. The 
defensive ones even verbally abused Songsheng when she tried to ask about the 
number of pomelo trees. They were well aware of the aim of the statistics. More 
importantly, the villagers suspected that it was not the state policy but the wicked idea 
(gui zhuyi) of local cadres. After Songsheng failed to fulfill the task, she under­
reported and mis-reported the number of pomelo trees of the villagers on the 
reporting forms (baobiao). She also asked the accountant, Yueshun, to complete the 
job for her. I heard of Songsheng's under-reporting through Yueshun. He was 
dissatisfied with Songsheng, feeling that she shirked responsibility to him considering 
the deadline of the data collection was drawing near. He showed me the reporting 
forms and grumbled about the villagers’ uncooperative nature and Songsheng’s 
irresponsibility.
One evening, I  visited Yueshun’s home. His wife told me that he seemed to be 
unhappy. When he saw me, he was warmly making tea for me. Chatting for awhile, 
he began to speak his unhappiness (tu ku shui). Yueshun said, “Now the villagers 
lack the concept o f ‘public’. They will do anything for self-interest. It is due to the 
mentality o f petty peasants' economy and it is impossible to ask them to contribute a 
proportion to the ‘public’.... ”
Yueshun's mother suddenly interrupted him, “You must understand the villagers' 
situation. They are poor. They have no money to pay the tax. ” “No money? They 
have TVs, radio sets, motorbikes... The average income o f our village is above 1000 
yuan. Today's individual peasants are rich, but the collective are poor!” Yueshun 
angrily said.
Then he ignored the old woman and continued to talk to me about his 
dissatisfaction, "I don't know how to report the data. All the data we have collected 
is false. It is impossible to report data like that...HoM> low is her standard o f 
education? I  will not bear the responsibility. I  wall not change her handwriting!” He 
said as he continued to grumble.
Looldng at the data in the reporting forms, I  found the data was really far  
from reality. As I  knew, the households had at least 30 more pomelo trees each.
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Some even had more than 100 pomelo trees. But on the form, each household only 
reported five to twenty trees.
In 1995, the Chinese government formally implemented the policy of 
“collecting a special local agricultural product tax”. One day I found a large fresh red 
piece of paper posted out by the ADC. Looking closely, I realized that it was a 
statement of state policy copied by the ADC. It read as follows:
The Propaganda for Special Local Agricultural Product Tax
1) What is a Special Local Agricultural Product Tax?
A special local agricultural product tax is also called an agricultural 
tax to be charged on special local agricultural products. It is one kind 
of agricultural tax. It is a tax levied by the state on the 
unit/individuals who obtained income from special local agricultural 
products or the unit/individual who collects these products.
2) Which kinds of agricultural products have to be taxed?
The following seven kinds of agricultural products set by the 
provincial government: 1. tobacco; 2. garden fanning; 3. aquatic; 4. 
forest; 5. livestock; 6. edible mushroom; 7. and valuable food.
3) How to calculate the tax?
According to the tax policy of the state and considering the present 
situation of our region, on the 17th of October, the cadres of the 
administrative region committee and leaders of the villages have 
decided to collect two fen for each jin of Shatian pomelo. The village 
cadres will register the total amount of production of each household 
and then collect the tax. Thank you for your cooperation and 
understanding.
Xiaohuang Administrative District Committee, 
18th October 1995
238
Ail official in county government told me that, according to rigidly state 
policy, the tax rate of special local agricultural product was set at 13.2%. But the 
county government thought that that tax rate was too high for the peasant. They were 
worried that this policy would destroy the enthusiasm of the peasants. They knew that 
the peasants would withdraw from pomelo planting if the tax was too high. So they 
just set up the quota for the township government and then the township government 
set up the quota for the different villages based on the estimated area of pomelo 
production. Based on the quota, the villagers’ committee of Ku Village had to fulfill 
the quota and pay about 2,000 yuan in total. Based on the estimated amount of 
production, the villagers had to pay two fen  per fin. Although the tax rate was light, 
the villagers were still veiy discontent with the pomelo tax because the tax violated 
their principles of what they deemed just. They once again argued that the 
government had not provided them with any assistance. Some also stated that the 
pomelo tax was a duplicate tax because some of them used the contracted land to 
plant the pomelo. They thought that their fulfillment of gongliang implied they have 
fulfilled all the tax obligations from contracted land. So they thought it was unreason­
able to be asked them to pay the duplicate tax. Uncle Qiang explained why he 
thought the tax was duplicate:
The tax itself is unreasonable. Taking I myself as an example, I did 
not reclaim much wasteland. I planted most of my pomelo tree on the 
contracted land. You know, I have paid the gongliang for the 
contracted land. Of course I refused to pay the tax for my pomelo 
which is planted on the contracted land.
There were varieties of responses from the villagers to the pomelo tax. Some 
villagers told me that they would wait and see if other villagers would pay; some 
suggested that the villagers’ committee could use the collective fund to pay the tax; 
some refused to pay the tax without any further consideration.
Although the administrative region committee had posted the statement of 
state policy, the village cadres still had to convoke a villagers’ meeting in order to 
hear the opinions of villagers. When I was staying in the village, Secretary 
Songsheng failed to convoke a meeting every time. Nobody assembled meeting 
because the villagers clearly knew that the cadres would announce the policy of
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pomelo tax. Once again, feigned ignorance was adopted by the villagers in order to 
resist the tax policy. All of them were absent and claimed that they were “busy”. 
Songsheng was very angry and complained that the villagers “had no discipline and 
were belligerent” (wu j i  lii) and were “savage” (ye mang).
We find it veiy difficult to cany out our task. They are very savage!
They have no concept of "public" (gong)\ Two fen per jin has been 
veiy low, and it is unreasonable to refuse to pay.
There was also a dissension among the cadres about the ways to approach 
getting the money for this tax payment. Some cadres, who were afraid of much 
trouble, agreed to using the collective fund to pay the tax. In fact, Songsheng was one 
who strongly recommended this method. She told the village leader:
... this is a good idea to pay the tax with collective fund. The quota of 
your village is not so high, and I think your village is financially strong 
enough to pay this money. This method not only reduces your work 
load, but also rewards to the villager who plants more pomelo trees and 
punishes the lazy ones who are not working hard enough (jiangqin 
falan).
However, some village cadres, such as Yueshun, did not agree with this idea. To him, 
it was unreasonable to pay the tax by using the public fund again. He firmly stated:
No! Who say the tax can be paid with the collective fund? The policy 
clearly states that the tax is levied from the individuals who obtain 
income from pomelo. The collective fund is not an individual's 
money, it is for public affairs. Peasants are always so stubborn and 
selfish. They always want to divide the property of the collective.
You know this method is also unfair because the production of 
individual household is different. How can we ask them to pay the 
same rate?
Although the government also intended to collect the tax from the buyers of Shatian 
pomelo, according to the villagers and the buyers, this policy was not implemented. 
To the villagers, collecting the tax from the buyers made no difference because the 
pomelo buyers would lower the purchasing price and transfer the cost to them. They 
also did not expect the government to really collect the tax from the buyers. Meeting 
some buyers in Ku Village, they confirmed that they did not pay the tax to any 
governmental department.
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The villagers also rejected to pay the tax because the purchasing price of 
Shatian pomelo was fluctuating and even decreasing in these three years.3 In 1994, 
the average purchasing price was around 1.8 yuan per jin. However, in 1995, the 
price decreased to 1.5 yuan per jin and even lower. Most of the peasant households 
kept the pomelo in their storeroom and waited for the higher purchasing price. They 
told me that they felt veiy uncertain because the "the money was still not in their 
pocket".4 Indeed the new tax policy of pomelo deepened their sense of insecurity 
which made them insistent on rejecting the extraction from the government.
6.4. Tao Shui: Villagers' D iscontent with the Tax o f  Slaughtering
Raising pigs is the main sideline activity in Ku Village. I remember the first 
time I entered the Ku Village, almost all households in the house I had lived had two 
or three heads of pig. They told me that raising pigs was not only for earning money, 
but for farmyard manure which was provided by the pigs. However, during these past 
several years, there have been less and less households raising pigs. According to a 
small survey conducted by myself, there were only nine households raising pigs in Ku 
Village. Uncle Chang’s wife gave me some of the reasons:
The tax is so high. It isn't worth raising pigs. Slaughtering tax, market 
tax, service charge, and so on, there are so many different kinds of 
taxes that I cannot remember!
Another village woman, Aunt Xiang said:
Today raising pigs makes no money. For each head of pig we have to 
pay 65 yuan tax. Including the cost of pig feed, we raise pigs for 
nothing and go through a lot of hardship in the process.
However, not all the villagers stopped raising pigs. Some households even raised 
more than before. Brother Xin was an exceptional case. He raised six heads of pigs.
3. After the pomelo plantation became the dominant economic activity in Ku Village, the income o f the 
villagers mainly depended on pomelo trading. Any policy which influenced their income would be 
hated by the villagers.
4. The villager explained that there were several reasons for the decrease in the purchasing price. First, 
under the state policy of "macro adjustment", the pomelo buyers could not obtain the loan from the 
banks. Secondly, most of the buyers lost money in the pomelo business last year, so they adjusted the 
purchasing price this year. Third, there was an increase in pomelo production and die demand of 
pomelo could not be increased by the same rate, so the purchasing price decreased.
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I was so puzzled, if it was a losing business, why did the villagers still raised pigs. 
When I asked Brother Xin for reasons, he just smiled and told me that he had his own 
solution. It was mid-night, and I finally discovered what his solution was.
I  remembered when I  almost fell asleep, I  was suddenly awakened by the cry 
o f pigs. It was noisy outside my window, and looldng at the clock, it was 2 a.m. I  
was curious as to what had happened outside. I  heard someone say, "Hurry up! 
Hurry up! Put the pig head into the bamboo basket." It sounded like Brother Xin's 
voice. I  heard another one say, "Don’t wake up the neighbours. Go quickly!" I  
thought it was Uncle Leng, Xin's father. "Good! Let's go. My bother is waiting for  
your pigs," someone said. I  heard the sounds o f motorbike engines, and then the 
voices were gradually lost along with the fading motorbike sounds.
The next day I  asked Bother Xin what had happened last night. He knew it 
was impossible to hide the fact from me: "You are ziji ren (one o f us). I  will tell you 
the truth. I  sell my pigs to the private butcher in a neighbouring village, so I  needn't 
pay the slaughtering tax. We have no other way. I f  I  paid the tax, I  make no money." 
I  thought I  was no position to express my feelings on this issue, so I  said nothing. Xin 
saw I  had no response, so he continued to say:" I  think it is unreasonable to tax our 
pigs. The government doesn't do anything for us other than impose different taxes on 
us. The peasants work veiy hard to earn money. Of course we don't want anyone to 
get our 'blood and sweat' money (xuehan qian) without thanks." I  showed my consent 
as he expected and asked him how the butcher was able to sell his pork on the free 
market. His eyes seemed to tell me what a silly question I  had asked. He said: 
“Today in China, money can make the ghost turn a millstone (youqian neng shi gui 
tuimo). I f  they can pay some money to the staff at the Industrial and Commercial 
Bureau (Gong Shan Ju), they can finely sell tax-free pork in the free market. It is not 
difficult." 5
Confronted with the unreasonably high taxes of pig slaughtering, some 
villagers chose to stop raising; some selected to evade the taxes silently. No matter of
5. In China, pork without the chop of a related department cannot be sold in the market.
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what practice they chose, they villagers had the normative consensus that the taxes 
were unreasonablely high. According to the villagers, evading taxes is a common 
practice in villages. It was seriously criticized by the official newspaper in which the 
old tune was repeated without any creativity — "It is an honour to pay taxes and fees, 
and it is shameful to evade tax."; "Evading the slaughtering tax is an illegal 
behavior"; "The local governments have to actively stop these criminal activities." 
There were some private slaughterhouses set up by the villagers. The butchers 
privately slaughtered the pig at midnight for the villagers. Villagers like Brother Xin 
were willing to sell pigs to these private slaughterhouses because not only did they not 
have to pay the slaughtering tax, but they could also get a higher price. Then butchers 
wholesaled to pork to the pork sellers or would directly sell to other villagers. Staying 
in Ku Village, sometimes I saw some hawkers selling pork to the villagers. Of 
course, the price was lower than in the market.
There were many different tactics the villagers adopted in evading the 
slaughtering taxes. Some villagers even altered the old receipts of slaughtering tax in 
cheating the staff of the Industrial and Commercial Bureau; some also borrowed the 
receipts of slaughtering tax from other villagers; and some bribed the staff of the 
Department of Quarantine to issue the certificates of quarantine.
To the villagers, they knew that private slaughtering had violated the law of 
the government. But in the Ku Village, nobody intended to report this to the village 
cadres. Also, the village cadres often kept "one eye open and one eye closed" because 
they knew the villagers dared to offend them nowadays. According to Secretary 
Songsheng, there were cadres of the neighbouring village whose pomelo trees were 
destroyed by the villagers in the night. And the cadres had 110 evidence to prosecute 
the suspected villagers. That is why the cadres said “mingqiang yiduo, anjian 
nanfang" (it is easy to dodge a spear in the open, but hard to guard against an arrow 
shot from the dark, i.e. better the devil you know than the devil you do not know). So 
the tacit and complicity enabled the villagers like Brother Xin be possible to evade 
taxes.6
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6.5. Resistance to the M ultifarious Fees Collection
The central government tried to stop the multifarious fee collection of the local 
government, but as the villagers often said 11shangyou zheng ce, xiayou dui ce" (those 
above have policy, those below have their counter-measure), the local government 
created new items in the name of different excuse to siphon off anything from the 
peasants' purse. In the following, I just select two cases to illustrate how the Ku 
villagers resisted the unreasonable collection of fee.
“Gongchandang is good in naming”
Dining the period of “yan da” in 1995, the villagers who owned a motorbike 
had to be veiy careful because there was a point of checkpoint at the highway. The 
police would stop the motorbike in random and check their license. Anyone who 
failed to provide the drivers license and vehicle registration would be fined by the 
police. There was no standard fine, but which depended on the police in charge on 
that day. If you were from the same village, the fine was lighter; if you had some 
guanxi with the police or other department of the government, you could get an 
exemption; if you did not have any guanxi network, you would be fined heavier. 
Anyone who refused to pay the fine would have their motorbike confiscated. To the 
villagers, it had nothing to do with “keeping the order of transportation and the 
security of people’s lives” as the newspaper claimed, but a good opportunity for the 
local government and its staff to make money and stuff their own pockets.
According to the new regulation in 1995, every diver had to take a driving 
examination and get a driver's license. Anyone who bought a motorbike also had to 
register their vehicle with the Transportation Department (ruhu). The ruhu fee is 
about 2,000 yuan. To the villagers, it was really expensive. In Ku Village, a few got 
a driver's license and registered their motorbikes. Apart from these, they need to 
make a vehicle license too. Of course, when they were going to get their licenses, 
they had to pay different kinds of fees, e.g. an examination fee, license fee, 
registration fee and so on. Wen-ming, the new village head, was one of the few who
6. Although some villagers were jealous of Brother Xin, they still did not intend to report to the village
cadres because they did not want to hurt the personal relationship (gauging) between them.; at the
same time they often said "I don't care the business of others" (shibu guanji, jibulaoxm).
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had paid all the fees which cost about 3000 yuan. He told me that his motorbike cost 
about 7,800 yuan, and when adding the fee, he paid more than ten thousand yuan. 
The villagers thought it was ridiculous to pay a fee on so many items. Brother Xin 
was the one who refused to pay all the fees. He rationalized his own argument in the 
following way,
Driving a motorbike is a simple thing. Even the women know how to 
drive. Why do we have to take an examination? Examination is just 
an excuse for them to take our money. I didn’t pay my registration fee 
either. I have made a calculations, and you know, my motorbike is a 
cheap one. It is not worthwhile to pay such an expensive registration 
fee. I only travel horn the village to Songkou town. Yan da is only 
temporary, after that, no one will care whether you have a license or 
not.
Brother Feng suddenly came home from Guangzhou during the period of yan 
da. He was a truck driver. Based on the new regulations of traffic control, a drivers 
license and vehicle registration had to be examined and revived (nian shen) every 
year. Prior to this regulation, drivers could take the examination and revision in other 
regions or provinces. But the new regulation required the drivers to the examination 
and revision in the place where the license was originally issued. Like the villagers, 
he thought it was a policy the government had adopted to make money. In the 
villagers' term, it was government's "jiliang" (bad way). Different to Xin's argument, 
he put an additional step to question in the zeren of the government.
The new regulation really causes lot of trouble. I have to stop my job 
and come home. I think I still have to wait for a week. You know, 
Gongchandang is very inefficient. Anyone who wants to get back their 
license quickly has to zou houmen (walking through the back door) by 
sending the staff of the Transportation Department gifts. The 
Transportation Department in Songkou would collect the licenses and 
then send them to the county’s Transportation Department. Then they 
would wait for the licenses to be returned to the township. There was a 
good excuse for the township to charge us service charge as they sent 
the license for us. Gongchandang is really good in naming. Not only 
driver's licenses and vehicle registration, but my truck also has five 
other licenses to renew. Each license costs me about 400 yuan. Every 
year the renewal fee costs me several thousands. The government does 
nothing for us, but steal half of my income from our pocket. It is really 
unreasonable.
Feng also told us stories of how the police making money through different methods 
at the highway within Guangdong. One of the stories exemplifies this,
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Eveiyday on Guangdong’s highway, the police set up a checkpoint.
When they stop your vehicle and when they want to get your money, 
they can fine you with any excuse, for example, an expired license, 
speeding, unclean vehicle.... One day, I saw a big joke! There was a 
new truck stopped by a policeman. He examined the truck for a long 
time, but couldn’t find any excuse to fine that driver. In the end, he let 
the truck go. I think the driver was very angry for being checked for a 
long time. So he closed his door heavily. The policeman stopped the 
truck again and pulled the driver out. He found the driver was 
sliirtless. So he fined the driver in the name of “destroying the healthy 
image of drivers”. Suddenly, he found the driver wearing slippers.
What a poor guy! The driver was fined again because according to the 
regulations, 110 driver can wear slipper while driving.
I am not sure whether the story is true or not, but I am sme that story telling and story 
making is one of the most powerful ways for the villagers to negate the image of the 
government and form their intersubjectivity. They circulate these stories in everyday 
conversations, but nobody can identify who is the story maker when the stories spread 
from the first person to ten people, and even to hundreds of people.
In addition to story making, the villagers had their tactics to avoid the 
checking and fining by the police. They changed their route to townships as Brother 
Moi. They also inquired about the checkpoints from those just coming back from 
township before they went to the town. They also went to townships in the evening 
rather than during the day for avoid being checked. In short, they rational calculators 
who rationally calculated ways to reduce their loss by choosing the safest ways.
“The River is ours”
One day in 1995, the hydroelectric power station posted an announcement for 
a new electric fee (dian fe i) which would increase to 8 jiao per kilowatt-hour. The Ku 
villagers felt discontent with the increased rate. So they sent several representatives to 
see the head of hydropower station and bargained to maintain their rate at 4.5 jiao per 
kilowatt-hour. Their argument was that the hydropower station occupied much arable 
land of Ku Village, so the station did have to compensate their lost land by offering 
them a preferential rate, and their electric fee could not be set at the same standard as 
other villages. The head of the station could not make the decision and passed the 
information onto the Songnan township government.
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The township sent people to mediate the dispute between the Ku villagers and 
the hydropower station. They held a meeting at the office of the station and invited 
the Ku villagers to join in. Almost all the young villagers joined the meeting to be 
supportive (zhuzhang shengshi). During the meeting, they had an animated debate 
where they individually tried to validate their arguments. The Ku villagers 
maintained their position as before, but to the officials, the ownership of land still 
belonged to the government, which had the right to design uses for the land. Thus, 
there were no questions of occupation and compensation. But the Ku villagers 
insisted that the electric fee was set at 4.5 jiao per kilowatt-hours. In the end, they 
failed in gaining a compromise, and the station maintained the new rate.
The Songnan hydra electric power station was established by the commune in 
the 1970s and provided electricity to the villages of Songnan Commune. It was 
located at the Ku Village and occupied several mu of fields. The villagers always 
paid the same rate as other villages without any complaint. But since the 1990s, the 
electric rate increased quickly — from 3 jiao per kilowatt-hour in the 1980s to 8 jiao 
per kilowatt-hour in 1995. The villagers thought the increased rates were 
unreasonable. I think the villagers could not accept the new rate because they 
consumed more electricity than before. Based on my own survey, most households 
had a high power consumption due to electrical appliances like TVs, radios and 
electric stoves. Increasing electric rate meant multiplying their expenditure each 
months. So the villagers collectively refused to pay the electric fee. Cowardly 
villagers also followed the masses because anyone who paid the fee would be 
gossiped about by the others as "having no code of brotherhood" (mei yiqi) or 
“showing off their wealth” (bai kuoqi).
Then transpired a “guerrilla war” (you j i  zhcin), in villager’s terms, between the 
hydropower station and the villagers. The hydropower station cut the electric wires of 
Ku Village as punishment for rejecting to pay. But the villagers reconnected the 
mains again and destroyed the electric meter inwardly. The station responded by 
putting all the meters together and locked them up into a box. Then the young 
villagers secretly pried open the box and destroyed the meters again in the night. The 
station was unable to detect who destroyed these meters. Since 1993, the Ku villagers 
have not paid a coin to the station.
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However, on the 28th December in 1995, the Law o f Electric Power was 
passed by the Standing Meeting of National People's Congress, and it was formally 
carried out on the 1st of April 1996. The villagers sensed that the struggled for the 
electric fee was still going on and in their everyday exchange, the issue about the 
electric rate was raised. At the moment, they also discussed the tactics of how to fight 
the collection against of the electric fee. The following is one of their daily 
conversations in Brother Qi-yuan’s house.
One day I  went to visit Brother Qi-yuan with other villagers. Qi-yuan opened 
his refrigerator and took out some fruit and served us bottles o f beer.
Uncle Guang said: “Qi-yuan, your refrigerator is veiy profitable with free 
electricity. ”
Qi-yuan replied: “I  think it is only temporary. They will collect the fee again. ”
Uncle Guang: “Yes, I  laiow it is temporary. ”
Qi-yuan: “Did you read the newspaper? The law o f electric power has been passed. 
It is impossible for us to have free electricity any longer. ”
Uncle Guang made the old argument: “I  agree that we have to pay. But the question 
is how much. The power station is located in our village and it occupies our land. 
According to reason, they should look after us a little bit, and it is reasonable to 
compensate us for our loss. ”
Qi-yuan: “No, no, no. I  think if  you still use this argument, you won't win. You 
Imow, the time the station was set up in collective era, and there was no division o f  
land. So there was nothing called 'making a requisition o f land’. All the land, even 
the labour, belonged to the collective. They didn’t have to consult your opinion 
concerning the construction o f the power station, not to mention compensation. ”
Brother Xin: “That’s exactly what they said. Do you remember their argument in the 
last meeting? They said times were different and we couldn't mix up things from Mao 
and Deng. That's why they refused to reduce our electric fee. ”
Qi-yuan: “Right, in M ao’s era, there was no any private land. How can we ask them 
to compensate for our land. But I  still think we have strong points. ”
Brother Xin: “What are those? ’’
Qi-yuan: “We can argue that since the building o f the hydropower station, the dam 
has affected the water flow and water quality. We Guam ren (people o f Ku Village) 
drink the river water generation after generation. But the hydro-station has affected
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our living condition, so we have to spend our money to dig wells. It is reasonable for  
the hydropower station to compensate us for our expenditures on the digging o f the 
wells. ”
Moi: “That ’ a good idea. It sounds great. ”
Qi-yuan: “I  think we can only bargain to pay less. It is impossible to be totally free o f 
charge anymore. The law has been passed. Do you see the banner hanging in front 
o f the station? It promotes ‘the strictly prohibition o f the illegal consumption o f 
electric power ’. They have given us a signal.
Uncle Guang: “I t ’s better to calmly discuss with them. It is unwise to confront the 
tough with toughness (ying peng ying). Gongchandang isn’t afraid o f direct 
confrontation. You see from the Tiananmen event that they can crack down on the 
confron tation with coercion. We must learn from that lesson. ”
Brother Xin: “Yes, maybe you're right.’’
This struggling was continued until I left Ku Village. I hope that there was not 
any violence or bloodshed in Ku Village. I think the villagers had generated 
experiences and tactics to deal with their everyday struggle. I think they must be 
aware of which is the safest way, when is the best time, and where is the best space to 
fight for their own interests and check the unreasonable extraction.
6.6. Discussion
Since May of 1928, according to the situation of the time, we have 
come out the simpler basic role of guerrilla warfare. That is "di jing  
wo tui, di zhu rao, di p i wo da, di tui wo zui" (when the enemy attacks, 
we reheat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; when the enemy 
was tired, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue and attack).
The movement of the army has to be secret and rapid. We have to 
employ the ingenious to swindle, seduce and confuse the enemy, e.g. 
making a feint to the east and attack in the west (sheng dong j i  xi), 
suddenly attacking from the south and suddenly attacking from the 
north (hu nan hu bei); immediately attacking and immediately 
retreating (ji da j i  li); and taking action at night (ye jian xing dong),....
— Mao, December, 
1936
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The proletariat not only leads the struggle but also defines its targets,
its methods, and the places and instruments for confrontation ...
-- Michel Foucault 1977:216
Studying peasant resistance in taxation is 110 longer a new issue in peasant 
studies, even in China studies (e.g. Bernhardt, 1991; Lucien, 1986; Duara, 1986; 
Perry. 1985). What the literature largely ignores is that the construction and creation 
of peasant activism in resistance. In the case of Ku village, the villagers' fighting 
against the "unreasonable tax" and multifarious impositions rest on both the ability of 
manipulating the guerrilla strategies as well as the ability of fashioning and 
constructing a vision, symbols and framework.
In the villagers' eveiyday discourse, they had constructed a framework of 
argument that divided taxes into "reasonable tax" and "unreasonable tax". This 
division wholly rested on their conception of guanxi and zeren. If the government had 
provided some resources, assistance, input or services, they would have thought it was 
reasonable to stake a claim 011 the produce or revenues from the sale of produce or 
service. It would have been their zeren to fulfill their payment. Where there was no 
input, service or resource, it was deemed quite "unreasonable" for the government to 
expect a return and the fact that it did so was attributed to the government's "greed" or 
interest in merely "taking money from the peasants' pockets" without providing "any 
return" or "gratitude". Basically, the villagers' framework of argument emerged from 
a historically specific set of circumstances in a reform era for the sake of countering 
the official discourse of taxation. In the reform era, a "new" knowledge and practice 
the taxation system was constructed by the government for the sake of extracting the 
resources and maintaining its revenue. In the official discourse, tax was defined and 
legitimized by the state in terms of citizenship which was linked with the language of 
rights and laws. Paying taxes was normalized in discourse as the practices of 
modernization and a market economy. Anyone who rejected the taxes was labeled as 
“abnormal” which was defined in the legal terms as criminals (fanzui fenzi) or illegal 
elements (bufa fenzi).
In the battlefield of knowledge, however, villagers did not passively accept 
alien knowledge imposed by the government; rather, they also created their own
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framework based on their conception of reciprocal relations and mutual obligations. 
Those governments that failed to fulfill their zeren, as defined by the villagers 
themselves, were irresponsible, and that nullified or “turned down” the exchange 
relationship; and for this reason their resistance to taxation was self-legitimized. 
Villagers' resistance to land taxes and pomelo taxes were again evident: they defined 
the ownership of land based on their interpretation. Most of the land for pomelo 
plantation was reclaimed by themselves without obtaining any assistance from the 
government. They thought of the wasteland as natural resource that was freely 
available for use and everyone had rights to access it. While the land was being used, 
one had exclusive rights to it. Therefore, they thought it was not their zeren to pay an 
unreasonable tax for the crops planted 011 “their” land. The villagers also perceived 
that they had fulfilled their zeren 011 the contracted land with gongliang; thus it was 
unreasonable again for the government to collect the land tax without providing any 
additional supplies.
The villagers not only voiced out their discontent and debated the nature of 
taxes, but also transformed their voices into active resistance. The villagers always 
avoided direct confrontation with the government because they knew that an open 
confrontation would probably be met with armed force bloodshed under the socialist 
state. The villagers overtly practiced kangshui in land contract fee and pomelo tax 
only when they thought they had formulated the strong points of argument. When 
they thought their action had violated the law of the state, e.g. the slaughtering tax and 
license fee, they silently evade the taxes “offstage”. There were varieties of tactics 
including spreading rumours, feigned ignorance, underreporting, smuggling and so on 
being adopted by the villagers. These guerrilla strategies made villagers' resistance 
remain publicly invisible. Although there were not any formal organizations of 
resistance and collective action in Ku Village, the villagers practiced similar 
resistance every day for the shared reasons of material gain. They had the shared 
knowledge of "unreasonable tax" and "reasonable tax" and economic interest which 
made the cooperation among the villagers at the level of tacit. For instance, the 
villagers evading slaughtering taxes depended 011 the complicitious silence of other 
villagers to escape detection of local cadres.
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In short, there are no riots, 110 demonstrations, no petitions, no violent 
confrontations, and no protests of any kind, but the unannounced achievement of the 
resistance has been impressive. The term "youji zhan" (guerilla) was invented by Mao 
and this strategy was also applied by Mao in the peasant war. But guerrilla strategy 
resistance is nothing new to peasants because it is the wisdom of local people, which 
is generated by them in eveiyday resistance. They have been well manipulated by the 
villagers in a defensive effort to defeat or minimize a direct appropriation from the 
government. Of course, the struggle is still going on, and I dare not to romanticize the 
power of the villagers, although they had successfully check the tax collection from 
the government in these cases. Maybe one day they will have to surrender their 
"money in the pocket" to the socialist government when it decides to adopt coercive 
methods to collect taxes. But I believe that they will generate some new ways of 
resistance which we cannot imagine at this moment.
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Chapter 7: Xingan baobei -- Ku Villager’s Dreaming of and 
Struggling to Have a Son
l3 th  November o f 1993 was the happiest day o f Fu-sheng’s family. Fu-sheng
worshipped the gods o f heaven and earth as well as gave thanks to their ancestors 
because his dream had come true — he finally got a son after having two previous 
children. Today was his son's birthday. He invited some o f the close friend and 
relative to have a lunch to celebration. I  was one o f them. The guests brought 
different lands o f gifts for his son. During the lunch, people were also chatting about 
family planning in China.
Uncle Bin: "Fu-sheng, you are so luclcy to have a son. You have to thank for our 
ancestors."
Uncle Wen: "Bin is right. As I  Imow, someone in Yaoshan (a neighbouring village) 
couldn ’t get a son until the eight birth."
Hok-Bin: "How can he do that? Doesn’t the government intervene into all these 
births?”
Uncle Wen: "Of course that guy had an excess births secretly. I f  it is discovered by 
the cadres, they will be fined. The rich people don’t care about the fine. They just 
pay it and keep on bearing the babies."
Uncle Qiang: "Don’t exaggerate. I f  they were caught in the “gaochao” (high tide), 
they would be taken for sterilization or abortion,"
Hok-Bin: "Brother Fu-sheng, how much have you been fined by the government?"
Fu-sheng: "I still haven’t paid the fine. But I  know I  have to pay the fine sooner or 
later. Fine, it is a worthwhile fine in exchange for a son."
Hok-Bin: "Why do you insist on having a son? "
Fu-sheng felt embarrassed to answer my question. Uncle Qiang answered instead, 
"It's really sad if  you don't have a son. Who is going to look after you when you are 
old? The daughter is the outsider, like water spilled out..."
WJten we were chatting, Fu-sheng’s son was carried out from the room by his 
wife. He had just woken up. People expressed what a lovely baby he was and turned 
to play with him. Uncle Wen’s wife: “A Moi, so sweet you are, let grandaunt hold
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you.. ” The baby didn’t want to be held by others. His mother said: "A Moi is still 
sleepy. ”
What they called the baby made me feel so puzzled. "Moi” is Hakka dialect, 
which meant "baby girl” or “little girl”. Why did they call a baby boy as a baby 
girl? I  asked several old ladies in the village and they gave me similar answers.
It was an old custom. People in the village believed that there was a balance 
between the number o f living and the dead. I f  anyone died it meant there was a new 
life coming. The ghosts in Hell had to queue up to wait for someone to die. For 
reincarnation, the ghosts or the devils often came to attack newborn babies because 
their life was so weak. They preferred to attack boys rather than girls because the 
lives o f baby boys are more precious and valuable. When a baby boy died, there was 
one more quota o f male in the book o f reincarnation. To protect a baby boy from the 
attack o f the devil, the villagers addressed the baby boy as a baby girl. They thought 
it could cheat the devil.
*  *  *  *
They dream of having sons; they dream of having grandsons; they dream of 
“keeping the incense smoke burning”. To Ku villagers, a “son” is very important in 
many aspects — a son is a permanent labourer of the family; a son is a source of 
support and security in old age; a son is obligated to his father and his father's lineage. 
However, the population policies implemented by the government in the reform 
period has made many of the Chinese peasants “fond of dreams that are difficult to 
come true” (meimeng nanyuan).
Since 1949, in the name of modernization, the state ordered and disciplined 
the bodies and minds of the Chinese people through the introduction of modem 
education, policing, censuses, registration of birth and deaths, and new ideas on health 
and hygiene culminating in the medical inspection of bodies and the campaign for
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eradication of disease.1 Family planning was one of the modem techniques which 
directly shaped the bodies of the women and controlled the reproduction of the family. 
Although population control was not a modem thing, as M. Foucault (1980) noticed, 
it had never been so emphasized and integrated into such an intricate control system 
of the modem state.2 He asserted that,
The great eighteenth-century demographic upswing in Western Europe, 
the necessity for coordinating and integrating it into the apparatus of 
production, and the urgency of controlling it with finer and more 
adequate power mechanisms cause “population,” with its numerical 
variables of space and chronology, longevity and health, to emerge not 
only as a problem but as an object of surveillance, analysis, 
intervention, modification, etc. The project of a technology of 
population begins to be sketched: demographic estimates, the 
calculation of the pyramid of ages, different life expectations and 
levels of mortality, studies of the reciprocal relations of growth of 
wealth and growth of population, various measures of incitement to 
marriage and procreation, the development of forms of education and 
professional training.... The biological traits of a population become 
relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes necessary 
to organize around them an apparatus which will ensure not only their 
subjection but the constant increase of their utility (1980: 171-172).
In the early 1980s, the intervention of the socialist state into the domestic 
arena of reproduction has intensified after the invention of a family planning policy. 
Woman’s body became the battlefield of the socialist state and family. To the family, 
a woman’s body is the way to fulfill dreams of her husband and her husband’s family, 
and maybe herself; to the state, a woman’s body is a focus in fulfilling its goal of 
population control. It was repeatedly addressed by the socialist government that 
population control was a determinant factor of the economic reform and Chinese 
modernization project; however, on the other hand, it was said by the villagers that 
having a son was very important to their family and kin. “Gong shuo gong you li, po 
shuo po you IF (grandfather and grandmother each says he/she is right), both parties 
claimed to be in the right. But policy has been formed and earned out, the state’s will
l' Socialist states seems not an exception. Many scholars (e.g. Michell, 1988, Arnold, 1993, 
Chakrabarty, 1994, Asdar Ali, 1996 & so on) have shown how the colonial project in the colonial 
societies colonize the people through the deployment o f the modem knowledge.
2
‘ Not only Foucault, there are many other scholars that hold similar views, e.g. Treichler, 1990; 
Jacobus, 1990; Kamran Asdar Ali, 1996.
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could not be changed by the "ignorant and backward” peasants. Facing this 
“disastrous” policy, to guarantee having a son, the angered villagers rose up and 
engaged in various forms of resistance such as escaping, simply paying the fine for 
exchanging a child, rumour spreading, threatening and so on. On the other hand, 
lacking in reliable and effective means to ensure the implementation of a birth control 
policy, many village cadres frequently turned to coercion. The result is that violent 
clashes have grown in recent years in rural China (e.g. Li and O'Brien, 1996; Aird, 
1990; Greenhalgh, 1994; Wasserstrom, 1984). Apart from resistance in action, people 
in Ku Village also carried out resistance via discursive penetration. They were 
capable of constructing their framework of argument to delegitimize the state policy. 
Again, in their everyday discourse, the principle of zeren or mutual obligation was 
adopted by the villagers to define the government policies which rested on the similar 
division of what was "reasonable" from "unreasonable".
In this Chapter, to understand the conflict between the socialist state and the 
villagers on the issue of birth control, I not only examine the peasants' resistance in 
action, but also examine how they made the counter-discourse, through which I tiy to 
understand the cultural meaning of having a son to Chinese peasants and its 
relationship to their family and kinship, economic structure of rural society and local 
religion. The following questions will be answered: How do the Chinese government 
make the discourse and carry out the population policy? What is the cultural meaning 
of "having a son" in rural China? How does the fertility culture influence the birth 
preference of the villagers? What is the difference between the official and villagers' 
views of birth control? How do the villagers apply the similar framework resting on 
the division of what was "reasonable" from "unreasonable" to fight for a son and fight 
against the birth control policies? How do village cadres implement this difficult state 
policy?
7.2. Official Discourse on Population Control since the 1980s
In the late 1970s, under the influence of ideology of modernism, the Chinese 
government was alarmed by the total sum of China's population and the projection of 
the population growth rates. It was because the age structure of China's population
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with about 65% of the population under thirty were expected to give birth in coming 
years and the total population would reach 1.3 billion after twenty years. In the 
modernist view of development or in the name of Marxist population theory, 
economic growth was regarded as negatively correlated to the population growth. 
The “great architect” of China’s economic reform Deng Xiao-ping had made the clear 
explanation in his address on March 30, 1979 entitled Jianchi Sixian Yuanze (the 
Insisting Four Principles):
Now China has population 0.9 billion and peasants occupies 80%. A 
large population has its advantages, but it also has its disadvantages.
In the condition of underdevelopment, the large population will cause 
serious problems of food, education and jobs. Thus, we have to 
strongly promote family planning, even the population will not quickly 
increase after several year, but it is still a problem during this period.... 
Although the area of our country is large, the arable farming area is 
small. The problem of limited arable land and a large agricultural 
population is not easy to solve (my own translation).
Almost all of the prominent Chinese demographers held these views (e.g. Tian, 1997; 
Liu, 1988; Hou, 1991; Ma. 1987). The census data was “scientifically” represented by 
the experts as “reality” of an alarming population increase and its impact on the future 
food distribution in China. Numerical and statistical analyses were used to prove the 
relationship between overpopulation and the narrow strip of farmland. For improving 
the per capita availability of food, clothing, housing, health care, education, 
transportation, and consumer goods, to ease problems in employment, and to speed 
the pace of overall economic development, carrying out a new strict single-family 
policy became necessary to the socialist government.
While the rural reform in the late 1970s was introduced to stimulate economic 
growth, the one-child policy announced a month later was to slow down the 
population growth. The rationale for this policy was to promote China's development 
and modernization. Vice Premier Chen Mu-hua clearly justified the one-child policy 
in the following:
National economic development must observe the law of planned and 
proportionate development. This law requires not only that the... 
production of material means ... but also that human reproduction 
develop in a planned way. Thus, the planned control of population 
increase in our nation ... is not a subjective and arbitrary decision;
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rather, it is dictated and demanded by the socialist mode of 
production....
To a great extent, the degree of a nation's potential for increasing 
capital accumulation, and the pace of raising the people's living 
standards and of increasing national power, are determined by the 
relationship between the growth rate of the economy and the growth 
rate of population (1979: 94, translated by Pi-chao Chen).
At the beginning, the one-child policy encouraged all couples of the Han 
majority to limit their family to have one child in order to ensure the achievement of 
the national population size target of 1.2 billion in the year 2000. The families and 
couples were asked to recognize that the economic costs of having many children and 
persuaded to adopt family planning as a "voluntary and non-coercive" choice (Open 
Letter, 1980). The old family model was rejected as the “residue of feudalism” 
(fengjian canyu) and the new family model was promoted in the following rhetoric:
"Zhongsheng zhisheng yige haizi guangrong"(It is glorious to have only one children 
in the life)
"Shidai butong, nannu dou yiyang" (The time is different, male or female doesn't 
matter)
"Wei kongzhi renkou zhengzhang, zaori shixian sihua, zhongsheng zhisheng yige 
haizi" (To control the population growth, to achieve modernization, we have to keep 
one child in the life)
"Shixian yidui hufu zhi shengyu yige haizi, shiyichangyifengyisu de dashi” (A couple 
who has only one child is a important event o f changing values and customs)
"Dangyuan ganbu bixu daitou kefu ziji tounaozhong de fengjian sixiang, qu diao 
meiyou shengyun nanhai jiu  buneng chuanzhong jiedai de cuowu guannian" (The 
Communist cadres have to play a leading role in cleansing the feudal ideology in 
their mind, and the wrong conception o f son being the only way offamily continuity)
To guaranteeing the fulfillment of the population goal set by the government,
in 1982, family planning was defined into the Constitution of PRC. In Article 49 of
the Constitution, it was defined that, as citizens of PRC, “a couple had the duty and
obligation to carry out family planning” (see Picture 7.1 & 7.2) The policy was
strictly implemented in the early 1980s. The system of incentives (rewards) and
disincentives (penalties) were implemented in most provinces (Banister, 1984 &
1985; Aird, 1982; Goodstadt, 1982; Croll, 1985 & 1994).3 Although the government
2
There was no standardized reward and penalties attached to the policy. These were largely 
dependent on the will and wealth of individual work units, neighbourhoods, and villages in which the 
couples were employed or resided.
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encouraged couples to have one child, in the early 1980s, there were also some 
exceptions to the one-child rule which comprised a wide number of concessions 
permitting a second birth, including health defects, sterility and remarriage. In the 
countryside, there were supplementary concessions to kinship and the continuation of 
the family line.4 At the beginning of the one-child policy, the government 
emphasized education and persuasion in the implementation of the policy. But the 
Chinese government perceived the population problem and the rising birth rate in the 
countryside to be too serious to allow any relaxation of the policy. So from 1983 to 
1984, several family planning campaigns were earned out to achieve their goals of 
population control. In Guangdong, "compulsory sterilization" was adopted by the 
government for forcing either party, husband or wife, of those couples who already 
had two children to practice birth control. However, the coercion of the Chinese 
population policy had sparked a wave of national and international concern, as well as 
increased the unpopularity of the policy.
Starting from the mid-1980s, the policy's goals and means were relaxed and 
softened. It was reflected in the change of the national target for the year 2000 from 
strictly 1.2 billion to about 1.2 billion by the Chinese government in 1985. In late 
1988 the minister in charge of the State Family Planning Commission announced that 
the population was likely to top 1.27 billion by century's end (Greenhalgh, 1990). 
The relaxation of the one-child policy was also reflected in the condition of permitting 
a second birth (Davin, 1990). A second child was newly permitted in the countryside 
where an only son gave birth to a daughter, where the continuation of the family line 
was threatened by the birth of a single daughter or where the husband had moved into 
the wife's household after marriage and the first child was a daughter. According to 
the provincial docmnent of Guangdong and that of Mei County in 1986, the number 
of conditions under which rural couples were allowed to have two children was 
increased to five. It was clearly stated that "We encourage the rural population to
4' According to Croll (1994:189), generally, the Chinese government permitted the couple to have a 
second child "if one son had been born for three consecutive generation, if  both spouses were only 
children, if  marriage was uxorilocal (the groom had moved into the bride's household) with a wife an 
only child, and if  a household had only one son capable of begetting heirs. Additionally, households in 
mountainous regions which had economic difficulties were permitted to give birth to a second child." 
According to a Japanese demographer, Ruolinjinzi (1994:51-61), there are some variations among 
provinces. Readers can see the tables constructed by Ruolinjinzi for comparing the family planning 
regulations between ten provinces and cities in detail.
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have one child and the second child is pennitted under the plan, quotas and four year 
intervals. We strictly prohibit the third child and unplanned second fertility and 
unmarried birth," (see Regulation, 1986). So in reality, by the end of decade, the 
majority of rural couples could have a second child.
7,2, The Reasons fo r  H aving a Son
The Chinese government's population policy was obviously unwelcome by 
rural society. To understand the reasons of the villagers' resistance to the birth 
control, we had to learn to listen to the villager’s voice.
Getting information from 45 households, there were 30 inhabitants that told 
me they definitely wanted to have a son. Most villagers thought that if they could 
have a son, they just wanted two children. I also asked them to give reasons for 
wanting to have a son (see Table 7.1). Their answers reflect that a pure economic 
interest account of the villagers' struggle for a son seems to be inadequate. In their 
voices, I found that the economic reason was often interwoven with the cultural 
meaning of having a son. "Old age supporting" (lao you suo yi) and "carrying on the 
family line" (chuanzhong jiedai) were the most important reasons rural couples of 
insisted on having sons in Ku Village.
Table 7.1 Reason For Having a Son (total Number = 45)
Reasons Number of Villagers Answered "Yes"
Old Age Support 32 (71.1%)
Continuity of Family Line 30 (66.7%)
Local Custom 25 (55.6%)
State Policy 16(35.6%)
Requirement o f  P arents 16 (35.6%)
Economic Reason 15 (33.3%)
Guarantee of Child’s Survival 14(31.1%)
Large Family Has More Power 11 (20.0%)
Source: my own survey.
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As one of my informant Uncle Xiang said:
No matter how harsh the penalty is, in the mind of "uncle peasants" 
(nongmin bobo), they always hope their house keys can be transferred 
to their sons. The daughter is the outsider, like the water spilled out, 
we have no reason to give the key to the outsider. All light?
Uncle Qiang also expressed the same opinion. He said:
The daughter is not ours. At last, she has to follow her husband. So 
everyone wants to have a son. If you haven't a son, you will be very 
pitiful. Who can take care of you when you are old?... I don't 
understand why our government doesn't allow us to have a son?
Traditionally, the villagers were naturally supported by their son(s) in old age 
after they lost their ability to do labour in the old age. Although the socialist 
government tried to develop their social welfare services such as a wubaohu system 
(five guarantees system) for supporting the elderly without children. However, the 
"five guarantees" offered to the childless elderly was only at the minimal level. These 
minimal support revealed the fact that any rural resident wishing a good life in old age 
had no choice but to have a son. The dismantling of the collective made this system 
difficult to implement. In the absence of central allocation, local government funds 
were depleted. So the wubaohu system, still existed in name, but was largely 
determined by the economic power of individual village. Even though the elderly in 
Ku Village can get support from the villagers' committee, their lives were far from the 
perfection as the traditional ideal of "spending their remaining years in happiness"
(anxiang wannian). With financial support from the overseas Chinese, the township 
government had set up the old age home {jinglaoyuan) to support the elderly who did 
not have any sons or daughters. However, in the eye of the Ku Villagers, it was a 
miserable place to live in one’s old age. I had an opportunity to visit the Songnan 
Jinglaoyuan with Brother Ying. The Building of the jinglaoyuan was quite nice (see 
Picture 7.3). It was a two floor flat. There was an office, a public kitchen, two public 
toilet and about twenty single rooms. There were a superintendent, a staff, and a cook 
who worked for the jinglaoyuan. Most of the old people lived there were incapable of 
supporting themselves due to illness. Though the government could support their 
basic needs of living, it was not good enough. On their notice board, I found they 
only received about 57.75 yuan a month from the government. According to the 
living standard of Mei County, it was pretty low. Now the rooms were still not fully
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occupied and there were only 13 people living there. Most of the single elderly did 
not want to live in jinglaoyuan according to the superintendent.
In the villagers' imagination, jinglaoyuan was a terrible place. Uncle Huang
said:
That isn't a place for the elderly to have an easy life. As I know, the 
elders still have to work there. They raise pigs, grow vegetables and so 
011. Basically, they still have to depend on themselves.
Brother Ying also said:
People live there just because they have no choice. Nobody wants to 
stay in this pitiful place.
In Ku Village, the pity story of Grandaunt Xiao also taught the villagers a lesson that 
"without a son one would be very miserable in old age." Grandaunt Xiao was about 
80 years old. She had not bome a son. Although she had adopted a son, the son 
treated her badly and did not want to live with her. He also did not support her life, 
and her life mainly depended on the support from her overseas relatives. One time 
when she carelessly fell down and broke her hands, nobody could take care of her.
Most of the villagers felt very sorry and tried their best to help this poor old lady in
different ways. When I was talking about family planning with Lian, he referred to 
grandaunt Xiao's case:
I don't understand why I cannot have a son. If we don't have a son, we 
will be very sad in our old age. The state won't take care of our 
livelihood. Do you know Grandaunt Xiao? Her experience shows us 
that having your own son is very important. Although she has adopted 
a son, the son isn't her own. Last time while she was hurt, he didn't
even come to visit her. I don't want to follow in her footsteps.
It was commonly shared by the villagers that the non-existence of old-age support and 
social security from the government was the their main reason of having a son. Put 
in other way, the Ku villagers' argument and resistance to birth control policies 
centered on a simple equation -- support for the government's birth control policies 
had to be matched by its obligation to provide care for the elderly. Uncle Huang 
declared clearly why he could not accept the state population policy as well,
... our government does nothing for the aged people in rural areas. We 
haven't any old-age pension. We haven't any old-age welfare. That's 
why every family in rural areas wants to have a son. We have to
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depend our son in our old age. If not, we will be very pitiful when we 
become old...
Uncle Bi, the former village leader, also showed his understanding as to why the 
peasants preferred having a son and countered the single-child family policy. He told 
me:
Ai! The situation is quite different between the rural and urban areas.
In the urban areas, workers can get salaries from the government, even 
after retirement. They have "iron bowls" (tie fanwan), but the peasants 
don't. No matter how harsh the state policy is, once they get "iron 
bowls", they must abide by the state policy. But the state doesn't 
provide any "iron bowl" to the peasants, so how can you persuade them 
not to want a son?
Not only the old villagers, the younger generation, like brother Xin, also showed their 
preference toward having a son. His argument is shown as below,
I think our situation is different from yours. In rural society, we have 
no other choices. We have to get married and we have to have a son. 
Everyone has to repeat this cycle. When we become old, we have to 
rely on our son. You know, we have no retirement pay. It is also quite 
hard for us to have savings too.
The villagers repeatedly complained of the government's not fulfilling its zeren to 
provide elderly care and took it as their reason to support their resistance. However, I 
do not think that all the villagers would be willing to follow the state policy even if 
the state provided them old-age care. This is because "having a son" is not only for 
the sake of security in old age, but is also related to moral zeren between them and 
their family and ancestors.
The issue of old age support implies the moral social relationship between a 
son and his parents. It is socially accepted that parents have the zeren of feeding and 
educating their children, in return, the sons have the zeren to support their aged 
parents in return. This is a consensus between the parents and the children. Anyone 
breaking down this relationship of moral reciprocity or not trying hard to fulfill their 
obligation will be condemned as not filial piety (buxiao) by other members of society. 
To the villagers, implementing birth control meant the government has to take up the 
zeren of supporting the elderly. If not, they felt it was unreasonable to accept this 
policy, as having sons 01* grandsons to support them in their old age would be 
necessary.
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Compared with the reason of "maintaining the family line", "supporting parent 
during old age" was a short-term moral zeren. In rural China, all the male villagers 
also have to fulfill their long-tenn moral zeren of reproduction of the family line. 
There is a deeper cultural meaning of continuity of family line in rural society. To the 
villagers, their teleological concern of life is manifested and fulfilled through the most 
secular way — that of reproduction. Reproduction lets the line of their ancestors 
become immortal because their children are thought to be a continuous form of their 
body and spirit and they themselves are the continuity of their parents' body and spirit. 
Only then is their dream of eternal life possible to fulfill through the continuity of 
their sons and grandsons. So to the villagers, the reproduction of sons is their long- 
tenn moral obligation to their parents and ancestors which can not be shirked. Failing 
to reproduce a son means the zhong (seed) of their ancestors would stop or 
distinguish. And they would then be condemned as buxicio (unfilial piety). So in 
Chinese society, "may you die without sons" or "may you be the last of your line" 
(idunzi juesun) is the most venomous curse and it is seen as the most unfortunate of 
situations in life.
People have different dreams and wishes in this life (Jinsheng). When they 
camiot fulfill their dreams and tasks in this life, sons become the only one who 
will/can continue their tasks and fulfill such dreams. For example, in Ku Village, 
building a new big house was always the wish of the villagers. But not all the 
villagers could fulfill this dream in this life, especially poorer families. Their sons or 
descendants became their hope to complete their task. One of the villagers, Uncle 
Dong, told me that building a new house was his father's dream. He would tiy to 
fulfill his father's dream during his lifetime. If he could not fulfill it, he would leave 
the unfinished task to his son. In this sense, sons also play the role of fulfilling hopes 
and dreams in this life.
I also noticed that in the villagers' mind there was a conception of duality of 
life - "jin sheng” (this life) and "lai sheng” (the next life). To them, their sons and 
grandsons not only support their old age in this life, but their descendants also 
support their next life through burning joss stick and offering sacrifices. Stopping the 
family line will force their ancestors in the next life to becoming the "guhun yegui" 
(the hungry ghosts without offerings). So in rural society, “keeping the incense
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smoke burning” and “continuing the incense smoke at the ancestral shrine” represent 
the villagers' concern of the next life. Continuing the family line becomes the long- 
tenn moral obligation of sons to their fathers and to their father's lineage. In return, 
breeding and educating children, and helping their sons to get manied and start their 
son's career becomes parents' obligation or zeren to both their sons and ancestors.
The conception of continuity within a family line is rooted in the villagers' 
minds. To them, it is as natural as eating, and in their everyday practices, the morality 
of continuing the family line is reproduced and generated. While I was staying in Ku 
Village, there were two events that happened in which the importance of having a son 
was obviously manifested.
Crying for Losing a Son
The sly  was gloomy, that made people feel a little bit sad. When I  was 
chatting with the villagers in Uncle Guang’s house, someone came in and told us a 
bad news. Broth er Hua's younger son had died o f asthma that morning. His son was 
only two years old. That villager said,
When I  passed Hua's door, I  heard him and his wife cry loudly. Poor 
thing. I  lenew his son had died. His son had suffered from asthma for a 
long time, and during the last several days, his condition had suddenly 
worsened. They immediately sent him to the hospital, but his condition 
became worse. I  suspect the doctor used the wrong medicine.
Aunt Xiang sighed and showed her sorrow,
What a pity! I  think Hua must be vety sad. He loved this son more 
than any one else. You know, today everyone can only have two 
children. Nobody can afford to lose one. A son is as precious as his 
heart (xingan baobei).
Aunt Guang added a few  words,
The saddest thing is that Hua's wife was sterilized after she gave birth 
the second time. Songsheng will be cursed by the villagers because she 
mobilized Hua's husband to be sterilized.
The villager who brought the news to us continued to say,
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I  think after Hua's case, nobody will be so foolish as to accept 
sterilization just after a second birth. The government never considers 
the difficulty o f the peasant. How can a "castrated cat" still give birth!
The news o f Hua's son was quickly spread throughout Ku Village. All the villagers 
shook their heads and heaved a sigh. Everybody M>as talking about the matter; some 
criticized the population policy o f the government; some suggested that Hua adopt 
another child from other villages as a guarantee.
Weeping for the Father
The day after Hua's son died, Granduncle Liu died in a myocardial infarction 
too. He w>as seventy-five years old. He had four sons, three daughters, four 
grandsons and two granddaughters. I  also participated in the traditional funeral o f  
Granduncle Liu.
After receiving the news o f Granduncle's death, all his daughters and son-in- 
laws returned to Ku Village. All the true sons, daughters, grandsons and 
granddaughters in mourning had sacldng draped over their shoulders (pima daixiao). 
They had to set up the mourning hall (lingtang) for the dead. The coffin containing a 
corpse (lingjiu) was put into a place behind the sacrificial table (jitai). This is where 
there was an enshrined tablet o f deceased names, burning joss sticks and candles, 
offering sacrifices o f wine, tea, fruit, chicken and so on. There was a pair o f paper 
virgin boy and maiden keeping watch on either side o f the sacrificial table. There 
were also many wreaths and flags were laid in the mourning hall (see Picture 7.4).
The memorial ceremony for Granduncle Liu was held on the day after he died. 
Most o f the villagers such as the new village head Wenming, Uncle Wen, and the 
close relatives assisted to organize the ceremony and set up the mourning hall. The 
ceremony started at a good hour (hao shichen) in the afternoon. When it started, the 
sons and daughters in mourning began to cry loudly. One o f the elders in Ku Village 
gave an elegiac address. The villagers and the relatives from outsides also came in 
succession to worship and bid farewell to the dead. Every visitor had to give the 
baijin (white money)5 to the family o f the dead. Both the Xiaohuang Old People
5‘ White money is money given to the family of the deceased by relatives.
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Association and the Songxi Primary School organized their worship teams to 
participate in the funeral ceremony. So in Ku Village, no matter i f  you were the old 
or the young all participated in these events.
They also invited a monk and two Buddhist nuns to come and hold the 
Buddhist rituals and recite scriptures for (chao du) releasing souls from purgatory 
(Picture 7.5). The relatives came from outside and some o f the villagers were also 
invited to have dinner. After dinner, most o f the villagers stayed at mourning hall. 
According to the old villagers, the sold o f the dead would be lonely and they had to 
keep the hall lively. The funeral continued overnight and the sons and daughters o f 
the dead had to keep vigil beside the coffin. The next morning, the coffin was sent to 
be buried by a team o f people including family members, relatives, friends and 
primaiy school students (see Picture 7.6).
The funeral ceremony and other expense spent a lot o f money. According to 
Uncle Wen, it was about twenty thousands yuan. In those few  days, the villagers 
chatted about Granduncle Liu's death and his funeral. Granduncle Liu's death 
seemed to remind the villagers o f the importance o f having sons. The following were 
some o f the villagers' discussion about Granduncle Liu’s death.
"What the greatest blessing o f Granduncle Liu! Full ofposterity."
"Lucidly he has so many sons and daughters. I f  not, how can they afford such a huge 
expense? Nowadays, it isn’t easy to pay for a funeral."
"Granduncle Liu's funeral was so lively. Now every family only has two children. I  
wonder iffunerals in the future can be done like that."
"Sons were the greatest blessing o f Granduncle! I f  there were no sons, who can come 
to handle all these things for him?
Through eveiyday life practices, knowledge and culture have been reproduced 
and generated. The death of a son or a father have taught the villagers what the 
meaning and significance of having a son. Nobody needed to teach you in formal 
education. The people, including the young school students, have accepted the fact 
that it is the moral obligation of sons through participating in a funeral ceremony 
without knowing what it is.
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Apart from the cultural meaning of having a son, to the villagers, sons are also 
important to the economy of a family Decollectivization increased the labour benefit 
of children which stimulated the fertility desire of the villagers, especially of sons, 
because the relationship between labour and income became even closer. Under the 
collective economic regime, the advantages of children, especially the son, had 
become minimal because the functions of children in a traditional family were partly 
taken over by a production team. In a traditional family, the important reason for 
desiring a son was to ensure economic security and be supported in old age, as well as 
to provide a permanent labour for the family. Sons were believed to bring more 
economic benefits than daughters as they would join their husbands' family at 
marriage. But in collective institutions, the collective guaranteed the basic livelihood 
of the old. The economic power of the daughter was equal to the son because they 
earned equal gongfeng (work points) in the collective. But after the dismantling of the 
collective, there was increasing evidence that family planning policies came into 
conflict with those of the responsibility production system. The number of family 
labourers would influence the income of the family. In the villagers' eyes, the son was 
not only a permanent labourer in a family, but he could also get another more labour 
from his wife's family. The belief that “in order to get rich, one must have more 
boys” is prevalent in rural China. “Daughters are like water spilled out” is the 
metaphor villagers have used to describe the less important role of a daughter. 
However, I would like to say that the villagers' practices, at least some of them, did 
not always match with what they said. Some daughters played important roles in the 
family. For example, Uncle Si relied on his daughter more than other villagers. This 
was first because his daughter, Sister Hui, lived in a neighbour village; second 
because his two sons all worked in the city. Sister Hui was not like "the water spilled 
out"; she still took care of her family after marriage. She and her husband came to 
visit Uncle Si at least once a month. In the harvest season, they also assisted in the 
fruit collection.
As the Ku villagers frequently said "shi yu yuan wei” (things do not always 
turn out the way one wishes), not all the villagers finally got a son. The alternative 
strategy was to either adopt a son or "zhaoxu". The adoption of a son is a popular
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practice in rural China.6 In Ku Village, as I know, there were about four families who 
adopted a son from their close relatives, and the son would have the surname "Ku". 
"Zhaoxu" means that the wife's family seeks a husband for their daughter and asks the 
son-in-law to live in the wife's home. Their first grandson will use the surname of the 
wife's family. One of the inhabitants of Ku Village, Sister Feng's husband died 
several years ago. Because she did not have any son by her first husband, she sought 
a second husband to continue the family line for her first husband's family. In 
general, only a man who came from a poor family practiced "zhaoxu".
7.3. The Local Practice o f  Birth Control
In Ku Village, I often heard voices of discontent about the birth control from 
both sides — villagers and cadres. To the villagers, they complained about the 
unreasonable population policy and its coercive means of implementation. To the 
village cadres, they complained about the difficulty of executing the birth control 
policy.
At the village level, the task of birth control was mainly implemented by the 
women's representative and other village cadres. Ling was the women's representative 
of Xiaohuang ADC. She was about 35 years old and had one son and one daughter. 
She was sumamed Ku, but she lived in the neighbour village called Shangping. I 
visited her several times. In our conversation, I got a broad picture of how the village 
cadres implemented the policy in the villages. Ling told me that the policy was 
transmitted from the township government. Every month, secretary Songsheng 
reported the task to the township government as well as received the new policies and 
tasks from above. Every year, the township government divided the family planning 
quotas to different ADCs. The quota was distributed by the xiang or township 
government according to the population of the locality. Ling told me that there were 
about 17 quotas of fertility they could get from the township government Although I 
knew Ling well, every time I asked her about how they implemented birth control in 
the villages, she suddenly became a cadres of the village and not my friend. She got
6. See Waltner, Ann, 1990, Getting an Heir: Adoption and the Construction o f Kinship in late Imperial 
China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
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used to speaking to me with official jargon when talking about implementation 
policies:
Basically we implement the policy based on the spirit and direction of 
the upper government. Not so bad, Xiaohuang does not exceed the 
quota of fertility every year.
She further explained her everyday task to me.
Basically, we know eveiy household well. We know which 
household's son get married, and whose daughter-in-law becomes 
pregnant. We often have to visit the new and young couples repeatedly 
and have a heart-to-heart talk (jiao xin) with them and check up on 
their contraceptive practices and birth plans. We also have to try to 
educate (jiaoyu) them about the need to control fertility, and mobilize 
(dongyuan) the women to have intrauterine rings inserted after the first 
birth. When the couples have given birth a second time, we will 
persuade them to get sterilized. If we find an illegal pregnancy, we 
will persuade them to terminate it. If the persuasion is not successful, 
we will supplement with administrative measures (xingzhen cuoshi) for 
providing technical services. But in general, we prefer to adopt 
persuasion (she emphasized).
What did "administrative measure", "technical services" and "persuasion" 
mean? Was there anything obscured by the use of euphemisms and apparently 
innocuous abstractions of these terms? Interview the villagers, I found that the 
seemingly innocent expressions may disguise sinister intent. "Persuasion" denoted 
not only oral argument but official harassment, threats, and heavy fines. "Technical 
services" was a euphemism for birth control surgeries including IUD insertions, 
sterilization, and abortions. The phrase "administrative measures" was also standing 
for unspecified applications of bureaucratic power at the grassroots level.
According to the villagers, like other villages in other parts of China, the 
cadres in Xiaohuang also adopted coercion in birth control because they could not 
guarantee to fulfill the state policy. Although Ling tried to avoid mentioning the use 
of coercion in Ku Village, she told me if the couple with an unauthorized pregnancy 
or higher order birth did not pay the fine, they sometimes confiscated the property of 
those “illegal families”, such as a TV, furniture, a bicycle and so on for substitution of 
a fine. But under normal circumstances, they were unwilling to choose such 
compulsory methods because it would hurt the human relationship between them and 
the villagers. But when the “high tides” of family planning (jihua shengyu gaochao)
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came, under the pressure of government they had to commit to these kinds of coercive
practices. Ling emphasized:
At ordinary times, it is impossible to employ coercive measures. How 
can we catch people based on our own effort? In "high tides", there is 
a cooperation between the different departments such as the paichusuo 
(local police station), thefulian (women’s federation), hospitals and so 
on. The township government also sends a lot of people to the 
villages.
Ling repeatedly emphasized their measures of penalties were based on the 
policy of the government. Checking the document of the Regulation o f Family 
Planning in Guangdong Province, I found there were different kinds of rewards for 
rural couples who followed family planning regulations, and there were different 
kinds of punishments to rural couples who broke the family planning regulation. 
Concerning the rural population, the Regulation clearly stated that:
Rural couples having a second birth not under the quota, without the 
permission (unplanned birth), and within a four year interval will be 
fined 500 to 1500 yuan; one having a third birth will be fined 5000 
yuan; and one bearing more than three children will be doubly fined.
Those purposely not following family planning will be additionally 
fined 500 yuan. In addition, illegal couples will not be allowed to 
work in a city, to work in rural enterprises, to change rural residence 
status to urban residence status (nongzhuanfei), and to benefit from 
public welfare services. Unauthorized children will not get the division 
of land, dividends of public funds and other benefits...
7.4. Guerrilla Warfare in Family Planning
What clearly marked the response of the villagers to birth control was a great 
deal of villagers defying the policy and having a son, especially if they were unlucky 
enough to have two daughters, or became pregnant soon after the birth of a first child. 
No matter how harsh the punishments were, there were at least ten "illegal 
households" that offended the regulation of family planning in Ku Village. I 
interviewed some of them. Through their stories, we can grasp how these villagers, 
who were labeled by the government as "chao sheng you j i  dui" (guerrillas of excess 
birth), manipulated the "youji zhanshu” (guerrilla strategies) to resist unpopular state 
policy; and on the other hand, how the village cadres implemented the population 
policy at a local level.
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Sister Fang's Story
Sister Fang was thirty-eight years old. She was married to a villager in Ku 
Village when she was twenty-three. Her husband's father had two wives. The first 
wife had borne him no children and she finally adopted a son. According to Sister 
Fang, this adopted son in fact did not support her old age. Although Fang's husband 
was the second wife's son, they supported their mother-in-law and treated her as a 
blood mother. Sister Fang had bome her husband three children. The first two were 
daughters and the third one was a son. She recalled her painful experience when she 
was bearing the unauthorized pregnancy,
After my second birth, Songsheng and Ling repeatedly visited my home and 
requested me to be sterilized. You Imow, we still didn't have a son, so how could I  
stop giving birth? So my husband and I  refused to be sterilized. Songsheng 
threatened to fine us heavily. But we told her that even i f  they fined us, we wouldn't 
change our mind. When I  bore the third child, I  Jaiew I  couldn't stay in Ku Village 
any longer because through newspaper and radio, we hiew that family planning was 
veiy tight fjihua shengyu gaocao). That was 1983.
One day, a villager ran to inform me that the cadres o f the ADC were joining 
with officials o f township government and were coming to the villages to catch up 
with unauthorized pregnant women. At the time, the team was in Datangbei Village. 
My husband and I  were very scared. The villagers suggested that I  escape. Because 
all o f us Jaiew that pregnant women caught by the cadres in the campaign (yun dons) 
had little chance o f refusing an abortion as the women pregnant without permission 
would not be allowed to return to their families until they consented to carry out an 
abortion.
We couldn't escape by land as we would met the cadres on the way. So I  
decided to escape by water. I  remember that it was raining. I  ran and ran along the 
river with fear. When I  got to the Ershui Temple, the rain suddenly became heavy. I  
went into the temple. A monk came out and when he saw me, he Jcnew that I  was 
escaping the compulsory abortion. He was veiy kind and invited us into a room to 
seek shelter from the rain. He also got dry clothes for me to change into. He was a
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really good man. I  was so touched at that moment. Until now I  still remember that 
monk. He also asked a man in the temple to carry my luggage and sent me off to my 
father’s home. I  fled from Ku Village and went into hiding for about 100 days until 
my baby was born. While I  was staying at my father's village, I  knew that there were 
three other fellow villagers hiding from family planning in the village.
After I  gave the third birth and returned to village, the cadres came to collect 
the illegal birth fee. I  refused to pay because our family was so poor. We really had 
no money to pay the fine, and I  also Imew that other villagers who had excessive 
births hadn’t paid the fine. But in autumn o f 1983, there was another high tide. 
About thirty or forty cadres came to the villages to collect the excess birth fee and 
other anti-family planning fees. Anyone who refused to pay the fine would have all 
their valuable things confiscated. When the team o f cadres were talcing action in the 
neighbouring village, a villager quickly ran to divulge the news to me. So we 
concealed all our valuable things in the house o f our neighbours. I  also hid myself in 
another villager’s home. When the team came to Ku Village, it was late afternoon. 
One o f the old villagers, Grandaunt Ba steamed many sweet potatoes for the cadres to 
delay the progress. She hoped that after the cadres finished the sweet potatoes, they 
would leave. But Grandaunt's plan failed. When the cadres came to my house, they 
couldn’t find me. The rooms were also empty and there were only two beds left. My 
mother-in-law and my daughters all slept on the new bed. The cadres couldn’t find  
any valuable things in the room and they finally confiscated my old bed.
I  didn 't want to get into any more trouble. I  finally became sterilized and 
when I  went to the hospital, I  met one o f the cadres who came to confiscate my 
furniture. She was a fellow villager from my father's village. My sister-in-law (my 
brother's wife) cursed her pungently: "Do you still want our things? You aren't a 
human being (bushi ren). You are one o f us (zijiren). How can you treat the other 
villagers like that!"
My unauthorized son faced unfair treatment from the village committee. He 
got no division o f land or the dividend o f public funds. However, I  know another 
household's unauthorized son obtained dividends from their village committee. I  
complained o f their unfair treatment in a villagers' meeting and the fellow villagers
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also support me since they thought twenty-yuan didn't much affect their dividend 
distribution. In the end, my son also got the dividend,
Lian's Sixth Birth.
Lian was about 38 years old. He was the youngest member in his family. His 
three brothers all had two sons. But his wife had bome him no son until the sixth 
birth. After her second birth, the village cadres came to mobilize them to sterilize. 
But Lian refused to do that. His wife fled from Ku Village and hid in her father's 
village in Hainan province to avoid compulsory abortion. After the baby was bom, 
she returned to the village. Although the village cadres knew his wife had had an 
unauthorized birth, they did not force his wife to be sterilized. Lian also did not pay 
the fine. According to other villagers, it was because Lian had a good relationship 
with secretary Songsheng.
But in the tight year of family planning, 110 illegal birth households could 
escape punishment. In 1983, when the working team of family planning came to Ku 
Village, they also confiscated valuable things in Lian's house by force. Lian said that 
his clock, furniture and other property were seized by the family planning working 
team. When the team was still staying in Ku Village, Lian's wife took refuge with 
other members of Ku Village in their house because she was afraid that the cadres 
would catch up with her and force her to be sterilized.
Before Lian got a son, he did not build a new house because he thought that all 
his daughters would leave his village when they got married. After he got a son, he 
built a new house for his son. Now he has sent three daughters to his wife's family 
and left two girls living with him in Ku Village.
Brother Fu’s Silence
Brother Fu, 32 years old, was actually not a member of Ku Village. He lived 
in Ku Village to look after his grandmother (his mother's mother). His grandmother 
had borne no sons and in her old age her daughter sent one of her sons to live with her
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and support her. Fu had changed his domicile and taken his mother's surname to 
become a member of Ku Village.
Fu had an unauthorized third birth because his wife had borne him no sons 
during the first two births. They were lucky enough to have a son at the third birth. 
The same as other women in Ku Village, his wife had their son in her parents' house 
to escape the capture of compulsory abortion. Brother Fu kept silent when his wife 
was pregnant at the beginning and village cadres did not pay attention to her third 
birth because she had the son one-year after her last child. Returning to Ku Village, 
she left her second daughter with her mother. Now her son must be two years old. 
They had not yet paid any extra-birth fine at that moment, but they worried about 
having to pay it when his son entered school. They did not want to talk too much 
about their son. His wife just said "We have no other choice. Everyone is the same in 
rural society."
Brother Shao’s Trouble
Shao was 40 years old. He got married in his late twenties. Shao also had an 
unauthorized third birth for the same reason as the other villagers. Now his son 
should be eight years old. This "illegal son" caused a lot of trouble in his family. 
Before his birth, the village cadres repeatedly visited Shao's home to require his wife 
to have an abortion. The cadres threatened to fine them heavily, but the material 
punishment could not eliminate Shao's desire to have a son since they had financial 
support from overseas relatives. To Shao, he was willing to pay fines in exchange for 
this third birth. According to Shao, he had paid about 3,500 renminbi for his son.
But paying fines did not mean nothing would happen again. One night, 
dozens of rural cadres surrounded their house and wanted to catch his wife for an 
abortion. His wife had escaped through the back door to take refuge with relatives. 
When the village cadres could not find his wife, they confiscated their TV, furniture, 
bicycle and other property by force. Now, after his son has entered primary school, 
the government continues to fine him via school. Shao's complaint will be presented 
in a later part of this work.
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Wang's Painful Experience
Wang's experience of being forced to sterilize and fined by local government 
illustrates how the enforcing of birth control had been implemented in the village. 
Wang's first birth was a girl. According to villagers' interpretation in the regulation of 
government, the couple was permitted to bear a second birth after a four-year interval 
if their first child was a girl. However, Wang was pregnant soon after the birth of 
their first child. She was very scared and hid herself to avoid enforced abortion. 
When she returned home — twelve days after the second birth — the village cadres 
came to her house with officials of the xiang government. They asked her to pay the 
fine, but Wang and her husband did not have enough money to pay any fines. Then 
the cadres confiscated their bed, furniture and so on, and also destroyed their stove 
and kitchen range.
She was also captured by the cadres to be sterilized. In the hospital, she was 
also treated badly by the doctors. She told me that many people paid black money to 
doctors for better treatment. But she insistently refused to give any extra money to 
the hospital. She said, "It is not right for them to receive extra money because they 
are already paid regularly by the government." So the doctor deliberately deferred her 
treatment and she was kept in the hospital for 24 hours only because she did not pay 
such black money.
Village Head's Son
Xin was the son of the former village head, Uncle Leng. He was about 24 
years old. Xin and his wife also broke the regulations of family planning early in their 
marriage (zao him). According to the Marriage Law, the legal marrying age of 
females and male is 22 and 25 years old respectively. Thus, those who get married 
and give birth before the legal age will be fined. When Xin got marriage, he was only 
22 years old and his wife was only 18 years old.
Xin met his wife, Xiu, in Shenzhen when he went to Shenzhen to visit his 
friend. Xiu was a working daughter (dagongmei) who came from Shaoguan. She 
worked in a foreign invested factoiy in Shenzhen. When Xin met her, they quickly 
fell in love and had a sexual relationship. Xiu soon became pregnant and she could
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not stay in the factory any longer. Xin brought Xiu back to Ku Village without any 
formal certificate of marriage from the local government. In the same year, his wife 
had their first child. This child was a son and this son was given the urban household 
registry, the same as Xiu. Xin told me that he was not fined by the government and 
his wife was not forced to abortion or become sterilized. He told me frankly that 
money and personal relationships were the determining factors for his good fortune. 
He also said that his wife's household registry was not at Ku Village, so the local 
government did not want to deal with any extra tasks.
Before I left Ku Village, Xin's son was only two years old. I knew that his 
wife was pregnant for the second time. I knew that they had broken family planning 
regulation again. According to regulation, the couple was only permitted to bear a 
second child within a four-year interval if the first birth was daughter. But Xin did 
not seem to worry too much about this. In Ku Village, there was general recognition 
among the villagers and cadres that there was a de facto two-child policy in operation. 
The village couples who had only one child, no matter if it was a son or a daughter, all 
planned to have a second child.
Escaper from Jiangxi
One day when I was walking along the river, I saw a man I had never met 
before. After chatting with him, I knew that he was not from Ku Village. He escaped 
from Jiangxi province with his pregnant wife to avoid an enforced abortion and 
sterilization. He told me that after having two girls, the local government forced his 
wife to insert an intrauterine device (IUD). She removed the ring herself. But after 
his wife became pregnant, they knew that the local cadres would force his wife to 
have an abortion and then become sterilized. So they decided to leave Jiangxi and 
sought refuge from his sister in Ku Village. His sister was married to a villager in Ku 
Village. When they arrived in Ku Village, they got a lot of assistance from the 
villagers because they had had similar experiences too. They borrowed a room from 
Brother Hua, and Brother Kang also lent them a piece of land to plant watermelons. 
Nobody reported their situation to the village cadres of Xiaohuang district 
administrative committee. This man told me that he was just waiting for the birth of a 
son and did not have any plans at the moment.
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These six stories illustrate how the enforcing of birth control was implemented 
by the village cadres and how the villagers resisted birth control in the village. The 
goal of the government's population policy seems not easy to achieve. In most rural 
areas like Ku Village, the fine had become the only method of penalty in birth control. 
The problem with an economic penalty is that if the villagers' economic power 
becomes strong, they can easily ignore the policy of birth control and pay no attention 
to the economic sanctions.7 On the other hand, cash seems to legitimatize the 
unauthorized births of the villagers. Uncle Bi made fun of the policy and said:
The policy tells us that "best to have one, at most to have two, an 
unplanned birth will be fined". Ha! Ha! The government tells you that 
if you have money, you have more children.
Uncle Si also criticized the means of fine. He said:
Since the government states clearly that the third birth is not permitted, 
why can one have three or more children after paying the money? Just 
because our Communist party is so materialistic. If you have money, 
you can do anything.
Most scholars -- both Chinese and overseas — have warned that when the fine cannot 
prevent the excess births of the villagers, the population of rural China will lose 
control (e.g. Croll, 1994; Greenhalgh, 1990). In short, paying the fines for 
exchanging a child has also become one of the most powerful weapons of the villagers 
to resist the population policy.
Absconding or escaping is also a significant strategy of the villagers to resist 
birth control. The village cadres cannot control the migration of villagers now 
because the villagers no longer need a certificate of permission from the village 
government for leaving their home village. In the above stories, we know that the 
unauthorized pregnant women often escaped compulsory sterilization and abortion 
measures by abandoning their home villages and taking refuge with relatives or 
friends in other places. When babies were bom, they would return to their villages.
7' As Croll states (1994:190), "(e)conomic sanctions constituted less of a deterrent to peasant 
households, which had access to many resources not available to urban households. Food supplies, for 
instance, could be produced on their land allocations, housing was privately owned, and health and 
educational facilities were not as well developed as in urban areas, and local village governments were 
not in die same position to reward and penalize peasant households."
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The villagers and the cadres labeled them an "unplanned birth guerrilla force" 
(chaosheng tousheng youjidui). Any resistance required the support and collusion of 
the village as a whole, so the success of an escape largely rested on the tacit and 
complicity among the villagers. In rural China, the villagers mostly share the cultural 
meaning of having a son. When villagers were hiding in other villages, local villagers 
complicitiously kept silent. When the "high tide" of family planning came, some 
villagers even volunteered to hide pregnant women or valuable things for these illegal 
families.
Face to face cursing is another tactic the villagers used to fight against the 
birth control policy. The villagers soberly know that the implementation of the state 
policy basically depends on the performance of the local cadres. If they can prevent 
the local cadres from working hard in implementing the population policy, then they 
can easily have an "illegal son" without being punished by the government. For 
instance, in the early 80s, Secretary Songsheng implemented the policy harshly. The 
villagers bitterly hated her, so that they reviled her whenever they met her. The 
villagers told me that:
Songsheng had been damned to tears by the villagers. Having learned 
a lesson, she has become much more clever as she seldom carries out 
coercive practices on birth control. Now she has "one eye open, and 
one eye closed" {zhi yan kai zhi yon bi) in implementing the birth 
control policy.
In their cursing of the cadres, I found that they were capable of articulating the 
language of the Communist Party to defame the local cadres. For example, when they 
condemned the coercive confiscation and compulsory sterilization and abortion by the 
local cadres, they liked to describe the behaviour of village cadres as more 
abominable than that of the "Guomindang" (National Party) and "tufei" (bandits). I 
often heai'd their condemnation in their everyday conversation -- "They (local cadres) 
are fiercer than the tufei"; " Guomindang was kinder than them. They didn't treat their 
people like that"; " Guomindang's officials weren't so barbarian" ... I think most of the 
people know that in the film and media produced by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), the CCP tried to create dirty images of the National Party and bandits. 
"National Party" and "bandits" became the signifier of evil-doers and bastards which 
were used to signify the "others". Although the CCP had the power to produce the
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language, but they could not prevent how the people used that language. In de 
Certeau's words, "nobody can prevent the ordinary people from taking the production 
of meaning into their own hands" (de Certeau, 1984). Villagers in Ku Village made 
the official language their own and borrowed the categories constructed by the CCP to 
condemn the behaviour of their local cadres. Uncle Si often compared the communist 
local cadres with National Party's local officials:
Now there is 110 difference between the bandits (tufei) and local cadres.
I experienced the period of Guomindang and New China (Xin 
ZhongGuo), Honestly, I think the discipline of Guomindang's officials 
is better than that of Gongchandang. At least the former would not 
bully the people like Gongchangdang's cadres.
I think the officials of National Party are not necessarily as good as the villagers 
described. In this sense "National Party" has become a symbol of signifying which 
anybody can adopt to represent something for their own purpose.
The villagers are also capable of constructing their own story to de-legitimize 
the state policy. In Ku Village, in eveiyday chatting, a story often became a rumour 
which quickly swept through the village. Again, nobody knew who the story creators 
01* the rumour makers are. Everyone could be and nobody would need to be a 
responsibility taker. In Ku Village, for legitimizing their resistance and de- 
legitimating the population policy and control, the villagers had constructed a story 
about the disagreement between Deng Xiao-ping and Ye Jian-ying's in making the 
population policy. Ye was an influential leader in Mao and Deng's era. He was also 
veiy important after Mao's death because he made "the Gang of Four" (siren bang) 
out of power and helped Deng come to power. Ye Jian-ying was also a Hakka. 
Hakka people were proud of Ye and looked up to him as the "great man" or "hero" of 
the Hakka people. I repeatedly heard:
People said Marshal Ye didn't agree to carrying out the birth control 
policy. Marshal Ye thought it couldn't work in Chinese society. On 
this issue, there was a big gap between Deng Xiaoping and Marshal 
Ye. When the policy was finally carried out, Marshal Ye was veiy 
angry and said "I will not take any responsibility for this policy."
I think this story was not necessarily true, but the villagers' imagination and creation 
was indeed a discursive practice in everyday life. They tried to articulate their fellow 
villager and important leader Marshal Ye as part of their political jargon for
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legitimizing their resistance to create their own framework of argument in fighting 
against the population policy.
7.5 N ew M eans o f  Control, New Conflict Created
The everyday resistance and guerrilla strategies of the villagers made the 
population policy difficult to implement. It is often said that of all the policies 
implemented by the government in the reform period, it is birth control policies that 
are not only the most unpopular of policies but also constitute the only "hard" policy 
in a village (Liu, 1996; Croll, 1994). When I interviewed the village cadres, they 
often complained about the difficulty of executing the birth control policy. Ling told 
me the fine was difficult to collect, and the unplanned birth was also difficult to 
discover.
If they [unplanned birth guerrillas] hide in other villages or other 
places, you are unable to catch them. We have much more work to do.
It is impossible to keep watch on them every day...
Sometimes, when they know that we have discovered their 
unauthorized pregnancies, they move away all the expensive things 
from their house. So we can take nothing from their house.
Having a group interview with the village cadres in Songsheng's house, the village 
cadres aired their grievance and powerlessness in the task of birth control. Secretary 
Songsheng repeatedly complained that family planning was an unpopular program.
This [family planning] is a hard and thankless task. It often hurts the 
personal relationship (guanxi) between us and the villagers. Nobody 
[the upper government and villagers] can understand the difficulties of 
the task at the local level. If we cannot fulfill the task, we have to pay 
a cash penalty from our own income. Who wants to take this difficult 
and unpleasant work?
She continued to blame the backwardness of the ideology of the "petty peasants 
economy" with the official language.
They are really stubborn and conservative. Whatever we told them, 
they could not change their mind. Our government had told us that the 
population policy was for the sake of long-term national interest. Their 
petty peasant ideology just made them consider selfish shot-term 
family interest. I don't think it is easy to change their bad reproductive 
habits.
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The "cadres' job responsibility system" had also been introduced in the 
implementation of population policy. The village cadres had to sign a contract with 
the higher level government in order to guarantee the fulfillment of the target or quota 
of family planning. If the village cadres at different levels could not fulfill the target, 
they would be punished.
To escape punishment from the upper government, the village cadres adopted 
strategies of under-reporting and mis-reporting most of the time. Because every 
village had their quotas of birth every year, if the village could not fully use their 
quotas in this year*, the village cadres still reported that they had used the quotas and 
kept the quotas for the year of excess birth in the village. From the data of birth 
reported by the village cadres, it was difficult for the upper government to find out the 
number of excess births in a village. Avoiding violent clashes with the villagers, the 
village cadres often learned to keep "one eye opened and one eye closed". Especially 
to the pregnant women who came from other villages; the village cadres feigned they 
"didn't know" and did not take up the cases.
Confronting the resistance of the villagers and the collusion of the village 
cadres, the local government tried to search for some new means of birth control. 
Education was one of the "significant" means to punish "illegal families". But this 
new control aroused new problems.
There was a bustling scene in Songxi Primary School inasmuch as it was the 
day o f student registration. The parents o f students came to school to pay school fees 
and collect books for their children. The principal, Uncle Xiang, and teachers 
collected the fees and gave the books to the parents as usual. As the villagers and the 
teachers Imew each another well, after paying, the villagers often stayed and chatted 
with the teachers. So there were many people gathering in the school. However, the 
sensitive villagers would find that day was somewhat different because the party 
secretary, Songsheng, and another unfamiliar man appeared in the school office. 
They kept watch on the people coming in to pay the fee, like "watchdogs" in the 
villager's words.
Brother Jun did not feel at ease when he met Songsheng in the office. He 
wondered why Songsheng appeared in the school's office at this time. He asked Uncle 
Xiang eagerly, "What is she doing here? " Uncle Xiang secretly told him, "Look! That
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fa t man comes from the township government. Songsheng and he came to collect 
extra birth fees. They ordered us i f  anyone refuses to be fined, we would not be 
alloM>ed to give the boolcs to the students who are the extra children in their family." 
When they were talldng, Songsheng came to them and talked to Jun with smile, "Jun, I  
am sorry> that your son is an unauthorized birth. According to the government policy, 
you have to pay a fine o f 1,500 yuan." Jun replied immediately, "I  have no money." 
Songsheng kept on talldng with a smile, "Don't worry, our government has taken care 
o f those who have difficulty in paying the lump sum. Now we will allow you to pay 
200 yuan every term until you have been fined 1,500 in full." Jun questioned, "What 
kind o f policy is this?" Songsheng threatened him, "If you don't pay the fee, the 
school won't distribute the books to your son and he won't be allowed to go to school 
anymore." Jun replied to Songsheng angrily, "Secretary, I  warn you not to take away 
my son's school bag. Don't forget you also have a grandchild attending school. I f  
you dare take away my son’s school bag, how can't I  allow the same thing to happen 
with your grandchild? My son can't go to school, neither can your grandchild. 
Doesn't our government offer nine years o f free education to our children? Why can't 
my son go to school?" The fa t official from the township came to Jun and said, "Don't 
be so fierce. There’s nothing that can't be discussed. Could you please consider our 
difficulties? I'm also from Xiaohuang. We are uncle and brother. I  don't want to 
hurt the guanxi between an uncle and a brother. OK, don't say that I'm getting the 
fine from you, but begging from you? All right?" Jun calmed down and said, "OK, 
OK, I  will pay the fee. But I  have paid 100 yuan already.” The fa t official said 
happily, "You can pay 100 yuan this time." Jun paid 100 yuan and left.
Near mid-day, more and more people came to pay the school fee. Suddenly, 
an old man from another village loudly swore at Songsheng, "You plainly bullied me! 
I f  you want my life, I  have one. Money! I  have none!" Songsheng screeched with 
arms akimbo, "This is government policy. You dare to refuse to? You must know 
your grandson is an illegal birth!" The old man continued to swear loudly. Suddenly 
he drew his sword and threatened her, "Who dares to take my money, I  will kill her. " 
The township official and Songsheng were veiy scared and quickly ran away. Uncle 
Xiang and some villagers came out to stop him from hurting the cadres; some just 
discussed among themselves in a low voice; some just watched the scene o f quarrel. 
Then, the old man turned to the teachers and Uncle Xiang and gave a warning, "The
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person who dare to move my grandson out o f his classroom, I  will make trouble for." 
Teacher Ying replied, "We are not stupid. This thing is only done by the foolish 
cadres. We will not choose to make things difficult for ourselves." In the end, the old 
man only paid the school fee and also got books for his grandson.
According to the villagers, this old man lived in another village near Ku 
Village. He had been an officer o f Guomindang’s army. In his house, there were 
different sorts o f swords. His son had three daughters, but refused to let his wife be 
sterilized until he got a son. He also refused to pay the fine and often threatened the 
life o f any official who dared to fine them. Everyone Jaiew that he was an old man 
with a violent temper. So the cadres did not dare to collect the illegal birth fine from  
his family.
Collecting extra birth fees via school aroused the discontent o f the villagers. 
In their everyday conversations, I  found they were very dissatisfied with the new 
means o f birth control o f the Chinese government. One afternoon, in Uncle Xiang's 
house, some villagers were talldng about the quarrel that had happened in Songxi 
school. In the following conversation, we can hear some different voices from the 
villagers.
When I  met Uncle Xiang, he began complaining about the township 
government shifting the burden o f exercising birth control to schools. He said, "Who 
says there is no new thing under the sun. Our Communist Party creates new devices 
everyday. Ha! They order us to collect extra birth fees for them. How strange it is! 
Sch ool is opened for education, not for birth con trol. It is unreasonable to shift the 
burden to us. It will not only worsen the relationship between the schools and the 
masses, but also influence the progress o f our teaching." I  asked, "How about the 
response o f the teachers?" Uncle Xiang, "Basically, the teachers sympathize with the 
situation o f the students. We really understand why they want to have a son. But you 
laiow, the teachers and I  are very powerless when the parents came to quarrel with 
us... They also asked us to collect the fee from those who didn't fulfill the compulsory 
grain. We don't understand why we have to taken so many duties o f the government. 
Basically, it isn't our business."
When we were chatting, Uncle Si and Jun came in. They joined our 
conversation. They questioned whether the policy o f collecting the illegal birth fee in
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school was authorized by the higher level government. Uncle Si always believed that 
many policies were commanded by the township government, but not by the central 
government. He said, "Don't believe them. They can only cheat the dead (man si 
ren). The local policy (tu zheng ce) is made o f the Songnan Commune (Songnan 
Township)." Jun agreed with him , "Right! I  saw the document held in Songsheng’s 
hand. It was printed by Songnan township." I  asked, "Why didn't you directly 
question Songsheng?" Uncle Xiang said, "My nephew, it is useless. They o f course 
can tell you the central government allows them to make the policy according to the 
local situation. 'According to the local situation' becomes their shield." Uncle Si then 
sighed, "The Communist Party is so astute!"
Brother Li came out from the room. He interposed into our conversation, 
"Uncle Xiang, people said that Songkou Secondary School didn't collect extra-birth 
fees from illegal families. Is it true?" Jun said, "As I  know, there is no extra-birth fee  
collection in Dahuang district. Only the cadres o f Xiaohuang act like 'pig bellies' 
(that means the cadres strictly implemented the state policy as good executors without 
taking villagers' interest into account)." Aunt Si said to Jun, "They (village cadres) 
can successfully collect the fee from you only because you are too well-behaved and 
not as united as Dahuang’s people. I f  you have a consensus o f refusing payment 
collectively, how can they force you to do so?"
This kind of stoiy often happens in Chinese rural areas. The enforcing of birth 
control in rural China has become the new conflict between the state and peasants. 
And it has also become the most difficult task that rural cadres face. In recent years, 
the rural cadres find it more and more difficult to control the birth of villagers and fine 
illegal births. The government tries to find new control mechanisms to tackle with 
new problems. Education has become one of the control mechanisms of birth control 
in recent years. But the new control mechanisms only created a new conflict between 
the local government and the villagers.
7,6. Conclusion
The politics of birth control has become a main line of recent inquiry of 
peasant politics in reform era of China. The struggle between the state, local cadres,
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women and the family has been maintained for about two decades. It is a specific 
historical phenomena caused by economic reform which have fallen under the 
ideology of modernization. In mainland China, maybe not just China, reflexivity 
about the politics of demographic praxis is notably lacking. The central 
problematique is that the demographic theories of fertility change which the 
government and academics adopted is formulated in terms of modernization theory’s 
evolutionary view of societal development. As Greehhalgh and other scholars 
criticized, in this ahistorical view, society and history are seen as moving in a 
unilinear, predetermined fashion and "History" can be collapsed into traditional and 
modem phases. The pattern of western fertility transition is also tautologically 
symbolized as the cause and effect of economic development (Greenhalgh, 1996:27). 
To achieve the goal of economic development or modernization, family planning and 
birth control legitimately become necessary. Dipping into the official demographic 
discourse, we are not uneasy to discover the similar voice in which birth control was 
naturalized as paid of effort to achieve the goal of Four Modernization or Deng’s 
designation of a socialist market economy.
To go beyond the hegemonic discourse on family planning, this chapter aims 
to discover the neglected voice of the local people and understand the cultural 
meaning of having a son in the rural socioeconomic context of China which shapes 
their views and practices of reproduction. "Son" to the villagers, no matter male or 
female, in the short term represents survival, prosperity and old age security; in the 
long term, males represent the continuity of family line, their moral obligation to their 
ancestors and lineage, and the security in the next life. The population policy of the 
Chinese government launched in the 1980s, intended to reshape the meaning of 
reproduction, has greatly threatened the fulfillment of the villagers' dream. Villagers 
in Ku Village have fought and continuously prepared to fight for a son at any cost.
Similar to other aspects, they employ the everyday forms of tactics to resist 
birth control, especially if they have been unlucky enough to have two daughters or 
have a son soon after the birth of a first child. They ran away, they hid in near and 
distant villages, they evaded capture, they evaded fines, or they concealed their 
valuables in the houses of their neighbours; all of which have made the family 
planning policy existing in name as well as demolishing in practices. Any resistance
286
required the support and collusion of the village as a whole and their collective 
resistance was defended in a shared understanding — having a son is legitimate. In 
other words, their tacit complicity in resistance have also made the government's 
target of population policy difficult to achieve. Not only have they fought against the 
policy in action, but in everyday conversation the villagers have also formulated their 
framework of argument which has centered on a simple equation — support for the 
government’s birth control policies to be matched by its obligation to provide care for 
the elderly. They time and again stated that they could not understand why the 
government did not allow them to have a son when it did nothing to support the 
elderly. Thus in their mind there was a direct relationship between old age support 
and birth control. However, in the reform era, the government's withdrawal of its 
zeren of eldercare provision has further made the villagers passionately desire to have 
a son. The birth control policy feared the villagers and increased their sense of 
insecurity because the pitiful life of the elderly without sons in the village had shown 
them examples. In short, the elderly without sons had to depend on themselves and 
not depend on the government was, in the eyes of the villagers, a break in the social 
contract between government and people and therefore entirely legitimized resistance 
to birth control policies.8
The village cadres at the local level find it veiy difficult to implement the 
population policy. Lacking in reliable and institutionalized means to ensure the policy 
implementation, they are not willing to turn to coercion at ordinary time because 
coercion will hurt the relationship between the village cadres and the villagers. Out of 
self-interest, the village cadres often passively cooperate with the villagers and also 
use their own strategies to fulfill their task. However, in the case of birth control, in 
contrast to taxation, we can find the village cadres occasionally turn to coercion in the 
"mobilization" of family planning because they can get the support of different 
departments of upper government. In short, coercion cannot oppress the villagers' 
desire of having a son and the political propaganda do not guarantee a corresponding 
practice by people themselves. The villagers on the ground have created meaning
g
. I cannot say that the villagers would really accept the birth control policy after the government had 
provided the old-age care services. But I can say "old-age support" is one the important reason the 
villagers adopted to justify their resistance.
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and participate in the production of moral desires influenced by their own culture(s), 
which is different from that articulated by the government and dominant academics.
7.1. slogan o f  family planning I
7.2. slogan o f  family planning II
7.3. the elder’s home in Songnan town
7.4. mourning hall
7.5. performing the ritual o f  religion
7.6. people joining the funeral
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Chapter 8: Sidelining Government ~  Legitimacy Crisis, 
Grassroots Democracy, and the Revival of Traditional 
Organization
One day, Secretary Song-sheng came to see me for the first time. She took out
two pieces o f paper and showed me the purpose o f her visit. That piece o f paper was 
a letter written to an overseas relative, which was entitled "Xiaohuans cunmin zhi 
haiwai xiangxian shu" (letter to the overseas villagers from Xiaohuang villagers). 
Songsheng asked me to mobilize the other overseas villagers to fund the building o f  
the ADC office. She was preparing many copies o f this letter and would be sending 
them to the overseas villagers. Songsheng told me, "Hok-bin, you are also Xiaohuans 
ren (Xiaohuang's people). You also wish that Xiaohuang would become better. You 
know, we don’t have any permanent office and when we want to handle official affairs 
(bangong) and deal with routine matters for the villagers, we really don’t have 
anywhere to go. We shouldn’t always occupy Yueshun’s house as our conference 
room. It is quite inconvenient because his family members are also there. In 
addition, we really don’t want to lose the Xiaohuang people’s face. As I  Imow, the 
neighbouring villages often make fun o f Xiaohuang behind our back. They say there 
are so many overseas relatives, but no one can afford to build an office building. I  
think i f  we can build a modern office building, nobody will dare look down us. ” I  
really didn’t Imow how to respond and only told Songsheng “I  would try my best. ”
Three days later, there was an overseas villager, Uncle Zhun who had 
returned to Ku Village from Indonesia. As I  Imow, Songsheng also went to see him 
and asked him to financially support the building o f the ADC office. Not only party 
Secretaiy Songsheng, the representatives from different organizations o f the village 
also went to see Uncle Zhun to ask for financial support. The school principal, Uncle 
Xiang asked him to support the education fund (jiaoyu jijin). The representative o f 
the home for the elderly asked for a donation. The accountant o f the ancestral hall 
committee, Uncle Wen, also asked for a donation for the normal expenditures o f the 
ancestral hall. He also proposed the idea the construction o f a menlou (village gate) 
to Uncle Zhun.
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I  consulted Uncle Si and Uncle Wen about Songsheng's idea o f raising funds 
from overseas villagers for building the ADC office. Both o f them told me “just 
ignore her nonsensical idea “don ’t believe her guizhuyi (wicked ideas) Uncle Si 
even said, “She is building a pack o f lie. Why do we need such a modern office 
building? It's benefit means nothing for us. I  doubt she is making money for her own 
pockets. " Uncle Si also told me that it was often reported by the mass media that the 
local cadres embezzled public fund in the name o f fund raising (jizi).
* * * *
In Ku Village, the local government at village level had gradually lost their 
trust and respect from the villagers since the rural reform. It was because the local 
government did not function properly after the rural economic reform and the 
reconstruction of the rural administrative organization. As I presented in prior 
chapters, the village committee and the ADC cannot intervene into the production and 
control the life chance of village households nowadays; they also cannot function to 
provide any social welfare to the villagers. To the villagers, the local government was 
just the one who had extracted their interest and destroyed their reproduction of 
family by hook and by crook.
To the village cadres, they knew that they had been losing their authority — no 
respect from the villager, no economic power, and no loyalty and support from the 
villagers. However they were not passive actors either. They also actively tried to 
rebuild their prestige using different strategies. Constructing a "modem" office 
building was one of the ways. In the eyes of the village cadres, the office building 
symbolized the power of the local government and its extension, meanwhile the style 
of the building; for example, how many stories, what kind of decoration, signified the 
economic power of the village committee. To Songsheng, economic power was a 
determinate factor to maintain their authority. The villager cadres believed that the 
village cadres in PRD became powerful because "they had money." Lacking any rural 
enterprise and industry, overseas relatives became the source of financial income and 
support. Thus, the village cadres actively competed for funds from overseas.
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The Communist government was also aware of the low prestige of local cadres 
had influenced the policy implementation. Thus, it began to carry out the so called 
'grassroots democracy' in the mid-80s for the sake of maintaining the legitimacy of its 
representatives in local society. The Communist government declared that the idea 
was for the reason of enhancing the consciousness of democracy among the Chinese 
peasants and promoting the rural economy. The central government believed that the 
leader selected by the villagers themselves would be more responsive to local 
economic needs because the villagers have a much better notion of village talent than 
the higher authorities in theory. However, it is often reported that there were some 
serious violent clashes between the cadres and villagers in the village election (South 
China Morning Post, April 21, 1997; Xu, 1997; Wang, 1997; He, 1997). Facing 
unpublished election results, interference of the upper government, and other 
fraudulent elections and practices, Chinese peasants no longer endured the fraudulent 
behaviour of local government and village cadres. Some angry locals beat up the 
officials and elected cadres; some were able to organize themselves to collective 
petition and demonstrate against unfair results; and some appealed to the upper 
government or central government via legal procedures based on the Law of 
Organization of Village Committees.
However, as James Scott predicted (1989), the direct clash and organized 
demonstration was often met with heavily aimed policemen because such overt 
resistance called attention to these locals. For instance, on April 11, 1997, villagers in 
Wuyun, a mountain town 325 kilometers east of Guangdong, carried out 
demonstrations against unpublished election results. In the end, the dispute turned to 
violent and aimed officers were sent to restore order, and at least 100 people were 
arrested. In this sense, locals in Ku Village seem to be wise and clever. They adopted 
somewhat different tactic to resist the unfair elections, what I called "sidelining local 
government". This tactic can be classified as the everyday form resistance which 
avoids direct confrontation with the government, but can fulfill their own interest in a 
safe way. This chapter aims to reflect on how the villagers practiced this tactic.
294
8.1. Playing the Voting Game in Ku Village
A turning point in the relationship between the government and village was 
the village election. In 1987, a law was passed by the central government, which 
formally allowed villages to elect their own headmen and committee. According to 
the constitution, the democratically elected villagers' committee has been 
constitutionally and legislatively mandated. One of the goals of local elections was to 
enhance grassroots democratic practices in official wording. The idea was also that 
these new forms of government would be more responsive to local economic needs. 
The advent of village democracy in China sounds impressive to western audiences. It 
was widely reported that
There are around 900,000 villages in China, housing perhaps three- 
quarters of the country's 1.3 billion people. Since 1988, over 80% of 
these villages have elected, through universal suffrage and secret 
ballots, their own chiefs and village committees, who serve for them of 
three years. By next year, 95% of villages will have held elections...
For China as a whole, it marks the party's most sweeping abdication of 
power since the People's Republic was founded in 1949 (Economist, 
November 2, 1996).
It was also highlighted by western reporters that the local election was the victory of 
peasant power in China ( The Independent, 1997).
However, available evidence of my case and other cases reported by others 
indicated that there was a disjuncture between the Communist government's intention 
and the actual practice of grassroots democracy (He, 1997; Xu, 1997; Wang, 1997). 
The villagers in Ku Village were not enthusiastic in carrying out elections according 
to the constitution. The former brigade leader, Uncle Bi, told me that the village 
election was held one time after the law was passed down. He explained the 
stipulation of the constitution to me in detail.
There are five cadres in the ADC. They are party secretary, district 
head, accountant, women representative and public security officer.
Among these five people, the party secretary is only elected by the 
party members in the villages. The other cadres are elected by 
representatives of individual households. In the villagers' committee, 
there are two cadres. One is a village head and the other is the 
accountant. These two cadres are also elected by representatives of 
individual households. The election of an administrative district is
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carried out every 3-5 years, and the election of villagers' committee is 
carried out every 2-3 years ...
But he also said,
But you know, it is quite common that locals take a negligent attitude 
toward state policy. When the policy is transmitted to locals, the locals 
often fulfill the requirement of the state at first time because the policy 
is tightly implemented by the government of a higher level at first. 
Afterward, the situation of the state is often ignored by the locality as 
the control of government is loosened.
In Ku Village, the election was not seriously earned out by the cadres because they 
told me that there were very few people willing to become village cadres. Those 
current cadres often complained about their heavy workload and their low salary in 
front of me. Party Secretary Songsheng often told me that if the government allowed 
her to resign, she really did not want to be village cadres any longer. Because there 
was little benefit to be gained from the position, there was no keen competition 
between the villagers for the position as the village head. Therefore, after some 
cadres resigned, local government had to tiy veiy hard to persuade someone to fill the 
vacancy. That means some of the new cadres were directly appointed by the local 
government.1 The situation in Ku Village is quite different from those wealthy 
villages in which the villages' committee controls much of public property such as 
enterprises, and lands for commercial purpose and resources. So in wealthy regions 
like the Pearl River Delta, there is keen competition in a village head election. It was 
reported that clashes often occurred in such villages (South China Morning Post, April 
21, 1997).
Although most of the villagers in Ku Village seemed to be not interested in the 
competition for the positions in the ADC and villagers' committee, they still paid 
attention to whom would become their head and how this came about. They did not 
mind the cadres appointed by the local government. But they were discontented with 
the local government appointing those village cadres who did not serve the interests of 
the village, but their own self-interest. As I have presented in the last several
According to Oi (1992) and Nee (1989, 1991 &1992), the village cadres were still powerful in those 
villages which had developed rural industry and enterprises, village and township industries. So after 
the grassroots democracy was earned out, many people competed for these advantageous positions 
which allowed them to maximize benefit from both the public and private sectors of a mixed socialist 
economy.
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chapters, the villagers were dissatisfied with Songsheng's appointment of Uncle Leng 
and Dongtou who were not seen as qualified people in the position of village head. 
The villagers knew that they were powerless to change the mind of the local 
government even though they disliked these persons. In the village, mianzi (face or 
social honor) and ganqing (warmth) were still the important things they had to 
maintained. They never came out and objected to someone they disliked in public 
because it would damage the face and social honour of another villagers (si po 
lianpi). Thus, in the end they only chose to be uncooperative as a way of passive 
resistance at village elections.
The democratization in some countryside of China like that of Ku Village 
began in piece-meal fashion. However, it was being pushed hard again by central 
authorities in the early 1990s. It was reported that the provinces which lagged behind 
politically, such as Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi in the south, were getting a 
tongue-lashing from Beijing. The villages which did not cany out election were 
required to rehold their village election again (Economist, November 2, 1996).
In March of 1995, the village election was reheld in Ku Village. One day, I 
found three large fresh red notices posted up by the ADC (see Picture 8.1). Looking 
closely, I realized that one of the red papers contained a list of the candidates to 
represent the people's congress at the county level. In this paper, all the candidates 
were the cadres of the ADC - Songsheng, Fashun, Yueshun, Liuzhu, and Wuqiang. 
The other two were the name list of voters. But the villagers were not interested in 
participating in the campaigning of elections. When I asked them about the election, 
they reacted veiy coldly, as cynicism had overtaken the villagers:
The game of Gongchandang can only cheat the dead.
Whomever we choose are all the ones they preferred. Whomever wins
the election is decided by themselves. It makes no different.
Hok-Bin, don't be so serious. They are just acting.
We don't care whether the leaders were elected via democratic
procedures or not, we only care who can do something for the village
and protect our interest.
At the day of election, those villagers eligible to vote were asked to cast their 
votes into the ballot box in Songxi Primary School, polling station of the election.
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Each voter got a ballot paper two weeks before the election. Today they had to make 
choice and they could vote for two candidates on each ballot paper. Two red banners 
reading "toupiao si mei yige gongmin yingyou de yiwu he quanli" (voting is the 
obligation and right of every citizen) and "xucinju ziji de renda daibiao” (elect your 
own representative of the people's congress) were sharply hung on the building of the 
school.
In the morning, the candidates and the cadres who came from the township 
government stood by and awaited for the voters in school. When the voters came in, 
the candidates kept smiling to welcome them. But until about eleven o'clock only few 
villagers came to vote. So the township cadres asked the candidates and the village 
cadres from different villages to mobilize the villagers in person. When Songsheng 
and Wen-ming came to Ku Village to invite the villagers to vote, the villagers were 
absent and excused themselves by saying "shi fen mang" (being veiy busy). When the 
township cadres found it difficult to mobilize the villagers, they finally decided to 
collect the ballot papers household by household.
Songsheng and Wemning came to Yuqing House to invite villagers to vote. 
When they saw Uncle Si, Songsheng asked, "Brother Si, have you voted?" Uncle Si 
coldly said, "Not y e t " Songsheng said, "According to state policy, it's your right to 
choose your representative." Uncle Si replied, "Really? But then I  can choose no 
one, can't I? " Wemning kept silent and listened to their conversation. Songsheng 
kept her smile and said, "Come on, brother, please give me a favour." Uncle Si said, 
"I lost my ballot. Could you give me another one?" Wemning passed a ballot to 
Uncle Si. Uncle Si wrote down something on the paper and put it in the box.
Uncle Xiang's wife prepared to go out. Songsheng and Wemning saw her and 
stopped her. They asked her to vote. Xiang's wife tried to find an excuse to decline 
Songsheng's request, "On! I  am so stupid. I  don't Imow how to use the ballot." 
Songsheng said, "Don't wony. We will tell you how to use it. It's quite simple.” 
Xiang's wife unwillingly came to her room and took out the ballot. Songsheng 
pointed to the ballot and said, "You only need to write down the one you want to 
select." Xiang’s wife said, "I'm illiterate. I  don't know how to write." Wemning came 
out to solve out the problem. He said, "Sister, I  will do for you. You only tell me 
which one you prefer." To avoid the award situation, Wenming turned to Songsheng,
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"Secretary, you go to collect the other ballots first. Then I ’ll come to join you." After 
Songsheng left, Xiang's wife made her decision...
This was not an easy task for the village cadres, especially for those 
candidates, because not every villager was willing to cooperate. After collecting the 
ballot papers from each household, the cadres put all the ballots together in the school 
hall. The school teachers and the village cadres were invited to scrutinize the 
balloting process. Then they counted the ballot papers openly. In the end, Yueshun 
and Fashun were the winners in this election. Yueshun obtained most of the support 
from the villagers. However, several days after the election, rumor spread again in Ku 
Village. The villagers told me that eventually Songsheng replaced Fashun as one of 
the winners.2 "Is it possible to change the result of election like that?" I asked one 
villager who was suspicious. "Why not? Gongchandang only choose the one they 
prefer. Of course, they can change the numbers of the ballot paper each candidate 
got." Some villagers even made jokes about this election,
Democracy? I never heard democracy like that. That's democracy with
the characteristic of socialism.
I did not know whether what the villagers said was true or not. But one thing I could 
say was that their rumour and criticism about the black box operation of the local 
election really had eroded the legitimacy of this election. It was this single act which 
conclusively undermined the trust between the villagers and "the bad local cadres" 
and the legitimacy of the township government in the eye of villagers. To the 
villagers, it was the township government's zeren to guarantee a fair election. 
However, the result disappointed the villagers again. Songsheng was the target of 
criticism in this event. They created rumours about this election only for the sake of 
delegitimizing Songsheng, but not Yueshun.
The paralysis of local organization at the village level and the losing of 
legitimacy of the village cadres made the socialist state difficult to intervene into 
village affairs. Any hopes or remaining expectations that contractual obligations 
between local government and villagers would be honoured in the future were set 
aside. As a consequence, villagers turned to think that they had to rely on their own
2 ■ In Ku Village, people seldom mentioned about Fasliun. As I know, he takes charge the economic 
management of Xiaohuang ADC.
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efforts (kao zi j i ) to reconstruct their homeland. They sidelined the village 
government by establishing their own village organization based 011 kin elders and 
village lineage. They began to reorganize themselves cooperatively based on cultural 
and religious practices as well as public utilities like road paving, irrigation programs 
and so on. In the process of reorganizing themselves, the Ku identity was made 
through the cultural and religious practices. They identified with their common 
ancestors and their own local deities governed by senses of reciprocity, warmth or 
filial duty. The social boundary of the village was also redefined. I11 the process of 
reviving the traditional organization, the social hierarchy re-merged and there were 
some families growing into powerful groups whose members demonstrated patrilineal 
descent from a common ancestor. At the end of the day, there were elderly and 
wealthy kinsmen coming out to hold the collective activities.
8.2. Rebuilding Their Protective God
The villagers had already turned to the protection of local gods in their initial 
bid for prosperity and blessings, at first alongside, but increasingly in lieu of the local 
government. Several temples for local gods had been rebuilt or refurbished and a 
renewed mutual or reciprocal relationships of zeren was established between local 
deities in which blessings and offerings were exchanged for assistance and protection. 
To understand the significance and cultural meanings of the revival of traditional 
religious activities in the village politics, I "stubbornly" believe that we have to return 
to the everyday life of the villagers. Through their voices and activities in daily life, I 
will tiy to make sense of the relationship between the revival of local tradition and the 
formation of village identity, and the implication of the formation of village identity 
in the local politics of rural China.
Everyday Talk of Gods
Staying in Ku Village, one of the important topic in everyday chatting was 
about the stories and miracles of the local deities such as Guanyin, God of Mountain 
(Gongwang), and God of Rivers (Hekou bogong). To the villagers, these gods 
belonged to Ku Village, in other words, they protected the interests of Ku Village.
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One day when I was walking with Uncle Si to Shanping Village, he told me about the 
miracle of the god of mountains. The story happened in the civil war between 
Guomindang and Gongchandang. One day there was a fierce fight between 
Guomindang's army and the Gongchandang's guerrilla forces. The guerrilla forces 
were defeated by Guomindang's army and retreated to the mountainous area in Ku 
Village. The Guomindang’s army came to Ku Village to pursue the guerrillas. The 
military officer of Guomindang rode a horse ahead and led the army to the Ku 
Village. When he came to village's entrance, the horse suddenly stopped. No matter 
how he whipped the horse, it did not go forward. The officer found the shrine of 
Gongwang located beside the road, and thus he thought it was Gongwang that had 
made its presence known to the horse. Therefore, the officer withdrew his army and 
Ku Village escaped the disaster of war by a hairs breadth. This story was transmitted 
from generation to generation, and the villagers worshipped the Gongwang at every 
important festivals. For instance, every year, when it came to the birthday of 
Gongwang, almost all households participated in the celebration of Gongwang’s 
birthday with enthusiasm. The villagers earned rich sacrifices to worship Gongwang. 
They also worshipped Gongwang during Chinese New Year and other important 
Chinese festivals. To the Kus, Gongwang was very efficacious. He was one of the 
local gods who would protect Ku Village's safety.
Guanyin was another god they often talked about. I remember the first time I 
met Aunt Tong, an old woman in Ku Village, the first thing she told me was about the 
accuracy of prediction of Guanyin. She told me, "This Guanyin is very efficacious. 
You are a very nice guy. You have to worship Guanyin. She will bless you." The 
villagers told me that they prayed to her when they had any problems with sickness, 
marriage, birth and so on which they not solve themselves, they would go to worship 
Guanyin and ask for blessings. To them, Guanyin was the god who answered all 
requests (youqiu biying). Each year, 011 the first day of the Lunar Chinese New Year, 
the old women from different households would go to worship her by offering 
abundant sacrifices and pray for blessings. They also asked for good fortune in 
coming years by drawing the bamboo ships for divination. In 1993, there was 
something happening in Ku Village in which the villagers once again affirmed that Ku 
Village's Guanyin was very efficacious.
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One day in the late afternoon, a scream was pitched into the glow o f the 
setting sun. The villagers recognized that was Brother San's cry and chased the 
direction o f the voice because they Imew something was wrong. The news quickly 
spread out to all corners o f Ku Village. All the villagers came out to see what had 
happened. When they found him on the slope behind the Guanyin temple, he was in a 
state o f unconsciousness because he had suffered a severe head injury. This accident 
made the villagers carry on endless discussion. Some believed Brother San was hurt 
because he had offended Guanyin. He was going to cut down a huge pine tree behind 
the Guanyin temple. The tree fell down and hurt his head. Some villagers believed 
that Brother San was still alive because the blessing o f Guanyin niangniang. They 
said Brother San's mother was a devout follower o f Guanyin and she worshipped 
Guanyin niangniang in every important festival. So Guanyin niangniang blessed her 
son. No matter i f  it was punishment or blessing, they believed Ku Village's Guanyin 
was very efficacious.
In Mao's period, the traditional religious activities were criticized as 
‘superstition” and a “residue of feudalism”. They were banned and the temples were 
destroyed. The Communist government also intended to replace all the functions of 
traditional institutions by the commune system which tried to take care of every 
aspect of livelihood of peasants. Evidence showed us that the attempt at the total 
replacement of traditional organization was a failure because the villagers were still 
strongly attached to the family, household, kin and other religious organizations. 
Scholars found that in Deng’s era there was a rapid revival of local cult in South 
China (e.g. Siu, 1990; Dean, 1993; Feuchtwang, 1992). But the revivals of 
traditional organization and religious ritual is not something natural as the view of 
mechanical historicism; rather, people reconstruct the traditional rituals in a new 
meanings, which respond to the new politico-economy in a reform era.
The dismantling of the collective and the disfunctions of the village committee 
led the villagers in some sense still missed Mao’s period and sprouted out nostalgia. 
In comparison, to them, no matter how harsh their lives were, the collective still could 
provide the basic survival needs and services for them such as health services, basic
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grains and education. But after the rural reform of 1979, the villagers lost their sense 
of security and source of dependence. They had to struggle for their livelihood with 
their own effort. The state policy such as taxation and birth policy further threatened 
their survival and reproduction of family; meanwhile, the market economy also 
increased their uncertainty. Thus the villagers turned to the protection of local gods in 
their initial bid for prosperity and blessing. In our daily conversation, the villagers 
revealed their nostalgia. One day in October of 1995, I joined the chitchat with the 
villagers after lunch. The villagers' topic was about the production and the price of 
pomelo because it was the season of harvest. But they seemed to be worried about 
their production. It was continuously raining in these days, which would seriously 
affect the production of pomelo. Uncle Guang stated with a heavy heart,
Ai! The rain will really kill our production. If it continues, we really 
will have a hard time in the coming year. In the Maoist past, the 
collective would take care of our basic needs, but now, we totally rely 
on ourselves. Whether we will have rice or congee depends on Heaven 
(chi/cm chizhou lean tian le).
The local gods provided the feelings of security for the villages. When they found 
something could not be solved by themselves, they would go to the deities and search 
for blessings. When the family members were sick, they would ask for healing from 
the local deities. In the villagers' prayers, they also asked for “good weather for the 
crops” (fengtiao yushun), as well as wishing the gods to send them a son. In 1993's 
Lunar New Year, I visited the village and joined their worship to Guanyin on the first 
day of the new year. The prayers of the old women were like these:
"Guanyin niang niang, I pray for my son that he can get me a grandson soon. I will 
repay your blessing."
"Guanyin niang niang, I pray for good weather for our production. If we have a good 
harvest, we will repay you with oil and incense."
"Merciful Guanyin niang niang, you are our savior, I beg for your mercy to protect 
our village. I also beg for you to bless my grandson so that he can enter the university 
this year." ....
Their prayers were closely related to their living experiences and their personal 
interests, which revealed their expectations of the local deity; in some sense, it also 
revealed their discontent with the current government, because it shirked its zeren of 
providing social security to the villagers.
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To the villagers, all these local deities were their protective gods. Their moral 
principle of reciprocity also manifested in the relationship between the villagers and 
the local deities. They offered the sacrifices to these local deities in exchange for their 
blessings. Temples were destroyed by the Communist government in the campaign of 
“destroying the Four Out Model customs” (po si jiu ). In searching for the greater 
blessing, they quickly reconstructed and restored the traditional temples, the shrines 
and ancestral hall after the control of state became loosened.
The Reconstruction of Guanyin Temple
I remembered the first time I entered into Ku Village. My uncle brought me to 
visit and worship the grave of my great-grandfather. The grave was located at the 
middle of the mountain at the other side of the river. When we were walking across 
the river, I found a small house located at the middle of the mountain. I asked my 
uncle who lived in the mountain. He told me that was a Temple which housed 
Guanyin — a god of Buddhism.
I visited the temple several times to participate in villagers' activities. It was only a 
simple three-wall house without a front wall and luxuriously decorated roof. In the 
temple, an idol of Guanyin sat at the central altar. On the altar, there was incense and 
a candle pot. In front of the altar, there was a table for the offering of sacrifices (see 
Picture 8.2). According to my uncle, the temple was destroyed during the campaign 
of “doing away with superstitions and blind faith”. In the commune era, nobody 
dared to worship the deities because it would be exposed by other villagers and 
criticized as “ideologically backward” (sixiang luohou). After the rural reform, the 
villagers began to worship Guanyin in the destroyed house. In the mid-1980s, the 
income of households was still very low and it was impossible for them to raise 
enough funds among themselves. So the old villagers actively wrote to their overseas 
relatives for donations. Due to the support of the overseas villagers, they quickly 
raised enough money and reconstructed their temple.
However, the same as Dean’s accurate observation in South-east China, “The 
permissibility of a ritual depends a great deal on the determination of the local people, 
the relationship of the village Party secretary with the villagers and with the local
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government, the extent of overseas Chinese connections, the wealth and influence of 
the community, and the constantly changing "political atmosphere. Every ritual puts 
all these issue on the line" (Dean, 1993:9). Every outcome was the result of 
negotiation between different parties. The progress of rebuilding the temple in Ku 
Village was not as smooth as the cadres of ADC intervened in their project. They 
persuaded the villagers not to rebuild the temple in hurry because they were not sure 
about the state policy on religion. But the villagers insisted on constructing the 
temple because they thought the state had no reason to interfere as they used their own 
money in this project. They also articulated the “freedom of religion” clause in the 
new Constitution to support their action. But on the other hand, the local cadres made 
a counter-argument that the government was opposed to “superstitious activities”. 
Then the villagers justified that the project was supported by overseas villagers. In 
order not to displease the overseas Chinese, as well as not to violate the state policy, 
the local cadres finally just kept one eye open and one eye closed as before. 
According to one of the cadres, they allowed the village to build the temple because 
they often got the message form the newspaper that the Communist government 
wanted to attract the investment of overseas Chinese and give preferential treatment to 
them. Compared to the overseas Chinese policy (huaqiao zhengce), they seldom got 
the news about religious policy. After calculating the benefits and cost, they decided 
not to intervene into the construction. But to the villagers, they believed the Guanyin 
always blessed the Ku villagers. They rebuilt the temple in the mid of 1980s. Their 
average income increased from about 400 yuan in 1984 to about 3,000 yuan in 1995. 
They attributed the improvement of their living standard year by year to their 
reconstruction of the Guanyin Temple, which earned the blessing from Guanxi.
Reconstruction the Gongwang Shrine
When I was still in the village, one day Uncle Si told me that the Gongwang 
shrine had been renovated. It was because Gongwang had been moved to a temporary 
place during the renovation. In 1995, the old villagers thought it was the right time to 
rebuild the Gongwang temple. The reconstruction was led and organized by a middle- 
aged woman who was Uncle Mang's wife. She collected the funds from household to 
household. Her family contributed the main part of financing in this reconstruction.
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After completing the construction, they chose a lucky day (jiri) to move Gongwang 
back to the new house and invited a religious specialist to hold the kaiguan dianyan 
(rituals of consecration of the god involving dotting the eyes with blood or red ink to 
open them to the light).
On that day, the hillside behind the power station was filled with plenty of 
'heat and noise' (renao) — as it was packed with people, who were chaotically 
boisterous, different voices, and dashingly colorful. The representatives of each 
households carried their basket of sacrifices and arrived one after another. When I 
arrived at the hillside, I surprisingly found that all who had joined in the worship were 
women (see Picture 8.3).
The shrine was just a simple gravestone with an incense pot. The gravestone 
was made in the style of a luxury house. The worship still did not start because they 
were waiting for the zaima to come from the town. Zaima are women who practice 
abstinence from meat for a long time. They were different from nigu (Buddhist nun) 
because they did not practice tonsure and did not live in a temple. Uncle Mang's wife 
invited a zaima to hold the ceremony of setting up the shrine of Gongwang. The 
zaima performed different sorts of rituals in the ceremony. The zaima sat cross- 
legged in front of the shrine and put her palms together like a Buddhist (see Picture 
8.4). She also gave a speech and sang songs with peculiar pronunciations of difficult 
text. Then she stood up and held a bowl of uncooked rice, while she sang 
continuously. She turned to the villagers and scattered the rice against the villagers. 
The villagers received the scattered rice carefully by rolling up their clothing because 
they believed that the rice would bring blessings from Gongwang. The ritual was 
earned out with a multitude of different meanings, which I found quite impossible to 
interpret. The villagers also did not understand the meanings of the rituals. They 
came because they wanted to obtain blessings. Some only went for the 'heat and 
noise' and to get favors granted, not for the essence of this religious practice. Some 
children also joined in for fun and learned to honor the deities from the adults with 
sticks of incense.
The collective religious activities played an important role in forming the 
village identity. Through the rebuilding of the local shrines and collective worship,
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they were aware of their common interest. As for them, both Guanyin and Gongwang 
were their protective gods who protected the interest of the villagers.
8,3, Formation o f  the Ancestral H all Committee
Many researches have shown that religion is an important aspect of peasant 
life in rural China and ancestral halls are the traditional centers of popular' ritual. The 
earlier ethnographic studies on Chinese society paid much attention to this aspect (e.g. 
Baker, 1979; Freedman, 1958; Yang, 1948; Yang, 1961; Fei, 1939; Granet, 1962; 
Potter and Potter, 1990). We know that rural China has experienced great 
transformation since 1949. Under the ideology of Mao, everything that belonged to 
the 'old' tradition was destroyed in the name of "pojiu lixin" (destroying the old and 
establishing the new), especially during the Cultural Revolution, when all the 
religious activities were abandoned. The ancestral halls were occupied by the 
government, the temples were destroyed and the clergy were arrested.
The state intervention did not totally eliminate the cultural heritage in Chinese 
villages. In the late of 1980s, it was reported that the ancestral halls had been rebuilt 
again in most places of rural China (Siu, 1989; Feuchtwang, 1996; Potter & Potter, 
1990). Although the phenomena seemed to be the same, apparently, the local 
practices of these reconstruction were in fact very different. In some villagers, the 
local cadres were bound up with the revival of local tradition; in some villages, the 
overseas Chinese were actively involved in the rebuilding of these local tradition; and 
in some villages, the reconstruction was motivated by the villagers themselves. In 
Ku Village, the local cadres were excluded from the reconstruction of ancestral hall. 
Indeed, the overseas Chinese and the villagers themselves actively participated in the 
movement of reconstruction. To me, this “stubbornness” of the Chinese peasants is 
not without reason and cultural meaning. They do not easily give up this symbolic 
system because it refers to their indigenous internal organization and to the physical 
world around them. It was also their foundation of ethnic identities. Through 
religious ritual, ethnic identities are formed, and the meaning and the values of the 
world were produced and reproduced. To understand the cultural meaning of 
ancestral hall and ancestral worship, I think we have to look into the everyday 
language.
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Their Gen (roots)
Kejia ren a, kejiaren! ni gen zai hechu? yuan zi he fang?
O, Hakka people, Hakka people! Where are your roots? Where do you come from?
— Hakka Folk Song
I think most of the scholars of Hakka studies would not deny that Hakka 
people have a strong conception of roots (e.g. Lo, 1994; Yang & Tan, 1994; Aijmer, 
1994; Zhong etc. 1997). In their folk songs, they express the urge to search for their 
roots. In their family letters, we know how much they miss their homeland. The 
concept of root is closely correlated to their social identity. In Guangdong, the Hakka 
identify themselves as Hakka. Among Hakka, the villagers identify themselves to 
different villages, different surnames, different kinship and then different families. 
Without their roots, they would lose their identity.
They often talked about “luoye guigen ” (fallen leaves have to return to their 
roots), that meant they had to die in their homeland. Homeland was their source of 
roots. It was a great regret dying outside their homeland. The unfulfilled wish of 
those overseas villagers who could not return to their homeland was to bring their 
bone ashes back to the villages. It was also their children's responsibility to fulfill 
their wish. Those villagers who cannot fulfill their responsibility would feel guilty 
and blame themselves as having “no filial piety”. While I was staying in Ku Village, 
Uncle Zhun brought back his father's bone ashes from Indonesia. The tomb of his 
father had been constructed by his brother, who had stayed in the village for several 
years. The style and the location of the tomb were designed by his father based on the 
principle of fengshui before his death. The whole funeral was followed to the 
traditional rituals which involved all the members of the village. The fengshui 
specialist was invited to hold the ceremony. The devotion and ceremonious funeral 
revealed the seriousness of the villagers to the matter. Uncle Zhun told me that it was 
his father's final will. What impressed me was he said "I am so happy to fulfill my 
zeren, I think my father must have a smile on his face in the nether world (han xiao 
jiuquan)."
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The villagers' sense of gen was also manifested in their memory of their 
forefathers and patriarchal clan, the virtues and contribution of their ancestors in 
everyday chatting. Every time I returned to Ku Village, they told me about the 
contribution of my great-grandfather and my grandfather to village education.
Ancestral halls were the symbol of their roots. Through worshipping of their 
ancestors, they found the identity which linking between them and their clan; and 
through their ancestral worship, we could also find the relationship of reciprocity 
between ancestors and descendants. Ancestral worship was the continuation of the 
parents/child dependence after the death of parents.3 Death did not release the 
responsibility of the sons to their parents, it merely altered the form in which his duty 
takes. Descendants serve and worship their ancestors, and in return for the sacrifices 
and service, the ancestors gave to their descendants such blessings and assistance 
which were in their supernatural power.
Reconstructing Their Ancestral Hall
As the ancestral hall was so important to the villagers, they decided to rebuild 
their ancestral hall. In the village, most of the villagers' ideas came out in their 
eveiyday chat. The idea of organizing the ancestral hall committee also came from 
their discussion at Uncle Bin's home.
Uncle Bin, an elder villager, lived in market town. He was about 62 years old. 
Because he was more highly educated and came from a wealthy family, he earned 
high respect from the villagers. Also because he was willing to help the villagers 
solve their problems, he had a good relationship with the villagers. Again, because 
his sister was rich in Indonesia, every time the village needed financial support from 
the overseas Chinese, Uncle Bin would write to his sister for a donation. When the 
villagers went to the periodic market (ganji) every week, they liked to visit him on the
3- According to Baker (1979:71), “the importance of reciprocity could be seen very clearly in Chinese 
family relationships, and the sense of mutual responsibility between parents and son was central to the 
operation of the family as a continuing and strong unit. When the son was young and the incapable 
was fed, clothed, housed and educated by his parents. As he grew older so he began to take on more 
and more tasks and achieve a state of comparative self-reliance where he was putting into the family 
quite as much as he was taking o u t... It would then be his turn to feed, clothe, shelter, and care for his 
parents; thus directly reciprocating their previous care of him.”
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way. One day when Uncle Wen, Uncle Si and Wen-ming went to visit him, they 
talked about the wom-out ancestral hall.
Uncle Wen: Every time the overseas relatives return to Ku Village, they sigh over the 
ancestral hall having long been out o f repair. I  feel sad about it too. As Wangsheng 
Gong's descendants, we cannot maintain our ancestral hall properly. After we pass 
away, I  don't think we will feel ease at facing our ancestors.
Uncle Bin: I ’ve been thinking about an idea for a long time. Because I  have been 
busy, I  have not been able to find time to discuss it with you.
Uncle Wen: What ‘s the idea?
Uncle Bin: It is about the ancestral hall. I  agree with you that we have to fulfill our 
responsibility to maintain our ancestral hall. I ’ve talked with several overseas Idn- 
men. They all promised to donate some money in the reconstruction o f our ancestral 
hall.
Uncle Si: Well, that's a good idea. But who will be willing to take the lead and 
mobilize the others?
Uncle Bin: Brother Si, I  think we have to take up this obligation. In our village, we 
have higher beifei (seniority in the clan). I f  we don't take the lead, who dare?
Uncle Wen: You are right. But we are old. We can just chumian (appear 
personalityj? Wen-ming, all the matter still depends on you to chuli (devote your 
strength).
Wen-ming: In our village, there are many young laborers. I f  you can get the funds, I  
will mobilize the labor.
Uncle Bin: Brother Qiang is also concerned about the ancestral hall. Next week, I  
will return home and discuss the details with Qiang.
Uncle Si: Do we need to inform the ADC?
Wen-ming: Forget about them, now every village is reconstructing their ancestral 
hall. How can they manage all these cases?
After the discussion, Uncle Bin drafted a proposal and sent it to the overseas 
Chinese compatriots. They also asked the villagers' opinions household by 
household. The overseas clan members responded to the proposal rapidly. There 
were 110 people actively making donations for the reconstruction of an ancestral hall. 
In the end, they collected about thirty thousand RMB. Uncle Bin was responsible for 
the project of maintaining the ancestral hall; Uncle Wen was in charge of the
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financing of this project; and Uncle Qiang was responsible for the production of a new 
sacrifice table and mourning dress.
After five month’s of reconstruction, the ancestral hall became rose anew (see 
Picture 8.5). The zhaoqian (the enclosing wall) was re-strengthened and re-painted. 
The doufcing (the bracket which supports a block of wood) was also reconsolidated. 
The tianmian (skylight) and weiping (threshing ground) were re-paved with cement. 
A pair of menlians (gate couplet) were painted on both side of the door, reading 
'xiangxian shize, guobao jiasheng' (the virtue of village will be earned forward 
generation by generation, the treasure of nation will be proclaimed family by family). 
A tanglian (hall couplet) also was painted inside the hall, reading "xiaoyou wei 
jiazheng, wenzhang bao giioen " (repay the family's debt of rearing with piety, requite 
the nation's debt of gratitude with an essay). All the couplets were written in black 
characters with red background which very much attracted peoples' attention. The 
shenkan (shrine) was also painted in a new color. Above the shrine, there were eight 
big characters written in yellow color with red background. It was written that "tianqi 
xinyun zude chongguan" (God's new blessing makes the virtue of ancestors shine 
again). There were there large framed red papers hanging on the wall. One was the 
name of a list of donors and the amount they donated; one was the management 
pledge of the ancestral hall; and the other was about the roots of ancestors in Ku 
Village.
The rebuilding process was not without any disputes among the villagers. 
Some villagers complained to me about the high rebuilding cost; some villagers had 
doubts over the ways the responsible people spent the money. However, the villagers 
just gossiped behind their back because face to face confrontation would hurt the 
ganqing (warmth) and mianzi (social honor) of those involved. The reconstruction 
also affected the fishpond in front of the ancestral hall because they had to lower the 
water level to re-consolidate the foundation of the threshing ground. Liang, who 
contracted out the fishpond, asked for the compensation from the ancestral hall 
council because some of his fish died when the water level was lowered.
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The Formation of Ancestral Hall Council
After the daitouren (those who played a leading role) decided to rebuild the 
ancestral hall, they decided to form the ancestral hall council for the sake of managing 
the affairs of Ku Village. Uncle Qiang was nominated as the lishizhang (director) of 
the council. Uncle Bin himself took the post of fulishi (vice-director) of the council. 
Uncle Wen was assigned as the siku (treasurer) and wenshu (secretary). Uncle Si was 
the baoguan (storekeeper). All of them were not elected by the villagers. They 
automatically became the leaders because they had high seniority in the kin and they 
contributed a lot to the reconstruction of the ancestral hall as well. Although 
Wemning also actively participated in the reconstruction, he was still too young and 
lacked experience in taking charge of the affairs of kin. The last post was citang 
guanliyuan (ancestral hall administrator). They opened the last post for election 
because guanliyuan would manage the ancestral hall everyday, so it needed the 
villagers authorization for this post. Uncle Bin explained that "We don't want the 
people to say we are undemocratic. Elections can also silence the villagers when the 
administrator has conflict with other villagers. You know, the administrator is elected 
by them. They can't say anything." In this sense, I camiot say the villagers really 
credited the institution of election. They practiced election only for some practical 
concerns, leaving no excuse for other people to criticize them. This was the reason 
why Wenming insisted on having an election when he replaced Uncle Leng as village 
head.
In the process of reconstruction, the ancestors' tablets (zuxian lingwei) had to 
be moved to another place. After finishing the reconstruction, the lingwei had to put 
the tablets back to their original places (chongdeng baozuo). According to Chinese 
tradition, for good fortune, they had to choose a good day for this important event. So 
they checked the almanac (tongsheng) and found that the 19th of September would be 
a good day. Then the members of the ancestral hall council organized mass meetings 
to discuss the arrangements of that day. Different from the meetings held by the 
village cadres, almost all households sent their representatives to attend the meeting 
(see Picture 8.6). The meeting was held at Shan Yu house. In the meeting, Uncle Bin 
gave a talk to the villagers:
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... I am very glad to see so many uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters 
coming to join our meeting. As you know, we have completed the 
rebuilding of our ancestral hall. The lingwei has to be put back to the 
original place as soon as possible. We have chosen the day of 19th in 
this month according to tongsheng. The date is drawing near, and we 
have to discuss arrangements with you. I know you are tired after 
spending a whole day of working, but the issue of ancestors is 
important to everyone. We are Wansheng Gong's descendants, we 
must work together in one heart to make our village better ...
In Uncle Bin's talk, he announced the establishment of the ancestral hall 
council. He also read out the regulations of ancestral hall that the villagers had to 
follow. That evening, the villagers also elected their own ancestral hall administrator. 
Aunt Tong was elected as an administrator who was responsible for cleansing the hall 
and worshipping the ancestors with candles and incense on the lunar 1st and 15th of 
each month. Under the regulations, the administrator could get a 15-yuan subsidy 
from the ancestral hall council, although Aunt Tong refused to accept the subsidy 
because she considered it her obligation to serve the ancestors.
In the early morning of the 19th of September, there was a collective worship 
in Ku Village. The good time (ji shi) to put the tablets back to the shrine was 5:45 
a.m. So everybody had to arrive before the good time. So in the evening of the 18th, 
many villagers were busy preparing their sacrifices. Some young villagers did not 
even want to sleep because they had to wake up so early. When the sun rose, the sky 
became clearer and clearer. The lights were shining in every household's room and 
the members of the council went to the ancestral hall earlier than the other villagers. 
They arranged the sacrifices tables starting from the shrine to the gate of the hall. 
Aunt Tong was busy cleaning the pot of incense and candles, the ground and tables. 
At about 5:00 a.m., the villagers came to the hall in succession. Every villagers put 
on their clean clothes. Each household offered their sacrifices including sansheng 
(three kinds of meat), fruits, incense, candles and paper money. The tables were full 
of sacrifices. The villagers offered all the best food to their ancestors. Of course, in 
the process, the households also competed with one another for wealth and prestige by 
comparing their sacrificial offerings. The members of the councils acted as leaders to 
organize the worship and kept the order. At 5:45 a.m., they respectfully put the 
tablets back to the shrine, then they collectively made a deep bow to their ancestors. 
In the end, they let off firecrackers. The children joined the fun and looked for the
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unfired firecrackers on the ground. After the worship, the council also treated the 
villagers to an open-air film shown in the village. The Ku Village was full of heat and 
noise (re nao) the whole day. The villagers, especially the older ones, were very 
happy and touched and they shared with me that there had not been so much 
collective enthusiasm in the village for a very long time. It was a great comfort for 
them to see the Kus re-uniting together and doing something for their ancestors.
The Functions of Ancestral Hall Council
The ancestral hall council became the village organization and the members 
became the leaders of the village. They actively managed the affairs of the village, 
and after rebuilding the ancestral hall, they earned out the project of paving a cement 
road in the village.
The idea of paving a cement road was brought on by the younger villagers 
when they chatted together in Wen-ming's house. During their conversation, someone 
suddenly mentioned about the poor situation of the village roads.
Kim: Lunar New Year is drawing near. Do you remember last new year?
Ming: How can Iforget? That's a terrible new year. It was raining day after day. All 
the roads became muddy and rugged and no vehicle could pass. Any vehicle that 
dared to try would get stuck in the mud.
Da: Even the motorcycles couldn't go to town.
Kim: No driver in the township wanted to get passengers to our village no matter how 
much you paid. I  hope this won't happen this year.
Xin: This terrible road really affected our pomelo business. During the rainy days, 
the traders find it difficult to purchase our pomelo.
Wen-ming: I  think we have to solve this problem by ourselves. As I  know, it is quite 
popular to raise funds from individual households for public utility in other villages. 
Why don't we follow this method? In our village, there are so many young laborers. 
I f  they can contribute free labor, the cost won’t be too high. Even if  we cannot raise 
enough, we can pave the road up to our limited budget. Everyone has suffered 
enough because o f the terrible road. I  think they also want to improve 
transportation.
Xin: Everyone has to use the road. Who dare say no?
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Wen-ming: All right, i f  we really get started, nobody present here can escape. OK, 
let's go to discuss it with Uncle Bin. Anyone free can go with me.
The young villagers led by Wen-ming immediately went to visit Uncle Bin. They told 
Uncle Bin about the idea of paving the village road by raising funds from individual 
household. Uncle Bin strongly supported their idea and promised to write letter to 
overseas villagers for donations. Uncle Bin was the first one asked by the young 
villagers to contribute funds for paving a road. The ancestral hall council promoted 
this idea in the village. Every household actively and positively responded to this 
project and quickly, eighteen thousand-yuan was raised from individual households. 
Overseas villagers also contributed about 2,400 yuan after receiving the letter from the 
ancestral hall council. A former villager who was married in another village also 
contributed five tons of cements after hearing the news of paving the road of her home 
village. Brother Ming who was now running the cement business in Meixian also 
provided 50 tons for this project at preferential prices. Brother Qi-yuan transported the 
materials for the village gratuitously. Uncle Bin borrowed a concrete mixer from his 
construction brigade and to save the cost of paving. The villagers got the stone from 
the riverbed.
All members of the village were mobilized regardless of their age. They 
spent ten days and nights paving the road from main entrance of the village to 
Chengqing House. Because of the limitation of funds, they could not finish the part 
from Chengqing House to the temple of God of the river. During these ten days and 
nights, all middle-aged and young male villagers contributed their labor without 
compensation. The old villagers and women made the tea and cooked the rice gruel 
for them. In the morning, Uncle Si and Uncle Bi also made the bread (mantou) for 
those who participated in paving. As they told me, every day they worked for more 
than ten hours until late into the night. Most of the villagers were moved by their 
sacrificial acts. Every time when I asked them about this event, they spoke highly of 
the young villagers and flaunted villagers' uniting in one heart.
The ancestral hall council planned to pave the unfinished part in August after I 
left in 1996. The budget was about fourteen to fifteen thousand yuan. They had got 
twelve thousand-yuan in donations from one of the overseas villagers. They
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continued to send the letter to the overseas villagers for financial support. They were 
also going to raise fund from the households after the villagers sold their pomelo. 
When I was writing up my thesis in London, they wrote to tell me that they had 
completed the project of road paving because they had received another large 
donation from a overseas relative.
They had many other plans for construction in their village. For example, they 
planned to construct the water system in the village; they also wanted to set up an 
elders fund to help the old villagers without children. The council also had a critical 
idea of building an the arch over the gateway (menlou). They had designed the arch 
and chosen the location based on the guidance of the fengshui teacher. The design 
which they showed me was a traditional style (see Picture 8.7). A henpi (a horizontal 
scroll bearing an inscription) hung over the arch, and written on it was KU 
VILLAGE. The menlian (vertical scrolls) were written “xishui wanyan liu wangu, 
xiluan junqiao wei quancun ” (the meandering stream runs through forever, the high 
and steep mountain protect the whole village). The construction of the arch was in 
need of financial support from overseas villagers too. The names of donors would be 
carved onto the arch to remember their contribution to Ku Village. I thought the 
village gate would distinguish Ku Village from other villages. This would also further 
strengthen their Ku identity and form the boundary between Kus and other surnames.
8.4. Discussion
Locating the discussion in the peasant politics, this chapter attempts to 
illustrate how the new social movement formed in rural China. People in Ku Village 
have abandoned the conventional form of resistance — direct confrontation. They 
demonstrate how peasant activism actively creates alternative modes of political 
vision and identity. Their creation derives from local spirits of synthesis and 
invention which rest on the their eveiyday practices and concrete living experiences. 
The birth, or rebirth if you like, of the Ancestral Hall Committee was the villagers’ 
response to the evaporation of the zeren of the socialist state in the post reform era. It 
also revealed the villagers’ disappointment of re-establishment of contracted 
obligation between the local government and villagers in future. Without remaining
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expectation, without collective demonstration, and without violent clashes. They 
sidelined the government by establishing their own village organization based on 
traditional authority (kin elders) and village lineage. The new village organization 
represented a new spirit of local cooperation, autonomy and democracy. It replaced 
the function of the village government to take charge of a small community public 
work project like the reconstruction of an ancestral hall and the repair of the road.
To me, the moderate movement of the Ku villagers has significant political 
implication. The formation of the Ancestral Hall Committee in fact reflects the 
villagers’ disappointment with the government; meanwhile, it delegitimizes the 
village committee and local government. The traditional organization replaced the 
functions of the local government in the village. The new leadership has undermined 
the power of the village cadres and has reshaped the exercise of power. These leaders 
were not integrated into the formal bureaucratic system. Different from the local 
cadres, the power and privilege of these local leaders were not granted by the state and 
in this sense they did not depend on the state for their legitimacy. In contrast, the 
legitimacy of these local leaders was granted by villagers based on their ability of 
organizing expensive reconstruction, making large religious contributions and giving 
personal loans and donations and so forth. Therefore, to me, the revival of 
traditional organization in a certain sense is another form of resistance of the villagers 
because their action changes the power relationship in the village. Furthermore, it 
makes the local government functionless and the local cadres simply figureheads of 
power and authority.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
I t  was my last day in Ku Village, and I  visited and said say good-bye to those
households whom I  had good guanxi with. The villagers seemed to be reluctant to 
part and urged me again and again to come back in the year after I  completed my 
course in London. I  was so touched and promised to come back and raised funds for  
road paving for them. Staying in the village for such a long time, ganging had been 
established between the villagers and me.
Until I  left the village, the people still didn't understand why I  stayed therefor 
such a long time, although I  tried to explain to them. The methodology o f 
anthropology was alien to them. They re-categorized my work in their native terms — 
shehui diaocha (social investigation). To them, zhishi fenzi (intellectuals) were 
obligated to serve the poor and speak for justice (zhengyi). Last night when I  visited 
Uncle Chang, his wife indicated this expectation to me. She said, “Hok-Bin, you 
intellectuals have to speak for the nongmin (peasants). Nongmin ’s life is still very 
hard. Today the government says we have to pay this sort o f tax, tomorrow it says we 
have to pay another sort offee. We are almost out o f breath. You have to report our 
difficulty to the higher level (shangji). You shouldn’t exaggerate the improvement o f 
our living standard. You Imow, in M ao’s China, false reports got the peasants into a 
serious trouble."
The villagers ’ expectation remained in my mind. At night, I  couldn 't fall to 
sleep. I  was thinldng about my subjective position; thinldng about my zeren to the 
villagers; thinldng about the question o f intellectuals and power. ...
* * * *
Society is a very mysterious animal with many faces and hidden 
potentialities, and... it's extremely shortsighted to believe that the face 
society happens to be presenting to you at a given moment is its only 
true face. None of us knows all the potentialities that slumber in the 
spirit of the population.
— Vaclav Havel, 1990
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How do I know that you exist, and if you do, how do I know that my 
concepts represent your real existence?
-  E. P. Thompson, 1979
Those who act and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group 
or a union that appropriates the right to stand as their conscience.
— Foucault & Deleuze, 1977
In this final chapter, I think it is time for me to self-reflect on writing of the 
whole text. Many events have been presented, many everyday conversations have 
been quoted, much resistance has been talked about, but, maybe you will also 
challenge me as E. P. Thompson — "how can you know that your concepts represent 
the reality of rural China and its population?
The villagers asked me to speak for them, but the question is "can I speak for 
them? "Can I fully understand the 'reality' or 'true face1 of them?" In the trend of any 
"post-" style of thinking, no one dare to think that the total representation of others’ 
life experiences is possible, and no one can declare that they can speak for others. In 
some sense, I agree with the postmodernist critique of positivism, which emphasizes 
the objectivity and power of the social scientist to discover the "reality" through the 
scientific method. But does it mean that thus I have to shut up my mouth and stop 
doing any research and writing something? My answer is “No”.
As Spivak (1993) says, and I agree with, “the intellectual’s solution is not to 
abstain from representation.” What we have to be careful of is that we must be aware 
that any sort of narration and writing cannot be neutralized from his/her own 
consciousness or ideology. “[Tjhere are people whose consciousness we cannot grasp 
if we close off our benevolence by constructing a homogeneous Other referring only 
to our own place in the seat of the Same or the Self’ (Spivak, 1993:84). We have to 
recognize what we have done is not to represent them but to learn to represent 
ourselves. What we say and write only provides one version, but not the only one, of 
narration, which may serve as a deconstruction and counterpossibility for the grand 
narration granted to the oppressed subject by the dominant group.
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9.1. Peasants as Practical Philosophers
I agree with what Foucault said "the [masses] know perfectly well, without 
illusion; they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very 
well...." (Foucault & Deleuze, 1977:207). People in the Ku Village have exemplified 
this point. They do know the histories well; they know the local politics far better; 
they know the essence of the socialist state clearer than any outside intellectual.
They have shown us that they have their own views of human relationships 
and political models, but with a different logic of thinking and practice. They have 
their own conception of justice and equity; they have their perception of good 
government/leadership and immoral government/leadership; they have their own 
definition of zeren or mutual obligation in their guanxi with others. We think they do 
not know because they lack the instrument to grasp it, to speak about it; they do not 
ask and argue in the systematic way of an academy; they do not think about moral 
issues in precisely defined abstract terms, and they do not make it a major priority to 
link such abstract terms together into a logically consistent system; they also do not 
systematically present their philosophical thinking and give lectures about their 
thinking formally (Bourdieu, 1992; Madsen, 1984; Geertz, 1973). Instead, they 
"discuss" and "introduce" these in eveiyday life, e.g. in chatting, funerals, ceremonies, 
festivals and other daily occasions. They also show their thinking by performing 
dramatic gestures, by uttering invective, by gossipy table talk, and noisy altercations. 
They summarize their argument in aphorism and tell it in the local language which is 
filled with colloquial expressions, colorful local sayings (chengyu), and references to 
the rich legacy of traditional stories passed on for centuries. In Bourdieu’s words, 
"they control a knowledge, a knowledge of practice" (Bourdieu, 1992). So the 
ordinary people are philosophers of practice. Their discourse involves a constant 
between word and deed.
By saying peasants as practical philosophers or active agents, it does not mean 
that we have to valorize the oppressed group as subjects who can speak, act and know 
for themselves. As Spivak criticizes Deleuze, this “leads to an essentialist, utopian 
politics” (Spivak, 1993:71). I think we have to recognize that the peasant in socialist 
China encounter a lot of structural limitation, and there exists a system of power 
which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge; thus, their
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voice cannot be easily heard in the public stage. Although we, act as intellectuals 
with conscience and consciousness, can transform their everyday discourse into text 
and writing, again, it is never the case of the oppressed group speaking for 
themselves. It is we intellectuals who have spoken for them and written for them, it is 
us who represented ourselves,
9.2. The Politics o f  M emory
Narratives of history are one of the ways villagers employ to reveal their views 
of their government, their country and their life. In this text, I never intended to argue 
about the reality of history as such, but how the history was constructed and 
reconstructed by different parties for their own sake of interest.
During Mao's era, like the other regime, the Chinese Communist government 
had sought to base its legitimacy on the creation of a "new socialist society" and 
rejection of an "old feudal society". To obtain consent from the masses that "the CCP 
government was the only one that could save them from the 'old society'", the CCP 
government had to develop an hegemonic discourse and way of historic narration for 
legitimizing its authority through different political propaganda. Indeed, at the initial 
stage, the legitimacy of CCP was consolidated by the prospective economic and social 
benefits promised by the new socialist system, such as egalitarianism, food and the 
shelter, medical care, education, job security, stable prices, social stability, and 
elimination of social evils, all of which were seriously missing or lacking under the 
Nationalist regime. An informal "social contract" like relationship between the CCP 
and the masses was established through restructuring the political and economic 
organization. The main responsibility of the Communist government was to provide 
the socialist benefits or goodies and to eventually realize the “Communist paradise” as 
promised in Chinese Marxism; in return, the public was expected to accept one-party 
rule.
During the first ten years in the history of the PRC, the CCP did make some 
impressive progress in realizing socialist goals. For example, almost full employment 
was achieved in the cities, job security was guaranteed, income was by and large 
equalized prices were stabilized, minimum human needs were basically satisfied. But
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the Chinese Communist government has experienced a legitimacy crisis since the late 
1950s because the rural collectivization had created a sluggish and almost stagnant 
agriculture of China. To the peasants, the government had broken its promise of a 
better life for them. The CCP government relied more on ideological purification and 
mass political campaigns to relegitimize its rule. The campaigns included Anti- 
Rightist movement, the Socialist Education campaign, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, the Anti-Confucius campaign, Criticizing Water Margin campaign, Study 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat campaign, and a Campaign against Capitalist 
Roadsters and so on. The incessant political campaigns greatly influenced the normal 
economic activities, especially during the first three years of Cultural Revolution. 
Between 1966 and 1968, industrial and agricultural output dropped thirteen per cent. 
The exhausted economic situation and concrete living experience prevented the 
Communist regime from obtaining the consent of the peasants.
The Ku villagers have by no means forgotten the history from 1949 to 1979, 
especially the important events like land reform, three years of hunger and Cultural 
Revolution. Treating history as culture, we know that each actor is powerful in 
endeavouring to maneuver to define or seize control of historical narration. Although 
the Ku villagers did not have the instruments to write their own history like an 
academic writer, they had their own way of keeping their history. The old Ku 
villagers transmitted their history or knowledge of history to the younger generation 
through everyday conversation. Indeed, the history in their narration is fragmented 
and contradictory as sometimes they negated the CCP government in Mao’s era; 
sometimes they praised it instead. They contradicted themselves in presenting the 
history, but putting their narrative into a speaking setting, we understand why they 
present the history like that and what they say is meaningful at that historical moment. 
As they say "guwei jinyong", they adopted history as their tool of straggling and to 
serve for their own interests at present.1
1 • That’s similar to Susan Wright’s assertion, “Symbols and ideas never acquired a closed or entirely 
coherent set o f meanings: they were polyvalent, fluid and hybridized. Key terms shifted in meaning at 
different historical times” ( 1998:9).
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9.3. Economy, Culture and Politics
Officially, China's reform was formally carried out in 1979. But it has been 
argued by many scholars (e.g. Vogel, 1989; Zhou, 1996; Kellier, 2993; Johnson, 
1982; Wang, 1992) that the experiment of rural reform was earlier than this official 
time. From 1977 to 1978, the peasants themselves had tried to find the way out of 
poverty. Some peasants and the cadres at the village level in Sichuan and Anhui 
began to cany out the 'production responsibility system' secretly without the 
permission of the government. The successful experiment taught the government that 
the only way to overcome sluggish and almost stagnant agricultural production and 
earn credit was to follow peasant’s idea and dismantle much of the commune 
structure. So in the early 1980s, when rural reform began, it was reported that 
peasants in many areas moved quickly to dismantle collective fanning and chose 
instead to farm as individual households. The rural refonn in China was often 
regarded as the result of demand of Chinese peasants who eagerly desired to walk out 
from under poverty. Their desire of becoming rich was related to the “lack” which 
was historically created in Maoist past. The hukou system and inequality between the 
rural and urban populations had given Chinese peasants a strong sense of lacking and 
inferiority. They hoped to become urban residents; they wished their children to no 
longer have hunger; they desired to be "churen tondi" one day. These desires drove 
Chinese peasants to search for a way of survival. Chinese peasants in this situation 
invented the "production responsibility system".2
Soon after economic refonn was canied out all over the country, the industrial 
capitalism and a market economy, a socialist market economy if you like, were also 
introduced into China. For legitimizing the new government in a reform era, by 
articulating peasants' concrete experience of social lack, "refonn and open door" 
(gaige kaifang) was constructed as the only way out of China. Modernization and 
economic development became a "regime of truth" that was used to supply the 
justification for its creation of a "good society" or a "new society" under reform, and
2 . As Deleuze and Guattari put it clearly, desire and lack are created and often social unconscious, 
which helps to promote the ideology of a market economy. They said that the creation of desire and 
lack is the art of a market economy that "involves deliberately organizing wants and needs amid an 
abundance of production; making all o f desire teeter and fall victim to die great fear of not having one's 
needs satisfied" (1983:28).
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provide the basis for its rejection of the development policy by Mao which was 
defined as wrong, radical and leftist. Mao's theory of "continuous revolution" and 
class struggle was abandoned and replaced by commercialization, market competition, 
and economic rationalization. "Being rich is glorious", "let some people become rich 
first", "making money is the priority" all became the dominated cultural rhetoric and 
codes in the reform era. The official press also served to adulate the "great role" of 
Deng Xiao-ping and its government in conceiving and directing the reform. They 
praised that Deng's economic policy brought the dying rural economy back to life and 
won the hearts of the peasants. On the other hand, "the gang of four" was described as 
the sinner of China and the Cultural Revolution was denunciated as a catastrophe of 
the country. In short, they portrayed Chinese refonn as a case of Deng's successful 
policy implementation. As before, peasants were continuously defined as "others". 
When the government policies came across difficulties and encountered the resistance 
from the peasants, they attributed it to the backward "mentality of petty peasants" 
(.xiaonong yishi) — that peasants were conservative, unprogressive, unchanging and 
anti-market.
Again, the state planned pomelo plantation program also borrowed the idea 
from the village, but developed it into a large scale of commercialized cash crop 
production. This program has been imposed to villages and transformed the local 
economy structure as almost all the rural households in Meixian changed to cash crop 
production and the pomelo became the dominate source of income. But closely 
looking to the everyday life practice of economy, we would find that the "mentality of 
petty peasants" stubbornly maintained and which resisted to the invasion of a market 
economy. Taking economics as culture, we would find that economic practices were 
also a result of a negotiated process of meaning making, in which agents contested to 
redefine key symbols which gave a particular view of the world, shaped perception, 
value and behavior. In Ku Village, villagers’ conception of economy, e.g. land, 
labour, time, and production relationships, were far different from the state promoted 
market economy. To the villagers, production was for survival and for fulfillment of 
the demand of the family, which is defined in terms of zeren among the family 
members. For instance, the villagers in Ku Village working harder were for 
supporting the education of their children, preparing a new house for children’s 
marriage, and other reasons. The labour 01* exchange of labour in the village was
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never calculated in tenns of wages, but in terms of guanxi. Profit earning through 
extraction surplus labour was still alien to the villagers. Albeit the government 
encouraged the peasant to develop large scale zhuongyuan jingji (manor economy), 
subsistence economy and principle of safety was still their first consideration rather 
than profit maximization. They preferred to avoid economic disaster rather than take 
risks to maximize profit which was often regarded as modern reason. They had their 
own strategies, e.g. drudgery of labour, diversification of production, and 
undifferentiation of labour, to tackle the problems of fluctuation of market price, 
natural disaster and other uncertainty. In short, treating economics as culture, through 
the concrete practice of the villagers, we can see that ideology of a market economy 
cannot totally colonize the mind of the local people.
Of course, the persistence of a subsistence economy in rural China does not 
imply that the introduction of industrial capitalism and a market economy in the 
refonn era has not had any impact on villagers’ cultural conception, e.g. ideas about 
time, self and work, which have changed their understanding of money and 
commodities. Some young Ku villagers began learning to think differently about 
money and "the economy", some even jumped into the stream of making money. 
They made money not only for subsistence, but also for a better life, for more luxury 
goods, for a modem (urban) life style and so on. So the young villagers tried different 
ways to make money such as working in foreign invested factories in the region of 
Pearl River Delta, changing rice fields to cash plantation, participating in pomelo 
trading, and some even became involved in “criminal behavior” in the government's 
sense, such as felling trees in the state's forest area.
9,4, A Sense o f  Insecurity in the Post-reform Era
The economic development of China during the first decade of reform has 
earned some credits from the peasants, especially the peasants in the rich provinces 
like Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang. For example, in Mei County, the average income 
increased from 78.7 yuan in 1980 to 1,178 yuan in 1992. According to the new IMF 
formula, China's total GNP for 1992 was $1660 billion and GNP per capita $1450. 
Since the early 1990s, China has been described as a rising economic star in the East
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and has become the world's third largest economy based on a new calculation formula 
adopted by the International Monetary Fund (Zhong, 1996).
It is unquestionable that there is rapid economic growth in some parts of 
China, and people's living standards in a material sense have been noticeably 
improved in refonn era, however, the reform itself created some other problems which 
have invalidated and delegitimized the socialist regime. One obvious example is the 
dismantling of the collective which has made the former collective support for the 
elderly and disabled and for some social services while subsidies for health care and 
education had either decreased or were now non-existent. The voice of discontent is 
prevailing in the second decade of refonn. In Ku Village, people often complained 
about the rising inflation, widening income gap, increased uncertainty of life security, 
the deterioration of social welfare programs, the increasing cost of education, the lack 
of public utility provision and so on. In their everyday life conversation and dialogue, 
we can glimpse at their strong sense of insecurity, especially the elderly. They 
constantly felt that income maintenance or “money in their pocket” was threatened by 
rising costs of services and lack of protection in times of illness or other needs.
One of the important reasons for causing peasants to have a sense of insecurity 
was the paralysis of the local administrative organs, e.g. the ADC and villagers' 
committee. As I pointed out before, the fiscal reforms in the mid-1980s seriously 
weakened the economic power of those ADC and villagers' committees which are 
without enterprises and industries. Most of the village organs like Ku Village were no 
longer able to fund the welfare services and public affairs which were still defined as 
their zeren by the government. Not only village cadres sensed their authority lost, but 
also villagers sensed their right to enjoy social services evaporating, especially in the 
post-reform era.
The arbitrariness of fees and tax further strengthened the villagers' sense of 
lack. They found their earnings barely covered their expenditures (>rubufuzhi), which 
implied that their desire of having a modem/urban living standard was difficult to 
achieve. For instance, in Ku Village, some villagers time and again told me that they 
faced financial difficulty these past several years and it was impossible for them to 
purchase the luxurious goods, e.g. electric housing appliance facilities. The daily 
comments, like "a village is always a village", "doing farm work is good for nothing
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(mei chuxi)", "peasants suffer poverty throughout their lives (yibeizi aiqiong)", and 
"city is always better than country", in some sense, unraveled their strong feeling of 
lack and of inferiority.
9.5. Defining Zeren as Politics
Facing the uncertainty of life security, villagers began to question the zeren of 
the CCP government and challenged its legitimacy. The Ku villagers articulated their 
entitlement to social security and services as part of a social contract between the 
government and villagers which in itself is based on notions of exchange, reciprocity 
and mutual obligation. Such contractual guanxi basically is an extended version of 
the person-to-person guanxi among the villagers who practice and cultivate it in 
everyday life. To the villagers, anyone involved in the guanxi network would be 
expected to fulfill their mutual obligation for maintaining renqing or ganqing. 
Similarly, they applied such principle of reciprocity to their guanxi with the 
government. Land contracting underlying the responsibility of the production system 
in the refonn era is a model of such guanxi. Based on villagers’ interpretation, under 
the land contract, the government provides them a piece of land. In return for such 
favor, they are obliged to contract a portion of the produce or pay a cash fee to the 
government. Furthermore, for exchanging support and loyalty, the government has 
the zeren to provide social security and services in return. Obviously, in the eye of the 
villagers, a “good government” is obliged to provide social protection, income 
maintenance and welfare, education and health services, and public utilities provision 
to meet the needs of the elderly, children, the poor and disabled.
Villagers’ conception of the zeren of the government was fostered and 
consolidated by comparative knowledge which accessed from different information 
sources. The open door policy in the reform era has allowed some free space to the 
Chinese. People in villages, especially in Guangdong, have had more opportunity to 
have contact with the outside world. The intervention of modem technology, the 
relaxing restriction of rural-urban migration, and the free interaction between villages, 
and the returning of the overseas Chinese, have all provided a variety of information 
for the villagers. The exposure of many different sorts of information and knowledge 
have dramatically awakened the cultural and political consciousness of the people
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who live in Chinese villages, at the same time prevent the domination of an 
authoritative interpretation and discourse in rural China. As they often said 
“youbijiao jiu  zhiclao" (comparison makes the thing clear), one of the most common 
topics of conversation in Ku Village was about comparative types and costs of 
welfare, security, education, health and support for the elderly and other provided 
elsewhere and the role of other local and national governments in the funding and 
delivery of social security and services. As a villager said “Ku Village is no longer a 
closed village, nobody can lie to us”, by comparing with other foreign governments, 
they have learned to think differently about their government and self-interest, and 
they have found the incoherence and contradictions in the official discourse on the 
superiority of socialism. There were also eveiyday comparisons with the “iron rice 
bowls” of urban residents and with other more prosperous rural regions of China like 
the Pearl River Delta. The past too was constructed as a comparative yardstick for 
complaints about the present, and again these comparisons centered on the provision 
of social security so that constructions of the past focused on memories of “selfless 
service” by local cadres, and the provision of communal welfare services for the 
elderly and social services, including barefoot doctors and low-cost education. 
Although forms of social security and services were remembered as minimal and 
Maoist China was a period of “fear, hunger and chaos”, subsidized low user-fees, 
services and about all entreaties for cadres “to serve the people” compared favorably 
with the present. It seemed to the villagers that the only concern of the present 
government was with extraction money from their pockets, but did not fulfill their 
zeren by providing benefits in return.
In some sense the CCP government can still control the mass media to a 
certain extent, but as de Certeau (1987) asserts, 110 one can control how the users 
make use of what they absorb, receive, and pay for. Different sources of information 
open a variety of interpretation. The villagers have their own interpretation of 
programs based on their own interest. In Ku Village, I found that the Hong Kong 
mass media had invaded in the village. In the evening, villagers spent most of their 
time watching Hong Kong TV programs. Most families also had set up satellite TV, 
and through which they obtained information of other cities and provinces produced 
by other provinces' TV stations. As strategic actors, villagers are capable of adopting 
laws, policies statements and other official communications to define the zeren of the
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local government and village cadres. They defy those local governments and local 
cadres who fail to fulfil their zeren. To defend or advance their interests, villagers 
challenge the irresponsible government and unlawful cadres and strive to ensure that 
potentially unbeneficial policies are not implemented scrupulously.
By defining the zeren of the government, they constructed their model of 
"good government" and "good cadres" which became their frame of reference for 
judging their government and cadres. They refused to fulfill their obligations when 
they thought that the CCP government was not helping them in their production or 
providing any benefit to them. In the villagers' view, the local government in the 
post-reform era was one that often extorted people's wealth under all sorts of pretexts 
(qiaoli mingmu). Different kinds of fees collected by the local government, like the 
pomelo tax, were attributed to the greed of the local government. So they defined it as 
an “unreasonable tax”. Their discourse of “unreasonable tax” and “reasonable tax” 
was once again based on their principle of mutual obligation. Their resistance to birth 
control was also justified by the lack of elderly support from the government, which 
was entitled as part of the government’s zeren. In this sense defining zeren is politics. 
By saying defining zeren as politics, I mean the villagers' definition of zeren is not 
fixed; its connotation is changeable. They define zeren for the sake of serving their 
own purposes; therefore, they selectively, or even deceptively, quote those beneficial 
information, e.g. policies statement and Party propaganda, for supporting their claims. 
Sometimes they may creatively misread laws and vague ambiguous national policies 
to push for policy change. In this situation, readers should not be surprised to find 
that sometimes villagers are ambivalent in their judgements and opinions.
9.6. Popular Resistance in Post-reform Era
When I was writing this monograph, I suddenly heard news about a peasants 
riot in Guangdong from the South China Morning Post (August 26, 1997). But this 
news did not surprise me because it was quite common to hear of peasant resistance in 
post-reform China. Although some are collective acts of violence and some are 
eveiyday forms of resistance; some are audible and some are inaudible.
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The dismantling of the commune destroyed the control mechanism in Mao's 
era. As newly autonomous fanners became more demanding, rural cadres in many 
locales were finding it increasingly difficult to govern the villagers. Lacking a 
reliable institutionalized means to obtain funds and ensure acceptance of their 
commands, many grassroots cadres in Ku Village were left powerless to control the 
villagers. So most of time the cadres had to keep "one eye open, and one eye closed". 
Sometimes misreporting and underreporting became the necessary strategies of the 
village cadres in order to deal with the unwelcome policy and reduce the violent 
clashes with the villagers as well.3 However, when the “high tide” came, the only 
way to fulfill the target of the policy was the coercion. First, it was because they 
faced great pressure from above; second because they could obtain the support from 
other governmental departments, such as police force.
In recent years, collecting taxes, imposing fees, and enforcing birth control has 
become the main arena of conflict between the local cadres and the Ku villagers. In 
responding to the material extraction, e.g. taxation and imposing fees, the Ku 
villagers have two tactics of resistance. The first one is more open and public. For 
instance, when the village came to collect the pomelo tax, some of the villagers 
directly refused to pay because in their mind the tax is unreasonable. The second 
response to material domination is in the fonn of disguised, low profile, and 
undisclosed resistance. For example, to evade the paying of a vehicle registration fee 
or paying a fine for not having a driver’s license, the villagers changed their route of 
traveling to the township. They also collected the news about the checkpoints from 
those who had just come back from the township before they departed to the town. 
They also went to the township by taking their motorbikes in the evening rather than 
during the day. To evade the slaughtering tax, some sold their pigs to private “illegal” 
slaughterhouse late at night. Some young villagers secretly cut down the trees in the 
night as well. Desertion was often the tactics the villagers adopted, who had an 
“illegal” birth. When the village cadres came to collect the fee for an illegal birth and 
confiscate their property, they ran away and hid in near and distant villages, they
3- It was reported that many grassroots leaders in other places all too frequently turned to coercion in 
implementing the state policy. In response, angered villagers sometimes rose up and engaged in 
various, often spirited forms of resistance. The result is that violent clashes and rural unrest have 
grown in recent years (Liu Chujiang, 1992, Tang Jinsu and Wang Jianjun, 1989; Li Lianjiang and 
O'Brien, 1996).
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evaded capture, they evaded fines, and they concealed their valuable belongings in 
their neighbours’ house. The villagers sometimes adopted threat and sabotage too.
Responding to the status domination in Ku Village, I found the villagers got 
used to gossiping about the cadres and spread the minors to defame the image of the 
village cadres. Sometimes they created the minor in order to check the state policy. 
Gossip and rumor were a powerful way of resistance in Ku Village, which in turn 
spread quickly and became the “truth” which was then used by the villagers as reasons 
for justifying their resistance.
Regarding the ideological domination, the villagers openly propagated the 
counter-ideologies only when they had some strong reasons to support their 
resistance. Sometimes they cited the laws, government policies, and other official 
communications to support their arguments when they challenged taxation, the 
imposing of fees, the corruption of the cadres and so on. Sometimes they applied the 
universal principle of truth like equality to fight against the unjust treatment by the 
local government. Confronting ideological domination, the Ku villagers also 
developed their dissident sub-cultures e.g. folk religion, myth of "protective local 
gods" and historical heroes for negating the ruling ideology. Their sub-cultures often 
reflected their hope, belief, worldview and their expectations to the CCP government. 
In Ku Village, there was widespread and an increasingly public revival of popular 
religion. Many temples abolished at the time of land refonn had been reconstructed. 
The ideas of ghosts and gods, and “this life” and “the next life” were still deeply 
rooted among the villagers.
A turning point in the relationship between the government and villagers was 
the village election. Nation-wide village elections were introduced by the central 
government, anxious about the strength of the Party in the countryside and aiming to 
restore trust between the party and its grassroots. Although the elections have been 
widely applauded as a means of giving villagers a democratic opportunity to elect 
local cadres of their choice, in Ku Village subsequent interference in village elections 
by township party officials convinced villagers that there would be no change in local 
leadership in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, the villagers set aside or 
sidelined the village government by establishing their own village organization based 
on kin elders and village lineage. The villagers with their own donations and the aid
335
of overseas relatives had then turned their attention to rebuilding the ancestral hall of 
the village, which had both religious, economic and political implications for the 
government of the village. The ancestral hall council was revived and in effect took 
over the management of the village. Its first task was the paving of roads, which the 
local government had not done for many years. They also planned to build the village 
gate and a new water system in the foreseeable future. Rather than relying on the 
local government, the villagers excluded village cadres from the ancestral hall council. 
The village cadres, except the village-oriented ones, were held to be in breach of zeren 
and were left functionless, without any role in the village.
In short, everyday forms of resistance are significant for peasants to protect 
their own interest. They do not intend to afford the luxury of open and organized, 
political activity. They are far less interested in changing the larger structures of the 
state. They are just concerned about their own interest and their village's interest. 
They actively fight against those who seek to extract taxes, rent and interest. They are 
capable of constructing their political discourse for the sake of making sense of their 
resistance. In the construction of political discourse, they are able to articulate the 
history, law, statement of state policy and other resources which benefit their own 
interest. This form of resistance has become the way of a peasant life or peasants’ 
political culture. They practice this resistance everyday, consciously or 
unconsciously. Although there is no organization, no planning and collective action, 
there is consensus and solidarity shared among the villagers. They cooperate with 
each other in a form of silence, cheating, feigned ignorance, hiding the facts and so 
forth.
I can only say that the everyday forms of resistance are significant to the 
villagers. Actually, they rarely have revolutionary aims like the revolutionary elite. 
The slogans or targets of revolution advocated by the elite are not necessary 
representing the goals and interests of peasants. It is unfair to judge the political 
action of peasants based 011 an elitist perception. They have their own dynamic and 
logic of political action, so that the individual action of eveiy resistance is not 
unreasonable. The individual action of different people is not to say that these actions 
lack coordination. There are varieties of individual practice with the unity of 
understanding and ideology which are formed in their eveiyday life and come from 
their life experience. No formal organizations are created because none are required.
336
Therefore, the traditional version of resistance like revolution, violent collective 
action, large scale social movement, demonstration and so on just tell us something 
about the organized expression of social conflict, but not everything we need to know.
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Appendix 1: Predicament of Ethnography and Crisis of 
Representation: Some Reflections and Reminders
In the trend of post-structuralist, post-modernist or post-colonialist style of 
thinking, anthropologists have started to see how power relations and anthropological 
knowledge are mutually constitutive, and self-challenge and rethink about their 
traditional methodology and their power of representation. They have been aware of 
the partiality of truth, and of possible dangers of imposing one's own interpretation on 
the subject of studies by meaning of writing.
Influenced by the optimistic modernism, modernist anthropologists believed 
that it was possible to explore the true knowledge of other societies via their scientific 
method - ethnography. Malinowski, as an important figurehead, in his Argonauts o f the 
Western Pacific, declares a victory of scientific ethnography over 'distorted' 
presentations of the native and claimed that science had “killed” the false 
representations of other cultures (Malinowski, 1984). Fernandez also says, “We 
anthropologists may often decry the fact that we make a fetish of fieldwork, yet in 
almost every case it is the rich data of a fulfilled field experience which is the matrix of 
significant accomplishment in our discipline” (quoted in Fardon 1990:2). The 
presuppositions embedded in so-called “scientific ethnography” is that “participant 
observation” appeals to experience to act as validations for ethnographic authority. 
“I-witness” or “I was there” or “out there” justify, legitimize and account for authentic 
representation of other society. As a result, it is not ethnographer's writing itself, but the 
experience of the author with native people and his personally observation, that gives 
power to ethnography; that is the participation, the experience obtained in another alien 
world that authorizes ethnographic writing. This assumption is obviously based on the 
so called “scientific empiricism” that treats the native people and society as object 
which can be observed, controlled an manipulated. So intensive fieldwork has become 
anchor to secure the safety of the discipline.
However, the romanticized discipline of anthropology has been challenged by 
the post-colonial writers. Edward Said (1979), Asad (1973) and others accuses that 
anthropology as a discipline is a participant of the creation of orientalism, which serves 
the interest of the dominant power in term of white, western and male. Both Sahlin and
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Clastres also have criticized the ethnocentrism, specifically Eurocentrism, which often 
makes the anthropological writings seriously distorted the picture of other people in 
other societies (Sahlins, 1974; Clastres, 1987). These reflection concludes that the 
study of other culture is no longer to seek empirical evidences to proof any universal 
rules of western progress or human evolution; rather, that the western ways, especially 
the capitalist modes of organizing human societies and activities are not the only 
possibilities, left alone to say the best. Anthropologists like Clifford also self-criticize 
and deconstruct the traditional positivist anthropology. They try to construct the 
interpretive anthropology as an alternative. Clifford writes:
Interpretation, based on a philosophical model of textual 'reading', has 
emerged as sophisticated alternative to the now apparently naive claims 
for experiential authority. Interpretive anthropology demystifies much 
of what had previously passed unexamined in the construction of 
ethnographic narratives, types, observations, and descriptions. It 
contributes to an increasing visibility of the creative (and in a broad 
sense poetic) process by which 'cultural' objects are invented and treated 
as meaningful (1988:38).
But Clifford is aware of that although interpretive anthropology exposes a textual 
dimension to ethnographic writing, it seems to suffer the same symptom as what it 
attacks with respect to the problem of objectivity. So recent practices come to the 
consensus that 'ethnographic truths are inherently partial — committed and incomplete' 
(Clifford and Marcus, 1986:7). It is argued that “culture” is invented (Wagner, 1980) 
and the anthropology's “object” is made (Fabian, 1983), as well as the making of 
ethnography is thus artisanal.
While the interpretive anthropology is preoccupied with the new criticism of the 
issues of representation, some other anthropologists in recent years concerns more 
about the political engagement and localizing strategies of ethnographic writing. 
Richard Fardon and Mark Hobart shared the view that self-critiques of interpretive 
anthropology still could not escape ethnocentric views of other cultures. Because of the 
pre-inequality of relationship between the ethnographers and the subject, Hobart 
argues,
so, despite claiming to embrace the Other and liberate its polyphonic 
discourse, such approaches perpetuates the vision of the anthropologist 
as the superior 'knowing subject' who beneficently grants the Other its 
right to appear on its owns behalf in the circus of contemporary
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academe... The cruelest cut of all, however, is that the Other is only 
authorized to participate according to Western notions of self and action, 
and so is liable to be deemed not playing fair when it does not co-operate 
(1990:306)
Thus the problems of registering the Western self as the knowing subject in 
anthropological practices are still not solved. The self-critique of anthropology on the 
one hand try to reject the legitimacy of Western knowledge, but 011 the other hand 
recognizes that the authority of Western self is inevitable since 110 matter how one self 
criticize one's own society , the other cultures are only the reference image. The 
unsolved question is that the ethnographers still have the power to speak, to construct 
the others, and to take others as the reference.
It is the eternal problem in social science. We can continue to question in this 
way without a final solution. To me, the most important thing is that we have to 
understand our limitation, be aware our subjective position and open our heart to accept 
the possible danger of imposing our mis-interpretation to the Others. Our purpose of 
doing research is to understand others rather than to represent a Culture and make a 
Histoiy, in which there is no alternative interpretation. And the only thing we can do is 
to tiy to leam from the people and seek an interpretation in terms of perception of the 
masses themselves, for reducing the opportunity of mis-understanding of other society. 
To achieve this purpose, we have to take the action and agency of both the fieldworker 
and the field agents into account.
With to the question of representation, here we come to another issue about the 
practice of “native anthropology” which emerged in recent debate of anthropology. 
The aim of native anthropology, as Ong (1996) says, is to articulate alternative 
modernities of non-western societies in contrast to the western modernity. She argues 
for redefining the meanings and uses of alternative modernity in the local geographic 
context as the practice and contribution of native anthropological knowledge. The basic 
assumption in her argument is that the authentic knowledge can be articulated by the 
native anthropologists who are lacking of bias of ethnocentrism. Indeed the 
romanticization of native anthropology makes the native anthropologists into the 
similar fallacy of experience determinism with their foreign counterparts. Their 
different type of subjectivity is actually used as means for justifying a new type of 
“objectivity”. The “I-witness” is transformed into “I grow up” or “I am xyz-ness”.
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“Who they are” are supposed to offer them their authority of representation, as if 
Culture (with capital C) were written in ones genes, as being “Native” makes them 
closer to truth than others. As Liu (1996) says, for most native anthropologists, the 
logic is: they (we) are native, they (we) were brought up in the society, villages (or 
towns) which they (we) study, so they (we) are closer to truth than others. He says,
The native anthropologist actually created two 'Others': one is the Other 
of a particular locale in China which constitutes their object of study and 
the other is the western Other from whom they borrow the theoretical 
framework and to whom they claim a superiority of being native over 
their counterparts. That is, on the one hand, native anthropologist used 
the western Other to claim that their knowledge of Chinese society ... is 
true since it is empirical and, on the other hand, they used their 
privileged position of being brought up in the places where they carried 
out their studies to argue that they know better about the society than the 
western Other does (1996:16).
In Chinese anthropology, for a long time, the native anthropologists often 
tended to return to their home village (or towns) as fieldwork sites. Martin Yang 
returned his home village for ethnographic study, in which he was bom and reared 
there, and lived there until he entered high school (Yang, 1945:ix). He wrote: "... to 
make the picture real, through the eyes of a person who actually grew up in the 
community and experienced most of the social life described, the study is concluded 
with the story of a villager's boyhood";"... the information given in this study is reliable 
and that he life picture thus presented is preserved in its wholeness so far as possible" 
(Yang, 1945;xi). Fei also went to Kaixiangong village which was his native village. 
He asserted that being a native of Kaixiangong provided him 'special families', that is , 
linguistic advantage and the possibility to "penetrate into intimate life without arousing 
suspicion (Fei, 1939:25-6). Their justifications imply that "I-grow-up" or "I brought up 
there" would make their writing more 'real' and 'comprehensive' than one provided by 
an outside ethnographer. Of course, I do not deny with them that it is more 
convenience, either linguistic or social, for native anthropologists to return to their 
home village. However, I doubt that the native anthropologists have more authentic 
voices or have more authority in producing local knowledge than alien anthropologists. 
To me, the question is not whether you are native or not, but what worldview and 
subjective position you hold. The native anthropologist can totally follow the suit of
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their foreign counterparts,1 and serve as a participant in constructing the “oriental 
others” without any reflexivities. The native anthropological inquiry can also be made 
to serve the existing regime (Chiu & Ku, 1998).2
The status of Hong Kong Chinese grants me an ambiguous position in my 
fieldwork, whatever I like it or not. To the Western people, I am Chinese; but to the 
villagers, I am not so native indeed. Choosing my father's home village as field site of 
study undoubtedly brought me some convenience such as linguistic and social linkage 
and so on. It was also feasible for me to stay for a long time. But there were so 
limitation due to my ambiguous identity. In the village, I automatically became a kin 
member, in their term “zijiren”, because of my father having direct kindred relationship 
with the villagers; on the other hand, as a Hongkongese, I was not really an indigenous 
people. They still kept some distance from me. As a relative of the villagers and a 
researcher, I self-defined the one like me as a "sub-indigenous" anthropologist.
I remembered first time I visiting the village, they considered my coming as 
"returning home" (hui laijia) or "visiting relatives" (tanqin). They appreciated my 
"returning home" and ability of speaking their language (Hakim) because they though 
that implying my acknowledgment of ancestor (renzu or renzong). My interest and 
enthusiasm, due to the anthropological instinct, in learning everything in the village 
also made me accepted by them as they thought that I was humble, in their term 
“meiyou jiazi". My studying in U.K. also suddenly became part of their honors and 
pride. For this reason, they often tried their best to help me in obtaining the information
1 wanted. Treating me as one of their member meant I having to fulfill my obligation 
and contribute for the village. When there was any project in the village, they would 
come to me for donation. I also became one of the overseas network which the local 
cadres and villager competed with each other to appropriate.
Although the villagers treated me as their relatives, sometimes, I found it was 
quite difficult to participate in their life world. They were aware that I had something 
different to them because I was still a somewhat foreigner or outsider who came from
1. Most of native anthropologists are trained in the British or American Institutions as proffessional 
ethnographers. They are armed with certain theoretical frameworks as their foreign counterparts.
2 . See Fred, Y. L. Chiu & H. B. Ku 1998, “Affirming Anthropological Research and Teaching in Asia 
and South China — some historico-ethnographic recaps and perhaps, a reminder” in Future of  
Anthropology, CUHK.
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Hongkong. They treated me differently such as preventing me to participate into the 
hard and dirty work, and cooking special food for me. Besides, they did not want to 
expose the bad things or dark aspects regarding the village to me because they though it 
was the thing to be ashamed of (ciiulian de shi) in front of the outsiders. I tried my best 
to make friends with different groups of people including young villagers, elders, 
women, village cadres, business men and so on for a better understanding their 
worldviews and living experience, and sensitivity. And I also hoped that they could 
identify me with them. However, their keeping distance from me reminded me that 
totally identifying with them was impossible. To be honest, I was still a so-called 
"anthropologist" who coming to study their culture. I was still an outsider, their 
"others" in a sense, but not a "real" member of the village. Even I am a real member of 
the village, there is no guarantee that I can present a realer picture of the village. This 
writing (representation of others) was only a result of struggling in understanding and 
interpreting the possible meaning of the villagers' everyday living experience.
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Appendix 2. List of Some Informants
1. ALing — female, about 38 years old, women representative in Xiaohuang
2. Aunt Guang — about 64 year old, ordinary villager
3. Aunt Shu-feng — about 70 years old, former leader, now is Ancestral Hall keeper
4. Aunt Mei-zhen — about 72 years old, ordinary villager
5. Aunt Xin-gu — about 65 years old, ordinary villager
6. Brother Feng — about 35 years old, working in Guangzhou
7. Brother Fu — about 32 year old, ordinary villager
8. Brother Kan — about 38 years old, ordinary villager, owns largest area of plantation
9. Brother Kim — about 23 year old, ordinary villager
10. Brother Li — ordinary villager, about 29 years old, has worked in the factory of 
Shenzhen, and now returns to village
11. Brother Mei — ordinary villager, about 21 years old
12. Brother Ming — about 43 years old, former vice-party secretary of brigade of 
Xiaohuang. He joined the army and became state cadres after retiring from military 
service
13. Brother Moi -- about 19 years old, ordinary villager
14. Brother San -- ordinary villager, about 23 years old
15. Brother Shao -  about 40 years old, ordinary villager
16. Brother Qi-yuan -- about 38 years old, driver
17. Brother Wong — ordinary villager, about 28 year old, has worked in factory of 
Dongguan
18. Brother Xian — 21 years old, studying in University
19. Brother Xin — ordinary villager, about 24 years old
20. Dongtou -- male, about 32 years old, current village head
21. Lian -- male, about 38 year old, ordinary villager
22. Sister Fang -  about 38 years old, ordinary villager
23. Sister Feng — about 35 years old, ordinary villager
24. Sister Wang — about 28 years old, ordinary villager
26. Sister Ying — about 36 year old, ordinary villager-
27. Songsheng -- female, about 55 year's old, the party secretary of Xiaohuang production 
brigade and administrative district
28. Secretary Li -- about 68 years old, former vice-chairman of Agriculture Committee of 
Mei Comity
29. Uncle Wen — villager, about 70 years old, is treasure and secretary of Ancestral Hall 
Council
30. Uncle Ba -- about 70 year's old, ordinary villager
31. Uncle Huang — about 60 years old former brigade secretary
32. Uncle Bi — about 70 year's old, former brigade leader
33. Uncle Bi’s wife — about 65 year's old, ordinary villager-
34. Uncle Chang — villager, about 5 year's old
35. Uncle Chang's wife — villager, about 48 years old
36. Uncle Bin — ordinary villager, about 60 years old, now lives in Songlcou town, is 
vice-director
37. Uncle Gong -- ordinary villager, about 80 year old
38. Uncle Jiang — villager, about 50 years old
39. Uncle Leng — about 58 year old, former village head
344
40. Uncle Nianhua — about 55 years old, former brigade leader in Xiaohuang
41. Uncle Qiang — villager about 58 years old, now is a director of Ancestral Hall Council
42. Uncle Si — villager, about 73 years old, was storekeeper in Collective era
43. Uncle Si’s wife — villager, female, about 60 year* old
44. Uncle Wu — villager, about 65 years old
45. Uncle Xiang — about 53 years old, principal of Songxi primary school in Ku Village
46. Uncle Zhun — 75 years old, overseas relative
47. Wen-ying — male, 40 years old, primary school teacher
48. Wen-ming — male, 43 year’s old, current village head
49. Yue-shun -  about 53 years old, present accountant of Xiaohuang
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Appendix 3. Selected Glossaries and Slogans
Glossaries
anlao fengpei
anxiang wannian A A R iA f-  
ba shan yi shui y i fen tian
A [ i |- 7 k - ^ M
b a i j i ^
b aijin
bai nian
baiwu tenggui
bangong
bao guan
baobiao f  [2^
baochan daohu ^ /I I S J A
baochan daozu
bei lian lei
beifen ffffrV
benshiAA-
biaomian gongfu A '®  A  A  
bie £jlj
binggong banli f g A A l ®  
bu dongli A l'fiilS  
bu fu zeren 7 'J l i l t ' f i  
bu heli de shui
bu xiao you san, wu hou w ei da
* M t J i A
bu xiao 7 7
bu zhengdang shouduan A J E S 'A F x  
bu f i
bufa fengzi 7 A 7 C P  
buheli 7  A H  
buxiaozi 7 7 7 '  
buzhong bu yi 7 7 7 § i  
caili f f l j j  
chaodai 
chao du
chao sheng you  jidui I 
chengshi ren ±^Tf? A  
chengshi fj^Tff 
chi guojia fan 
ch ijiti fan P g lfe f lfy
distribution according to work
spending their remaining years in happiness
eight mountains, one river and piece o f  land
offering sacrifice 
white money
mutual visiting in Chinese Year 
eveiything being expensive 
handle the official affair 
store keeper 
reporting form
production contracted to household
production contracted to group
being involved into trouble
seniority in the clan
capability
ritual work
distinction
handle the matter impartially 
not understand proprieties 
irresponsibility 
unreasonable tax
there are three kinds o f  unfilial piety, but without
male offspring is the m ost serious one
not filial piety
inappropriate means
nourish
illegal elements 
unreasonable 
unfilial children 
not loyal and righteous 
financial capacity 
dynasty
releasing souls from purgatory by reciting scripture
guerrilla o f  excess birth
urbanite
city
state rice 
collective rice
chili bu taohao
chi xijiu IXUhIJ
chijiao yisheng A P i f A
chu li BBA
chu mian tB ®
chu ren tou di X A S lB tk
chuan bu guo qi
chuan m enkou
A H P
chuan zhong jie  dai A X I A X  
chun fiti 
cou re nao
cunmin weiyuanhui or cunwei
cunmin xiaozu A A A ® ,  
da chengshi A M ®  
da guofan AflnjiS  
dabaogan A 1 A I7  
dadui A P f  
dagong f J X  
dagongmei jX P £ 7  
dai tou ren X S i lA  
dan xiao ru shu JjJif/jN
dangbing
dangguan jiaohua lan zuoguan
danwei X A  
danxiao pashi IftAfQSjS 
dapao A'i@ 
dashi A  V  
dawu AM 
difang ganbu X  A f t  
difang shuishou 
dingchan A®, 
diu lian AM  
DongFang Hong A  A H  
Dongfang A A  
dongluan IjjfjL 
dongyuan S/jit 
doufang A  A  
du gui H A
duH
duanzi juesun m m
d u ll WU ® ' l  a *
duolao duode OakrJ3
entailing strenuous effort but without appreciation
drinking the wine of happiness
bare foot doctors
devoting effort
appear personality
stand out among one’s fellow
hardly breathe/ nearly out of breathe
visiting relatives and friend from door to door/
mutual visiting
carrying on the family line
honest, simple or unsophisticated
join in fun
villagers’ committee
villager groups 
big city
food prepared in a large canteen caldron 
big contracting of production 
brigade 
working
working daughter
those who playing a leading role
as timid as mouse, i.e. chicken hearted
join the army
a beggar cannot adapt to be an official 
work unit
timid and overcautious 
big gun
important events and ceremonies
big house
local cadres
local revenue
unified production quota
losing face
The East is Red
Eastern Wind
chaos
mobilize
the bracket for supporting a block of wood
gamble ghost
gambling
stop the family line 
enlightenment
more you work, more you get
en ren j§lA
fan liangfan IjfjMiM
fazhan
fenghong A H  
fengjian canyu 
fengjian zhidu 7 7 M 0 H  
fengshui xiansheng 
fengshui MIA 
fengtiao yushun JMLilMJIIH 
fengyi zushi 1 I X X A  
fenshu xian jfW M k  
fentian daohu AMAKX 
fu lian 
fu®
fumin zhengce l iX tM X
fumu yangyu zhi en X X cltW H iil
funong g  J |
gaige kaifang BfcAilTO
ganji
ganbu f t  n|5
gannu er bugan yan fAHTlTXTtW
ganqing iMff
ganqun guanxi A i t I I 7
gaochao [fXfl
gaohao guanxi fU H IU tt
gaojia shu
gaokao
ge ziben zhuyi weiba 7  ISfX X  i i  M li5 
gen fjt
Gong Shang Ju XjUjf)
gong shuo gong you li, po shuo po you
li A tftA W H  ’
gong zuo dui XfFPfc
gong A
gongchandang 
gongfeng X A  
gongliang A S  
gongmin yishi A S H  
gongmin A S  
gongping A  A  
gongren X  A
gongshe de shihou A H ^B ffll 
gongshe Alt 
gongsi heying A 7 A H  
Gongwang A X
benefactor 
four times 
development 
dividend
residue of feudalism 
feudal system 
specialist of fengshui 
geomagetic omen 
good weather for the crops 
well-fed and well-clothed 
marking line
dividing the land to individual household
women’s federation
prefecture
the policy let people making money 
parents' kindness of rearing 
upper-middle peasant 
reform and open door policy 
go to the periodic market 
cadres
forced to keep their resentment to themselves 
human feeling, affection 
relationship between the cadres and the public 
high tide
maintaining good personal relationship 
high priced education 
examination for entering university 
cutting the tail of capitalism 
roots
Industrial and Commercial Bureau 
each party insists they are right
working team 
public
Communist Party
working points
agricultural tax or tax grain
consciousness of citizenship
citizen
fair or equity
worker
Commune era
commune
integrating of private and public enterprise 
god of mountain
i^ SE
gongzuo he zeren 32fFfQW{3:
gu w ei jin yong A S  A  A
gua zhi Mf'H
guan ka H A
guanbi minfan ®  M X ®
guangrong X X
guanliao zuofeng X I 7 1 7 M
guanliqu weiyuanhui X ’H M A i
guanliqu
guanshan goujie A fln  
guanxi wang H X X J  
guanxi
%m
Guanyin |UX" 
gugan fezi 
guhun yegui M i l  
gui zhuyi A X m  
guisu jl§f§  
gunong {g jft  
guojia ganbu |M||§i 
guojia g R  
Guomingdang [Ml X X  
guoshi
haiwai guanxi AM 'f-lilA
han di A H
hao shichen H tkffci
he shang
hei w ulei M S ^ jf
helcou bogong ®  P  ®  A
heli de shui
henpi fjrfllt
hong w ei bin H t f l lF
hongbao H X
hongqi H /X
huahong A H
huaqiao
huayan qiaoyu A  I f  A im  
hukou system X  P 7 J ®  
huo bu dan xing i ® 7 7 X f  
huowu chumen, shu bu tuihuo
huzhuzu
jiceng jianshi S I  
ji liang g c f ii  
ji ri A  0
duties and responsibilities 
making the past serve for the present 
worshiping the ancestors 
checking point
the official exploitation w ill make the people rebel 
glory
bureaucratic style o f  work 
administrative districts committee 
administrative districts
collusion between the official and businessm en
personal connection network
relation, personal connection, social networks, or
personal relationship
god o f  Buddhism
back-bone element
the hungry ghost without offerings
wicked idea
home to return
farm labourers
state cadres
state
Nationalist Party 
outdated
overseas network 
dry land 
good hour 
monk
black five categorized 
god o f  river 
reasonable tax
a horizontal sprolling bearing 011 inscription 
red guard
monetary gift; red pocket m oney
Red Flag
bonus
overseas Chinese 
sweet words 
household registration 
double troubles
goods can't return after leaving the store
mutual aid groups 
local construction 
bad way  
lucky day
Life
ji shi X'B# 
jianju xiang f A i  
jian qian yan kai 
jianchi si xian yuan ze
jiangjing
jiangqin falan i i f j j f i  
jiao huan X IX  
jiao xin X 'Lf 
jiaoyu liang iS /W fl  
jiaoyu
jiang yitao, zuo yitao
jiaxiang techan 
jiben kouliang f  
jiefangjun MjjkW- 
jihua shengyu ffS U X W  
jijing S X
JiLu JianCha W ei Yuan Hui
jin sheng A X .  
jingkuan  
jinglao yuan  
jinshi iHdb 
jiu  guanliao 
jiu  shehui f f i i l l r  
jiusi fushang
jujiao kuanxiang X X i H  
kai guan dian yan  
kai huang zhongguo | 
lcaiwang xiao H X X  
kanbing f t ®  
kangshui zhe 
kangshui frif®  
kao zi ji
kejiaren A A A  
keqi A  A  
koutou U \m  
kouxin P'(H  
kuiben shengyi 
kun nan hu X I I A  
lai sheng A X  
lao ren zhi jia  7  A X  
li shi zhang H A A
li Wt
liang §
good time
boxes for accusation letters 
m oney make the eye open 
insisting four principles
m oney award/ bonus
award the hard worker and punish the laziness
exchange
heart-to-heart talk
education grain
education
says one thing and does another
home-make or local product 
basic grain, basic ration 
liberation army 
family planning 
fund
Commission For Inspecting D iscipline 
this life
glass-framed artwork 
old people's home
scholar passing the highest imperial examination 
old bureaucracy 
old society
save the death and heal the ill
rejecting the imposed fee
rituals o f  consecration o f  the god
opening out the wasteland and planting fruit tree
cracking a joke
seeing a doctor
people who reject to pay taxes
refusing to pay taxes
relying on their own efforts
Hakkas
modest
kowtow
oral m essage
losing proposition
econom ically distressed household
next life
recreation center o f the elders / elder’s centre
director
integrity
grain
lianjie 1X77 
lianluo ganqing 
lianzu 
libu 7n|5 
limao §ttB 
lingjiu MM  
lingtang MX 
linyangpjtlii 
lishi zuiren M X flA  
lishi M X 
liwu |§#%} 
longtou f i l l  
luan ML 
hm f#
luohou zhengzhi juewu
m
luohou iAflt 
luoye guigen 
man tou fJill 
mangliu
mei chuxi A lBA 
meijing A !7 
mei wenhua, mei shuiping
A A fc  ’ A 7 ¥
meimeng nanyuan 7 7 1 1  
meinai de ma A
meiyisiASBA
meiyong A l l  
meiyou qian C//? 
men lian P'jlfffi 
menlou fHH 
mianzi ® 7
ming bu fu shi 7 7  A lt' 
mingong chao ATffii] 
mingqiang yiduo, anjian nanfang
mmm%  ■ m mmm
minzhu zhengquan X 7 IA !I
mixin zhiyezhe
mixin
nashui hu |p 
neimu xiaoxi X fSH iifL  
ni de
ni gu fg M  
nian shen 
nong hui M O t  
nong zhuanfei
understanding the situation 
maintaining a good relationship 
big mutual-aid team
the Ministry o f  Official Personnel Affair
courtesy or politeness
coffin containing a corpse
mourning hall
adopted heir
the sinner o f  the history
history
gifts
dragon head i.e. major 
chao
proper human relationship 
backward political consciousness
backward
the fallen leaves have to return to their roots
bread
blind flow
without future
lackadaisical
lacking o f  education, lacking o f  art o f  leadership
fond dream difficult to becom e hue
the mother without milk
meaningless
useless
no money
gate couplet
the arch over the gateway
face or social honor
the name does not match the reality
tide o f  migrant labour
it is easy to dodge a spear in the open, but hard to
guard against an arrow shot from hiding
democratic regime
specialist for religion
superstition
tax-paid household
inside stories
yours
Buddhist nun
yearly exam and renew
the Farmer Association
change rural residence status to urban one
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nongcun JHAf 
nongmang Imi't 
nongmin yijiao niufen
nongmm 
nongxia /ssH 
nongye shengchan J 
pai chu suo 
paocha 
pengyou H X  
pian si ren A  
piao M
pima daixiao MUBff 
pingbei H #  
pinkun diqu HtX 
pinkun shanqu ®A|iiTT 
pinnong J U t 
pinqiong xian JStlAIA 
po si jiu5SP3H 
pochan dizhu
pochuqu de shui '/fftBASBA 
pojiu lixin
putong gongren ilM X A  
qi shan pa e XvHI'77 
qiang gan zi 
qiao liang
qiaoluo dagu jf£f||fTt£ 
qiaoxiang fulfil? 
qifen gong, sanfen guo
qing lai li wang 'fW A IIH
qing yuan Yfu [SI
qing f#
qingke | f 7
qingqi
qingtie | f
queli
qun zhong pidou dahui 
quxie bixiong 
re nao i&[flf|
Remin Dahui Tang A A,AAA
reminbi AKfj?
ren pa churning, zhu pa fei
A m s
renchao 
Renda A  A
rural or countryside 
busy season
peasant's leg is filled with cow dung
peasant or farmer 
slack season 
agricultural production 
local police station 
making tea 
friends
cheat the dead 
prostitution
the gunny draped over their shoulders
the same generation
poor-difficult region
poor mountain region
poor peasant
basic line of poverty
destroying the Four Old Model customs
bankrupt landlords
spilled out water
destroying the old and establishing the new 
ordinary worker
bully the weak and fear the strong
gun
bridge
beat the drums and strike the gongs 
native homes of overseas Chinese 
70% merits and 30% faults
human affection comes, gifts must return
clear the garden
affection
banquets-giving
relatives
formal invitation
act without proprieties
mass struggle meeting
driving out the evil and avoiding ill luck
heat and noise
People's Conference Flail
Chinese currency
men are afraid of becoming famous, pigs are afraid
of becoming fat
great mass fervor
People's Representative Congress
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renmin jie fang jun A1XMXXX
renqing A1W
renzheng jAlX
renzhi changqing A X 'f it tf
renzu guizong
ru hu A  A
rubu fuzhi A X iA X  
san luan XML 
san sheng 
san tong AjM 
san zuo da shan
X J X A l i i
shangao huangdi yuan 
Shangshu AHf
shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice
±M $tm  > T w m
shehui fengqi jjT±#]E^
shehui zhuyi l i 'S ’X ®
shen kan
shengsi XAh
sheng bu bu, shi bu shou
X X I®  * ?EXi|fc
sheng bu dailai, si bu daiqu
X X ^ fA  * ^ X l r X
sheng yi A m  
sheng zhengfu XilXff 
Sheng A
shengchan dui X  I t  III 
shengchan guanxi X X  ill A  
shenren ba shidi X  A l l X X  
shi bu guan ji, ji bu lao xin
n x n a  * b x ^ a
shi fen mang A X f t  
shi yu yuan wei XMIJMpA  
Shi X  
shiye Xlft
shougongyi zhe X T f lX
shuangchong shui
shuangjiang ffPA
shui huo 7j<A
shui shen huo re A y^ A IX
shui tian tKEB
si po lian pi A
si ren bang HAW
People's Liberation Army 
sentiment and human feeling 
policy of benevolence 
the way of the world 
acknowledging their ancestor and roots 
registered
income failing short of expenditure 
three unreasonable fee collection 
three kinds of meat 
three together
three big mountains — imperialism, feudalism, and 
the mountain is high and the emperor is far away 
Minister
those above have policy, those below have their
counter-measure
social conduct
socialism
shrine
life and death
no additional land to the new bom, no confiscation 
of the death
bring nothing to this world and bring nothing back 
business
provincial government 
Province 
production team 
production relation
the live man occupy the dead land, i.e, greedy 
don't care other's business
being very busy
things do not always turn out the way one wished
City
career
craft artists
double taxes
Frost's Descent-18th solar term 
fake
deep water and scorching fire i.e. an abyss of
suffering
wet fields
break other's skin of face, i.e. make other feel
embarrassed
Gang of Four
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si A
sihai zhinei jie xiongdi 
siqing H'/ra
sixiang baofu X H /eT® 
sixiang luohou 7  IMBIBE 
siyou caichan AW H'X 
songli
tai bu qi tou fp X A ll 
tang lian AlfM 
tantian shuodi M A M H  
tanwu X X  
tao shui pXA 
taoshui zhe jTMX 
tewu
tian mian A ®
tianqi xinyun zude chongguang
A W f r S l t l l tA ;
tie fan wan
tong yiliuo ® —BA
tong zhi M ||j
tonggou m M
tongsheng MM
tongxiang ®|||5
tongxiao |7$f
toupo xueliu
tu huangdi 7 X  A?
tu leu shui
tu zhengce T A X
tudi gong ± M &
tufei ± ®
tugai AEfc
tuo ping M X
wan yuan hu A
wei da fl| A
wei ping HU±7
weixing dianshi XT-'MfrjM
wenhua dageming A X A X X
wenming jianshe A H  Mix
wo de
wu ji lu Ttft 
wubao hu A H A  
wubao liang S H U  
xishui wanyan liu wangu, 
xiluan junqiao wei quancu
private
all are brothers at all corners of the land
Four Cleanups 
a weight on one’s mind 
ideologically backward 
private property 
gift giving
could not rise their head 
hall couplet
chatting about heaven and earth
corruption
taxes evasion
people who evade taxes
spy
skylight
god’s new blessing makes the virtue of ancestor
shine again
iron bowl
same group
announcement
unified purchase quota
almanac
fellow villagers
unified sale quota
head broken and bleeding
local emperor
speak one’s unhappiness
local policy
earth god
bandits
land reform
walk out of poverty
ten thousand yuan peasant household
great
threshing ground
satellite TV
Cultural Revolution
construction of spiritual civilization
mine
no discipline
five guarantees household 
five guarantees grain
the meandering stream run through forever, the high 
and steep mountain protect the whole village
xian )f!$
xiang / zhen |pf5/f® 
xiangqin
xiangxia ren $ $ 7  A  
xianjing A i l
xianxing fa geming 1 ^ 7 7 7 #
xiaobao
xiao shun AKIM
xiaofan /JAH
xiaomo shijian XllfHMH
xiao you wei jiazheng,
wen zhang bao guoen
# A J 5
xin zhong guo fffA ll 
xinfff
Xing Zheng Cun / guanliqu
xingan baobei 77FWJ1 
Xingbu JFJBI5 
xingzheng cuoshi 
xingzheng shouduan 7 7 7 1 7  
xingzheng zeren 7 7 J t{ T  
xu 7
xuanchuan yue 
Xue Da-zhai ip A ill 
xuehan qian
xun rjim
ya sui qian M jllii 
Yamen TtH  
yan da
yang feng yin wei
yangyu zhi en §tW7Ml 
ye mang SMI® 
yi liang wei gan H IS filll 
yi zhi yan kai, yi zhi yan bi
yibeizi aiqiong —*3 
yichang huanxi yichang kong
yiku sitian
ying peng ying hMMllli® 
yingyang buliang I f  51:7 A  
yinjian [XH 
yiqian JTftj
county 
township 
fellow villager 
country folk 
advanced
counter-revolutionaries 
small-sized newspaper 
filial piety 
small peddlers 
whiling away their time
repay the family’s debt of rearing with piety, requite 
nation’s debt of gratitude with essay
new China 
sincerity
Administrative Village or District
as precious as his heart
Ministry of Punishment
administrative measure
the rigorous administrative measure
administrative tasks
order
propaganda month 
learning the model of Dazhai 
blood and sweat money 
periodic market day
money giving to children in Chinese New Year 
local government 
seriously attack
overtly agree but covertly oppose or feign
compliance
kindness of rearing
savage
mono rice production
one eye open and one eye closed
poverty in a life time 
one’s hope come to naught
recalling past suffering and think over the source of 
present
confront the tough with toughness
lacking nutrient
life after death or hell
before
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yiwu i§
you bijiao jiu zhidao A A fA ffA l 
you bing A fit 
you qian neng shi gui tui mo
you qmg you yi 
you qiu bi ying X  A 'E M
you yan qian YE 
youdai liang jSAIR 
youji dui WW^W 
youji zhanshu jJ/f-SPlAlh 
youqian haobanshi AIflX/lX 
yue fa san zhang 
yuliang fTfM 
yunshu MW(
Zaixiang 710  
zaoyang
zengzufu 7 1 0 7
zeren XffF;
zhao biao jHf®
zhao gu
zhao qian Miff
zhao xu At Iff
zhen zhengfu |®7lfT
zhengfu 7Jhf
zliengjing heyi 7fMl=r~~*
pp
zhengming f l H  
zhenya fangeming 
zhifu
zhishi shuiping A P c-T T  
zhong
zhongqiu AfA
zhongyang shuishou A A M 7
zhongyang zhengfu A  MIMA
zhuan qian Plitil
zhuzhang shengshi
ziben zhuyi weiba 7 : 7  .’A i l  M E
ziji ren i i  E  A
zijia de shi Ml A 7 7
ziliu di §
zou houmen A l7 P Fj 
zou huitou lu AlHBBJtr 
zou ziben zuyi daolu
zu pu m
duty
comparison makes things clear 
sick
money can make the ghost turn the millstone
having human sentiment and having righteousness
all requests shall be answered
salt and oil money, i.e. basic expenditure
favouring treatment grain
guerrilla force
guerrilla strategies
money can make the things easily done 
agreement on a three-point law 
surplus grain 
fortune
Prime Minister 
suffer disaster 
great-grandfather 
responsibility or obligation 
inviting tender 
preferential treatment 
the enclosing wall
seeking a husband to live in wife's house
township government
government
integrating government administrative and
economic management
certificate
suppressing counter-revolutionary elements 
becoming wealthy 
level of education 
seed
mid-autumn festival 
central revenue 
central government 
making money 
making the support 
the tail of capitalism 
one of us 
my own business 
garden plot
walking through the back door 
taking the road back to old society 
walking on the road of capitalism
genealogy
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zugong ting ililXIl
zui xiajian 
zui xian
zuo sixiang gongzuo 
zuoshang fenzhuang 
zuxian lingwei lIlASt'fu
ancestral hall 
the lowest category 
drunk god
doing ideological work 
divided the land 011 the table 
ancestor's tablets
Slogans
aiguo aishui, shuli dishui xin xingxiang love the country, love the tax; establish the new image
f i t ® :  ’ of local tax
fan zibenzhuyi zhi you hua Anti-Capitalist Liberation
fayang tuanjie zhandou de jingshen Carrying forward the spirit of solidarity and militancy
jiaona shuifei guangrong, toulou sliuifei It is honour to pay tax and fees, shameful to evade tax
kechi and fees
m m m y t m  * f t f t m i f  t o
maozhuxi wansui Long long live Chairman Mao
ni jingying wo zhichi, ni zhuanqian wo You do the business, I support; you make the money, I 
shoushui collect the tax
qianwan buyao wanji jieji douzhen 
quanshijie renmin datuanjie wansui 
reai dishui, zuo kua shiji rencai
m m m  * w m tf c A #
renming gongshe hao
a
shehui zhuyi wenming jianshi 
shoufa jingying, zhaodang nashui
’ m m m
shouru zhongdan dajia tiao, renren 
jianshang you zhibiao
Never forget the class struggle
Long long live the great union of the people of the 
world
loving the local tax, becoming the talent of crossing 
century
People’s Commune is good 
Construction of Socialist Civilization
doing the business in accordance to law, paying the tax 
based on regulation
everyone have to share the heavy burden of state 
revenue, everyone’s shoulder have to bear the quota
L A M I A S *  ’ A A M iiW I S
shuishou renmin de shuishou, guojia de tax revenue, people’s tax revenue, state’s tax revenue 
shuishou
toupiao shi mei yige gongmin yingyou de voting is obligation and right of every citizen 
yiwu he quanli
tuanjie jingzhang yanshu huopo Be united, alert, earnest and lively
wnasij
tuanjie jiushi liliang Unity is strength
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tuanjie yiqie keyi tuanjie de liliang 
tuanjie zai dangzhongyang zhouwei
B E A M A A M IIl
wei remin fuwu EIAAfMf;?j 
xuanju ziji de renda daibiao
« { f t g B ^ A A f ^ l
yao zhifu,zhong guoshu
lentil ’ fHlilllf
yikao pingnong, tuanjie zhongnong
yiqie wei geming
pp
yongyuan ganggenung 
zhongguo gongchandang wansui 
zichanjieji geren zhuyi
zili gengslieng
Unite with all the forces that can be united 
Rally around the Party’s Central Committee 
serving the people
electing your own representative of people's congress 
want to get rich, plant fruit tree 
relying on poor peasants, uniting middle peasants 
All for revolution
Cany the revolution through to the end 
Long long live Chinese Communist Party 
capitalist or bourgeois individualism 
Self reliance
358
Appendix 4. Note on Measures and Transliteration
1 mu = 1/15 hectares = 1/6 acre 
10 fen = 1 mu
fen  and mu are the units of area
1 jin  = 0.5 kilogram =1.1 pounds
1 jin  = 0.5 kilograms = 1.1 pounds
1 dan =100 jin
1 liang = 50 gram
liang and jin  is a unit of weight
1 yuan =10 mao/jiao 
1 mao =10 fen
1 yuan = U. S $ 0.3 or 0.08 pound
yuan, mao/jiao, and fen are the units of currency
1 chi =1/3 meter 
chi is the unit of length
All transliteration of Chinese terms is in the pinyin system of organisation of Mandarin.
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